ESTHER MCINTOSH

John Macmurray's Religious Philosophy

What it Means to be a Person

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Recent dissatisfaction with individualism and the problems of religious pluralism make this an opportune time to reassess the way in which we define ourselves and conduct our relationships with others. The philosophical writings of John Macmurray are a useful resource for performing this examination, and recent interest in Macmurray's work has been growing steadily.

A full-scale critical examination of Macmurray's religious philosophy has not been published and this work fills this gap, sharing his insistence that we define ourselves through action and through person-to-person relationships, while critiquing his account of the ensuing political and religious issues. The key themes in this work are the concept of the person and the ethics of personal relations.

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Contents

List of Abbreviations

Books by John Macmurray

BS	The Boundaries of Science
CC	A Challenge to the Churches
CD	Constructive Democracy
CF	Conditions of Freedom
CH	The Clue to History
CS	Creative Society
FMW	Freedom in the Modern World
IU	Interpreting the Universe
PC	The Philosophy of Communism
PR	Persons in Relation
RAS	Religion, Art and Science
RE	Reason and Emotion
SA	The Self as Agent
SRE	The Structure of Religious Experience
SRR	Search for Reality in Religion

Unpublished Undated Material by John Macmurray

A	'The Agent'
AGWL	'Aesthetics, and the Greek Way of Life'

AHC	'Aristotle and Hellenistic Civilization'
ANEI	'Action' – '1: The Nature of Ethical Inquiry'
AWJ	'Aristotle'
BGP	'Background of Greek Philosophy'
BPO	'Beyond Purpose – 1'
BPT	'Beyond Purpose – 2'
BRLT	'The Basis of Religious Life Today'
CAS	'Church and State'
CCT	'Critical Comment'
CENS	'Cogito Ergo Non-Sum'
CM	'Christian Materialism'
CP	'Cultivation of the Personal'
CPB	'Common-Place Book'
CRS	'The Conflict of Religion and Science'
CT	'Chronological Tables'
CTR	'The Contemporary Task of Religion'
DF	'Defence of Freedom'
EB	'Exercise Books'
EE	'Educating Emotion'
ERP	'Ethics and Romantic Philosophy'
ESP	'Ethical and Social Philosophy'
EWKM	'Early Writings of Karl Marx'
FER	'The Fundamentals of Economic Recovery'
FMP	'The Failure of Modern Philosophy'
GCRP	'Greek Contemplatives and Roman Pragmatists'
HE	'History of Ethics'

HJF	'Herbart, Johann Friedrich'
HM	'Hegel, and Marx'
I	'Imagination'
IDCP	'Is a Democratic Culture Possible?'
IMOBN	'In My Opinion: Beyond Nationality'
KAK	'Kantians and Anti-Kantians'
KMP	'Kant and Modern Philosophy'
LLS	'Lectures on Leibniz and Spinoza'
LMA	'Leisure in the Machine Age'
LNB	'Lecture Notes and Bibliographies'
LP	'Logic and Psychology'
LPE	'Lectures and Papers on Education'
LWIK	'The Life and Writings of Immanuel Kant'
MCMI	'Modern Civilization and the Moral Ideal – The New Romans'
NCCSO	'The Nature of Christian Concern for the Social Order'
PCS	'Philosophy and Contemporary Society'
PPM	'Philosophies and Philosophical Methods'
PTMDS	'The Philosophical Theory of the Modern Democratic State'
RFPS	'The Religious Function in a Planned Society'
RHGW	'Reflections on H. G. Wood'
RM	'Reason and its Modes'
RMW	'Religion in the Modern World'
RP	'Romantic Philosophy'
RR	'Reason in Religion'

Key to References

Letter before date:

a	refers to article
c	refers to correspondence
ch	refers to chapter in book
cr	refers to cassette recording
m	refers to miscellaneous
o	refers to obituary
p	refers to pamphlet
r	refers to review
u	refers to unpublished material
w	refers to website

NB Any emphasis in quotations is in the original, unless otherwise indicated.

Acknowledgements

Introduction

John Macmurray (1891–1976) characterizes the ideas in his Gifford lectures in this way: 'The simplest expression that I can find for the thesis I have tried to maintain is this: All meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action for the sake of friendship' (*SA*, p. 15). Underlying this quotation are two key principles; the first is that the self is defined by action at least as much as by thought and the second is that the development of the self requires dynamic relation with other selves. Consequently Macmurray's most significant contribution to philosophy is a definition of the person that shifts the focus from the isolated thought of the individual to action, which, in turn, leads to an analysis of the ethical relations of persons. At the time that Macmurray is promoting emphasis on the whole person and highlighting the vital importance of positive relationships, these are original and striking ideas. As a result Macmurray's ideas are proving to have contemporary relevance in the fields of philosophy, psychology, mental health, education, sociology, politics, theology and feminist theology. In addition, while this book represents the first full-scale analysis and critical appraisal of his work, the recently increased interest in Macmurray's thought has meant that a number of his books have been reissued, a reader has been published (Conford, 1996) and some of his articles have been collected in an anthology (McIntosh, 2004).

An extensive account of John Macmurray's life was first published in 2002, following years of painstaking work by John Costello in deciphering Macmurray's personal

correspondence and interviewing his friends and acquaintances. From Costello's biography, the unpublished correspondence and the autobiographical material contained in *Search for Reality in Religion*, it is possible to provide a brief sketch of the main life experiences informing Macmurray's religious philosophy.

Born on 16 February 1891 in Maxwellton, Kirkcudbrightshire, Scotland, Macmurray is part of a strict Calvinist household. Consequently he is instilled with strong religious convictions that remain with him throughout his life, although he seeks to change their content and form. Following an education at the Aberdeen Grammar School and Robert Gordon's College in Aberdeen, he registers for an MA degree in Classics and Geology at Glasgow University. During his time in Glasgow he intends to become a missionary and joins the Student Volunteer Missionary Movement. He is also an active member of the Student Christian Movement, which introduces him to a less rigorous and more enjoyable form of Christianity than he has previously encountered.

As a university student, Macmurray attempts to apply the methods learned in his science studies to his religion. First, this prevents him from having a theology that is at odds with scientific understanding. Secondly, in preparation for a Student Christian Movement Bible study session, he is led to abandon the dogmatic doctrinal teaching of the Calvinist tradition, on the grounds that examination of the relevant material fails to justify the doctrines (*SRR*, pp. 13–14). Macmurray does not explain which doctrines he finds to be absent from the Bible, but he is particularly opposed to Christian individualism and otherworldliness. From the point of the aforementioned SCM Bible study onwards, Macmurray's theological convictions remain flexible.

When Macmurray graduates in 1913, he has already acquired a place as Snell Exhibitioner and Newlands Scholar

at Balliol College, Oxford. He plans to study Greats for two years, but war breaks out before he has completed the course. Uncertain of his ethical stance regarding armed combat, Macmurray enlists as a Nursing Orderly with the Royal Army Medical Corps. Once in France and in the midst of the fighting, however, he seems to be as involved in the war as a soldier; hence, he joins the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders as a lieutenant. While on leave in 1916, he marries Elizabeth (Betty) Hyde Campbell, an artist, whom he had met through a school friend and fallen in love with some years previously. (There were to be no children.) Macmurray survives the fighting on the Somme, but is wounded in the battle at Arras. Consequently he is invalided home, where he remains until the end of the war, subsequently receiving the Military Cross for bravery.

The carnage of war has a profound and lasting effect on Macmurray's thoughts; he claims that he returns from the war cured of youthful idealism and, more surprisingly, disabused of the fear of death (*SRR*, p. 18). Hence much of his work is concerned with what he views to be the damaging effects of idealism and fear and his proposals for overcoming them. In addition his encounter with the public response to war (rather than the war itself) represents a pivotal moment in his relationship with Christianity. Towards the end of the Great War, Macmurray is invited to preach at a north London church. Based on his experience of the front line, he is certain that the most important attitudes to be fostered in such times are reconciliation and forgiveness, motifs that recur in his works. However, the congregation are expecting a nationalistic and militant sermon that attests to their God's power and inevitable and imminent victory. As a result, the audience give their guest a chilly reception, leading Macmurray to declare that he will never again be part of an institutionalized church, a vow taken 'on Christian grounds' (*SRR*, p. 21). This is a promise Macmurray

keeps until, towards the end of his life, he joins the Society of Friends, an organization which still holds great sympathy towards his writings today. (Macmurray's combination of philosophy and theism has been well received also by Jesuit priests in North America and Canada.)

It is following the Armistice that Macmurray embarks on his professional life as a philosopher, having abandoned his childhood ambition to be a missionary. He returns to Oxford to sit his postponed examinations in Greats and to begin his career as the John Locke Scholar of Mental Philosophy (1919). Subsequently he obtains a Lectureship in Philosophy at the University of Manchester (1919–21), which is followed by a Professorship in Philosophy at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa (1921–22). From there he returns to Balliol College, Oxford as Fellow and Classical Tutor and Jowett Lecturer (1922–28), until he obtains the post of Grote Professor of Mind and Logic at University College, London (1928–44). While employed at University College, London (UCL), Macmurray is granted leave of absence to conduct lecture tours of Canada and the US. Despite the appreciative reception he receives abroad, he declines the ensuing international job offers.

It is in the 1920s that Macmurray begins to publish his views in articles and contributions to books. Although Macmurray's earliest work contains an emphasis on Christianity that diminishes during the 1930s and 1940s (but returns in a more nuanced form in his later works), he is already thinking through his concept of the person. In a letter to Richard Roberts, Macmurray states that 'if the world is to be comprehended, it must be in terms of personality' (c1914–36, 22 July 1925). In essence, his life's work is devoted to the elucidation of this proposition and its implications. Nevertheless, Macmurray does not produce any full-length monographs until the 1930s. According to Conford, the reason for this is that 'He decided that he

would allow himself time to formulate his ideas, and would not publish a book until he was over forty' (Conford, a1977, p. 17). As a result, his later works, while presenting more carefully argued and developed postulations, do not contain any major concepts that are absent from his earlier material.

During his life, Macmurray engages with a variety of fields, giving his writings an eclecticism that renders them accessible to a wide audience. In particular, he insists that philosophy is rooted in 'common human experience' (*FMW*, p. 68) and, hence, is of benefit to everyone. In keeping with this view, Macmurray aims to produce a philosophy that is widely intelligible. Furthermore, comprehension of his work is aided by the fact that he was forced to express his philosophical concepts in the vernacular, in order for them to be broadcast on BBC Radio in the 1930s. At a later stage in his career, he states that 'the effective medium of philosophical language is ordinary speech at its richest, used with precision' (*PR*, p. 18).

His first book, *Freedom in the Modern World* (1932), is a collection of BBC radio broadcasts, which, according to Duncan, brought forth such a staggering response from the general public that Macmurray's broadcasts are 'ranked as one of the B.B.C.'s most successful ventures in the field of radio talks' (Duncan, 1990, p. 13). In the aftermath of the First World War, Macmurray is certain that Britain is facing an undeniable dilemma and, further, that it is the task of philosophy to endeavour to solve it (*IU*, pp. 9–10). He states that the problem, as he envisages it, is 'a split between head and heart ... thoughts and feelings' (*FMW*, p. 25). In fact, it is the attempt to unite these categories that characterizes Macmurray's understanding of the nature of the person.

However, as the 1930s influence of Communism grows and Macmurray's ideas become increasingly socialist, the BBC radio producers become wary of Macmurray's opinions, labelling him a 'dangerous speaker' (Hunt, chForthcoming,

p. 10) and preventing him from participating in any future broadcasts. Despite this, the Marxist concepts that Macmurray admires in the 1930s continue to be the focus of the articles and books he publishes during the 1940s. Even so, he still maintains that he is a Christian, and that Marxism is flawed in its indictment of religion. In particular then, his writings attempt to synthesize Christianity and Communism, an issue which he discusses at length with Karl Polanyi (Costello, 2002, pp. 222–35).

In addition to writing, broadcasting and lecturing, Macmurray's academic career is punctuated by acts of wider public interest. For example, while employed in Johannesburg, he engages in the struggle for improved housing for the impoverished black South Africans. Then, during the 1930s, he contributes to the efforts to sustain peace through the Christian Left and the Left Book Club, influences which remain at the heart of his political philosophy. In addition, while Macmurray's account of the self bears the hallmarks of analytic philosophy, his account of the relations of persons bears some resemblance to Continental philosophy, perhaps partly attributable to his early interaction with academic refugees, such as Theodor Adorno and Karl Popper (ibid., p. 237). When the outbreak of the Second World War renders the plight of the Christian Left immaterial, Macmurray becomes involved in the founding of the Common Wealth Party, supporting its focus on the future of democracy in Britain and mainland Europe. In addition, when many of the students and staff of UCL adjourn to Aberystwyth and Bangor, Macmurray chooses to remain in London studying the possibilities for Anglo-Soviet relations.

It is also during his time in UCL that Macmurray is involved with the Froebel Society, named after the German educationalist who insisted on the importance of play in a child's formal education and development. In addition to

writing a number of articles on the subject of education, Macmurray is instrumental, with Kenneth Barnes, in opening the Wennington School, Lancashire (which, some time later, was moved to Wetherby, Yorkshire). The school operated on the principle that emotional training and play assist in the development of the intellect, and it appears to have been a success for a number of years, although financial constraints eventually led to its closure in 1975 (ibid., p. 374). Macmurray's involvement with alternative forms of education stems from his belief in the importance of education for all people. To this end, he maintains that the role of the university, and especially that of the philosopher, owing to their critical insight, is to serve the wider society (a1959, pp. 159–68; a1952, pp. 86–92). Moreover, Macmurray asserts forward-thinking views on the importance of educating all aspects of the person, including the education of the emotions, a theme underpinning his concept of the person. This Macmurrian image for education is consonant with contemporary developments and proposals taking place in British and American schools today.

Macmurray's final post is at Edinburgh University as Professor of Moral Philosophy (1944–58), where he also serves as the Dean of the Faculty of Arts in the later years. His commitment to education includes membership of the Inter-University Council for Higher Education Overseas, and a successful campaign for the re-opening of Newbattle Abbey, a college for mature students. It is during this time in Edinburgh that Macmurray has the opportunity to meet Gabriel Marcel and Martin Buber, perhaps cementing his Continental approach to the philosophy of personal relations (Costello, 2002, p. 322).

By the 1950s, and aware of the realities of inequality in the Communist countries of the East, Macmurray's explicitly Marxist emphasis dwindles; yet he remains socialist in his

outlook. Consequently, his prestigious Gifford lectures, which represent the most comprehensive form of his entire theory in other respects, barely mention communist principles or their relation to Christianity. Macmurray delivered his series of Gifford lectures at Glasgow University in 1953 and 1954, entitled 'The Form of the Personal' and published in two volumes as *The Self as Agent* and *Persons in Relation*; it is for these works that he is most widely remembered. The first volume concentrates on shifting the definition of the self from its traditional focus on thought to an alternative focus on action, thereby undoing the legacy of Cartesian dualism. One of the implications of defining the self as agent rather than thinker is that solipsism does not arise; rather, objects and persons other than the self are known to exist through the primary experience of interacting with them. The second volume looks in closer detail at the nature of person-to-person interactions, from childhood through to adulthood. Macmurray examines the reality of the interdependence of persons and the roles of politics and religion in enabling ethical and fruitful relationships to develop. Unknown to Macmurray's generation of scholars, his understanding of the person is proving to be useful to contemporary fields of scholarship that are attempting to move away from individualism and the Cartesian emphasis on thought, such as feminist theology and disability studies (Swinton and McIntosh, a2000, pp. 175–84).

Subsequent to his privileged appointment as Gifford lecturer, Macmurray is awarded an honorary LLD at Glasgow University. Shortly afterwards, in 1958, Macmurray retires to the village of Jordans in Buckinghamshire. It is in this village that Macmurray decides to become an official member of the Society of Friends, although he has shared many of their views for some time. His application to the Society of Friends is prompted by his dissatisfaction with living a 'religious' life

alone; in fact, the inherent communality of the religious life is a fundamental aspect of Macmurray's understanding of religion. Despite the pivotal role that religion occupies in his thought, however, Macmurray does not produce a philosophy of religion. Rather as Duncan explains, Macmurray's theory is a 'religious philosophy' (Duncan, 1990, pp. 118–19); that is, his philosophical enterprise includes religion as an integral part of it. Hence Macmurray views himself as an inherently religious person, whereas the logical analysis of a philosophy of religion can be carried out without necessitating any personal religious experience or belief.

Following his retirement, Macmurray does not publish much beyond two brief monographs. While the explanation for this might simply be old age, it is possible that he sees the Gifford lectures as the culmination of his life's work, and he realizes that it will be several years before the importance of his ideas would be widely acknowledged. The publications from his later life focus mainly on his concern to remain distanced from institutionalized Christianity, while also asserting the significance of the reported life and teachings of Jesus Christ for understanding human nature and relationships. It is this issue that forms the basis of his last public speech, 'The Philosophy of Jesus', which he delivers to a gathering of the Society of Friends in 1972.

Two years previously, in 1970, Macmurray returns to Edinburgh to look after his very elderly mother. Her death proves traumatic for him and not long afterwards, on 21 June 1976, he dies also. His wife, who outlives him by a few years, ensures that his ashes are returned to Jordans village and a memorial service is held at the nearby Society of Friends Meeting House. Two days after his death, *The Times* publishes an obituary in which Macmurray is referred to as a talented and remarkable individual, but one who 'did not measure easily during his lifetime' (*The Times*, o1976, 23

June, p. 17). A year before his death in a letter to Kenneth Barnes, T.F. Torrance writes 'he is something like fifty years ahead of the rest of us' (Torrance, c1975, 6 March). Thus while not fully appreciated in his lifetime, Macmurray's moral and political philosophy is gaining credence thirty years after his death. On the one hand, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair claims (albeit contentiously) that Macmurray's writings have had an impact on his political outlook (Blair, 1996, pp. 59–60). Hence it is from a social and political perspective, as well as a philosophical one, that Macmurray's 'thinking is now seen to be relevant to our present problems' (*The Scotsman*, a1994, 17 September). On the other hand, Beveridge and Turnbull suggest that Macmurray's philosophical contributions are noteworthy in relation to their consistency with peculiarly Scottish thought (Beveridge and Turnbull, 1989). Although Macmurray is not a nationalist, and in later works he explicitly condemns nationalism as a spurious and dangerous principle to foster, from his rhetorical writings on the tradition of the Scottish universities it is clear that he is instilled with nationalistic pride, especially in the aftermath of the First World War (a1941a, pp. 471–2; u1922b).

It is by placing the tenets of Macmurray's work alongside those of John Baillie, Ronald Gregor Smith and John Macquarrie that Beveridge and Turnbull argue that Macmurray is a distinctively Scottish thinker (Beveridge and Turnbull, 1989, pp. 96–9). This judgement is based on the claim that all these scholars have a type of 'personalist' theory. While this is the case, the argument is weakened by the fact that there are many scholars who have promoted personalism from other nationalities, of which Emmanuel Mounier is merely one example. Furthermore, since David Hume and Thomas Reid are probably the most famous Scottish philosophers, it seems that Macmurray's work, if distinctively Scottish, must have some connection with their

thought. While Macmurray is not a sceptic in the Humean extreme, his philosophy can be regarded as a 'common-sense' philosophy, at least in so far as the issues under consideration are made lucid to those whom they concern. That is, it can be argued that Macmurray succeeds in making his philosophy of personhood intelligible to persons.

When Macmurray reflects upon Reid's reaction against Hume, he asserts that the Scottish tradition is one of 'learning and serving', which recognizes that 'the commonsense of yesterday is the nonsense of tomorrow' (u1945a). In this respect, Macmurray seeks to retain a humble attitude with regard to his ideas, but he does not refer to his thought as profoundly Scottish; in fact he declares that his work is most similar to the thought of Martin Buber (*SRR*, p. 24). Thus, even though Macmurray was born in Scotland, his influences seem to be drawn from a worldwide source of scholars; likewise, he spent a relatively short period of his life residing in Scottish territory.

Nevertheless, Macmurray's political and moral philosophy retains the themes of the British idealists who went before him, such as, T.H. Green, Edward Caird, F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet (Nicholson, 1990). Like these thinkers, much of Macmurray's work contains the dual influences of Greek and German philosophy, notably Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel. Macmurray's theory differs from Hegelian idealism, since Macmurray is a scientific realist with a religious faith. Macmurray's reference to faith is accompanied by a strong critique of institutionalized Christianity and his account of the Absolute Agent bears some resemblance to Hegel's notion of *Geist* (Absolute Spirit). In common with the British idealists, Macmurray's work focuses on the social existence of persons and role of the state in promoting moral interactions therein. Yet while British idealists have been criticized for their inability to establish the grounds from which social standards are to be

critiqued, the inclusion of religious values in Macmurray's description of community aims to provide such grounds. Thus it is possible to argue that Macmurray's philosophy is rooted in British idealism, while going beyond it. Moreover the issues he raises relate directly to his life experiences, which, in turn, are deeply affected both by his austere childhood in Scotland and by the awfulness of the Great War.

With Macmurray's ideas beginning to achieve much greater academic recognition, this book aims to draw together the diverse strands of his thought, under the overarching theme of the nature of the person. Macmurray's concept of the person encompasses child development, politics and religion. For example, Macmurray examines the early development of person-to-person relations and draws on the importance of an emotional education, an idea that has been growing rapidly in significance since the mid-1990s (Goleman, 1995). For adults, Macmurray contends, the harmonious relation of persons requires 'communities'; a term which he explains by comparing functional relations with relations of equals. Macmurray insists that social organization by the state is a prerequisite for equality, and, further, that the meeting of equals, as friends, is an essentially religious enterprise. Macmurray's work on the state and on religion, while ahead of its time in essence, contains some of his most contentious notions. On the one hand, Macmurray's examination of the function of the state and his critique of the Marxist exclusion of religion is incisive; on the other hand, the extent to which he is influenced by Marxist economics needs some revision following the widespread collapse of Marxist states. Similarly, Macmurray's emphasis on the superiority of Christianity seems dated, whereas his description of religion as activity which promotes community is consistent with a broad spectrum of religious traditions. In expounding

Macmurray's concept of the person then, this book aims to draw out and expand on those aspects which are of contemporary relevance, while critiquing and rejuvenating areas of his theory that might otherwise appear to be mistakenly divisive. On the whole therefore, this book is sympathetic to Macmurray's concerns, maintaining that his concept of the person is philosophically astute, and that, where revision is needed, this is not due to the fundamentals of the theory itself.

Macmurray's most significant contribution begins with his assertion that, thus far, the field of the personal has been inadequately expressed (c1914–36, 25 October 1929). He contends that impersonal analogies lead to theorizing about the person from a dualistic and individualistic standpoint. On the contrary, Macmurray insists that this results in 'the need to transfer the centre of gravity in philosophy from thought to action' (*PR*, p. 11). It is in this respect that Macmurray's concept of the person is holistic; that is, it opposes the view that the mind and the body are most adequately understood as separate entities and argues for the realignment of thoughts and emotions. Likewise, Macmurray asserts that relationships are essential for personal fulfilment, and it is on this basis that Macmurray's work is referred to as a relational account of the person, in contrast with the individualism promoted by capitalism. Initially, it was the horrific experience of world war that caused Macmurray to argue for peace and, therefore, to examine the relations of persons. In his mature work, having developed his focus on action rather than thought, and thus the definition of the person as an agent, he maintains that the agent-self exists 'only as a community of personal agents' (*SA*, p. 12). In spite of his use of the term 'community' and his dissatisfaction with individualism, however, Macmurray is not, as Brittan explains, a communitarian in the contemporary sense of the word, since

Macmurray's emphasis on the care of others is interpreted universally, as opposed to being confined within smaller-scale communities (Brittan, a1997, pp. 18–20). Moreover, the notion of universal applicability remains grounded through Macmurray's insistence on the face-to-face relations of equals. It is in relation to equality that Macmurray finds Marxist economics useful, while also safeguarding the self by refusing to reduce the meaning of community to self-sacrifice for the benefit of society (c1914–36, 18 October 1930). Communities then consist of voluntarily related persons who are enjoying the mutual benefits of fellowship.

However, since Macmurray refers to communities as religious, he is faced with the task of reconciling his religious convictions with his certainty concerning the reasonableness of the majority of Marxist principles. Primarily he is able to do this by retaining a decidedly opaque definition of 'God'; he states that 'at most God is for thought a necessary hypothesis' (c1914–36, 22 July 1925). Furthermore, while he holds that religion, especially Christianity, is the root of all community life, he acknowledges the difficulty of defining Christianity (*SRR*, pp. 24–5; a1937a). When, therefore, Macmurray makes the statement, 'I stand outside the Churches because I am a Christian' (u1934b), this implies that his definition of Christianity differs from the prevalent forms of Christianity with which he is familiar. Consequently, amongst the few scholarly writings on Macmurray, the overall aim has been to apply Macmurray's open-mindedness to a traditionally stubborn framework of theology (Fergusson, chForthcoming). The latter is a legitimate and beneficial approach, but this book, while recognizing the importance of religion for Macmurray, contains the distinctive proposals, first, that his use of the term 'Christian' is vague and theoretically unnecessary, and secondly, that his theory is, in fact, rendered more consistent by replacing such

religiously exclusive terminology with something more inclusive of other religions. In short, this book argues that Macmurray's stress on Christianity is reflective of certain ingrained assumptions that he was unable to overcome, as opposed to ensuing from his philosophical propositions. Furthermore, this approach allows the most significant aspects of Macmurray's description of the person to be comprehended and adopted by a religiously pluralist society.

As the nature of Macmurray's work dictates, this book, while engaging primarily with philosophy, also has grounds for mentioning certain psychological, political and religious ideas. In this respect, the book does not intend to present an exhaustive account of the issues therein; it merely seeks to contextualize Macmurray's thought, offering both support for and criticism of his ideas from within the fields that he addresses. Moreover, such comparisons serve to bolster the wide-ranging impact and contemporary relevance of Macmurray's philosophy for improving the understanding of the person and of the importance of personal relationships in a wide range of fields. Later scholars are reiterating and expanding on the themes found in Macmurray's writings decades earlier, often without having come across his work; thus this book provides wider access to his ideas. The way in which Macmurray expresses his ideas is striking, since even a cursory inquiry into his works leaves the reader with the impression that Macmurray has made sense of the world.

Nevertheless, at times the significance of Macmurray's definition of personal identity and the implications this holds for persons in relation are obscured by his attempt to employ a triadic or tripartite methodology, at times straining the Hegelian dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Consequently, this book seeks to assist in the extraction of the underlying concepts from the form given to them, through a full–scale examination of both Macmurray's

published and unpublished writings. Such an analysis is justifiable owing to the increased interest in his ideas and the lack of any comprehensive study of his complete works. In addition, this book seeks to address some of the objections that might be raised to its holistic and relational account of the person, by combining the assertion of the credibility of Macmurray's perception with contemporary scholarship that supports and enhances its salient features.

PART I
The Essence of the Person

Chapter 1
Agency Theory

Introduction

In this chapter, Macmurray's theoretical understanding of the nature of the self is introduced, detailing his holistic approach and laying the groundwork for a subsequent examination of its practical ramifications. Primarily, Macmurray is engaging in a 'pioneering venture' (*SA*, p. 13), rejecting the widespread acceptance of substance dualism, as proposed by Descartes. He bases this renunciation on what he assumes is the common experience for every human; that is, the interaction of mind and body. Further, such interaction is most apparent, he holds, in action. Hence by asserting the reality of agency, Macmurray seeks to establish a new and radical foundation, from which a philosophy of the nature of the person can be built. Moreover, the impact of his enterprise is not merely the reconstruction of the mind and body association; in addition, this leads into a revision of the historical dualism of reason and emotion and, further, the reorganization of the relation of science and art. According to Macmurray, each of these activities is necessary for successful action and is capable of expressing objectivity. Through the assessment of these three areas of dualism, Macmurray raises the standing of the traditionally inferior aspect to equal that of the superior aspect. He does not embark upon a monist route for comprehending the possibility of simultaneous mental and physical or intellectual and emotional activity; rather, he retains a theoretical

distinction between these categories of operation, while insisting on their practical indivisibility. Furthermore, although he realizes that his effort to overthrow substance dualism has been preceded, he still holds that his formulation is a revolutionary breakthrough, justified by its consequences. Initially, the effect of his preferred position, he alleges, is that 'man recovers his body and becomes personal' (*PR*, p. 12).[1]

In Macmurray's opinion, previous attempts to overcome the dualism of mind and matter have been unsuccessful; nevertheless, despite the futility of these attempts the underlying assumption that mind and matter dualism is unsound is accurate. From his earliest writings he maintains that such dualism is at odds with reality and, therefore, is without rational justification. In particular, Macmurray maintains that the categorical opposition inherent in mind-matter dualism fails to provide a satisfactory account of organic properties. He asks, 'If the world consists exclusively of mental things and material things, where do cabbages come in?' (a1935a, p. 267).

If science was taken as a guide, he suggests, the divisions of the physical, biological and psychological sciences would prompt a threefold classification of reality into 'mind, life and matter' (a1935a, p. 268). However, he further asserts that any attempt to replace a twofold division of reality with a threefold one would still be inaccurate, since it is not possible to place all things in just one of these categories. For example, organic life is partially comprised of matter and the person is partially comprised of both life and matter.

It is in traditional definitions of the human person, and the possibility of that human person possessing knowledge, especially self-knowledge, that the employment of the dualism of mind and matter is most apparent. When considering the nature of the person and attempting to

differentiate between the human being and other animals, metaphysical dualism focuses on the self. In an early work, Macmurray expresses his dissatisfaction with the philosophical question 'What is the self?', preferring to ask 'What am I?', on the grounds that there is such a thing as me and there is such a thing as you, but there is no such thing as the self (a1935a, p. 269). Consequently, in later works, Macmurray replaces the language of the self with that of the person. Generally therefore, his use of the term 'personal' implies that which is of, or pertaining to persons, not that which is peculiar to a specific human being. He clarifies his use of this syntax by stating that the difference between particular persons is more properly referred to as personal individuality, while the term 'personality' implies 'that quality or set of characteristics in virtue of which a person is a person; a property therefore which all persons share, and which distinguishes a person from all beings which are not personal' (*PR*, p. 25).

Knowledge of the self, or rather the person who is me, issues from both internal and external consciousness, whereas knowledge of another person is only externally encountered. In addition, if 'we are aware of our bodies in external perception and of our minds in introspection' (a1935a, p. 271), this would seem to justify a dualistic perception of mind and body. However if the self knows the mind introspectively and has knowledge of the body from external experience, it seems that the self is neither mind nor body; as Macmurray states, 'I cannot both be a body and have a body, nor can I be a mind and have a mind' (a1935a, p. 272). In essence therefore, the dualism of mind and body fails to offer a wholly intelligible conception of the self.

By way of exposition of the widespread use of mind-body dualism, Macmurray explains that, in order to reflect on cognition, a distinction has to be drawn between the subject and the object of experience. While it is logical to contrast

subject and object, since these terms have a systematic connection, to identify the subject – 'that which knows' (a1935a, p. 273) – with the mind, and the object – that which is known – with matter, so that the mental and the material are regarded as contrasting entities, is illogical. Not only does this opposition result in the identification of the self with the mind, failing to reflect the manner in which the self is experienced, it is fundamentally individualistic and solipsistic. The self as subject and knower has no certain knowledge of the existence of other selves, since other minds exist as objects rather than subjects. Solipsism can be avoided by assuming the existence of many selves, but in Macmurray's opinion this is no more than a 'pluralism of solipsisms' (a1935a, p. 275), where there are several 'Is', but there is no 'you'. However, if we accept that human nature is essentially relational, then cognitive experience is of an 'I' and a 'you' in relation.

Consequently, for Macmurray, the dualistic starting point results in a twofold 'crisis of the personal' (*SA*, p. 29). First, there is the problem of formally constructing the definition of the person so that it includes both mind and body. Secondly, there is the difficulty of confirming the existence of a multitude of persons. On this basis, Macmurray aims to understand the nature of the person 'without assuming a dualistic classification' (a1935a, p. 278). Primarily then, he is arguing against Descartes' philosophy, which, he contends, is partly but not entirely overcome by Kant.

Rejecting Cartesian Dualism

In our everyday experiences as a human being, the body and the mind appear to be inseparable. While it might seem at times that the physical and mental are not equally active, the interrelation of these elements cannot be disputed. Hence the salient point of Descartes' philosophical theory,

for Macmurray's purpose, is Descartes' statement that 'I [my soul] am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it' (Descartes, 1984, p. 54). Descartes is confident in the reality of his own existence, chiefly in terms of his intellectual capacities; he claims: 'I exist – that is certain … as long as I am thinking' (ibid., p. 18). It follows, he alleges, that any functions presupposing a body can be dismissed as properties which do not indubitably belong to the essence of his existence, leading him to the conclusion that 'I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am a mind … I am not that structure of limbs called a human body' (ibid., p. 18). Moreover, although Descartes' comparison is between the soul and the body, these terms may be taken to mean mind and matter also, on the grounds that all corporeal substances, such as the body or matter, are held to have the same definable characteristics, and the mind or soul is held to be a non-corporeal substance. In essence, the mind (*res cogitans*) and the body (*res extensa*) are not only different substances, they are capable of independent existence.

As Cottingham attests, for Descartes, 'Mind and body … are not merely distinct: they are defined in mutually exclusive terms' (Cottingham, 1986, p. 116). Yet even without examining the problems of the method of doubt itself, Descartes' use of the first person singular, or the particular properties he attributes to these two contrasting substances, it can still be argued, as Cottingham shows, that 'even if one accepts the unitariness and indivisibility of consciousness, it remains possible that consciousness might be a … property of a physical system' (ibid., p. 118). Of greater significance is the inability of the Cartesian system to explain both how interaction between opposing entities can occur and where it takes place.

Descartes is forced to outline a solution to this problem when considering sensory perception and the imagination.

He accepts that these hybrid faculties do not fit the absolute criteria of either pure mental activity or simple physical functions. Subsequent to his identification of the self with the mind, he claims that 'it is also the same "I" who has sensory perceptions, or is aware of bodily things as it were through the senses … I certainly seem to see, to hear and to be warmed … and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking' (Descartes, 1984, p. 19). Furthermore, Descartes acknowledges that these special modes of thinking involve physiological activity which, he suggests, is located in the brain or, more specifically, the pineal gland (ibid., p. 340).

It seems then that the brain fills the space between the disinterested, intellectual cognition and the interested, visualization of a situation. Nonetheless, Descartes still maintains that his method of doubting and pure thought require no such physiological activity. Far from solving the problem of interaction therefore, Descartes has only transferred the problem from mind and body to mind and pineal gland. Cottingham comically states that 'The soul here seems to be reduced to a kind of homunculus – a little man inside the brain viewing a screen where the images from the optic nerves converge' (Cottingham, 1986, p. 121). Or, as Ryle famously claims, the reader is left with the impression that, in relation to the body, the mind is nothing more than a 'ghost in the machine' (Ryle, 1990, p. 17). Consequently, Cartesian dualism is unable to account for the human experience of embodiment, and this is unacceptable to Macmurray, partly because the system itself is flawed, but also on the grounds that, in his opinion, 'The task of the philosopher … is to express in coherent and meaningful terms what is usually only implicit in the way we live' (*IU*, pp. 9–10). However, as we have already mentioned, Macmurray alleges that Kant's philosophy, while still

containing dualism, is more successful in this respect than Descartes' theory.

Rejecting Kantian Dualism

Although Kant disagrees with much of Descartes' philosophical description of self-knowledge, it is possible, Macmurray contends, to detect the use of Cartesian dualism in the Kantian system. According to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* demonstrates the existence of thought, but it does not impart any knowledge 'of the subject in itself' (Kant, 1950, A 350); the I who possesses that thought. As Scruton demonstrates, in Kant's opinion the only inference that can be drawn from the Cartesian theory is that 'I can be immediately certain of my present mental states. But I cannot be immediately certain of what I am, or of whether, indeed, there is an "I" to whom these states belong' (Scruton, 1982, p. 12).

On the contrary, Kant uses the concept of 'transcendental idealism' (Kant, 1950, A 28) to make the assertion that the individual only has subjective as opposed to objective knowledge of their present mental state; however, this does not rule out the possibility of objective knowledge *per se*. Furthermore, he insists that neither subjective nor objective knowledge are possible if reason or experience are taken in isolation from one another. While the division of subjective and objective knowledge issues in Kant's well-known distinction between the world as it appears to be (the phenomenal world) and the world as it is in itself (the noumenal world), where only the former can be known, but knowledge of the former depends upon the existence of the latter (ibid., A 250–51). When considering self-consciousness in particular therefore, Kant alleges that it 'includes in itself the existence of a subject; but it does not so include any *knowledge* of the subject' (ibid., B 277).

Consequently the 'I' does not represent an object of consciousness, rather it represents a specific point of view on the world, where the self is subject and the world is object.

Despite requiring experience as well as thought, and thus improving on Cartesian mind-body dualism, in essence Kant's transcendental unity of apperception relies upon the intellect, since sensory apprehension of the self provides no definite knowledge of its real nature, although it presupposes it. Moreover, Kant's schema is unable to offer any further solution to the problem of mind and body interaction as it appears in the Cartesian system. Kant merely asserts that it is impossible to know whether the noumenal self and noumenal objects or the phenomenal mind and the phenomenal body are alike or can react (ibid., A 384, B 427). Hence, not only does the exact nature of noumenal and phenomenal elements remain unclear, but, in spite of the critical treatment Descartes' philosophy receives, Kant remains a dualist, inasmuch as he still speaks of the self as thinker and of the mind as an item that is not contingent on matter for its existence. Nevertheless, since he does not present mind and body as strictly separable substances, his system leans more towards the concept of an embodied mind than Descartes'.

On the basis of the first *Critique*, Macmurray criticizes Kant for conducting an investigation into human nature that relies on theoretical method and excludes the possibility of empirical verifiability (*SA*, p. 39). In this instance, he suggests that the dualism of mind and matter has led also to a dualism of theory and practice. Yet, despite the dualisms entailed, an extrapolation of Kant's theory, Macmurray contends, points towards the uniting of these dualisms. For example, the Kantian insistence that noumena cannot be known implies that knowledge must be empirical; that is, drawn from phenomena. In fact, in his second

Critique, Kant himself exposes these dualisms to a more advanced form of union. On the basis of his examination of the practical application of pure reason, he is forced to conclude that practical reason is indeed plausible and actually has primacy over pure reason (Kant, 1976, V 119). Before Macmurray can credibly allege that Kant has failed to establish a holistic notion of the self, he must consult the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

According to Macann, the impetus of the second *Critique* is the fact that 'Originally, human being is not a self-conscious subject, but an active agent' (Macann, 1981, p. 168). For Kant, the significance of this empirical nature of human beings lies in its reference to morality. Further, the principle that a person ought to do something is rendered nonsensical unless that person is able to do so. Hence when duty and desire conflict, the possibility of acting in agreement with duty exists only if reason has the capacity to override sensuous cravings. Consequently the existence of free will becomes a necessity and, in Kant's system, proves 'that pure reason can be practical' (Kant, 1976, V 42). Thus the transcendent self is regarded as an embodied self by virtue of free will. Free will, as Macann explains, 'is nothing but that mediating agency which puts into practice the principles first proposed by reason' (Macann, 1981, p. 170). A rational being, for Kant, is both a self-conscious core of knowledge and an agent capable of intentional or willed action.

Positively therefore, Macmurray describes Kant's improvement on the Cartesian schema as the realization that reason is not purely cognitive; rather, 'It is only when we turn to consider our practical experience as agents, and not our theoretical experience as thinkers, that we discover the true character of reason' (*SA*, p. 54). However, Macmurray further contends that this conclusion is in contradiction with Kant's premise; in his first *Critique* Kant

assumes that the theoretical is primary, but in his second *Critique* he asserts the primacy of the practical. Unless Kant were to rebuild his philosophy with the practical as primary, Macmurray argues, action remains 'logically inconceivable – a mystery in which we necessarily believe, but which we can never comprehend' (*SA*, p. 73). The persistence of theoretical primacy, therefore, leaves Kant with the peculiar division of an individual's actions into noumenal and phenomenal elements, even though these two aspects of a person's action are both part of the same act. In addition to this problem, the suggestion that a human being's passions are to be overcome by reason constitutes a self internally at war. Fundamentally, Kant's attempt to portray the self produces the empirical necessity of mind and body interaction, yet renders their relation theoretically incomprehensible.

On these grounds Macmurray proposes to develop a description of the human being as agent, which realizes Kant's emphasis on unity and practicality, without his contrast of reason and desire or the subsequent need to introduce the notion of the will. As with Descartes, Kant's depiction of the person as a rational and isolated agent receives sharp criticism from Macmurray (*SA*, pp. 63–73). In addition, he considers Kant's analysis of the relation between theoretical and practical activity to be inadequate. By assuming that pure reason is possible, in abstraction from empirical encounter with the world, Kant implies that thought is separable from action and that the self is complete without requiring any other selves. Even when he is considering moral agency Kant is more concerned with the knowledge of what ought to be done than with the practicalities of actually doing it. Vexed by this, and by any theory that gives the impression that knowledge is a sufficient criterion for understanding body and mind association, Macmurray states: 'The unity of experience as a

whole is not a unity of knowledge, but a unity of personal activities of which knowledge is only one' (*SA*, p. 66).

Macmurray's Alternative to Dualism

A preliminary explanation is necessary before examining Macmurray's particular alternative to the Cartesian and Kantian definitions of the self, since he does not address the mind-body problem in the usual way. When a scholar claims to be refuting dualism, as Macmurray does, this is usually followed by an engagement with the peculiar nature of mental phenomena and how these are capable of being related to physical phenomena. These studies stem from the acknowledgement that it is difficult, if not impossible, to ignore the inner awareness human beings have, even though there has been no satisfactory philosophical explanation of it. For this reason, as McGinn reveals, the monist attempt to represent this special consciousness as a purely physical phenomenon is insufficient (McGinn, C., 1997, pp. 18–20). Yet the opposing dualism, which insists on the distinction of the mental states from the physical to the extent that they are regarded as ethereal, is also inadequate, since it is unable to explain the possibility of interaction between contrasting substances; as we have seen with the Cartesian system for example.

However, Macmurray's rejection of dualism is not an attempt to elucidate the manner in which a physical organ, such as the brain, could be the ground of consciousness and could have an inner element. Furthermore, Macmurray does not seek to address the issue of human beings having mental states that seem to be different in kind to physical objects, since not all matter has them; Macmurray does not discuss the spatio-temporal location of such mental states within a human being's physical aspect either. We might

wonder then how Macmurray is offering a solution to the mind-body problem.

A pivotal aspect in understanding Macmurray's alternative position is the realization that he assumes he has no need to prove or explicate the existence and relation of mental and physical states; on the contrary, the combination of physical and mental activity is the underlying ground of his theory. Furthermore, with this presupposition as his basis, he has no need to propose subsequently the notion of free will in order to make sense of practical reasoning, although the existence of free will as the expression of that which is the opposite of determinism is taken for granted (*SA*, p. 134). Hence, in defence of his method and purpose, Macmurray states that 'Anyone who looks for a philosophical system, or demands a detailed and scholarly demonstration will be disappointed. Systematic scholarship is of the highest importance in philosophy; but it belongs to a later stage of the process which is here only initiated' (*SA*, p. 203).

In general, Macmurray views the history of philosophy as progressing on a hierarchical, linear scale. Consequently, the Cartesian perception of the self as substance is regarded as a less advanced than, but preliminary stage to, the perception of the self as an organism, which is favoured by post-Kantian theory. In some sense then Macmurray, having discovered that the organic analogy, while containing more scope than the substance analogy, is still unable to account for all human activity, represents an additional stage of development. His aim therefore is to construct a philosophical 'form of the personal' (*SA*, p. 21) that will be capable of incorporating all aspects of human experience. From as early as 1928 he states that he is 'thinking out the philosophy of Personality' (c1919–36, 29 January 1928). In the late 1950s, he still regards this task as 'the emergent problem for contemporary philosophy' (*SA*, p. 17), and by

that time he is not alone in this belief. For example, in his review of *The Self as Agent*, Harris alleges that 'Cartesian subjectivism and egocentricity have been outdated since before the middle of the nineteenth century; but many contemporary philosophers are too short-sighted to notice it' (Harris, r1959, p. 460).

Hence the movement away from dualism, as Hollis claims, is the result of the fact that 'human beings have slowly been learning to express what has all along underlain their universal sense of self' (Hollis, ch1985, p. 232). Further, as Lukes holds, this stems from a widespread outgrowing of liberal individualism, which is accompanied by increased attempts to integrate thoughts and feelings, mind and body, and the private and the public spheres of life (Lukes, ch1985, pp. 282–301). Nevertheless, through an examination of scholarly concepts of the person, McCall primarily concludes that, while the person, the self and the human being have been respectively distinguished in terms of third-person perception, first-person experiential subject and biological species, a theory that successfully clarifies the inherent interdependence of these aspects, thus constituting the individual, has yet to be discovered (McCall, 1990). However, in the attempt to establish an integrated account of the person, Braine points out that both Aristotle and Aquinas adopted a more holistic approach than the later Cartesian mind-body dualism or the modern brain-body distinction that has succeeded it (Braine, 1992). In essence, Braine's contemporary argument is that the human being is insolubly animal and spirit; an assertion reminiscent of Macmurray's much earlier effort to express the indivisibility of the inner and outer aspects of the person.

In Macmurray's account the term 'person', while being applicable only to the human species, is comprised also of specific properties that prevent it from being coextensive with the term 'human being'; in addition these properties

render reference to the self vacuous. Moreover, this has implications for the political activity of persons, and the enduring entity that personal identity seems to require remains central for Macmurray, thus resulting in a perception of the person as an agent capable of acting virtuously.

Philosophy, Macmurray contends, 'is reflection in search of an understanding of the wholeness of immediate experience, not of partial and isolated aspects of it' (*IU*, pp. 34–5); thus his concern is with the singularity of all personal experience. In an early work, Macmurray examines the various unity-patterns available for this purpose, but discovers that none of these is suitable for representing the complete human experience. He discusses the mathematical unity-pattern first (*IU*, pp. 84–102). Mathematics, he explains, is confined to the representation of mechanical activity, where change is understood as the effect of a cause. Consequently, inasmuch as the self is a passive object, the mathematical unity-pattern is applicable; however, in so far as the self is more than material – a centre of activity – it has characteristics which cannot be represented by such formulae. Therefore Descartes' view of the self as substance is an inadequate representation of the person. Secondly, there is the biological unity-pattern (*IU*, pp. 103–21). This is an improvement on the mathematical formula, since it accounts for change by allowing the organism to be active in itself, following a predetermined process of growth, without necessarily requiring external causes. Inasmuch as the person is an organism therefore, this pattern is applicable. However if, as Macmurray holds, the immediate awareness human beings have of themselves and their development goes beyond teleological explanations, then this and Kant's conception of the self are deficient descriptions.

The manner in which persons experience themselves as being similar to other persons can be accounted for by a mathematical representation of identities, and the sense in which they experience themselves as being different from their fellows can be symbolized by the biological representation of differences, but the integration of these two aspects of experience cannot be accounted for by either system. Macmurray suggests that to speak of the person as a material object and/or a living organism 'is true as a matter of fact. But if it is taken as a definition it is false' (*BS*, p. 221). Consequently, a satisfactory form of the personal would incorporate both the mathematical and the organic forms, while also going beyond them.

In later works, his criticism of the philosophical inability to represent the unity of experience is levelled more emphatically at its traditional division into mental and physical categories. Hence mind and body dualism is jettisoned, by Macmurray, on the basis that it disrupts the integrity of the self. Moreover, although dualism may take many forms – 'a dualism of mind and body, of mind and matter, of theory and practice, of appearance and reality, of subjective and objective, of phenomenal and noumenal worlds' (*SA*, p. 73) – in Macmurray's opinion, while the *cogito* is the primary postulate of the self, these dualisms cannot be abolished. The dualism which infects Cartesianism and Kantianism institutes a body that acts without thinking and a mind that thinks without acting, united in some inexplicable way. Further, the existence of the self is not inferred from the presence of thought; it is identified with it, and the self is defined as a thinking being. Where the existence of the self is dependent upon thought then, as Macmurray explains, the self does not actually exist at all; it is merely an idea (*SA*, p. 80).

Nevertheless, Macmurray reveals that his decision to assert the primacy of the practical can actually be justified,

to some extent, by the dualist tradition. When theoretical reason is taken as primary, thought and action are divorced. Nonetheless the fact remains that thought is an activity of the human being, and therefore the conception of the thinking self relies upon the existence of the self as agent. A contradiction is involved then, since agency is practical, whereas thought is theoretical. However, the existence of the self as agent remains unconfirmed, since existence implies causal efficacy, whereas thinking does not necessarily have any effect on the world. Thus, either thinking is not an activity or, as such, it assumes the existence of the agent and therefore confirms the reality of the body, rather than that of the mind. As Macmurray states, 'thinking can only be defined negatively in relation to a positive activity which is material' (*SA*, p. 81).

It is Macmurray's particular contention that the correct solution of this paradox is to view action as primary and thought as secondary. This conviction is elaborated on in an unpublished work where he argues that the construction 'I think' is more properly formulated as 'I *do* think'(A),[2] with the result that thinking is understood to be just one of the activities that qualifies an individual's agency. This shift in emphasis is clarified in a published work where he explains that 'What is here proposed is that we should substitute the "I do" for the "I think" as our starting point and centre of reference' (*SA*, p. 84). Nonetheless he is not advocating practical as opposed to theoretical philosophy; he is merely supposing that theory can be carried out from the standpoint of action. Any attempt to dispute his argument at this stage would be assuming the primacy of the theoretical. The success or failure of Macmurray's enterprise can only be judged by actively following it through. In so doing, one theory is not to be substituted for another; rather it is the foundations of the theory that are to be altered. In this respect Macmurray borrows Kant's analogy and

compares his proposal with the 'Copernican Revolution' (*SA*, p. 85).

Even so, he still needs to justify his assertion that this new outlook will eliminate dualism. He explains that, although thinking and acting are different pursuits, 'The Self that reflects and the Self that acts is the same Self' (*SA*, p. 86). Nevertheless action involves a whole range of attributes, such as 'sense, perception and judgement … along with physical movement' (*SA*, p. 86), whereas pure thought eliminates overt bodily movements and all sensuous elements. When considered in abstraction therefore, thought and action appear to be contrasting activities, but in practice, he suggests, they are the opposing poles on the spectrum of activity. Action, he maintains, is inclusive, making use of body and mind, whereas thought, employing mental activity alone, is exclusive. An exclusive activity depends for its definition upon that which it excludes; consequently the perception of the self as a thinking being is nonsensical in the absence of a conception of the self as an agent. Hence Macmurray states that 'Action is primary and concrete, thought is secondary, abstract and derivative' (*SA*, p. 89). On this basis, it seems that the principle of agency represents practical and theoretical modes of activity, thus rendering it more comprehensive in its coverage of human experience than an understanding of the self that gives priority to thought.

To express the different ways in which a single person engages in both these activities, Macmurray refers to the 'Self-as-agent' and the 'Self-as-subject' (*SA*, p. 90). He claims that 'All thought presupposes knowledge' (*IU*, p. 15),[3] that is, knowledge of the world. Likewise an action is only such if the individual concerned is aware of their engagement in it; hence knowledge is an essential component of acting. However, to question how an

individual knows that they are an agent is to emphasize the theoretical, thus confusing the primacy of action. As agent the self is acting in a world which it knows as subject. Moreover, for actions to have causal efficacy, the self as agent must be a part of the world it knows, even though the self as subject treats the world as an object from which it is somehow distinct. Macmurray states:

> The Self as subject then is not part of the world it knows, but withdrawn from it, and so, in conception, outside it, or other than its object. But to be part of the world is to exist, while to be excluded from the world is to be non-existent. It follows that the Self *exists* as agent but not as subject. (*SA*, p. 91)

Nonetheless, Macmurray is not instituting a dualism here between the self and the not-self. To view the world as object means that the thinking self meditates on that which is external to it; it does not mean that there is no awareness of the self as a part of and in relation to that world. Dualism is avoided, he claims, by maintaining a necessary relation between the self as agent and the self as subject. This is done by recognizing that action, as opposed to movement, requires the existence of the other: 'When I act I modify the world' (*SA*, p. 91). Without the occurrence of resistance and support, between that which is acted upon and the agent, there could be no action. Furthermore, for action to be carried out in the material world, the agent must exist in material form: 'As agent, therefore, the Self is body' (*SA*, p. 91). This condition is not a requirement of thought however; thus as subject the self is not body but mind. In order to retain this distinction without reverting to dualism, Macmurray refers to these as the negative and positive aspects of the self (*SA*, p. 87), which are interrelated on the basis of his assertion that exclusive, theoretical activity only has meaning in reference to inclusive, practical activity.

However, the terms 'positive' and 'negative' make a logical representation of the form of the personal

problematic, not just because these terms reflect contrasting activities, but especially since the exclusion of agency involved in thinking is an activity which the self adopts. Consequently, Macmurray claims, 'the unity of the self is a unity of self-affirmation and self-negation' (*SA*, p. 96). As we have already seen, Macmurray's early work reveals the inadequacy of the mathematical and organic unity-patterns for representing the whole experience of the person. In his later work, the addition of the symbols positive and negative makes this inadequacy even clearer. With the mathematical form, he affirms, positive and negative are terms that cancel each other out. As mutually exclusive symbols then, the mathematical form can only represent positive and negative dualistically; it cannot explain their relation. With the biological form, he demonstrates, positive and negative can be sustained on a dialectic, rather than an either/or relation, but they are still not depicted simultaneously (*SA*, pp. 96–8). If agent and subject did exist as successive stages in the growth of the self, there would be neither knowledge of action nor knowledge informing action, the result of which is a dualistic representation of the activities of the self. The dualistic failure of these two forms is to be expected, since, Macmurray states, 'The unity of the Self is neither a material nor an organic, but a personal unity' (*SA*, p. 98). The problem in expressing the two aspects of the self as a unity arises due to the fact that thought involves a withdrawal from action, and therefore the self as subject is a denial of the self as agent. For the negative to refer to the positive then, he insists that the self 'must be represented as a positive which necessarily contains its own negative' (*SA*, p. 98).

In the analysis of this logical form, as Macmurray defines it, the precise meaning of the terms 'positive' and 'negative' is not settled. As Macmurray's theory of the personal

develops, these terms are applied to a great variety of different things, leading Raphael and Emmet to conclude that their constant use is unnecessarily mystifying (Raphael, r1959, p. 275; Emmet r1958, p. 412). In each case though, the terminology implies that the activities to which they refer are correlatives and are, therefore, interdependent. However, when taken beyond this initial application, the terms seem to lose their logical standing. For example, Jeffko holds that the expressions 'positive' and 'negative' normally indicate contraries, but in Macmurray's theory they cannot be wholly contrary, since the positive is constituted by its negative (Jeffko, u1970, pp. 181–2). In contrast, McManus, while criticizing Macmurray's arbitrary use of such stipulations, maintains that, as designations for the self's relation to and isolation from the not-self, these terms are intelligible (McManus, u1967, p. 225). It would appear to be more sensible to regard this terminology as a device for understanding the unity of the personal than to view it as a highly specific description of the nature of the activities involved.

　　To summarize his proposal of agency and to relate his logical form of the personal to the practical experiences of personal existence from which it is gleaned, Macmurray constructs four propositions, two relating to the existential self and two to the functional self (*SA*, pp. 100–103). First, he states that 'The Self is agent and exists only as agent', reaffirming his conviction that the defining characteristic of personal existence is action as opposed to thought. Secondly, he states that 'The Self is subject but cannot exist as subject. It can be subject only because it is agent', which confirms his assertion that while thought can be contrasted with action it is inherent in it. Thirdly, he states that 'The Self is subject in and for the Self as agent', emphasizing his contention that the significance of thought lies in its reference to action. Fourthly, he states that 'The Self can be

agent only by being also subject', since the negation of the self is a necessary aspect of the experience of the self. Self-identity therefore includes both thought and action, on the grounds that the former is a requirement of the latter, although it is through action that knowledge and therefore thought is made possible.[4]

Thought as an Activity

In his later works, Macmurray does not elaborate on the purpose or function of thought; however, in his early works there is detailed explication. According to Macmurray, that which is immediately experienced in the activity of living is made explicitly conscious through reflection (*IU*, p. 10). Reflection is the expression of that which has not previously been expressed and expression which uses language is thought. It follows therefore that immediate experience is necessary before reflection or thought can be engaged in. Hence Macmurray contends that 'It is because we know things and are interested in them that we think about them at all. And the reason why we think about them cannot be in order to know them but at the most in order to know them better' (*IU*, pp. 15–16). Knowledge, in this sense, is imbedded in the immediate experience of the world that precedes reflection upon it. Reflection, in the absence of immediate experience, can provide some knowledge about an object, but this is qualitatively different from actually knowing the object. Moreover, this conception avoids the need to prove the reality of an object, on the grounds that there could be no reflection on it if it was not already known in immediate experience.

However, the nature of this immediate experience, Macmurray alleges, prevents it from being defined, since to do so would be to reflect upon it and thereby reduce its immediacy (*IU*, p. 21). He does point out that it is somehow

different from primitive awareness or initial sensory perception, in so far as it includes activity and is subject to development. In comparison with reflective experience, Macmurray states that 'The immediacy of an experience consists simply in the fact that we are immersed in it, that we are living it, and not setting ourselves over against it, as something other than us which we can contemplate and study' (*IU*, p. 21). In immediate experience, the cognitive and the practical activities are in union, thus giving rise to self-consciousness as a participant. In order to reflect however, cognition is disassociated from action, thus giving rise to self-consciousness as a spectator. Although reflection deals with the reality of immediate experience, what it actually expresses, Macmurray maintains, is essentially unreal due to its abstraction from the real (*IU*, p. 34).

In conjunction with his assertion that reflection is subordinate to action, the principal reason for allowing theoretical activity to dominate is, he alleges, an interruption in spontaneous action. This occurs when immediate experience is unable to supply a sufficient motive for action to continue without additional deliberation. Thought, therefore, is undertaken in order to 'enable us to resume the concrete activity of life' (*IU*, p. 38). It does not function by considering actual items in the world; rather, it employs symbolism and imagery to represent the objects encountered in reality. In itself then, thought has no direct causal effect on the world. However, the relation and manipulation of symbols, Macmurray suggests, allows inferences to be made that could enable effective action (*IU*, p. 60).

Not only is the application of reflection in action of paramount importance to Macmurray, on the grounds that 'Life is essentially concrete activity' (*IU*, p. 36), he insists also that 'verification is an essential part of any process of reflection which can claim to be deliberate' (*IU*, p. 79). If the

process of thought does not lead to further action, there are no means for verifying or refuting the conclusions reached theoretically. (In his later works he refers to this as the validity and invalidity of thought.) A theory which is never tested in practice contains unsubstantiated and therefore meaningless assertions. For this reason, in his earliest writings Macmurray is more concerned with the reality of a thought than with its truth or falsity (*FMW*, pp. 130–140). Real thinking, he affirms, refers beyond itself and is, therefore, incomplete until it is put into practice. If a theory has no influence on practice it is unreal. When a theory results in effective action though, while this does not prove that it is true, it does lend it support. If the theory results in ineffective action, it has been disproved and further directed thought can ensue, thereby endlessly refining the theory through constant experimentation. Moreover, Macmurray states:

> Truth is an ultimate by-product of real thinking. Apart from the reality of the thought that maintains it truth is dead, useless and insignificant. It is not so much truth that our minds are after as significant truth. Truth that has no vital significance is unreal and a mere nuisance. It is reality that matters, and if we take care that our thought is *real*, truth will look after itself. (*IU*, pp. 139–40)

It might seem absurd to suggest that scientists, for example, do not engage in the pursuit of science for the purpose of securing the truth, at least as much as for the practical applications of their discoveries. However, Macmurray is not asserting that all reflection is conditioned by urgent problems in action. Yet he is claiming that the scientists cannot know their discoveries are true without experiment or observation and, therefore, truth pursued for its own sake (without practical implication) is insignificant. Nonetheless, according to O'Connor, this does not mean that thought is less significant than action, inasmuch as 'The agent has

every reason to desire a true and unbiased picture of the world in which he must act' (O'Connor, a1964, p. 476 n. 14).

In certain respects, Macmurray's analysis of thought and its relation to action is similar to the material in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein, 1953). For Wittgenstein, Descartes' assumption that it is possible to recognize the thoughts of one's mind without having any recognition of one's body, the world or the existence of other minds, necessitates a private language, which Wittgenstein claims is not plausible. On the contrary, language, he asserts, does not express pure thoughts; it is attached to behaviour and so expresses sensations. He states that 'A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour' (ibid., p. 244). To insist that language concepts describe sensations in this way shifts the Cartesian emphasis from mental to physical experience. Just as Macmurray does not wish to reverse the traditional stress, making physical activity more important than mental activity, a necessary combination of the two is present in Wittgenstein's critique. As McGinn shows, Wittgenstein does not present the person as a mind and a body in separation, but as an 'embodied subject' (McGinn, M., 1997, p. 156). This person might be capable of having mental events that are not accompanied by physical behaviour, but at the same time the possibility of describing those mental states requires their behavioural expression. For example, according to Wittgenstein, when speaking of pain 'one has to say it of a body, or, if you like of a soul which some body *has*' (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 283). Consequently, similarities can be drawn between Wittgenstein's human being, who is irrefutably engaged in action, and Macmurray's person, whose existence is contingent upon their agency.

Action as an Activity

To underpin the assertion that theoretical activity is secondary to and derived from practical activity, Macmurray constructs a theory of action that is capable of including thought as its necessary negative aspect. He claims that the ultimate reality of the self as agent is beyond speculation, and, since this proposition implies self-consciousness in acting, action is constituted by the 'unity of movement and knowledge' (*SA*, p. 128). However, this formulation is only acceptable as a theoretical definition of action; in practice, these two dimensions of action are inseparable. This is not then a reverse dualism: cognition is not prior to physical activity and cannot be regarded as the cause of it. Movement, Macmurray reveals, is the 'experience of moving the Self' (*SA*, p. 128), without necessarily involving visible spatial repositioning, while knowledge is awareness of the other '*as other*' (*SA*, p. 168). Knowledge is the negative aspect and movement is the positive aspect, which includes and requires the negative.

In addition, these two dimensions have internal negatives inherent in their positives. For example, to move without collapsing there must be resistance, and in Macmurray's opinion, 'Knowing in action is only possible through an active ignoring of most of what is present' (*SA*, p. 130). A further contrast of the positive and negative dimensions of action, according to Macmurray, is evident from their relation to time and space. Movement between objects, he attests, is temporal and spatial, whereas in reflection objects are spatialized, creating an eternal present. Consequently, time can be seen as the positive which incorporates space as its negative.

Reflective knowledge draws on the past, which, Macmurray asserts, 'the Agent generates … by actualizing a possibility' (*SA*, p. 134). That is, in an implicit sense, the

past is comprised of the determinate, whereas the future, by contrast, is comprised of the possible. In reference to the traditional conception of free will therefore, the possibility of acting at all would require this, as opposed to determinism. However, since the postulation of the self as agent implies that it is the agent themselves who makes the determinate, Macmurray evades the usual tension between free will and determinism. Furthermore, this interpretation leads to two consequences of action. First, when an agent creates the determinate they inevitability limit the possibilities of future action; Macmurray refers to this principle as the 'irreversibility of action' (*SA*, p. 139). Secondly, it involves active and not just reflective choice, but this is 'a choice of one possibility which negates the possibility of all others' (*SA*, p. 139). This does not mean that movement is preceded by a choice, since if this were the case, the theoretical would be primary and the dualism of reflection and movement would be reinstated, necessitating the notion of will to unite them.

Further, Macmurray states that in order to discriminate between possible choices, the agent must 'characterize the act that is so performed as right and the others as wrong' (*SA*, p. 140). The accuracy of this differentiation is judged by the success or failure of the chosen act in achieving the agent's objective. Reflection on the past is on matters of fact, which provide 'instrumental knowledge', whereas discriminating between a variety of possible courses of action requires 'intrinsic knowledge' (*BS*, p. 253). Although utility and value are different kinds of knowledge, they are obtained from the same source. Thus Macmurray holds that they are 'distinguishable only in reference to the full practical experience of agency, as knowledge of the World-as-Means and knowledge of the World-as-End' (*BS*, pp. 256–7).

Despite Macmurray's generally anti-dualist stance, he admits that the element of choice in action allows a *prima facie* distinction to be made between acts and events. Yet he qualifies this acknowledgement by stating that 'what is a dualism from the theoretical point of view is not necessarily so from the practical' (*SA*, p. 147). That is, events are the negative and essential components of change within positive action. However, observation alone is unable to determine whether the change was an act or an event; this requires deeper investigation. In its most basic form, an act is that which is done, and an event is something that happens (*BS*, p. 239). It follows from this, Macmurray claims, that 'for an event there is a cause; for an act there is a reason' (*SA*, p. 148). An agent's reason for acting is informed by knowledge, in contrast with chance or mechanical occurrences. Since the cause of an event is non-agent, it is just a previous event. Those parts of an action that can be described without referring to the agent's deliberate purpose, such as the habitual or continuant aspects, Macmurray maintains, are the negative but necessary causal aspects of action. That is, 'a causal explanation only tells us *how* things happen, and not *why* they happen' (*SA*, p. 153). In addition, Macmurray makes a further distinction based on the principle of cause and effect and the principle of stimulus and reaction. Change in matter is caused by a chain of past events, whereas organic changes transpire in accordance with a process of adaptation to the environment. The teleological nature of this growth cannot be attributed either to a reason or to a simple cause; instead Macmurray calls this a 'motive' (*SA*, p. 149).

This appeal to reasons and their separation from causes is reflective of a certain era, although Macmurray's use the term 'motive' has a specific application. In the 1960s for example, Peters states that the difference between motives and causality in human action is that 'Motives … are a

particular class of reasons, which are distinguished by certain logical properties' (Peters, 1960, pp. 27–8). By way of elaboration on these properties, he holds that a motive is directed towards a particular goal and it offers justification rather than just explanation of an action. Likewise, Melden suggests that the motive places the action in the context of the wider circumstances and reveals something about the agent beyond the mere bodily movement involved in their action (Melden, 1961, pp. 103–4). While these two accounts use motive to explain why an agent engages in a particular action, which Macmurray does not do, its employment as the element of human action, which separates it from the causal movement of matter, is similar. Nonetheless, these two descriptions require the concept of free will to make motive intelligible, which Macmurray seeks to escape in order to evade the misinterpretation whereby it seems that a prior mental event is the cause of an action. According to Macmurray, it is action itself, not some inner characteristic of action, which enables a distinction to be made between human activity and that of matter.

In order to clarify these divisions, Macmurray adds another, and ultimately crucial, element to his theory. He states that 'Action is not teleological, but intentional' (*SA*, p. 150). It is the notion of intention, especially in Macmurray's later work, which takes the place of the motive in Peters' and Melden's versions of human agency. Although Macmurray does refer to reason as that which 'differentiates human activity from animal activity' (a1934–35, p. 145), intentions, rather than motives, are the reasons directing human action. Intentions are informed by knowledge and as such they must be conscious. However, since several short-term intentions might be employed in the fulfilment of a long-term intention, the long-range intention is not always at the forefront of consciousness. Nevertheless, conscious and intentional activity includes and is made possible by

unconscious activity. In turn, unconscious activity is made possible by the presence of motives. However, Macmurray acknowledges that 'there is considerable difficulty in distinguishing between the motive and the intention of the action' (*BS*, p. 240). In an attempt to offer an intelligible demarcation, Macmurray states that a motive 'is simply that which moves anything' (*BS*, p. 241); hence at least part of the motive force in human action is physical energy and, in so far as there is organic development in the agent, partly response to the environment. In spite of the fact that people sometimes misconstrue or fail to recognize their motives, the motive itself is conscious even if this is emotional and not cognitive consciousness. That which appears to be unconscious motive is, in Macmurray's interpretation, more properly understood as causation and is consistent with the material element of the agent.

Like the discrimination between reasons and causes, the concept of intention is employed by later scholars. In particular, Hampshire, critical of Cartesian dualism, maintains that 'It is necessary to start again with new distinctions' (Hampshire, 1982, p. 93). In accordance with Macmurray's view, Hampshire is confident that if a person is in a conscious state they are acting in some way, with body and mind united via intention. Moreover, he states that it is 'the *possibility* of our declaring, or expressing, our intentions … that gives sense to the notion of intention itself. Without this possibility, the notion of intention becomes empty' (ibid., p. 97). Nevertheless Hampshire, like Macmurray, acknowledges that an agent might be confused as to their intention and frequently has an intention which is not thought in a syntactic form, yet the possibility of making verbal statements about any intentional action is always there.

While the discovery and expression of an intention can be problematic, Anscombe's seminal research into the issue

begins with the recognition that intention is used in many different senses, without these being equivocal in meaning (Anscombe, 1957, p. 1). However, she agrees that an intention is something capable of verbal expression, although this cannot always be relied upon as an accurate rendition of the agent's intention. Furthermore, she holds that an intention is different from both predictions and commands, although it shares their reference to the future. Moreover, it includes reasons which relate to the action itself, as opposed to reasons for thinking that the statement is true. She holds that 'an expression of intention is a description of something future in which the speaker is some sort of agent, which description he justifies (if he does justify it) by reasons for acting' (ibid., p. 6). Intentional action, therefore, has a reason explaining why the action is carried out, and this reason is distinct both from the evidence that the action is being carried out and from the causal connections between activities. She claims that 'Intentional actions, then, are the ones to which the question "Why?" is given application in a special sense' (ibid., p. 24). Thus rather than being discernible from third-party observation, an intention is something internal, without this implying that it precedes the act. In this sense, it is similar to and directed by, yet not the same as, the agent's motive. For Anscombe, the motive and the intention provide descriptions of actions that go beyond mere natural causality; however, the difference between them is that motive can be applied to a greater variety of explanations than intention. Consequently, despite insisting that motives and intentions are not synonymous, Anscombe's exploration is unable to offer a strict list of criteria by which to distinguish between them.

Intentions and motives can be sensibly separated, Macmurray alleges, by viewing an intention as that which involves concentration and a motive as that which has

become a habit. Habits, he states, 'provide a pattern of behaviour in the individual which expresses itself in the recurrence of similar acts in similar situations' (*BS*, p. 247). While a sufficient motive is a requirement for intentional activity, it is not a guarantee that any prevailing motive will realize the current intention. A habit, then, is directed towards a particular end, which can subsequently be seen, whereas an intention does not reach an end, since if the intention ends acting ceases. The intention conditions the beginning and the continuation of action. Thus Macmurray claims, 'Here habit is clearly the negative aspect of our action, without which the action could not take place. It is integrated with and subservient to the positive aspect of deliberate purpose [the intention] in terms of which the actions must be defined' (*SA*, pp. 161–2). Although Macmurray accepts that primary intentions are biological, the aim of an action in its positive aspect is to alter that which is acted upon. Reflection, therefore, not only consults the memory of past actions, it anticipates the outcome of future action, assuming the absence of interference and the stability of circumstances. Consequently, as circumstances change, the intention is adapted; in this sense Macmurray holds, 'The end of an action … is in principle indeterminate' (*SA*, p. 150).

As a source of knowledge, the memory is both fragmented and vast, but the probability of an intentional action being successful is, to a large extent, dependent on the cognitive organization of the pertinent facts. To elaborate on the memory's selective ability, Macmurray, in his later work, promotes the concept of the 'limitation of attention' (*SA*, p. 130, p. 171). Attention, then, is another negative but necessary element of intention. As such, it is controlled by the intention, but represents a temporary withdrawal from it. Through the reflective symbols acquired, attention can be given to the relevant ends and means at

the agent's disposal, without having to devote cognitive exertion to those activities that have become habitual. Further, since events are a constituent part of acts, the attention makes no distinction in its symbolism between past acts and events and is, therefore, rather vague. Yet in Macmurray's opinion, 'The relative indeterminateness of a representation can be made more adequate either by generalization or by particularization' (*SA*, p. 176). It is apparent that in diverse situations knowledge of the uniqueness or the universal properties, of that which is given in imagery, may prove to be more or less appropriate for apprising intentional activity. Although an intention has this cognitive factor, Macmurray is adamant that 'It is not an event in the mind which can function as the cause or motive of a movement of the body' (*BS*, p. 255). However, the relation between the attention and the intention can be viewed, Macmurray allows, as a distinction between the theoretical and the practical intention, in the sense that the former 'intends a modification of the Other', whereas the latter 'intends a modification in the representation of the Other' (*SA*, p. 178). The accumulation of theoretical imagery enlarges the scope for action, but, without actually resulting in contact with the objects represented by those images, it becomes pointless; consequently the theory is incomplete without the practice.

For this reason, Macmurray contends, there is a necessary and eternal 'rhythm of withdrawal and return' (*SA*, p. 181) from action into reflection and back to action. He is not suggesting, then, that an individual must be acting all the time or even that practical activity must quantitatively outweigh speculative thought. Indeed he states that 'the relative time spent in action and in reflection is of no theoretical importance' (*SA*, p. 181). Furthermore, he accepts the fact that a whole host of means can be used for any one purpose, and, therefore, the

withdrawal phase can be engaged in to amass knowledge, without previously having decided on a specific goal for its application. Yet Macmurray warns us that when knowledge becomes an end-in-itself the cognitive pursuit of it is inane (*SA*, pp. 182–3). With this caution then, the significance of withdrawal, as an activity which enables future acts to be more educated and hopefully more successful than their predecessors, is upheld. Consequently, Macmurray's theory of agency, at the least, provides us with an heuristic model for comprehending the role of mind and body interaction; while, at the most, it has the potential to overcome the dualism that, he attests, is inherent in any system that is founded on the *cogito*.

Comparisons and Criticisms

Although Macmurray rarely refers to other scholars who share his opinions, it is possible to defend and clarify his position by considering similar theories. Likewise, by analysing and responding to the criticisms levelled against anti-dualist perspectives, the potential of Macmurray's theory is elucidated rather than diminished. Amongst the various refutations of the Cartesian dualistic explanation of human beings, a common thread is the rejection of the idea that states of consciousness are experienced by an entirely immaterial subject that cannot confirm the existence of other such subjects. Strawson, for example, takes this line and, in addition, argues that the immaterial subject hypothesis, with its insistence on a subject of consciousness, thereby supposes that other such subjects could exist (Strawson, 1959, pp. 94–8). If, however, the other subjects of consciousness were also immaterial, it would be impossible to discern one from another; thus there could be no notion of other subjects of consciousness. Yet when there is no other subject, there is no subject

whatsoever, and Descartes' postulate of a completely immaterial subject of consciousness is rendered nonsensical. Following his rejection of the tenet in dualism, that the subject of consciousness is wholly immaterial (and the idea in materialism that the subject of consciousness is the wholly material body), Strawson concludes that any image of a subject of the states of consciousness is a symbolic representation of both physical and mental attributes. In essence therefore, he maintains that persons are a combination of mental and physical properties, as opposed to defining the self as mere immaterial subject (ibid., pp. 99–104). Unity of the mental and physical aspects of self is realized in action, which in turn requires the existence of the physical world. Strawson's analysis of mental phenomena is (like Wittgenstein's) concerned with the traditional mind-body problem, and it contests dualism through a theoretical discussion of consciousness that is methodologically unlike Macmurray's empirically based rejection of dualism. Nevertheless, since the culmination of his refutation is the holistic reality of the human person as an agent, utilizing mind and body, an appraisal of agency or person theory, such as Strawson proposes, is relevant in the deliberation on Macmurray's form of the personal.

In reference to critics of mind-body dualism, Shaffer states that 'The person theory has very attractive features. It gives full weight to the distinction between mental and physical attributes, allowing them to be attributes of basically different natures. Yet it also does justice to the fact that they seem to be attributes of one and the same subject' (Shaffer, 1968, pp. 54–5). Subsequent to these positive comments though, Shaffer embarks upon a reconsideration of dualism, on the grounds that its problems are outweighed by its advantages. This position arises partly from an argument revolving around 'body', in which he claims that the dualistic treatment of the physical human being as a

material thing, separate from mental attributes, is a philosophical asset lost in person theories. He attests that person theories are unable to assert, without reverting to dualism, either that an individual is part body or that they possess a body. In person theories, the body is 'an abstraction, an intellectual construction, rather than a reality' (ibid., p. 57). Evidently Shaffer has a point in the sense that person theories are opposed to any suggestion that a person is a physical body that merely happens to possess mental qualities as well, or vice versa. Nonetheless, while person theories are against the alienation of either the mental or the physical, they rely on the insistence that a person is inherently both of these. In this respect, therefore, the outcome of Shaffer's argument appears to be rather ambiguous.

When debating the rationale of agency specifically, Shaffer criticizes the distinction made between intentional action and event causation, on the supposition that 'we no longer have the possibility of prediction, explanation, or causal laws'; hence agent causation is, in fact, 'no causal theory at all' (ibid., p. 86). Not only does he allege that this is regrettable, he discards also the view that agency theories are necessarily incompatible with natural causality, asserting instead that agent causation 'may well be a necessary supplement' (ibid., p. 88) to the concept of event causation. Even if the cause of movement is a prior mental event, as it is in Cartesian dualism, he contends, the agent is still essential to the act, as the subject of that mental event. Consequently, knowing who has performed a particular action would still aid in the cognitive search regarding why it was done. Hence, on the basis of the causal explanations possible through mental state theories of action, Shaffer is of the opinion that it is dualism, not agency theory, that presents 'the most plausible way of analysing what makes an action *intentional*' (ibid., p. 106).

While Macmurray can, as Wild shows, be accused of failing to provide any 'sustained attempt to explain and clarify' the exact meaning of intention (Wild, r1962, p. 228), this does not satisfy Shaffer's rejection of agency theory in any definitive way. To argue, in the way Shaffer proposes, that event causation and agent causation are not irreconcilable and, further to insist that Cartesian dualism allows for certain predictions to be made that agency theory makes more dubious, evades the fundamental aim of agency theory. In so far as Shaffer's concern is with the traditional mind-body problem then, Macmurray would accuse him of approaching the subject from a dualistic perspective and hence undoing the effort to marry thought and action. Moreover, Macmurray acknowledges that he is merely laying the foundations of a new person theory, which includes agency as a necessary component of it, and so the details to be found in the centuries of debate on Cartesian dualism are bound to be lacking. Without attempting to build on Macmurray's groundwork then, Shaffer would not have a sufficient basis for rejecting Macmurray's theory; that is, his critique of person and agency theories does not assess them on the terms of their construction and their corresponding explanatory success.

Nevertheless as we mentioned earlier, Macmurray does not approach the mind-body problem in the traditional way. Hence, while the philosophy of mind continues to debate the mind-body problem (Chalmers, 2002) and more precise definitions of reasons and intentions are being sought (Feldman and Buckareff, a2003), Macmurray's agency theory is receiving little attention amongst academic philosophers. In newer academic fields however, such as feminist theology, where there is a shift away from traditional approaches and solutions, Macmurray's person theory is proving useful. First and reminiscent of Macmurray's emphasis on agency, Harrison explains that

'*Do-ing* must be as fundamental as *be-ing*' (Harrison, ch1990, p. 202); that is, underlying feminist theology is the assumption that experience, especially the experience of women, is a valid starting point from which to theorize and, further, that action or praxis is more important than theory. Secondly, as Daly states, 'Feminist theological ethics claims to be informed by an analysis of the interlocking dualisms of patriarchal Western culture. These include the dualisms of male/female, mind/body, and human/nature' (Daly, ch1994, p. 295). Feminist theology insists that the dualism of mind and body, which valorizes the mind over the body and connects the female with the body, thereby regarding her as inferior to the male, must be overcome if female-male equality is to be achieved. Furthermore, the eradication of oppressive dualisms is a necessary step towards achieving equality for other minority groups, including the disabled (Swinton and McIntosh, a2000). Admittedly, Macmurray has been criticized for failing to eliminate gender stereotypes from his work (Parsons, ch2002), but, given the era in which he is writing, he does much to critique traditional gender roles, arguing that women need to be freed from family arrangements that support female subordination (*PC*, pp. 95–6). Thirdly, in its focus on the experience of women, feminist theology seeks 'to build up and deepen *personhood* itself' (Harrison, ch1990, p. 203). In turn, this requires a theoretical concept of personhood, since, in order to be taken seriously, as Fiorenza states, 'feminists cannot afford to be anti-intellectual' (Fiorenza, 1984, p. xviii). Macmurray furnishes feminist theology with the theory it needs to add substance to its experience of embodied persons. Moreover, as we will discuss in due course, Macmurray's concept of the person is necessarily relational, setting out the ethical and political arrangements required for human flourishing. As Farley notes, Macmurray, along with other scholars, is a useful tool for feminist theologians concerned with the importance of mutuality (Farley, ch1994, p. 197).

[1] Macmurray uses 'man' and 'he' to refer to humans in general, in keeping with his era; he implies she or he, but his original words have been retained in quotations.

[2] Macmurray is discussing the logical fallacy involved in Descartes' move from the statement 'I think' to the assumption that this implies 'I am', since 'I think' means that 'I think x' and, therefore, that what I think about x could be false. Moreover 'I think x' is more comprehensively formulated as 'I think x about y', where 'x' is merely an idea and 'y' is an actual object that is known in experience.

[3] For example, to reflect on a premise one must already have knowledge of that premise.

[4] This is a circular set of propositions, but the logical form of the personal requires this.

Chapter 2
Education and the Emotions

Introducing the Emotions

Up to this point our discussion of the self as agent has dealt with the role of thought in action; however, a further corollary of Macmurray's insistence that he does not always 'think first and then act' (*IU*, p. 28) is the contention that the whole of the self is involved in action. Feeling, like knowledge, is essential to action; at least in so far as all activities have motives, since, according to Macmurray, 'all motives belong to our emotional life' (*RE*, p. 3).[1] That is, if an individual had no feelings they would be unable to determine whether any one object was more attractive or more repulsive than any other. Hence, they would have no meaningful capacity for assessing the weight of one thought in relation to another or for choosing one action over another. Consequently for the agent, Macmurray asserts, 'What we feel and how we feel is far more important than what we think and how we think' (*FMW*, p. 142).

While Macmurray is aware that it could be argued that such choices are made in accordance with duty, he suggests that even when persons do what they think they ought to do, regardless of their desire to do otherwise, this choice is still based on feeling, except it is a feeling of reverence for a rule, instead of a feeling that this is a worthwhile thing to do. Although in cases of duty the principle involved implies that the desire to act contrary to a moral rule is at fault, Macmurray contends that 'our thought may be wrong, and our feeling may be right' (*FMW*, p. 144). In fact, he insists

that it is feeling, not thought, that discriminates worthwhile action. The existence of laws of duty reveals that in some previous tradition these rules were felt to be worthwhile; however, if they are at odds with contemporary feeling, this is no longer the case. Hence, Macmurray alleges, it is only that which we feel is valuable today that is worthwhile '*for us*' (*FMW*, p. 144). As with thinking, therefore, for Macmurray, 'it is far better to be real in our feelings than to be right' (*FMW*, p. 150).

Nevertheless, it is possible for an individual to fail to recognize or to misinterpret their feelings, as the practise of psychology testifies (Scherer and Ekman, 1984; Arnold, 1970).[2] Furthermore, Macmurray maintains that, at times, individuals deliberately evade identification of their emotions, with the effect that, where this suppression is widespread or persistent, it becomes impossible for them to detect their feelings unaided, that is, without psychoanalysis (*RE*, p. 12). Yet as Macmurray points out, 'if we are to be real in our feeling we must *know* what we really feel' (*FMW*, p. 146).

Real feelings, like real thoughts then, have their significance and are supported or disputed through their culmination in action. According to Macmurray, 'the practical upshot is quite simple. If we are to be real in our feelings we must act upon them and trust them as guides of our conduct. Then, if they are wrong, we shall discover that they are wrong and be able to put them right' (*FMW*, p. 150). Moreover, while the accuracy of a theory depends upon its adequacy as a representation of that which is not the self, similarly, the accuracy of a feeling is dependent upon the adequacy of its appreciation of the not-self. Thus Macmurray claims that 'real feeling grasps the value of what is not ourselves, and enjoys it or disapproves it' (*FMW*, p. 147). Consequently, a feeling is right if it corresponds to the nature of the object. By way of illustration of this point,

Macmurray suggests either a book that is read for the enjoyment of the narrative it contains or a person who is loved for themselves. In this sense, as we shall see in due course, Macmurray's argument is reminiscent of the Aristotelian concern with the appropriateness of feelings.

A false emotion arises when the nature of the object is misunderstood, whereas an unreal emotion originates when the reference to experience is lost; hence the parallel with thought continues. Thus an unreal feeling mistakenly holds an object to be of value which is not actually valuable in the manner felt, or it regards an action as worthless which is actually worthwhile. Evidently there is a moral agenda here determining what has or does not have intrinsic value; for example, Macmurray states that 'when we feel proud of doing something of which we ought to feel ashamed' (*FMW*, p. 145) this is unreal feeling. Hence, just as it is withdrawal from the world that gives rise to unreal thinking, equally unreal feeling, which has withdrawn from the world and become an end in itself, is, Macmurray claims, 'sentimental' (*FMW*, p. 147). In the illustrations used previously then, unreal feeling is present when the book is read for the emotions that it stimulates or the person is loved for the way they make the lover feel. As with thought therefore, it is possible to accumulate feelings by pursuing purely for pleasure different kinds of feelings in varying degrees, but in so doing the feelings lose their significance. Macmurray is not implying that pleasure in itself is morally wrong, but he is alleging that pleasure seekers have no empirical outlet for testing the validity of their feelings or assessing the adequacy of them.

In order to increase the reality of emotions, it is necessary, as with any fruitful research, to have a sufficient motive for activity. As a motive for examining feelings Macmurray insists that curiosity towards an individual's private life is insufficient, and that self-interested motives

such as this are 'wrong' (*RE*, p. 3). He bases this judgement on the assumption that the importance of the individual is to be found in their existence as a part of the wider society within the history of humanity. That is, a sufficient motive for analysing the emotions exists, and the weight of an individual's private life is realized, when the universal character of their emotional turmoil is recognized. This motive for enquiring into the emotional life is one of emotional reason, whereas a wrong motive, according to Macmurray, employs 'emotional unreason' (*RE*, p. 4).

Reason

However, this seems to be a radical statement when reason is traditionally contrasted with and opposed to emotion. In fact, Macmurray alleges that 'In contrasting reason with emotion we are under one of the strongest influences in our Western tradition – the Stoic dualism of Reason and the Passions, with its prejudice against being emotionally involved in the results of our actions' (*PR*, p. 32). In essence, reason is regarded as the capacity that separates humans from other animals, denoting a higher and more civilized type of being. As such it is equated 'with a state of mind which is cold, detached and unemotional' (*RE*, p. 5). Emotion, however, is portrayed as the brutish aspect of human nature, bearing similarities to the feelings of the lower animals. Consequently, emotion is equated with the instinctive and undisciplined reactions of the body, which need to be separated from the order cultivated by the intellectual and logical workings of the mind. Thus, as a result of the Stoic division of reason and passion, Macmurray maintains, 'We are inclined to think of our feeling as something a little ignominious, something that ought to be subordinated to reason and treated as blind and chaotic' (*FMW*, p. 142). On the contrary though, as we have seen,

Macmurray seeks to reverse mind and body dualism through his principle of agency. He contends that actions based on reason alone (the self-as-subject) have intention without motive, while purely emotional acts (the self-as-object) have desires without intent. Effective action therefore requires both reason and emotion.

Macmurray does not dispute the assertion that the capacity for reason separates human beings from other animals; in fact he claims that it renders them 'super-organic' (*RE*, p. 6) as opposed to being merely organic. Consequently, it is reason that controls the human ability to choose between different courses of action and discover the appropriate method for satisfying a specific purpose. As a defining characteristic of the person then, Macmurray states that 'Whatever is a characteristic and essential expression of human nature must be an expression of reason' (*RE*, p. 7). In particular, he cites science, art and religion as three enduring manifestations of human rationality, which must all be investigated if a full definition of reason is to be gleaned (*RE*, p. 6; *SA*, p. 199). However, there is a striking difference between these activities; namely that science is primarily an intellectual pursuit whereas art and religion are primarily emotional activities. From this it must be concluded, Macmurray contends, that it is not solely thought that demonstrates that which is peculiarly personal; rather, the emotions are equally indicative of reason. If emotions can have rationality in this way, they can be self-regulating and do not need to be subordinated to thought, which is an advantage for the agent, since action is emotional primarily and only secondarily intellectual. It is at this point therefore that Macmurray's definition of reason diverges from the traditional one. As Duncan explains, Macmurray is refuting the dualist perception of human abilities with a threefold conception, distinguishable as intellect, feeling and reason (Duncan, 1990, p. 63).

Nevertheless these three elements are interrelated in the experience of the agent: thought provides knowledge for informed action, emotion provides the motive to act and rationality increases the probability of the action being effective. Macmurray views this trialism (or tripartitism) as a timely construction rather than an entirely revolutionary one, alleging that with the advent of psychology 'Thought has begun to doubt its own monopoly of reason' (*RE*, p. 5).

According to Macmurray: 'Reason is the capacity to behave consciously in terms of the nature of what is not ourselves … reason is the capacity to behave in terms of the nature of the object, that is to say, to behave objectively' (*RE*, p. 7). Although, he suggests, it is possible, and indeed probable, that the capacity to behave objectively will not be fully realized (*IU*, p. 133). When a person does not behave objectively therefore, they behave subjectively, relating conduct to the self instead of to the object. It is as a result of a similar mistake, Macmurray alleges, that the antagonism between determinism and free will arises (*RE*, p. 7). When human beings are considered as if they behave in terms of their own nature, rather than in terms of the nature of the other, it appears as if they behave sometimes in a manner that conflicts with their emotions. However, using the example of a child in a busy road, Macmurray reveals that, while the parent's (or carer's) own nature compels the parent to shout out, in order to avoid frightening the child and causing the child to stand still in front of the oncoming traffic, the parent keeps quiet and reaches out to seize the child. Thus the parent's behaviour reflects the child's nature and is explained by the parent's ability to exhibit objectivity.

Despite the capacity for reason then, this is not sufficient in itself to guarantee successful objectivity; in addition, it is necessary to have accurate knowledge of the nature of the other. Indeed, the impetus to increase rationality, or objectivity, is an integral component of human nature. For

example, the nature of an object, Macmurray holds, is determined through science (*RE*, p. 8). Scientific activity is motivated by the desire to confirm certain hypotheses, but the scientist must be willing to accept the results of experiments even when they contradict their theory, if real knowledge is to be attained (*RE*, p. 9). Moreover, since the motive of every activity is emotional, Macmurray maintains, 'It follows that none of our activities, not even the activities of thinking, can express our reason unless the emotions which produce and sustain them are rational emotions' (*RE*, p. 10).[3]

Rational/Reasonable Emotions

As we have already seen, the assessment of the truth or falsity of an emotion is not based on the emotion itself, but on its reference to the other. Hence Macmurray states that 'feelings can be rational or irrational in precisely the same way as thoughts, through the correctness or incorrectness of their reference to reality' (*RE*, p. 11). Feelings do not, then, have a derivative capacity for reason enabled by their subjection to thinking; on the contrary, in conjunction with the principle of agency, reason is emotional primarily and only secondarily intellectual. Thus to be afraid of an object that presents no danger to the self would be a false or 'improper' emotion (*RE*, p. 11); yet these emotions are commonplace. In fact, Macmurray contends that this is a heightened problem for the post-nineteenth-century civilization, following the emphasis which that era placed on the growth of intellectual reason and the suppression of the emotions. In effect, this has encouraged the development of the private individual more than their social relations. As we mentioned earlier though, the pursuit of the intellect has led to a more sustained and deliberate examination of the emotions, through psychology and psychoanalysis, which,

according to Macmurray, is the beginning of systematic growth in emotional rationality (*RE*, p. 13). Like other scientific activities this is a process of disillusionment, whereby any bias towards the self is removed in favour of accurate reference to the other. It is not merely self-esteem that lacks objectivity, but any self-indulgence, such as self-pity or self-loathing, is also a demonstration of irrationality.

Furthermore, while scientific activity demonstrates intellectual rationality, Macmurray asserts that artistic expression is the behaviour of emotional reason (*RE*, p. 14). As we have already mentioned, objective and subjective emotion is the difference between loving another person and loving one's self when with that person; hence: 'It is an immediate appreciation of the value and significance of real things' (*RE*, p. 15). Consequently, it is the ability to love in the former manner, which, according to Macmurray, creates the distinction between the organic and the superorganic; that is, it is in relationships of love that objectivity is most clearly expressed in action and therefore that the human capacity for rationality achieves its fullest realization (*RE*, p. 15).

For traditionalists the suggestion that emotions are not irrational or even arational, but are capable of possessing rationality, might seem absurd, yet Macmurray's approach to this issue is not an isolated case. One scholar with whom Macmurray shares assertions on this topic is de Sousa. He alleges that 'What remains of the old opposition between reason and emotion is only this: emotions are not reducible to beliefs or to wants' (de Sousa, 1987, pp. xv–xvi). In addition, de Sousa claims that emotions are objective, in the sense that they can provide information about an object in the world that holds regardless of the emotional reaction to it. In other words, in reference to Plato's question, something is loved on the grounds that it is loveable, not merely held to be loveable because it is loved.

This rationality is, de Sousa holds, 'axiological' rationality (de Sousa, 1987, p. 171).[4] Axiological rationality operates on three levels: biological, social and individual. The three levels refer respectively to the appropriateness of an emotion in its normal medically determined aspect, the appropriateness of that emotion as determined by the relevant culture and the appropriateness of that emotion as determined by an individual's constitution. Although axiology is exhibited when an emotion is appropriate to its object, there is no one emotion that is always axiologically rational in any given situation, nor any single situation that demands just one axiologically rational emotion. Further, despite the element of cultural determination involved, de Sousa points out that redefinition of the axiological rationality of a certain emotion in a specific circumstance can be attained by applying the principle: 'Let your emotions be appropriate to the widest possible range of available scenarios' (ibid., p. 187).

Educating the Emotions

For Macmurray, the mere experience of irrational feelings indicates the potential for enlarging the scope of reason in the emotional life (*RE*, p. 17). Moreover, since there has been an enduring concentration on intellectual growth without a comparable focus on the development of feelings, he holds that the occurrence of irrational emotions is hardly surprising. He states that 'primitive, uncultivated feeling is chaotic and unruly, but so is primitive, uncultivated thought' (*FMW*, p. 143). While thought has had the opportunity to gain in maturity, feeling has not, which means that the increase of factual knowledge outweighs the expansion of knowledge of value. Hence information regarding past emotional responses is widespread, yet the ability to detect current feelings remains immature. In

effect, the emotional life is relying on the feelings of others and has, therefore, lost its objectivity. Consequently, to achieve greater rationality of feeling, Macmurray alleges that emotional education is not only a possibility, it is a necessity (*RE*, p. 17).

Even if the need is recognized, however, the nature of the task still has to be understood. The essential aim would be to reduce inappropriate emotions, thereby increasing the number of feelings that do correspond to the nature of items in the world in a variety of composite situations. Although some failure is inevitable, success is more likely if there is a satisfactory comprehension of the sources of irrational feelings. Unreasonable emotions, as we have seen, originate from either a delusion about the nature of the object, a mistake about the feeling stirred or even an inappropriate disinterestedness when confronted with the object. In all these cases though, the problem is subjectivity, requiring the appropriation or the restoration of objectivity, which is, in Macmurray's theory, 'to shift the centre of feeling from the self to the world outside' (*RE*, p. 14).

Rational emotion is enabled, Macmurray asserts, through training in sensuality: 'Sensuality means properly the capacity to enjoy organic experience, to enjoy the satisfaction of the senses' (*RE*, p. 19). Since the term 'sensuality' could be taken to imply unlimited bodily gratification however, Macmurray refers to emotional education as the refinement of 'sensibility' (*RE*, p. 19). Despite making this adjustment in his terminology, Macmurray contends that it is the view of sensuality as something offensive and in need of suppression that has prevented emotional expression and development, thus sustaining undeveloped and irrational feelings. Initially, therefore, any emotional education has to change traditional opinion, so that free emotions can be regarded as commendable.

Sensory awareness is the environment in which thinking, feeling and action occur; hence it is the root of consciousness and the ground of human experience. Macmurray states, 'The richness and fullness of our lives depends especially upon the richness and fullness, upon the delicacy and quality of our sense-life' (*RE*, p. 20). When sensory awareness is undeveloped or when the senses are deliberately restricted to their use as means for particular ends, life is limited. A sensuous life, however, is both varied in experience and full of feeling. Mature sensory awareness, according to Macmurray, recognizes the intrinsic as opposed to the instrumental value of an object, 'appreciating and enjoying it for *itself*' (*RE*, p. 22). If the object were another human being, this would mean being alert to every aspect of that person, entranced by the person's existence rather than the person's utility. This cannot be achieved through thought, since, Macmurray claims, 'Intellectual knowledge … gives us knowledge *about* things, not knowledge *of* them. It does not reveal knowledge of the world as it is. Only emotional knowledge can do that' (*RE*, p. 22). Thus intellectual knowledge, even when it refers adequately to the nature of the object, is confined to programming action towards the fulfilment of a specific purpose by subordinating the emotions to the mental activity involved. Contrary to this, Macmurray explains, a refined sensitivity to the world gives rise to inspired and spontaneous action in which the whole self participates (*RE*, pp. 23–4).

Nevertheless, there is a cost involved in educating the emotions. By encouraging this type of submersion in the sensory awareness of the other, the ability to experience pleasure and recognize beauty is developed; however, the capacity to undergo suffering and discern destruction is increased simultaneously. Paradoxically therefore, as Macmurray states:

> We must choose between a life that is thin and narrow, uncreative and mechanical, with the assurance that even if it is not very exciting it will not be intolerably painful; and a life in which the increase in its fullness and creativeness brings a vast increase in delight, but also in pain and hurt (*RE*, p. 25).

Faced with the choice of pleasure and pain or mediocrity, Macmurray would prefer a vivid, if at times distasteful, existence to an inert and coarse one, on the grounds that the former is 'open to *reality*' (*RE*, p. 27), allowing the human capacity for reason to permeate all areas of life.

In spite of the fact that Macmurray does not explicitly claim as much, there are definite connections between his promotion of an emotional education and Aristotle's understanding of proper feeling. In Aristotle's description of moral education, the purpose of reason, as practical wisdom, is not to eradicate the passions; rather it is to moderate them, ascertaining 'neither too much nor too little' but an 'intermediate' level of feeling (Aristotle, 1980, 2.6, 1106a17–b9). Like Macmurray, Aristotle insists that emotions can be rational, in the sense that 'the irrational element is … persuaded by a rational principle' (ibid., 1.13, 1102b30–1103a10) through knowledge and training. Aristotle maintains that 'in educating the young we steer them by the rudders of pleasure and pain … to enjoy the things we ought and to hate the things we ought' (ibid., 10.1, 1172a15–b2). For Macmurray and Aristotle then, the aim is not to eliminate what are viewed often as negative and unruly passions, but to learn to have adequately directed emotions. Macmurray's theory is consistent with Aristotle's statement that 'The man who is angry at the right things and with the right people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised' (ibid., 4.5, 1125b15–35).

Although Macmurray does not offer an explicit methodology for procuring emotional training, he does present some preliminary remarks on the issue. He states:

There is an increasing recognition in educational circles of the urgent need for a proper training of the emotions. But there is no corresponding understanding … of the nature of the task, so that efforts to meet the need have a curious way of tending, in the result, to defeat their own object. (*RE*, p. 37)

At least part of this failure, he suggests, stems from a misunderstanding of the function of discipline. If discipline is imposed by an authority figure, the outcome will be conformity through repressive indoctrination and harsh punishment. In contemporary education, indoctrination and corporate punishment are outlawed on the grounds of cruelty; nonetheless it is Macmurray's contention that fear-based discipline replaced with appeal to affection is equally deplorable, since it is tantamount to exploitation (*RE*, p. 37, p. 46). Discipline, he insists, simply means 'training' (*RE*, p. 37, p. 47), training that encourages diversity of experience and expression. Hence, while intellectual training does not mean dictating to an individual what they ought to think, emotional training does not imply that the teacher tells the child what they ought to feel. Consequently, it takes an emotionally mature adult to enable children to develop their capacity for reasonable emotions and an intellectually mature adult to teach children to be rational in their thoughts. Moreover, since the pursuit of thought 'finds its discipline in the effort to know' (*RE*, p. 38) through engagement with a plurality of intellectual theories, similarly the pursuit of emotional growth will find its discipline empirically through the struggle to encounter and discriminate the expanse of values in the world. On this basis, Macmurray claims 'Emotional education should be, therefore, a considered effort to teach children to feel for themselves; in the same sense that their intellectual training should be an effort to teach them to think for themselves' (*RE*, p. 39).

In the first place, this training must overcome the traditional subordination of desire to intellect and the

corresponding subordination of body to mind. Problematical dualisms are to be replaced with unity, specifically the unity of feeling and thinking in practical activity. Thus, according to Macmurray, discipline is actually 'integration' (*RE*, p. 48), the integration of the emotions and the intellect through their simultaneous education. Furthermore, on the grounds that action entails a relationship between the self and the other, an holistic approach towards education must involve the integration of one person with another. Hence, Macmurray maintains that 'Instead of training *for* society what is required from the beginning is a training *in* society' (*RE*, p. 51).

In the past, the education of the intellect, in isolation from the emotions, has been directed towards the production of profitable citizens. As such, it has provided children with means and not ends; supplying the power to live well with little discrimination for applying it. Consequently, objects in the world are viewed abstractly as instruments to be put to use, rather than cohesively as objects of wider merit. This imbalance and especially its neglect of personal relationships is, in Macmurray's opinion, a failure to fulfil the proper role of education. He alleges that 'All true education is education in living' (*RE*, p. 42), effectively increasing the quality of children's lives by equipping them with the intellectual and the emotional maturity to live well.

It might seem that Macmurray's engagement with this issue is confined to his early works; indeed, in his published works this appears to be the case. However, this does not mean that he changed his view or that he believed the schools had risen to the task. In 1961, he supported the re-publication of his papers on the emotions (first published as a book in 1935) stating that 'in spite of many shortcomings in detail it still points in the main in the right direction' (*RE*, p. xxi). Furthermore, his own involvement with the founding

of the Wennington School, which favoured communion and holistic personal development over intellectual excellence, is evidence attesting to the seriousness with which he regarded these matters (u1968d; c1935–73).[5] Moreover, he collated his papers on education in the hope of releasing a monograph on the subject (LPE).

Recently though, educational views similar to Macmurray's have gained currency. Some schools have begun to train the emotions, educationalists are writing on the subject, scientific investigation into the neurological and physiological aspects of emotions has increased and been combined with the embodied appraisal approach in feminism and in philosophy (Gilligan, 1982; Prinz, 2004).[6] As a rapidly growing area of philosophical and psychological research, there is much disagreement as to the relationship between mind, thoughts and emotion. Contemporary philosophical research focuses on the relationship between feelings and emotional experiences, the narrative development of the emotions, the extent to which the emotions can be regarded as rational, their role in forming judgements of value and therefore their importance in ethics (Goldie, 2000; Nussbaum, 2001). Overall, there is a philosophical shift from the idea that the emotions are irrational to a recapturing of the Aristotelian or Neo-Stoic view that the emotions are part of intelligence or right reasoning, including reasoning on moral issues (Goldie, 2000; Nussbaum, 2001). Contemporary philosophy of the emotions then combines with psychological analysis in its examination of the importance of emotional development for personal growth and its understanding of the manner in which childhood emotions persist into adulthood (Goldie, 2000; Nussbaum, 2001). In education, the growing numbers of horrific instances of violence on school property is forcing a reassessment of traditional educational principles. Goleman, for example, holds that incidents of violence at

school and wider social problems – such as the increases in crime, depression, eating disorders, drug addiction and marital breakdown – can be attributed, at least in part, to a lack of structured emotional education and a profound emphasis on intellectual ability (Goleman, 1995).

From his neurological and physiological studies, Goleman concludes that, in a sense, human beings have both an intellectual brain and an emotional brain; moreover, the latter at times overrides the former (ibid., pp. 1–29). Further, he claims that childhood IQ (intelligence quotient) scores are unable to predict who, as adults, will demonstrate the greatest aptitude for life or who will struggle to be content and to integrate into society. On these grounds, Goleman alleges that a child's development is affected by 'emotional intelligence' (ibid., p. xii), often referred to as EQ (emotional quotient), at least as much as it is by their intellectual brilliance. Contrary to the tradition which educates children to disentangle the intellectual brain from emotional influence then, Goleman proposes that emotion and intellect be harmonized.

Within the context of a reassuring environment, Goleman asserts, properly trained teachers can enhance the self-awareness and interpersonal skills of their pupils, thus reshaping emotional deficiencies (ibid., pp. 187–228). Hence, emotional education can function as a prevention rather than a cure for what are sometimes referred to as society's ills. In its most effective form, Goleman maintains, EQ is not a new subject on the curriculum complete with examinations and grades; rather it is blended into the daily routine of school life, thereby pervading all other subjects and addressing issues as and when they arise (ibid., pp. 261–88). The abilities that Goleman believes are the central components of EQ, thus contributing to an individual's happiness and social adjustment throughout their life, include 'being able to motivate oneself and persist in the

face of frustrations; to control impulse and delay gratification; to regulate one's moods and keep distress from swamping the ability to think; to empathize and to hope' (ibid., p. 34).

As a concrete example of the effect of emotional maturity on personal growth, Goleman cites 'The Marshmallow Test' (ibid., pp. 80–83), which was carried out in the 1960s by the psychologist Walter Mischel. In the experiment, 4-year-old children were placed in front of a marshmallow and told that they could eat it immediately, but if they waited for ten minutes they would be given two marshmallows. Over the next fifteen years, the progress of the children was intermittently reassessed. The results showed repeatedly that those who had received the second marshmallow were more socially adept and achieved higher academic grades than those who had eaten the single marshmallow; however, this difference could not be mapped onto the graph of their IQ scores. Mischel concluded, therefore, that the ability to deal with setbacks in later life is developed in childhood.

Although many factors could have influenced Mischel's findings, the schools that advocate training in emotional literacy are making comparable claims. In large inner-city schools as well as in small private educational institutions, Goleman reveals that aggression, depression, eating disorders, drug abuse and the breakdown of relationships have decreased since they began to teach emotional competence (ibid., pp. 229–87). Overall, the result of emotional literacy is an increased sense of community in schools and improved IQ scores. Nevertheless, Goleman is not suggesting that the development of EQ is a panacea (ibid., pp. 256–60). However, he is equally adamant that an education in emotional intelligence will have a much greater effect on children's personal well-being and social integration than the mere provision of information about

potential dangers, such as drugs, pregnancy, sexually transmitted infections and bullying.

It seems that Goleman's contemporary study, scientifically and practically, supports Macmurray's earlier contentions; yet emotional education, despite its growth, is having a mixed reception. On the one hand, Eysenck criticizes Goleman for using the term 'intelligence' when referring to the emotions (Eysenck, 2000, pp. 109–10), and Goleman is criticized for popularizing the more scientific account of emotional intelligence put forward by Mayer and Salovey (Salovey and Mayer, a1990; Mayer and Salovey, a1993; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, a2004). On the other hand, focus on the social and emotional aspects of learning (SEAL) in circle-time sessions is 'recommended' by the UK Government's Department for Education and Skills (DfES), on the grounds that these skills are essential for all aspects of school and community life (Crown, p2005). Despite these recommendations, Maxwell and Reichenbach argue that 'the idea of educating the emotions as a dimension of moral education remains something of a taboo subject' (Maxwell and Reichenbach, a2005, p. 292). They explain that, while the practice of emotional education is widespread, it lacks open acknowledgement. For as long as the education of the emotions is regarded as illegitimate, however, its success will be limited. As I argue, it seems that emotional education could be disapproved of for three reasons in particular; yet it is possible to refute these objections on the grounds of misinterpretation (McIntosh, a2001, ch2002).

First, if emotional control meant stultifying or deadening the emotions there would be cause for concern, but this is clearly not the case since there is no attempt to curtail the immediacy of emotions or to dictate acceptable emotional responses, beyond encouraging appropriate empathy and discouraging inappropriate rage for example. In fact, the expression of emotions is supported and ensuing actions

that conflict with society's rules only are questioned; thereby encouraging the development of emotions that adhere to acceptable moral norms. Secondly, reticent people would inevitably be uncomfortable with any attempt to extract overt displays of emotion; however, emotional training is against emotional pretence and actually views this as dangerous.[7] Thirdly, if emotional education led to manifest uniformity of feeling, it could be objected to for the sake of richness and creativity, but this would also be a misdirected argument since diversity of emotional temperaments is encouraged and favoured, while inappropriate emotional responses only, such as malice, are tempered.

Emotional Sincerity

An important corollary of emotional education, for Goleman and for Macmurray, is honesty. It is in consideration of sexual morality, gender distinction and his own definition of chastity that Macmurray emphasizes the importance of 'emotional sincerity' (*RE*, p. 75). Tradition, he explains, provides society with intellectual codes of morality, which require the suppression of emotional desire supposedly via reason; thus the mind dominates the body. Further, traditional gender roles equate the male with intellect and the female with emotion; hence the female is subordinate to the male. In the case of sexual passion in particular, the Christian institution of monogamous marriage is the established rule of moral activity in Britain. The attempt to place sexual desire under a taboo prior to marriage and then to have almost no boundaries for sexual practice within a marital union is, according to Macmurray, 'barbarous duplicity and trickery' (*RE*, p. 75).

On the grounds that it is emotional motives which occasion action, Macmurray holds that morality is properly

monitored by internal rather than external principles; for example, the morality of sexual intercourse could depend on love instead of marriage (*RE*, p. 73). Love, for Macmurray, is other-centred in a realistic way; it recognizes the intrinsic worth of the other person and has no ulterior motive. He states that 'This indicates the true basis for *any* intimate personal relationship and applies universally between persons, whether they are of the same or of different sexes' (*RE*, p. 81). Further, a loving relationship has to be characterized by equality and freedom, in order to prevent the nature of the person from being overshadowed by their function. However, the traditional gender distinctions, particularly within marital relationships, serve to promote dependency and inequality. On this basis Macmurray assumes that 'there is as much sexual immorality inside marriage as outside it' (*RE*, p. 82); hence he advocates a reconfiguration of social unity and family life.

While contemporary British society contains a multitude of types of families, which, where characterized by relationships of equality, are supported by Macmurray's theory, his account of moral sex is at odds with current practice. Sexual activity is, he asserts, one of the possible expressions of love, and, as such, it is moral only within the context of a loving relationship. Even if two people consent to treat each other as sexual objects then, by Macmurray's standards, this would constitute immoral and unchaste sex since it would be pretence of love (*RE*, p. 80). Moreover he alleges that the organic purpose of sexual activity makes the distinction between love and lust difficult to detect; thus he suggests that only relationships without sexual desire can be entirely chaste (*RE*, p. 83). Nevertheless, chastity, in Macmurray's opinion, means emotional sincerity rather than celibacy or virginity (*RE*, p. 78). Clearly there is substantial ambiguity here concerning the place of sex. It seems that Macmurray's philosophical outlook advocates sexual

freedom within the boundaries only of emotional sincerity, while his Protestantism causes him to retain a rather guarded and at times negative view of sexual relations. Admittedly, the association of moral sex with love rather than marriage amongst Catholic and Protestant Christianity is debated still (Moore, 1992; Thatcher, 2002); nevertheless, the suggestion that lust or sexual intercourse without love lacks morality is at odds with contemporary social norms in Britain, even though greater sexual freedom is accompanied by a sustained belief in the value of sexual fidelity (ESRC, wJune2005).

Positively then, the possibility of promoting fidelity and stable relationships is contained within Macmurray's theory. As he points out, it is the effort to subdue sexual appetite that animates it and creates 'a state of sexual hypersensitiveness, as a result of which we greatly overestimate the strength and violence of natural sexuality' (*RE*, p. 82). Macmurray's emphasis on equality and freedom could lead to greater sexual happiness in secular society by ruling out sexual relations when one party is involuntarily submissive or powerless. Amongst Christian society, if love is to be the proper guide for sexual morality as Macmurray proposes, it has to be emotionally sincere. Consequently, when love is said to be blind to defects or when love is upheld as an instrument of social unity, this, Macmurray maintains, is not love, but 'sentimentalism' (*RE*, p. 74) and emotional insincerity.

Emotional insincerity, Macmurray claims, is similar to intellectual insincerity; that is, while the latter implies the dishonest expression of thoughts, the former refers to the dishonest expression of feelings (*RE*, p. 75). There are, therefore, two possibilities of insincerity in both cases. Negative insincerity is when an individual claims to think something that they do not think or pretends to feel something that they do not really feel. Positive insincerity is

when an individual fails to state a belief that they do hold, which would be 'to someone else's advantage' to know, or conceals a feeling that they do feel 'from someone to whom it makes a real difference' (*RE*, p. 76). Emotional sincerity then is the non-expression of feelings that are absent and also the expression of feelings that are present.

Nevertheless, Macmurray acknowledges that the effort to pursue emotional sincerity would be an arduous challenge, especially since it is at odds with the historical Christian instruction to be intellectually sincere in the relaying of truths, but emotionally insincere in the feigning of warmth and understanding. He declares that 'though we think it wrong to tell lies – that is, to express a thought which we don't really think, we often think it right and virtuous to express a feeling that we don't feel. It is not right; it is completely demoralizing' (*FMW*, p. 150).[8] Indeed, for Macmurray, emotional sincerity has an even greater significance than intellectual sincerity due to the fact that the emotions are the impetus of action. However, he views insincerity in any form to be destructive on the grounds that its persistence leads to irreparable self-deception and the disruption of personal integrity. In his opinion, 'Emotional pretence leads to emotional insensibility' (*RE*, p. 77). That is, while an individual can be persuaded that falsehoods are truths, they can be convinced equally that they feel something which they do not feel.

In spite of this argument for emotional sincerity, Macmurray expects his interpretation of emotional education to be criticized for appearing to support moral decline, particularly in terms of extra-marital sex and the breakdown of marriage.[9] On the contrary, he alleges, the rejection of certain intellectual principles is moral progress in so far as it increases personal integrity (a1938a, pp. 418–19). Moreover he offers some reassurance to potential critics by claiming that emotional sincerity will increase

monogamous marriage if this is the most appropriate means for expressing love. However, if marriage is not the most appropriate expression of love, then it will be abandoned, but this will be in the interests of real and objective emotions (a1965, pp. 379–85). Free feeling, he states, 'will not guarantee us security or pleasure or happiness or comfort: but it will give us what is more worth having, a slow gradual realization of the goodness of the world and of living in it' (*FMW*, p. 49).

An individual who has neither real thoughts nor real feelings cannot act freely, since, Macmurray holds, 'we are bound, determined and unfree in proportion as we are ourselves unreal' (*FMW*, p. 163). An unreal person is inward-looking and 'egocentric' (*FMW*, p. 155), concerned with how they feel and with what others think. Hence both their thoughts and feelings are unreal; they are not drawn from their own encounter with the world. Thus action is either prevented by thoughts which contradict feeling or it is rendered specious by feelings which contradict thoughts; as Macmurray claims, 'The effect of such a struggle between thought and feeling is that thought becomes abstract and formal, while feeling becomes sentimental' (*FMW*, p. 159). An unreal person is dependent upon others for their sense of significance, playing the martyr to keep others indebted; they have no sense of who they are.

On the contrary, real thoughts and real feelings result in the freedom to act creatively, without restraint. A real person has a full and vital life, through which they know, delight in and respond to their encounter with the world. According to Macmurray, 'To be real is to live by the reality that is in you, and from within outwards. It is to be yourself. And we can only be ourselves for other people' (*FMW*, p. 162). As we have seen, for Macmurray, human nature is defined by its capacity for active self-transcendence; free action, therefore, is objective.

From Macmurray's account of the importance of emotional education, it becomes clear that he suspects that most people are not engaging in free action, having only been intellectually trained. Emotionally, he suspects that the majority of people are unable to assent to the values held by their ancestors, but they have only a limited ability for discriminating between feelings. He refers to this as the 'modern dilemma' (*FMW*, pp. 15–25). Consequently, people have the means to act without the ends to achieve; intellectually they know how to do something, but they cannot decide what would be worth doing.

Means and Ends in Action

As we have mentioned, Macmurray connects the means to engage in action with the power that scientific knowledge affords, while he attaches the ability to differentiate between the ends which are worth achieving through action with the artistic attitude. The awakening of spontaneity, through the sensory awareness of values, that an emotional education would occasion, therefore, involves 'training in artistry' (*RE*, p. 42). Consequently, Macmurray's attempt to replace Cartesian dualism with a theory of agency, unites mind and body by integrating the intellect and the emotions and adhering science and art. Since Macmurray considers the pertinence of scientific means to be more widely acknowledged than the relevance of artistic ends, the substance of the former is more tangible than the latter. Thus, in his early work, his focus is directed towards the explication of the limits of scientific enquiry. In so doing, he is hinting at the relation of science to art that he expounds in his later works. Throughout the unfolding of this exposition the accent is on the appropriation of science and art for effective action.

When an action is proving to be ineffective, by failing to realize the intention, it needs to be adjusted. Further, since acting, as opposed to reacting, has a cognitive base its adjustment begins with modification in knowledge. Macmurray states that 'The knowledge which is involved in action has two aspects, which correspond to the reflective distinction between means and end' (*PR*, p. 173). In conjunction with the integration of thinking and feeling then, it is emotional knowledge that aids agents in their choice of ends and intellectual knowledge that provides them with the necessary means. Hence, intellectual cognition designates the instrumental worth of an object, whereas emotional cognition relates to its intrinsic value (*RAS*, p. 52). The latter allows the agent to select a desirable outcome from the range of possible options, while the former enables the agent to control the success of an action in its method. Both the means and the ends are chosen in the anticipation that they will accomplish what is intended; thus either means, ends or both could be inappropriate. If the available means are inadequate, then the desired end would not be reached, but if the end is misconstrued, then the outcome of the action will not have the appeal expected. If the means are deficient and the ends are in error, therefore, acting will be utterly dissatisfactory. In any of these situations the intention would not be attained, action would be thwarted and reflection would follow. When the means are the problem, reflective concentration is given to what is essentially scientific knowledge, while difficulties attributable to the ends compel reflection which attends to primarily artistic knowledge. As reflective activities, science and art both have their source in the agent's experiential relation to items in the world; however, their aims and methods are distinct. Fundamentally, it is the perception of the other that constitutes the demarcation between scientific and artistic cognizance. As we have noted,

Macmurray holds that the agent can treat the 'World-as-means' (*SA*, p. 199) or they can view the world-as-end.

Science and Action

According to Macmurray, there is a necessary historical progression from the physical to the biological and finally to the psychological sciences, providing three categories of means (*BS*; *IU*). Yet it would not be credible for him to assert that there could be no biology before physics was properly comprehended, or that there could be no psychological investigation before biology had been completely developed.[10] Nevertheless, the psychological studies do need the biological and the biological needs the physical for a fuller understanding of the field of data, inasmuch as organisms are partially comprised of matter and people are partially organic and material.

In addition, Macmurray reveals, the closer the investigation comes to including people in its range the greater its impact on action and, therefore, its emotive content (*BS*, pp. 16–18). With the psychological sciences, the distinction between the subject carrying out the research and the object being investigated is blurred, which makes the possibility of sustaining disinterested observation more difficult (ch1975, pp. 7–23; *BS*, p. 87).[11] Consequently, it takes more courage and persistence to engage in beneficial psychological investigation than to pursue physics. On this basis, Macmurray alleges, it is particular societies that produce types of science, not vice versa. For example, he ascribes the rapid growth of physics to the attitude of progress that replaced the static attitude of the Middle Ages (*BS*, pp. 40–44).[12] Its ignition, he holds, was due to environmental changes that rendered the control of matter immediately important. Once matter is under human direction, the accumulation of means advances to the

inclusion of organic authority and eventually proceeds to include human beings themselves. It is in the interests of expanding the field of scientific expertise, then, that physics evolves into biology and psychology. However, there is a crucial difference in the application of scientific cognition, as means in action, between psychology and either physics or biology. Physics and biology acquire knowledge for its own sake and give rise to theoretical progress, in contrast with the practical progress that psychological information inevitably effects. In essence, physics and biology design society's external conditions, whereas the systematic pursuit of the psychological sciences represents an attempt to command the inner structure of human society. Thus, for Macmurray, this is the difference between discovering what can be used as means to serve humans and asking who can be controlled by their fellow human beings (*BS*, p. 164).

In particular, it is the inner aspect of behaviour rather than its outer demonstration that psychology seeks to manipulate. As we have seen, in Macmurray's opinion, the possibility of concentrating on the intention of an action includes the existence of habitual activities which do not require attention. However, if a habit malfunctions and the individual concerned is unable to change it, then the action it gives rise to will not fulfil the intention. When a habit is resulting in undesirable behaviour, psychoanalysis is able to apply the findings of psychology in order to bring this 'unconscious' (*BS*, p. 117) aspect of action into consciousness. Consequently, the determined element of action can be released from its earlier determination, being freed to follow an alternative course, altering the ensuing behaviour and increasing the chances of realizing the intention (*BS*, p. 206).

Despite the special status of the type of scientific knowledge that psychology affords, Macmurray still explicates the nature of science in general and, therefore,

the cognition that functions as means in action (*BS*, p. 22; *RAS*, pp. 11–17). Although he does not acknowledge his sources, the works of Popper and Polanyi both have points of connection with his description of science (Popper, 1957, pp. 130–52; Polanyi, 1974, pp. 131–49). Initially, he claims, the scientist constructs hypotheses from their immediate experience of the world. Then they engage in impartial and repeated experimentation, in order to verify or refute the hypotheses, with the aim of constructing generalized and universally applicable laws for instrumental purposes (a1926b, pp. 192–212). That is, they are concerned with matters of fact (*BS*, p. 131).

Due to the overemphasis on the intellectual life, Macmurray contends, the prevailing attitude in modern society is the scientific one; hence humans indulge in contact with items in the world in order to assess the potential utility of them (*RAS*, p. 22). If scientific knowledge occupies nearly the entirety of reflective exertion, then as well as pursuing the facts, science is forced into making decisions concerning the goals to which those facts shall be employed. In this sense, Macmurray holds, 'science is out of bounds' (*RAS*, p. 23). The appropriation of means requires a determination of valuable ends through the emotional life, which is the proper control of science. Current developments in stem cell research and genetic engineering are ensuring that the ethical use of science remains a controversial issue (Cohen, a2005; Lindsay, a2005). Science itself cannot be subjected to value judgements since in itself it is inert; rather it is the use to which science is put by human beings that is open to assessment. Hence it follows that science requires art in so far as it is the artist who engages in a reflective determination of ends.

Art and Action

In practical terms, science and art are inseparable. Emotional reflection cannot be carried out in isolation from intellectual knowledge since, as Macmurray states, 'any assertion of value presupposes what is matter of fact; and the experience of value includes and supervenes upon the apprehension of fact' (*RAS*, p. 32). In so far as it is only the application and not the pursuit of science that needs art, whereas the actual activity of art makes use of science, Macmurray holds that art presents a more extensive consideration of the facts than scientific assessment (*RAS*, p. 29). This elaboration of the interdependence of facts and values might not seem radical today, yet at the time of Macmurray's proposal, facts and values were often considered to be independent and so it was an unusual submission. Despite this integration however, Macmurray's description of art and artworks is substantially comprised of their antithesis to scientific activity.

Primarily, while scientific reflection is an intellectual construction of generalized principles about an object, he regards artistic reflection as an emotional process of particularization, through which the intrinsic as opposed to the utility values of the object are recognized. Consequently he asserts, 'The receptivity of art, the artistic consciousness of the object, is *knowledge proper*, as distinct from the understanding of or information about the object, which is all science can give us' (*RE*, p. 92). Fundamentally then, the artist seeks to know an object in its individuality, that is, in itself rather than in its relation to the self. Hence the essential characteristic of the aesthetic attitude, he alleges, is contemplation (*RAS*, p. 33) through which the critical appraisal of the object is successively refined and the corresponding emotions are continuously transformed. According to Macmurray, this artistic process is intuitive (*RAS*, p. 38), which, Ewens explains, implies that the artist intuitively, as opposed to intellectually, knows when a

person has comprehended the worth of the object and is, therefore, experiencing appropriate feelings in response to it (Ewens, a1992, p. 342).

It is possible for any human being to cultivate this aesthetic attitude, whereas, Macmurray points out, for the artist it culminates in the creation of a work of art (a1925, pp. 173–89). An artwork begins, then, with meditation on an actual item in the world; its completion, though, is not a merely factual portrayal of that object, rather it is a symbolic representation of the sensual experience which the object gives rise to, regardless of whether this is sadness or happiness, repulsion or attraction. Thus, in Macmurray's opinion, the artist does not create because they have apprehended the other, instead, the artist attempts to present their vision of the inner worth of an object (*RE*, p. 99).[13] Subsequent to its creation, then, the work of art is surrendered to an audience who submit it to a further stage of critical appreciation and aesthetic attention.

During the era of post-modernism and post-structuralism, Barthes insists that 'the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author' (Barthes, 1977, p. 148); whereas Macmurray relinquishes the importance of neither artist nor spectator. On the contrary, while Macmurray does not argue that the author has the authoritative statement on interpretation, he argues that the artwork is an expression of the artist as an individual (*RAS*, p. 40). In addition, it is the audience's interpretation of a work of art that determines whether it is valued as an artwork that successfully portrays the uniqueness of an object. If the emotions are rational, that is, if the capacity for sensibility has been cultivated, then the valuation of the piece by its audience will correspond to the extent that the artist has actually achieved objectivity, initially in contemplation and subsequently in creation (Wolff, 1981, pp. 117–43). However, an emotionally and, therefore, artistically

uneducated audience would respond irrationally to pieces that did not capture the intrinsic worth of an object, valuing the pieces for the emotions they stimulate. Consequently, the valuation of the piece would be relying upon its effect rather than its statement. In this respect Macmurray shares Collingwood's understanding of art; they both maintain that a piece which is praised for the feelings it gives rise to instead of for its own sake has failed to adequately apprehend and express the nature of the object (*RE*, p. 14; Collingwood, 1958). It follows, therefore, that these pieces are not properly referred to as works of art. A work of art, Macmurray insists, requires no external reference; that is, the artist's grasp of the nature of the object is such that they represent the object as complete in itself (a1934b, p. 24).

Aesthetic attention to a work of art, then, has the same qualifications as it does in reference to non-art objects, but at this point the description becomes circular. Aesthetic appreciation, for Macmurray, is simply that sensuous-experience which has no reference to the self; on the contrary, the self is disinterestedly engrossed in the object. A work of art, in Macmurray's opinion, is a human creation, deliberately representing the artist's aesthetic appreciation of an object. Presumably the term 'represents' implies that the work of art gives rise to a similar aesthetic appreciation in its audience, but it is not clear who decides that a piece of potential art has succeeded in recreating this experience and thus does qualify as a work of art. When a human creation, intended to reveal the intrinsic worth of an object, is aesthetically appreciated by an individual they could classify the piece as a work of art, at least for that individual. Hence it seems that the creation would need to be successful for only one individual in order to be regarded as a work of art, but any such recognition would be wholly relative. Moreover, the failure to reproduce the encounter

could be the fault of an insufficiently trained audience, not the artist, yet it is not clear who would judge whether this was the case. Thus the classification 'work of art' requires that it gives rise to aesthetic attention of the object in itself, where 'itself' already refers to a work of art, with the result that Macmurray's explication is unable to offer an intelligible distinction between art and non-art.

Nonetheless, he is able to comment on the extension of the artistic attitude. When an artist creates, both spontaneity and imagination are involved, expanding the previous perception of what constitutes art. Consequently, training in artistry is substantially different from an education in science; intellectual facts are static, whereas emotional values are fluid. For the purpose of schooling, therefore, Macmurray contends that art is not a subject to be taught in the same way that science is taught; rather aesthetic appreciation is an attitude with which an individual becomes infected by meeting with artistic people (LPE, 1.3). This fluidity implies that as society progresses, becoming increasingly alert to pleasure and pain, its understanding of value will change. Education in art history, then, is a requirement for understanding the aesthetic attention that inherited works of art command. For today's audience, however, it is originality as opposed to reproduction that will render a work of art precious. Macmurray states that:

> it is the modern artists we must look to ... the old masters are useless. They have no knowledge of the actual world in which we live, out of which a new world might be created ... The cult of the antique may develop taste, but it tends to destroy artistic receptivity. For the old has done its work of social transformation. (*RE*, p. 100)

Science without art is essentially cognition without vision, and in the absence of vision a society stagnates. Future progress will be the result of objective and spontaneous action, Macmurray contends, springing from a reflective

comprehension of both means and ends. Scientific knowledge of an object cannot be put to creative use if there is no aesthetic appreciation of that object. It follows, therefore, that if human nature is defined by the capacity for active self-transcendence, as Macmurray alleges, human beings need to be both scientists and artists. Agents can only realize their intentions if both their thoughts and feelings are rational. Objective action, then, has an aesthetic motivation, but it is rendered effective by scientific information. Yet in contrast with scientific knowledge which has developed significantly, Macmurray maintains that art has had no equivalent growth. Both the Renaissance and the Romantic periods, he suggests, were attempts to free the emotions from the dominance of the intellect; however, their success in this respect was short lived (*CH*, p. 168). Nevertheless, he would have to acknowledge that the twentieth century is testimony to rapid growth in the field of art. As Gombrich reveals, twentieth-century art appears to have broken with traditional structures in all areas; for example, visual art has combined with science to invent the mobile, while the ability of surrealism to use one shape to represent many things is unprecedented (Gombrich, 1978). Moreover, the development of technology sees art galleries in the twenty-first century faced with the increasing complexities of displaying digital art (Weil, a2002).

Evaluating Fact and Value

If Macmurray's relation of science and art to each other is credible, then the partial introduction of emotional education to complement its intellectual counterpart is an indication that the nature of humanity and the direction of its development are being realized. Primarily, as we have seen, Macmurray's emphasis on the need for sciences and

arts rests on the assumption that the scientific knowledge of matters of fact cannot be substituted for the artistic knowledge of matters of value. This belief is not unusual; indeed O'Hear insists that the purpose of scientific enquiry is to present others with a value-free representation of the world (O'Hear, 1991, pp. 223–9). It is only once the application of scientific knowledge becomes an issue that value judgements cannot be avoided. On the one hand, it could be argued that value judgements have already been made before a scientific project is given funding, so the scientists ought to consider the ends to which the financiers will put their scientific discoveries. On the other hand, scientific realists may argue that the scientific quest in itself is a search for facts about the world; consequently it is concerned with what is the case and not with what ought to be done.

Nevertheless, it is not necessarily the case that exempting the scientific endeavour from making value judgements would sanction, as Macmurray purports, the bestowal on the art world of the responsibility for endorsing the social applications of scientific knowledge. Yet Margolis and Blocker admit that artistic creation does bear some correlation to the emotional perception of matters of value (Margolis, 1980, p. 191; Blocker, 1979, p. 221). Within this acknowledgement, though, the presumption either that the audience's feelings towards a work of art are inherently representative of the artist's, or that the artist has expressed the final and the most adequate understanding of the world, is not meant to be included. Provided these two pitfalls are avoided, then, it seems plausible to present the artistic temperament as the attitude that can balance and supplement the scientific disposition, adding an end to the means. Moreover, these problematic assumptions can be evaded if the description of art and artworks is flexible. In this respect, Gill explains, Macmurray escapes any tendency

to construct an immobile definition by insisting on active progression, which demands that aesthetic notions of value are always in flux (Gill, 1989, p. 20).

As we have seen, this leaves rather vague terms for distinguishing between art and non-art, but Macmurray makes no claims to be presenting a solution to this problem. Rather it is his emphasis on the aesthetic appreciation as that which counteracts an overly instrumental view of the world, by identifying the intrinsic worth of the objects in the world, which is significant. Moreover, his concern with the necessity of valuing items for their own sake in order to put means to ends gives art an essential function in the business of living. On these grounds then, in spite of difficulties in detail, Macmurray is profitably offering a description of two contrasting attitudes towards the world that must be interrelated if action is to be effective. Consequently, engagement with works of art, which is often considered to be a luxury and a hobby, is elevated to the status of scientific pursuit as an essential component in the development of human nature and the ability to live well (LMA).

Conclusion

We have been concerned to assert the significance of Macmurray's holistic account of the person, while recognizing also that it contains certain ambiguities. Overall we have argued that Macmurray's portrayal of the embodied self is praiseworthy. In reference to the initial publication of Macmurray's text *The Self as Agent*, one reader concluded that his different approach to the definition of the person was needed, but that society was not ready for it ('Finding Directions in Philosophy', r1958, p. 65). It seems that this reader was correct and that today's society is beginning to discover the benefits in Macmurray's theory. In particular,

the self-transcending capacity of the human being, as demonstrated through action, renders Macmurray's work of primary importance, even if his cogency, in places, might be questioned. For this reason we began with Macmurray's rejection of substance dualism, in which we claimed that mental activity is derived from intentional physical activity. While thinking is a characteristic pursuit of human beings, its application in action is familiar also. Thought itself cannot satisfy bodily needs such as thirst and hunger; this requires action. Nonetheless, this is not the whole argument, since thinking, while being a different kind of activity to the practical, is itself a property of and an aid to agency. As Fox shows, 'This does not mean that all our thought *must* issue in action, or even that it *should* do so, but thinking must have a constructive relation to [physical] activity, at least in the sense that by means of it we become a different sort of responder' (Fox, a1985, p. 170).

Consequently, we have claimed that the meaning of thought is to be found in its reference to action and, therefore, that mind and body are both inherent parts of human existence.[14] Thus we have not critiqued substance dualism in terms that portray the mental and the physical as the same substance, but we have used Macmurray's theory to reject the allegation of substance dualism that the mental is independent of the physical. While Bertocci insists that Macmurray fails to surmount Descartes' division of mind and body 'except by fiat' (Bertocci, r1959, p. 421), Macmurray's insistence on the realm of experience, as the source of his theory of agency, weakens the force of Bertocci's criticism. Furthermore, even if Bertocci were justified in his assertion, this would not mean that Macmurray's position was unsuccessful in its attempt to improve on the Cartesian system. Indeed, whether or not Macmurray has effectively disproved mind-body dualism is not as significant as the assessment of the intelligibility of his proposals, since his

overarching aim is to display 'the unity of human experience' (*SA*, p. 13) and thence to clarify what it means to be a person.

Yet with experience as the handmaid of agency and the ground of reality, it could seem that persons exists in their own private world, but this is not the case. On the contrary, as Johann explains, the emphasis on experience renders existence contingent, rather than making reality subjective (Johann, a1964, p. 326). The experience that I have is unique for me, but only in the sense in which there is just one I. Inherent in action is the existence of the other; hence you are also part of my experience (thus the importance of the other will be the focus of later chapters of this book). As far as the postulation of agency as a positive which includes its negative is concerned, there can be no definitive theoretical validation or refutation of it since, as O'Connor establishes, 'it can only be exhibited and illustrated in use' (O'Connor, a1964, p. 482).

Furthermore, an analysis of Macmurray's effort to unify human experience does not simply rest on the postulation of agency, it must also acknowledge the difference it makes to the roles of reason, emotion, science and art. By defining rationality as recognition of the nature of the other, as we have seen, Macmurray is able to allege that the emotions do not need to be brought under the authority of the intellect. His emphasis on the validity of the emotions as an essential aspect of the experience of embodied persons is a key theme in feminist theory, informing an ethic of care that has much in common with Macmurray's understanding of personal relations, which we will examine in due course (Gilligan, 1982). Moreover, his Neo-Aristotelian account of the emotions as rational evaluative judgements and in need of education has affinities with growing areas of contemporary philosophy, psychology and education (Goldie, 2000; Nussbaum, 2001; Mayer, Salovey and

Caruso, a2004; Crown, p2005). It is in the area of emotional education that Macmurray's philosophy has its most current potential; in particular, clearer analysis of the relationship between emotions and feelings is needed, alongside a more consistent approach to emotional education, especially in respect of moral education (Nussbaum, 2001; Maxwell and Reichenbach, a2005). It is clear that well-educated emotions are required for personal fulfilment and success as a moral or virtuous agent. At present, emotional education in British schools focuses on discussions of emotional experiences and relationship problems, whereas Macmurray highlights also the significance of the artistic temperament, in relation to value judgements, and hence the need for training in art (Crown, p2005). Consequently, there is scope for Macmurray's insistence on the importance of art in the development of the person and in the discernment of valuable ends in action to be realized. In this respect, Phillips asserts, Macmurray insufficiently defines the meaning of the terms 'means' and 'ends' within the activity of art itself (Phillips, r1963, p. 186). Nonetheless, we have shown that the specifics of Macmurray's explanation, with reference to science and art in themselves, are not of primary significance for his purpose. Instead it is the equal possibility of objectivity and yet the distinction between the attitudes of science and art that warrants attention. In addition, Macmurray's recognition of the joint importance of science and art as mutually benefiting activities for effective action, inasmuch as the intellect informs and the emotions motivate physical activity, is worthy of serious consideration. Further, the consequence of this position, Fielding contends, is that it views education as a personal process (Fielding, chForthcoming, p. 9), in contrast with the technical manner in which it is usually approached. In this sense, Macmurray's comprehensive understanding of the personal presents an enormous challenge.

What Macmurray's agency theory loses that substance dualism allows is egocentrism. When the intellectual life is emphasized and forms the mainstay of the definition of the person, retreat into reflective activity is the goal. However, when the stress is on practical activity, especially objective practical activity, the demands on persons are greater than this, since their existence is from within outwards. Hence Macmurray's theory is both descriptive and prescriptive. In its descriptive aspect, it follows the intuitive drive to construct a definition of the person that includes mental and physical, intellect and emotions. In essence, the holism in Macmurray's account is refreshing, fulfilling the criteria of unifying human experience, at least in terms of the integrity of the self. As a prescription, Macmurray supposes that individuals realize their essential existence as persons by developing their capacity for spontaneous and rational action. Nonetheless, the possibility of realizing personhood and the manner in which this process originates brings the nature of the other and its relation to the self to the fore; hence it is to this area of Macmurray's interpretation of the personal that now we turn our attention.

[1] Macmurray uses the terms 'feeling(s)' and 'emotion(s)' interchangeably. In contemporary philosophy of the emotions, feelings are taken often to be the non-cognitive element of emotional experiences (Goldie, 2000; Nussbaum, 2001); hence, while using the terms 'feeling' and 'emotion' interchangeably does not help to define them, it is compatible with the view that feelings are essential components of emotions.

[2] Psychologists confirm also Macmurray's insistence that feelings motivate action.

[3] Reason is the capacity to act in terms of the nature of the other; hence rational activity is activity that expresses reason by referring to the nature of the object. Thus a rational thought or emotion is referred to also as reasonable. In this sense, the terms 'reasonable' and 'rational' are used interchangeably. In Macmurray's work then, the terms 'appropriate' and 'adequate', when used of emotions/feelings, thoughts or action, mean object-centred (and therefore rational/reasonable).

[4] Axiology implies worth or value, as opposed to the duty in deontology and the goodness or truth contained in strategic and cognitive rationalities.

[5] In addition to the points stated, Macmurray is concerned with the pressure examinations place on school children and the negative effect they have on personal growth and expression. Despite the idealistic-sounding ethos of Wennington School, it was praised for the quality and standard of the work its pupils produced; eventually, due to financial problems, it closed down.

[6] The embodied appraisal approach argues, following William James, that emotions are a form of perception, involving nature and nurture, relating to our well-being.

[7] Goleman claims, on the contrary, that children who are made to hug, kiss or say 'I love you', to someone for whom they feel nothing of the sort, will not only experience bitterness, but will be more vulnerable and less likely to seek help if ever faced with the horrific situation of sexual abuse or rape, since they will have learnt that so-called affection is an emotion which can be forced upon them (Goleman, 1995, p. 256).

[8] His wife's novel, if biographical, implies that Macmurray found this theory difficult in practice. In the novel it is the male character who upholds the virtue of emotional sincerity in theory, but fails to express his love for a woman to whom he is not married, whereas his wife does act on her love for another man and, after the event, her husband struggles temporarily to find this acceptable (Macmurray, E.H., 1935).

[9] Although Macmurray's work was regarded with some suspicion during his lifetime, his views have now been appropriated by Thatcher in an attempt to liberate the Christian description of sexuality (Thatcher, 1993, pp. 57, 62, 76).

[10] For instance, Aristotle's *De Anima* is evidence of an early interest in psychology.

[11] Hence, the invention of the subconscious/unconscious referring to the accidental as opposed to the intentional/personal aspect of behaviour (*BS*, p. 144).

[12] Before this progress, there was obviously some scientific knowledge; for example, tools were used in the ancient world (Gandz, 1969, pp. 3–14).

[13] Valuation of an object for its own sake is a standard Kantian definition of the aesthetic.

[14] In several respects, the ideas of Macmurray's with which we have dealt reflect those of Dewey, especially in relation to thought and action (Dewey, 1958). There is, however, no evidence that Macmurray was familiar with Dewey's work.

PART II
Developing as a Person

Chapter 3
The Human Infant

Introduction

As a complementary and essential aspect of Macmurray's postulation of agency, the rejection of the self as primarily thinker includes the denial of the solitary self. Both the self as agent and the self in relation are central tenets of his perception of the person and, therefore, crucial to this work. Since we have examined the 'I do' in Part I, the aim of Part II is to investigate the relation of the self to the other. In particular, this involves the distinction of the definition of the person from the conceptions of matter and organisms. It is in his earliest works that Macmurray begins his attempt to construct an adequate concept of the person, on the basis that mathematical and organic descriptions fail to account for those characteristics that are peculiar to persons (ch1927b, pp. 178–215). However, since in the past no satisfactory description has been formulated, Macmurray struggles to complete this task. As we mentioned in Part I, he seeks to avoid using the phrase 'the self' except for convenience, due to its dualist and theoretical connotations. Initially, then he refers to 'personality', but during the process of refining his theory he recognizes the misunderstanding that might arise from this syntax; hence in his later works he uses the phrase 'the personal'. As Duncan points out, this diction has less preconceived implications, but it is somewhat opaque (Duncan, 1990, p. 35). Both Macmurray's endeavour and the purpose of this work, then, are to clarify the meaning of the personal.

Clearly, Macmurray's perception of the personal is grounded in the historical understanding of the person, which includes attributes such as self-consciousness, moral capacity and sociality; however, he does not accept the traditional account of these attributes. By examining the nature of self-consciousness in particular, Macmurray fortifies his suspicion that there is a real difference between human beings and other animals. In fact, he explains that this distinction is recognized in practice, if not in theory, by academics and laypersons alike. Although there are some animal rights groups as well as certain pet owners, who place animals on a pedestal and elevate their status above that of human beings, it is commonly held that human beings are superior to other animals. As we discussed in Part I, while psychology operates from a deterministic model of the human being's mental states, the progression of psychotherapy depends on the view that human beings have special access to their internal states. Thus disregarding the possibility of arguing that human superiority is a fallacy, Macmurray is convinced that there are valid grounds for treating humans differently from the other animals. This argument rests on the assertion that human beings are persons. However, in order to have a cognitive comprehension of the human being as a person, Macmurray maintains that a category is required that is not merely an extension of the abilities of other animals. Although the need for a new form with which to represent the human being as a person is the essence of Macmurray's early writings, the development of such a form, with the corresponding explanation of when and how a human being can be meaningfully referred to as a person, is present only in his later work.

Fundamentally, Macmurray's understanding of the uniqueness of the person stems from the notion that every human being needs to be in a relationship with another

person. In his early monographs, the preparation for this tenet is exhibited in his claim that human nature is characterized by its capacity for 'spontaneous objectivity' (*FMW*, p. 178). According to Macmurray, the level of self-transcendence that this spontaneity denotes is not found in material objects or organic objects; in fact this is the capacity that renders humans 'superorganic' (*PC*, p. 67). Moreover, it is Macmurray's contention that this quality is exhibited from birth; however he does not state this explicitly until *Persons in Relation*. Besides one other unpublished lecture, the detail in *Persons in Relation* seems to be the only significant examination of the relationship between the human infant and the infant's mother figure (u1958a 'Mother and Child'). Consequently, secondary material on this aspect of Macmurray's work is relatively scarce beyond fairly brief discussions by Hood, Kirkpatrick and Trevarthen (Hood, 2003; Kirkpatrick, 2005; Trevarthen, ch2002); yet his analysis has proved to be influential in the field of psychology, if not so extensively in philosophy. Furthermore, once the idea that persons actively create self-other relations is supported by an investigation into human infancy, this then forms the background to Macmurray's discussion of wider social relations (*SRR*, p. 38). Before addressing Macmurray's treatment of the form and maintenance of necessary relationships and the more intimate and fulfilling relationships of mature persons, it is necessary, therefore, to assess his portrayal of the carer-infant relation. Further, prior to this, the notion of the isolated individual has to be decisively challenged.

Rejecting the Solitary Self

As we have already seen, acting provides a direct awareness and knowledge of that which is other than the self; indeed, it is only through the support and resistance which the other

affords that action is made possible. Consequently, the postulation of the self as agent includes an empirical knowledge of the other; the other is not merely an object which the self (as subject) knows reflectively. In short, one cannot act on nothing, hence as an agent the self must exist in relation to something; as Macmurray contends, 'the Self is the correlate of the Other' (*SA*, p. 142). From the standpoint of agency, therefore, the notion of an isolated self is rendered nonsensical and, likewise, the existence of the other is no longer in dispute. Thus Macmurray's understanding of the self both rejects the accuracy of the *cogito* as a definition of the self and opposes its 'egocentricity' (*PR*, p. 16). Essentially then, Macmurray's theory is designed to confirm the reality of the physical aspects of the individual and the reality of the existence of the other, on the grounds that both of these are fundamental to the existence of the self, since the self is defined as agent.

Whereas the existence of the self as an agent is contingent on the other, the Cartesian notion of the self as a thinking being is of a being withdrawn from the other. Consequently, for Descartes, knowledge of the other issues from reflection. However, as Macmurray explains, thoughts are merely ideas, which only have significance if they can be verified in practice (*PR*, p. 16). Without physical contact, then, theoretical speculation surrounding the existence of the other cannot be found to be true or false; hence it does not constitute knowledge. Thus the logical outcome of the Cartesian *cogito* is solipsism, but Macmurray reveals that such scepticism is 'a *reductio ad absurdum* of the theoretical standpoint' (*PR*, p. 17). In order to pose the question 'How can I know that other selves exist?', the existence of that which is other than the self is already presupposed and is, in fact, a necessity for any apprehension of the other. Alternatively, Macmurray's

assertion of agency includes an empirical sensory awareness of the other prior to any independent, theoretical confirmation of it. Hence he states that 'We know existence by participating in existence … Existence then is the primary datum … What is given is the existence of a world in which we participate' (*PR*, p. 17). As an agent, therefore, it is not simply the existence of the other, it is also the relation of the other to the self that is authenticated; hence Macmurray states that 'the Self exists only in dynamic relation with the Other' (*PR*, p. 17).

In addition, he alleges that the interaction between the self and the other, necessary to the existence of the agent, is a personal relation (*PR*, p. 17); in other words, the other, through and with whom the person referred to as the self has existence, must be another person. It could be argued that there is empirical evidence for this proposition, in the sense that in the pursuit of action the self encounters other persons as well as the material and organic items that are in the world. Yet Macmurray claims more than this; he states that 'The possibility of action depends upon the Other being also agent' (*SA*, p. 145). By way of theoretical justification for this statement, he suggests that if the other were wholly material the relation between the self and the other would be constituted by movement; while if the other were wholly organic the relation between the other and the self would be one of stimulus and response. In either case, he alleges, the self 'has the means of action, but no ground of action' (*SA*, p. 144). That is, unless the other is another agent, Macmurray suspects that the available resistance and support would fail to provide the self with any criteria for discriminating between the possible objectives.

As we discussed in Part I, Macmurray's definition of action is such that it involves distinctions between right and wrong courses of action, depending on the ability to realize the intention concerned. If the other were entirely material

and/or organic, then at the most, the self would be intending indefinite survival. However, as Macmurray points out, death is inescapable; consequently, it is not possible to intend immortality (*SA*, p. 145). Unless the other is another person, therefore, that which the self does is simply that; it cannot be regarded as right or wrong, since it does not involve another with potentially conflicting intentions. Although the existence of the other in general is the means of action, according to Macmurray the adjudication of intentions occurs only in reference to other agents. Thus in the absence of another agent, the self engages in activities rather than actions. The pursuit of intentions via action requires that the other, who resists and supports the actions of the self, is capable of limiting the possibilities of action for the self; that is, only another agent has the capacity to engage in action which could realize an intention contradictory to the intention pursued by the self.

   If Macmurray's understanding of the nature of intentions and his insistence that intentionality is a fundamental component of action is accepted, then his assertion that the self, as agent, is necessarily in relation with another agent (who, as agent, is similarly related to the self) must also be accepted. Further, since his definition of agency is such that it applies solely to human beings and not to other species, his claim that the relationship between the self and the other is a relation of persons is robust. However, this argument is decidedly circular: the existence of the self as agent is contingent on having a relation with other agents because Macmurray's concept of action is defined in such a way as to imply this relation. Likewise, the other agent is a person because Macmurray's description of agency denotes as much. While Macmurray's attempt to construct a theoretical basis for the necessary relation of agents is understandable then, the circularity of the resulting explanation weakens its impact. Nevertheless, in the

absence of a definitive need to establish a theoretical foundation for the postulation of relationality, his rejection of the solitary self stands firm. That is, just as Macmurray's emphasis on agency rests more heavily on empirical fact than theoretical proof, in spite of his construction of its logical form, the empirical fact of an awareness of the other and, in particular, the experience of encountering other persons endures.

Before assessing Macmurray's elaboration on the distinctive features of a personal relationship though, it would be advantageous to clarify the inherent redefinition of some of the terms previously utilized by the Cartesian description of the human being. Although Macmurray uses the phrase 'the self' when discussing the details of his agency theory in abstraction from the correlative emphasis on the impossibility of being an isolated agent, he prefers to use the term 'person'. He associates the terminology of the self with the two Cartesian flaws that he is seeking to resolve: that is, the notion of the self implies a mental as opposed to a physical centre of reference and a solitary as opposed to an interactive being. By replacing the traditional references to the self, with references to a person, both relationality and embodiment are implied. Moreover, as Macmurray shows, within the context of relationality, the term 'I' takes on a new significance. From the point of view of the thinking self, 'I' is used as a generic term to refer to all isolated selves; in this respect, every 'I' is assumed to be an identical centre of reference, deliberating on purely theoretical objects of existence. Consequently, the plurality of diverse selves is not established, and, therefore, the term 'you' has no meaning. However, from the alternative standpoint of agency, Macmurray contends, the term 'I' has a counterpart; that is, "I' exist only as one element in the complex "You and I"' (*PR*, p. 24).

When considering what it means to be a person then, Macmurray has to examine the intricacies of the relationship between a you and an I. If the you were to be abstracted from the you and I relation, this would, he maintains, be a scientific as opposed to a philosophical study, since, as we discussed in Part I, he holds that science provides knowledge of the other as an object, but not as a person (*PR*, pp. 28–32). Nonetheless, Macmurray's logical form of the personal is a positive that contains its own negative, so the personal relations of human beings include also this impersonal aspect. Inasmuch as both the personal and the impersonal aspects of relations exist within the person-to-person encounter, both elements can be said to be personal. However, for purposes of identification, Macmurray draws a distinction between the personal and impersonal aspects of relationships on the grounds of the emotional disposition that accompanies them. In his opinion, the impersonal attitude is dominating over the personal attitude when the other is viewed as an instrumental means, instead of as a free and equal agent (*PR*, p. 29).[1] In contrast with the scientific knowledge that reflection from a dominant impersonal attitude gains, the knowledge provided by reflection from a dominant personal attitude, Macmurray maintains, is philosophical, since it considers the person as a person (*PR*, p. 37). While in philosophy the otherness of the other can be upheld, in science the other is generalized as one member of a species possessing the same attributes as its fellows. It follows, then, that it is possible to have knowledge about persons without being in direct relation with them, but in order to have knowledge of persons, a direct relation is a necessity. Thus Macmurray explains that all indirect relations will be of the impersonal type, whereas direct relations can be either predominantly personal or impersonal, the former including the latter (*PR*, p. 43). We will examine indirect relations and the mature direct relations that are the fulfilment of the person in due course.

First we will examine the beginnings of direct relations and, therefore, of being a person. Evidently, it is usual for a human being to be involved in direct relations from birth; it is then the relationship between carer and infant that reveals, Macmurray holds, 'the original structure of the personal, and the pattern of its personal development' (*PR*, p. 43).

The Human Person: Beyond Aristotle

At odds with the deep-seated Aristotelian view of the human infant, Macmurray asserts that a baby is a person (*PR*, pp. 44–5). Primarily, he maintains that his perception of a baby as a person contradicts Aristotle's claim that a baby possesses potential rather than actual rationality. While Macmurray would not suggest that a child has the same capabilities as an adult, he is opposed to the Aristotelian interpretation of this difference, especially considering the implications it contains. For Aristotle, the distinction between latent and realized rationality is discernible from the behaviour of the individual concerned. That is, while the infant, according to Aristotle, pursues pleasure as the infant's autonomous impulses dictate, the adult, having harnessed these impulses in the creation of a mature disposition, pursues that which will make the adult happy. What is implied, therefore, is that the child is governed by animalistic drives, which need to be subordinated to reason in the growth to adulthood. Or, as Macmurray states, 'when an animal is hungry it goes in search of food; but when a man is hungry he looks at his watch to see how long it will be before his next meal' (*PR*, p. 44). Despite the obvious accuracy of this example, Macmurray is adamantly opposed to the underlying assumption that human infants are little animals who only acquire rational character through training. He emphatically maintains that 'this view is

radically false' (*PR*, p. 45). Nevertheless, he recognizes that the Aristotelian view is widely accepted, and, therefore, Macmurray's account of the baby begins by highlighting what he perceives to be the nature of the inaccuracy in Aristotle's view and the manner in which it can be resolved.

At the heart of the Aristotelian error, Macmurray alleges, is the endeavour to comprehend the attributes of the person from the concepts that are applied to other living things. Further, he holds that the development of evolutionary science has increased the tendency to seek to understand the human being from biological analogy. When society is referred to as an evolving organism, which adjusts in relation to its fluid surroundings, it is being described using biological diction. Moreover, this description is based on the assumption that an organic elucidation of human behaviour is supported by observable scientific evidence. On the contrary, Macmurray claims that 'It is in fact not empirical; it is *a priori* and analogical' (*PR*, p. 45), since it is founded only on the presupposition that the composition of human life is comparable with that of other living things. However, Macmurray contends that there is a practical contradiction involved in equating the structure of plant and animal life with that of humans, since 'We can only act upon the organic conception by transforming it into a determinant of our intention' (*PR*, p. 46). That is, when society is regarded as an organism, its failure to behave like an organism is accounted for by the insistence that it ought to be an organism, which is followed by the effort to make it so. Yet if society is organic, it is nonsensical to say that it ought to be so, or if society ought to be organic, this confirms that it is not actually so. Thus Macmurray declares that an organic perception of human society is an ideal rather than a real one. In addition, he points out that the organic interpretation of human beings is essentially a deterministic

one, which must, therefore, either reject or ignore the possibilities of human freedom and action.

It is clear that Macmurray needs a stronger argument than this before he can state convincingly that the evolutionary account of humanity is insufficient; nonetheless, in advance of this, and as a straightforward disavowal of the appropriateness of the evolutionary version as a complete account, he insists that 'We are not organisms, but persons' (*PR*, p. 46). Consequently, he suggests that society is more properly explained in terms of the historical pattern of expansion and recession amongst related persons than in terms of organic change occasioned by the surroundings. Even so, as we discussed in Part I, Macmurray's theory of the person includes the organic as a subordinate and negative, yet necessary, aspect of its positive. On this basis, Macmurray contends, 'A descent from the personal is possible, in theory and indeed in practice; but there is no way for thought to ascend from the organic to the personal' (*PR*, pp. 46–7). Hence, while the findings of scientific studies on plants and animals are applicable to humans in part, they cannot offer a satisfactory account of the whole, even by extrapolation. Rather, the characteristics which distinguish persons from plants and animals are unique to the former type and are not included in any description of the other two forms of life. Thus the special aspects of a human being that warrant the identification 'person', Macmurray insists, can only be understood through new and personal as opposed to traditional and organic concepts. Since babies have less sophisticated capabilities than adults, Macmurray holds that any indication of a deficiency in the organic analogy as a description of the early years of human life will point towards a fundamental incompetence in its reference to adults. It is, therefore, through an examination of the human being in infancy that Macmurray seeks to revise the

Aristotelian description and, in so doing, to establish the salient features of the category of the personal.

Helpless Dependence

It is indubitably apparent that a newborn baby is entirely vulnerable. As Macmurray states, 'The most obvious fact about the human infant is his total helplessness' (*PR*, p. 47).[2] In addition to possessing no means of survival, in Macmurray's opinion, even the small movements of which a baby is capable are haphazard and without design. This is not strictly true, since, as Trevarthen explains, contemporary research reveals that a newborn baby mimics purposefully some of the carer's tongue and limb movements (Trevarthen, ch2002, pp. 77–118). Nevertheless, it is true that a human infant is largely helpless and the sheer length of time required for a human being to be capable of individual care constitutes a chief distinction between a human baby and other animal infants. Physiologically, Macmurray holds, this difference is explained by the fact that human beings are born without the faculty of instinct that is common to all other animals (*PR*, p. 47). In this context, his use of the term 'instinct' refers to an innate capacity for responding to external stimuli in such a way as to satisfy a particular biological need. While it could be argued that when a baby responds to the presence of a nipple or teat in its mouth, by sucking, this is an unlearned instinct, Macmurray calls this a reflex (*PR*, p. 50). Whether, in this respect, there is a valid, but subtle, distinction between an instinct and a reflex is unclear. O'Connor, commenting on this aspect of Macmurray's theory suggests that 'Human beings have no *personal* instincts; we have at most organic reflexes' (O'Connor, a1964, p. 469). Although this might appear initially to be a clarification of Macmurray's position, on closer examination it seems to rely

on an inaccurate interpretation of the terminology involved. First, a person without personal instincts could hardly be said to be a person at all and secondly, the suggestion that a baby has organic reflexes is hardly dissimilar to the Aristotelian definition of the infant. On both these grounds, therefore, Macmurray would be opposed to O'Connor's statement. Nevertheless even if Macmurray's attempt to distinguish between instincts and reflexes is ambiguous, the point that a newborn baby is incapable of engaging in the purposive behaviour that effects the baby's survival cannot be disputed.

Macmurray maintains that helpless dependence is the negative aspect of a baby's continued existence; the positive aspect is the sense in which the human infant is equipped for staying alive. Macmurray states that 'He is, in fact, "adapted", to speak paradoxically, to being unadapted' (*PR*, p. 48). Clearly, the life of the human infant is thoroughly contingent on the continued presence of a human adult and the ability of that adult to exercise initiative and understanding in the gratification of the child's needs. In addition to being unable to act effectively, the baby cannot make intellectual judgements concerning the baby's well-being; someone else must think and act on the baby's behalf. However, a newborn baby has the ability, as Macmurray acknowledges, 'to express his feelings of comfort or discomfort; of satisfaction and dissatisfaction' (*PR*, p. 48). An unhappy cry serves the obvious function of alerting the carer to the infant's distress; although the carer still has to discover the source of the child's woe and the means for alleviating it. Then, once the crying ceases, the carer can be fairly confident that the child's biological needs have been met; thus a cheerful gurgle would seem to be unnecessary. In Macmurray's opinion, happy noises are an indication of the child's delight in the physical closeness of the carer. Macmurray claims that 'This is evidence that the

infant has a need which is not simply biological but personal, a need to be in touch with the mother, and in conscious perceptual relation with her' (*PR*, p. 49).

It would be difficult to dispute the suggestion that human babies, almost immediately following birth, crave intimacy with their primary carers. However, in order to conclude that this is evidence of a personal as opposed to a biological desire, which therefore separates the human infant from the young of other animals, it would have to be established that everything that other animals do has a biological function. Macmurray does not attempt to analyse animal behaviour in this way; instead he maintains that biological analogies can be regarded as sufficient only for understanding the human infant if every facet of the baby's behaviour can be accounted for by reference to biologically adequate acclimatization to the environment. While it might not be possible to draw a connection between each activity of another animal and its adaptation to the surroundings then, it is reasonable to concede that a human infant differs from other animal young by virtue of the infant's total inability to respond to stimuli in this manner. Nonetheless, Macmurray's claim that the child's happier noises have no utilitarian purpose is not satisfying. By crying when the carer leaves the room and giggling when that adult resumes contact, the child is strengthening the relationship on which the child depends. Thus it would seem to be equally plausible to suggest that the child plays a part in ensuring the continued care of the adult who enables the child's survival. In Macmurray's favour, however, Guntrip affirms that any such purpose of the relationship is secondary to the adult's primary role in enabling the child to be a person (Guntrip, 1961, p. 180). Moreover, since intimate personal relations are a uniquely human method of survival, even in utilitarian terms, Macmurray's contention, despite its weaknesses, is not without its strengths.

At the centre of his analysis is the allegation that 'to represent the process of human development, even at its earliest stage, as an organic process, is to represent it in terms which are equally applicable to the development of animals, and therefore to exclude reference to any form of behaviour which is exclusively human' (*PR*, pp. 49–50).[3] From this statement it becomes apparent that, for Macmurray, human beings are qualitatively, not just quantitatively, different from other animals. If this aspect of his theory is correct, then his claim that the organic categories offer an inadequate account of human infants is justified. A closer inspection of the nature of the relevant abilities, though, reveals the fact that Macmurray's view of animal capabilities is rather limited and might be problematic. For example, he states that biological terms do not include 'reference to rationality in any of its expressions, practical or theoretical; reference to action or to knowledge, to deliberate purpose or reflective thought' (*PR*, p. 50). We shall look more closely at this issue in due course, but for the present our concern is with Macmurray's description of the special nature of these abilities in effecting the development of the human infant.

Initially, these qualities are a part of the human infant's survival in a sense in which they are not a part of the subsistence level of other species. As we have acknowledged, the total dependence of the baby means that the exercise of someone else's rationality, knowledge, thought and action are essential to the baby's existence. On this basis Macmurray contends that, rather than surviving due to the organic growth of the child's own rationality, the human infant survives because the infant 'lives a common life as one term in a personal relation'(*PR*, p. 50).[4] Over time, the child will learn to be more independent, but this will require the adoption of the child's particular society's methods of living. From birth therefore, the life of the human

infant is one of association and collaboration. Even the carer's actions on behalf of the child cannot, Macmurray holds, be explained in biological terms, such as maternal instinct (*PR*, p. 50), since the provision of food and warmth, at least in contemporary society, requires trade. In addition, in spite of the extent to which the human infant is more dependent on an adult than other animal young, the human child does not have as great a need for its biological mother as other animals. Not only is it possible for the child's carer to be someone other than the child's mother, the carer need not have any biological connection to the child whatsoever. It is then, Macmurray alleges, simply the baby's inevitable lack of biologically appropriate abilities for ensuring survival and the correspondingly inescapable dependence on another human being that renders this infant a person, since 'the personal is constituted by the relation of persons' (*PR*, p. 51).

Consequently, for Macmurray, 'human being' is a generic phrase referring to a particular species, while a person is a human being who exists in relationships with other human beings. Hence in this sense, every human being is a person; even a recluse relates to other human beings, despite the fact that the character of the recluse's interhuman relations is their rejection. In addition to the certainty of relationality, though, when Macmurray claims that a human infant is a person, he is assuming that the infant possesses all the definitive traits of humanity. In order to account for the child's inability to exhibit these traits in a biologically meaningful manner, he suggests that 'childhood is human nature incompletely developed' (*RE*, p. 141). While a human infant cannot survive on the basis of the infant's own rationality, then, the infant is a rational being. Macmurray insists that the ability of the baby to communicate to the carer distress and contentment is evidence of 'germinally' existent rationality (*PR*, p. 51). At this juncture, it might

seem that Macmurray is reappropriating the Aristotelian description, which Macmurray dismisses as a misconception, of potential rationality. However, in addition to employing a difference in terminology, Macmurray is emphasizing the peculiarly personal impetus of human beings, in opposition to any perception of them as beings following purely biological drives. As we have seen, for Macmurray rationality implies a reference to the other, which is present in the baby's cries and smiles. Hence, rather than exhibiting animalistic impetus to survive by responding adequately to the environment, Macmurray insists, on the contrary, that from birth the human infant's 'essential natural endowment is the impulse to communicate with another human being' (*PR*, p. 51).

Habit Formation

Through the awareness and communication of distress and contentment, the child demonstrates, Macmurray holds, 'an original feeling consciousness, with a discrimination between positive and negative phases' (*PR*, p. 57). A newborn baby's capacity for discriminating between comfort and discomfort, then, is the beginning of the baby's acclimatization to the circumstances of human life. Over time, the child develops this consciousness by learning to identify the specific causes of and the beneficial responses to these feelings, but at first it is the child's helplessness that provides the motivation for communicating them. Moreover, Macmurray argues that the perpetual growth of a baby's ability to control bodily movements is evidence of motive and of consciousness, since this progress is not due merely to response to external stimuli, nor does it lead to the sort of adaptation to the environment that is achieved by other animals (*PR*, pp. 52–5). Indeed, the carer can protect a relatively motionless baby from harmful

surroundings with less vigilance than that which is required when the baby grows into a moving, crawling and walking toddler. Early development actually serves to make the child more dependent on an adult in this respect; indeed, even in the manner in which independence is increased by the acquisition of controlled motion, it is still many years after this before an individual has sufficient knowledge and ability to be considered a responsible member of society. Unlike the adaptation of other animals then, Macmurray suggests that the human infant develops abilities 'for their own sake, without any distinguishable objective to which they are a means' (*PR*, p. 53). In order to support this claim he lists the early development of sensory proficiency in connection with objects, the distinction of tone and form, the distinction and production of noises and the association of the visual with the tactile; these are skills in which the child is competent before exercising them in a manner which occasions the child's survival.

Furthermore it is significant, Macmurray holds, that the acquisition of such aptitudes has a 'hierarchical and systematic' (*PR*, p. 53) composition. Macmurray is not simply referring to the fact that basic abilities have to be obtained before more complicated skills can be acquired, he is pointing out that the complex abilities include and rely on the adeptness of the simpler skills; attention, therefore, has a key role here. According to Macmurray, the acquirement of a basic skill requires concentrated effort and attention, but once learned, this ability is continued unconsciously as the basis of a more difficult skill, which subsequently demands full attention for its accomplishment. He calls this process 'the formation of habits' (*PR*, p. 54), since a habitual activity is one that is carried on automatically and inattentively. As we saw in Part I, a habit is contained within Macmurray's theory of action as its negative element, action being intentional and, therefore, requiring attention. Moreover, he

refers to the unconscious, habitual element of an action as its organic aspect, on the grounds that it is an involuntary reaction to an external stimulus. Thus a human habit can be compared to an animal instinct; however, it is not synonymous with instinct, since its initial appropriation is undertaken consciously as opposed to being innately present. Despite the obvious effort and possibility of mishap implied by this distinction between inborn and procured ability, it contains, according to Macmurray, the beneficial implication that 'What has been learned can, in principle, be unlearned and relearned' (*PR*, p. 54).

Original learning, he explains, occurs within the context of play (*PR*, pp. 55–6). While play is aimed at securing certain abilities, it does not put them to biologically effective use. Similarly, the repeated exercise of a skill that follows its early acquisition reinforces its potential as a habit, without necessarily resulting in its employment as a means for achieving a specific purpose. Rather, in conjunction with the length of time that a human infant remains in a state of dependency, the repetition of a particular ability is often an exercise in mimicking the use to which that skill shall be put when the child reaches adulthood. For Macmurray, this point constitutes a further distinction between the growth of the human infant and that of other animals. He states, 'The child is learning the life of a personal maturity; the animal a life of biological maturity' (*PR*, p. 55). While this statement is not extraordinary in so far as it means that human skills are more complex in nature than the skills of other animals, it does contain the less usual supposition that there is a difference in form between them. According to Macmurray, the young of other animals perfect inborn capabilities through play, whereas human infants amass previously non-existent abilities through their play. In particular, the play of the human child soon demonstrates an intellectual awareness of bodily

movements that other animals lack. That is, the child's consciousness of what the child is doing becomes irrefutable when the child can successfully select both an end and the means for achieving it. In order for the child to be able to do this, Macmurray insists, the child must have developed reflective as well as physical capacities. Moreover, during the period of dependency, the ability to reflect on knowledge does not have an essential function, hence it is exercised in the imagination. Thus Macmurray alleges that imaginative capacity is the 'basic reflective skill, on which the others depend' (*PR*, p. 56). Furthermore, he maintains that the imagination is a peculiarly human ability, since it is a reflective skill acquired for its own sake; that is, it is without the practical reference that the behaviour of other animals includes.

Instead of a biological impulse then, the child's conduct is influenced by the carer. Throughout the lengthy period of dependency, the child is being taught rather than independently refining skills; hence the child looks to the carer for assistance with and praise following the performance of a task. Consequently, Macmurray holds, 'The reference to the mother is pervasive in all the child's activities' (*PR*, p. 59). Thus the carer guides the infant to engage in the type of behaviour that is deemed acceptable by the society into which the infant has been born. As a result, the child learns to view certain behaviour as right and other behaviour as wrong. Essentially, therefore, from the start the child is being groomed in the ways of cooperation rather than being equipped for self-sufficiency in nature. On this basis, Macmurray argues, in addition to the child's communicative drive there is a sense in which rationality is present in the negative aspect (the habit formation) of the child's progression to intentional activity. That is, the infant has to behave in accordance with the

carer's intention; in Macmurray's words, the child has 'to submit to reason' (*PR*, p. 59).

Despite the distinctions that Macmurray draws between the child's general formation of habits and the growth of other animals, his overall emphasis is on the persistence of communication. The particular habits and skills that allow for more sophisticated communication relate primarily to speech and language, and historically it is this capacity which has been used to distinguish between humans and other animals. Macmurray insists, however, that speech, while being one possible line of distinction between humans and other animals, is not a sufficient criterion in itself for this purpose (*PR*, pp. 60–61). Today, due to in-depth studies into animal behaviour and capabilities, any attempt to rely on the capacity of language or speech for dividing *Homo sapiens* from other species would be considered dubious. Consequently, Macmurray's assertion does not appear to be startling; nonetheless, his reasons for criticizing the use of speech as a distinguishing characteristic are still worthy of consideration. First, he explains that the ability to speak is a valuable commodity only if it is accompanied by the ability to comprehend the speech of others. Thus he states that 'It is our ability to share our experience with one another and so to constitute and participate in a common experience' that renders speech worthwhile; that is, speech is valuable as the possibility of 'reciprocal communication' (*PR*, p. 60). Secondly, he points out that speech is only one attribute of human beings and not a defining one, since an individual who could not speak would still be considered to be a human being. An individual without speech discovers alternative means of communication, just as a baby communicates, albeit elementarily, before the baby has learned to speak. Instead of a distinction based on speech then, the baby's communication is separated from the communication of other animals, Macmurray explains, on

the grounds that 'the impulse to communication is his sole adaptation to the world into which he is born' (*PR*, p. 60).

Furthermore, the absolute need that a human baby has to communicate and elicit a response in order to survive, which is not matched by other animal species, provides Macmurray with grounds for upholding the carer-child relationship as the fundamental configuration of human life. In essence, therefore, it is the reciprocity of the relation from which such skills are acquired that empirically illustrates, for Macmurray, his theoretical contention that the human infant is a person and not a mere organism. He states that:

> the unit of personal existence is not the individual, but two persons in personal relation … we are persons not by individual right, but in virtue of our relation to one another. The personal is constituted by personal relatedness. The unit of the personal is not the 'I', but the 'You and I'. (*PR*, p. 61)

Every skill and habit the child learns falls within this structure and so has an inescapable reference to the other, which is, in fact, a reference to another person not simply to an inanimate other. In addition, Macmurray holds that just as the carer has no essential need to maintain the relationship with the child, even the early communication and rationality that the child exhibits goes beyond the biological requirement that motivates it. He insists that child and carer express 'a mutual delight in the relation which unites them in a common life' (*PR*, p. 63). Thus, unlike the relations of other animals, interhuman relations have an intentional as opposed to a merely factual aspect. Habit formation, then, is the negative aspect of the child's development; the positive aspect is the growth of the child's relationships, which we will discuss more fully in due course.

At this stage in the book, it is Macmurray's stress on the necessity of the other for the development of the child as a person that concerns us. By way of elaboration on this point O'Connor alleges that:

Man is, as the ancients saw, a social being. This does not mean merely that men live in groups; other species do that. Nor does it mean simply that without the care of other humans infants could not survive; this too is not distinctive. The point is that we cannot be *persons* without communication with other persons. (O'Connor, a1964, p. 469)

Since it is communication that forms the basis of the distinction between animalistic sociality and personal relation, the criteria for communication (if it they are to include newborn babies) have to be rather broad. Clearly, Macmurray seeks to establish a definition that is capable of including all human beings, while excluding all other animals. Nonetheless, even with a loose description of communication, it is not certain that a human being in a coma or a persistent vegetative state would qualify as a person; while their existence is dependent on their relation to others, their possibilities of communication are extremely restricted. However, in spite of this limitation, Macmurray's theory has the benefit of rendering more human beings persons than Descartes' *cogito*. The traditional western definition of the human being, based on intellectual capacity, is and has been detrimental to the social acceptance of the mentally disabled. Macmurray's description of the person, though, invites greater appreciation and integration of humans with a whole range of intellectual capacities, since communicative relationships can exist in a limited form when the ability to develop other skills is absent.[5]

Buber and Levinas

In addition to the advantages entailed in Macmurray's understanding of the person, he is not alone in his perception of the need for a relational definition. His emphasis on an individual's relationships, as the ground of the personal, bears a striking resemblance to the writings of

Buber and, in part, to the work of Levinas. Although Macmurray's logical form of the personal reflects analytic theory, his description of the carer-child relation resembles Continental philosophy. Consequently, it makes sense to utilize the phenomenological theories of the person found in the writings of Buber and Levinas to assess and clarify the salient features of Macmurray's account.

Despite the comparisons that can be drawn between Macmurray's work and that undertaken by other scholars who attempt to replace individualism with relationality, he does not acknowledge his influences. With reference to Macmurray's endeavour to construct the form of the personal though, McManus claims that 'The turning point in this search came with the reading of Martin Buber's now famous work, *I and Thou*' (McManus, u1967, p. 8). Macmurray's unpublished writings confirm that he read Buber's work and once met Buber, subsequently stating that he and Buber were 'at one' (A). In addition, Jung claims that Macmurray's emphasis on the personal is irrefutably akin to Buber's stress on dialogue, while Friedman attests to the notable parallels between Buber's perception of the 'I-Thou' relation and Macmurray's understanding of you-I communication (Jung, a1966; Gee, a1996, p. 85). Whether either scholar influenced the other is doubtful; yet it is perhaps a sign of the times that these two contemporaries (amongst others) developed complementary theories of the person.

Like Macmurray, Buber holds that alienation in society is caused by a false understanding of the self; the self in isolation. He asserts that 'There is no *I* taken in itself, but only the *I* of the primary word *I-Thou*' (Buber, 1959, p. 4). Both Buber and Macmurray maintain that, although the 'I-Thou' (or you-I) relation has the potential to lose its mutuality, the fulfilment of humanity is through reciprocal relationships. Moreover, Buber's work is not merely a

defence for Macmurray's, the analytic element of the latter is an effective bolster against the criticisms that are levelled at the former. For example, Silberstein explains that Buber is accused of using mutually exclusive polar opposites, in the sense that a relationship is either you-I or I-it, as opposed to presenting a scale along which relations can be graded (Silberstein, 1989, p. 142). On the contrary, however, Macmurray's logical form of the personal – a positive which includes and is constituted by its negative – means that the you-I relation incorporates necessarily the I-It relation.

Nevertheless, it might seem that Macmurray's theory is more limited than Buber's in respect of the possibility of having an I-Thou relationship with anything other than another human being. While Macmurray holds reciprocity to be plausible only between human persons, Buber's work, as Berry shows, extends the image of meeting to include plant and animal life (Berry, 1985, p. xv). However, once the ambiguity that surrounds this aspect of Buber's work is recognized, it becomes apparent that Macmurray's theory is the more comprehensive of the two. As Gee reveals, Buber's distinction between an I-Thou relation and an I-It relation depends on whether the object is appreciated in itself or is appreciated as a means to an end (Gee, a1996, p. 86). In Part I, we discovered that Macmurray makes a similar distinction, referring to the latter as the scientific attitude and the former as the artistic attitude. Yet Macmurray's theory adds a third dimension to the categorization of relationships by distinguishing the artistic attitude from the relation of persons, on the grounds that only persons can enjoy mutuality. Consequently, while Macmurray's version of the you-I relation is more confined than Buber's I-Thou relation, it includes and clarifies the meaning of Buber's description.[6]

In spite of the manner in which Buber's work supports and is complemented by Macmurray's, a consideration of

the equally relational theory put forward by Levinas reveals some potential weaknesses and areas of opacity in Macmurray's work. As a point of comparison, Florival states that Macmurray's 'personalizing approach' (Florival, a1992, p. 313) is shared by Levinas.[7] Like Buber and Macmurray, Levinas asserts the interrelation of persons as the primal fact of human ontology. Despite the sociological or religious flavour of all three scholars' theories, they each present a philosophical redefinition of the self that attaches the I to the you, as thoroughly as they perceive the mind to be attached to the body. That is, they are not advocating relationships as an alternative to individualism merely due to the proximity of one human being to another; rather, they are arguing that person-to-person relations are the essence of humanness itself. As Jung states, 'The seminal importance of Macmurray and Levinas lies in their mutual confirmation of the sacrament of coexistence' (Jung, ch2002, p. 174). The relationship of the I and the you, therefore, is the foundation of an ethical system, where the status of the other person in the relationship is the primary focus.

Levinas' emphasis on the interrelational character of humanity is founded on the assertion that the I is infinitely responsible for the you (Wright, Hughes and Ainley, ch1998, pp. 168–70). Levinas' account of responsibility for the other goes beyond that of Macmurray and Buber; hence for Levinas the I has to justify its existence to the you. Moreover, he states that 'I can demand of myself that which I cannot demand of the other' (ibid., p. 176). In opposition to Macmurray and Buber, therefore, Levinas' relation is one of dissymmetry, where it is the otherness of the you in the relation that is emphasized, rather than the mutuality of the you and I.[8] Primarily, it is the unrealizable responsibility that the I has for the you, in Levinas' account, that is at odds with Macmurray's and Buber's understanding of human relatedness. For Macmurray and Buber, the dialogical

relationship between the you and I (or I-Thou) is such that every I is also a you (Thou), just as every you (Thou) is an I also. However, the importance of asymmetry in relationships, for Levinas, lies in its respect for the alterity of the other person. Consequently, he would be critical of both Buber and Macmurray for failing to give as much credence to otherness as he allows (Levinas, 1993, p. 17). Furthermore, in avoiding the necessity of heteronomy between interlocutors, by emphasizing the responsibility of an I to a you, Levinas escapes the problem of drawing another person into dialogue with the self: a problem which Buber and Macmurray must address. Contrary to Levinas' position and as Macmurray claims, it could be argued that the perception of the you as an I, who similarly views this I as a you, is necessary for any meeting (in Buber's sense of the term) to take place. Nonetheless (and especially since Macmurray's theory emphasizes the necessity of another person for the development of the self), if Macmurray is to succeed in his aim of avoiding the treatment of a you as an object, he has to provide sufficient space for the otherness of the other (as found in the account given by Levinas).

Macmurray does argue that to treat another human as an object would be to injure that person, and in this context he is maintaining otherness. Moreover, presumably Macmurray's relation of positive and negative aspects of relationships goes beyond Levinas' theory by including mutuality as well as otherness, but this point needs some clarification. Indeed, Macmurray's emphasis on the subordination of the negative to the positive leads Emmet to be concerned that the individuals involved are not allowed to have 'each their own inside' (Emmet, r1962, p. 234). Likewise, while confirming Macmurray's assertion that relationships are the primary focus for human beings, Guntrip stresses the importance of an individual's perception of self-worth before engaging in mutually other-

centred relationships (Guntrip, ch1971, p. 137). While Macmurray does not speak directly of the significance of self-worth, he allows for its development in so far as he states that 'The rhythm of human life swings to and fro between the withdrawal from action into reflection which is its negative phase, and the return from reflection into action which is its positive phase' (*SRE*, p. 110). On the basis of this rhythm, then, an individual can at times be self-interested; the individual is not expected to be always actively considering the other person in the relationship. Thus, in spite of the syntax positive and negative, since the latter is essential to the former, the individual is permitted, and requires, individual space. Even with this rejoinder to Emmet's criticism though, it is only necessary distance of the self from the other for the benefit of the self that is implied in Macmurray's theory. Hence it seems that Macmurray could still be lacking Levinas' understanding of the alterity of the other person. Yet in his analysis of the carer-infant relationship, Macmurray does address the need for the carer to implement withdrawal in order for the child to develop skills.

Otherness aside, a related weakness remains in Macmurray's understanding of the self-other relationship that is not brought out by the comparison with Levinas; however, it is apparent from psychotherapeutic studies (Marris, ch1982, pp. 185–201; Freud, 1957, pp. 243–58). The weakness concerns the manner in which certain relations are of particular significance to an individual. For Macmurray, it is the act of relating that is important and not necessarily who relates to whom. Despite his insistence on relationality and the sense in which the self changes through personal relationships, Macmurray retains a somewhat existential notion of the self. That is, he fails to address the issue of a significant other, implying that related persons are interchangeable; whereas the grief

following the death of a much-loved partner, parent, child or friend would seem to suggest otherwise. Indeed, it is the otherness of the other person that prevents the possibility of simply substituting one individual for another in any close relationship. In this respect, it seems that a greater emphasis on otherness would assist Macmurray in his attempt to describe the types of relationships that are required in an increasingly interdependent world, if individualism and exploitation are to be replaced with collective provision and respect for all persons. That is, as both Levinas and Buber claim, differences are 'required for genuine dialogue to begin' (Atterton, Calarco and Friedman, 2004, p. 2).

[1] It is Macmurray's contention that such a situation can only be properly justified as a temporary measure to enhance the fully personal relation in the long term. He gives the example of a psychologist and client, suggesting that the psychologist treats the client as an object in order to improve the client's mental health, subsequently allowing the client more successfully to exercise agency and to enjoy a fuller realization of what it means to be a person.

[2] In keeping with his era Macmurray refers to the human infant as 'he', but it is clear that he is referring to any human infant, whether male or female. While using 'he' when either he or she is meant is no longer acceptable, quotations have been given in their original form with the intention of seeing past the dated language and extracting the meaning regarding child development and relations.

[3] Macmurray addresses only the status of the baby; he does not consider the foetus or the embryo. Whether the development of the human is purely organic prior to birth is not ascertained, nor is the affect of premature birth mentioned.

[4] Macmurray emphasizes the development of the skills required to use rationality rather than the development of rationality itself, in order to maintain a division between *Homo sapiens* and other animals that is based on reason. There is a sense, then, in which Macmurray's understanding of the human infant's rationality is similar to Locke's suggestion; that is, it takes time to be able to exercise rationality (Locke, 1965, II 63).

[5] A more detailed exploration of the benefits of Macmurray's theory in the perception of disabled persons is found in Swinton and McIntosh (Swinton and McIntosh, a2000, pp. 175–84).

[6] While Buber's writings are indisputably religious, the nature of his religious conviction does not concern us here. Macmurray also has a religious dimension in his theory, which we will examine in Part IV.

[7] Marcel, Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur and Jonas are also listed by Florival as other philosophers with whom Macmurray's themes could be connected (Florival, a1992, p. 313).

[8] In Levinas' writings the terms 'dissymmetry' and 'asymmetry' are used interchangeably.

Chapter 4
Growth to Adulthood

Original Motivation

Macmurray's main concern with a child's development of skills is the growing capacity for agency. As we have seen, he defines action as intentional activity, which incorporates knowledge and movement. Furthermore, he contends that the possibility of intentional activity presumes non-intentional activity (*PR*, pp. 64–5). Since non-intentional activity has a motive, it is directed by response to stimuli rather than being conditioned by knowledge; hence it functions as the negative aspect of action. Accordingly, therefore, the child's ability to act requires the development of both motives and intentions; in fact, Macmurray claims that the former develops before the latter. Moreover, inasmuch as the carer continues to provide for the child, the child's increased intentional ability is exercised only recreationally; thus for some time it remains subordinated to motivation.

Inherent in the realization of the skills that reveal motive consciousness is the associated organic growth: muscle development, coordination, speech and so on. Macmurray assumes organic development, but his particular interest surrounds what he considers to be the specifically personal aspects of a human being's growth to adulthood. The progression of the child's relationships with other persons begins with the child's relation to the carer, which, as an agent, the child actualizes through action. Throughout the various stages of development the form of this action will

alter in accordance with the growing range of abilities; however, Macmurray insists that the underlying motivation withstands such changes. For example, while the carer's love is the enduring source of motivation for behaviour towards the child, the activities through which care is shown vary considerably in conjunction with the child's changing needs and capabilities.

We have already discussed the manner in which the child cries when distressed and smiles when content, demonstrating that the primary form of the carer-infant relation is this oscillation between positive and negative periods. On this basis, Macmurray holds that the motivation of the relational behaviour in the infant-carer relation is 'bipolar' (*PR*, p. 61). According to Macmurray, 'the positive motive of the mother's caring is her love for the child; it contains, however, and subordinates a negative component of fear' (*PR*, p. 62).[1] Moreover, the negative facet is not only incorporated, it is a necessity. Hence Macmurray alleges that if the carer's love for the child was not accompanied by an element of fear for the child's safety and comfort, the carer would be unable to act effectively to satisfy the child's needs. Love without fear is mere sentimentality, since it lacks initiative and the impetus occasioned by angst to act. Thus the content and distress that the baby communicates to the carer are evidence of the embryonic forms of love and fear. Furthermore, the polarity of love and fear and their reference to the other continue to be the foundation of the child's motivation through speech acquisition and the progression to maturity. Consequently, the infant's original motivation of behaviour establishes the characteristic form of the interpersonal life, as opposed to promoting a life of solitude. Rather than achieving autonomy as an adult, Macmurray holds that the child's 'direct and personal' reliance on the carer is transformed into an 'indirect and impersonal' dependence on society (*PR*, p. 67). He states

that 'If the *terminus a quo* of the personal life is a helpless total dependence on the Other, the *terminus ad quem* is not independence, but a mutual interdependence of equals' (*PR*, p. 66).

Nevertheless, Macmurray admits that the equation of the positive and negative poles of motivation with the terms 'love' and 'fear' is somewhat deficient, owing to their many meanings. Yet he still considers these terms to be the most appropriate, due to the contrasting nature of the two motives. Despite the scale of motivation then, motives, he holds, are 'few and persistent', whereas the actions they instigate are 'complex and diverse' (*PR*, p. 68). Moreover, as we mentioned in Part I, the attention is usually focused on the effective pursuit of an intention, so the underlying motive is likely to be unconscious. Since the agent only becomes aware of the underlying motive when an action proves to be unsuccessful, this explains, Macmurray alleges, the traditional tendency of assuming that rational activity is unemotional. On the contrary, in the absence of an inherently emotional motive, knowledge would not lead to movement or thought. Hence Macmurray contends that 'a cool feeling is just as much a feeling as an excited one' (*PR*, p. 68). Thus actions can be either rational or irrational depending on whether the agent employs the relevant knowledge of the other, but in so far as an action is successful, the motive cannot be easily identified. While Macmurray recognizes that actions which have an explicit emotion are less controlled than those which have an implicit emotion, he accounts for lack of composure by suggesting that the attention is centred on the internal motive, instead of being focused on the external situation.[2]

When human infants communicate needs, their satisfaction depends on their carers' motivation and ensuing action. Hence Macmurray asserts that the activity occasioned by love or fear 'is incomplete until it meets with

a response' (*PR*, p. 69), thereby confirming that these are personal motives and revealing that the field of the personal is essentially mutual.[3] Nevertheless, as Macmurray points out, the reference to the other is more opaque when there is a negative motive than when there is a positive one, due to the fact that 'Love is love for the other, fear is fear for oneself' (*PR*, p. 69).[4] Yet, Macmurray claims, since fear stems from the child's realization that the carer might not act to satiate the child's need, fear for the self is fear of the other also.

On the basis of Macmurray's logical form of the personal, the positive presumes the negative in all personal activity (*PR*, p. 70). Love requires fear in order to produce action, while fear encourages action by curtailing impulsive reaction in addition to forcing agents to realize that they could fail to elicit the appropriate response from the other. Thus as an inhibitor of action, fear promotes a reflective consideration of the possibilities, enabling the selection of the most suitable course of action for the fulfilment, in the given situation, of the relevant intention. Nevertheless, if fear did not have its bipolar counterpart, it would prevent action altogether; both love and fear, therefore, are necessary for action.

Since both love and fear are inherent in action, Macmurray maintains that the distinction between positively and negatively motivated actions rests on the relation of these poles (*PR*, p. 71).[5] An action which has love as its motive has a subordinate negative element, whereas an action which has fear as its motive has a dominant negative element. It is Macmurray's contention that a dominant positive motive produces 'heterocentric' (exocentric) action, while a subordinate positive motive results in 'egocentric' action (*PR*, p. 71). The former is concerned with the well-being of the other and so has an external direction, whereas the latter is concerned with the

protection of the self and is, therefore, internally directed. By way of illustration of this point, Macmurray cites the evasive action the carer takes in the event of the child's clothes becoming alight (*PR*, pp. 71–2). In this situation, the negative aspect of the carer's motive is apparent, but it remains subordinate to the positive aspect. Despite feeling afraid, therefore, the carer pursues the activity necessary to save the child from danger, since the fear that the carer experiences is fear for the child rather than fear for the self. In fact, the feeling of fear is a result of the carer's love for the child, effectively overriding any fear for the carer's own safety. This example highlights the ambivalence of the terms 'love' and 'fear' beyond their use as indicators of the positive and negative poles of motivation and, more significantly, it reveals the importance of assessing the motive from the point of view of the action it yields, instead of from the feeling that accompanies it.

In addition to his portrayal of motivation as bipolar, Macmurray describes 'the derivation of a third original motive', which, for purposes of recognition, he calls 'hatred' (*PR*, p. 73).[6] Since the terms 'original' and 'derivative' are logically inconsistent, this statement requires explication. According to Macmurray, hate is original in so far as it is a common ingredient in the dynamic relations of persons, while it is a derivative motive because it assumes the existence of love and fear. In his opinion, then, hate 'originates in the frustration of love by fear' (*PR*, p. 73). As we have seen, love issues in heterocentric action; this positive motive is thwarted, therefore, when it is not reciprocated. Further, since the person is constituted by relation to another person, in the absence of a response from the other, the negative motive of fear for the self and of the other becomes dominant.[7] If the continuation of the relationship between rejected and rejecter is inescapable, then bitterness and eventually hatred ensues. In this

instance, hatred is not just a feeling, it is a constituent part of the fear motive. Unfortunately, the chance of any individual always responding to another in an entirely satisfactory manner is absolutely minimal; consequently, as Macmurray points out, some hate will subsist in every relationship (*PR*, p. 74). Moreover, the injured party is forced to return the rejection. That is, in an effort to defend oneself from rebuttal, the rejected individual has to withdraw, substituting previously positively motived action for negatively motived action. Over time, therefore, one person's repeated failure to respond adequately to offered love can only result in the refusal of both persons to enter into a mutually satisfying relationship. This situation is always present as the negative possibility of any positive relation. In particular, this exposition underlines the sense in which an individual's refusal to enter into a loving relationship is actually a response and, thus, a relationship of sorts.

Furthermore, since the end result of persistent rejection is hatred and hatred is a motive, in the extreme case a rejected party becomes a murderer. In Macmurray's opinion, it is a definite action towards the other such as this that leads to the usual opposition of hate and love. However, he insists that fear and love are in greater contradiction and so are more appropriate terms for the poles of motivation, at least in so far as 'a negative relation of persons is a practical contradiction' (*PR*, p. 74). That is, a negative motive which dominates over the positive motive for a prolonged period impedes the personal growth of both parties by forcing the relation into stagnation. Hence it cannot be referred to as a personal relationship, since, for Macmurray, it is only by having positive relations that a human being can be a person. This is a rather circular argument, but there is an additional sense in which the negative relation of persons is paradoxical. Hate falls within the negative motive of fear,

spurning the mutuality that love seeks; yet, whereas fear refers to the self and aims for autonomy, hate refers to the other. Consequently, hate results in activity which simultaneously attempts to sustain and prevent the relationship. On the grounds that this situation obstructs the development of the person, Macmurray views hate as wicked, stating that:

> Hatred itself, as an original and necessary motive in the constitution of the personal, is perhaps what is referred to by theology as original sin. At any rate, the distinction ... between a positive and a negative relation of persons is the origin of the distinction between good and evil. (*PR*, p. 75)

Differentiation of the Other

In spite of the fact that our discussion of the original motivation has referred largely to the carer-child relationship in singular terms, the human infant is likely to be in contact with several caregivers. Macmurray assumes that the newborn baby is unable initially to separate the principal carer from the secondary carers, but recent research reveals that newborn babies recognize and respond to their mother's voice, having become familiar with its sound while in the womb (Kisilevsky et al., a2003). In addition, Macmurray contends that 'The primary perception of the Other is tactual' (*PR*, p. 75), whereas the research on voice recognition suggests that the primary perception is aural. Nevertheless, Macmurray's central claim is that tactual perception precedes visual perception, and this claim is accurate. Moreover, while Macmurray pre-dates the research indicating that aural and olfactory perception accompanies tactual perception, it is not long before tactual perception is of primary significance to the infant (Porter, a2004). Hence Macmurray is correct in assuming that the infant becomes aware of a carer's presence before being

able to recognize a carer by sight. Furthermore, the physical distance between the infant and the carers is monitored by the child's cries, instituting a repetitive pattern of distress and response which Macmurray refers to as 'the rhythm of withdrawal and return' (*PR*, p. 76). In addition, the immediate knowledge of the existence of the other, which tactual contact provides, encourages the child both to recall previous actions and to anticipate their perpetuation. Consequently, the infant has knowledge of the other before having the ability to use language and, Macmurray maintains, the baby's pre-linguistic communication with the carers is 'a fact before it becomes an act' (*PR*, p. 76).

Thus according to Macmurray, the child's first apprehension, however nebulous, is of the other. Hence his theory avoids the dualist dichotomy of self and other, and the associated problem of confirming the existence of other selves. For Macmurray, knowledge of the other is the foundation of all future knowledge, and as first knowledge it is non-verifiable. Moreover, since someone else acts on the child's behalf, the activity of the self functions as the negative element of the original cognition of the other as agent. Thus the infant's cognition is knowledge in action rather than reflective knowledge; hence Macmurray alleges that 'The "I do" is the correlate of "the Other does"' (*PR*, p. 77).

Ferré suggests that there is an 'unresolved tension' (Ferré, r1962, p. 287) between Macmurray's insistence that first knowledge is of the other and the divergent notion that, logically, there is only an other if knowledge of the self is prior. However, rather than having to postulate an initial perception of the self which is then extended to include the possibility of other selves, Macmurray's assertion is that the self and the other are discriminated simultaneously. When he speaks of the cognition of the other as first knowledge then, he refers to the experiential sense in which the

characteristics of the self are known through the tactual encounter with the other. In conjunction with Macmurray's form of the personal, whereby the negative is included within and refers to the positive, the discrimination of an I in the you and I relationship serves to add individuality to the mutuality. It is only through the recognition of belonging as well as existing in opposition to the other that awareness of both the self and the other grows. Thus Macmurray contends that the contrast of the self with the other is the source of the empathetic conscience; it is 'the capacity which is possessed by a person, and only by a person, to represent his fellows – to feel and think and act, not for himself but for the other' (*PR*, p. 91).

As knowledge increases, the infant develops the capacity to distinguish between the different carers responding to the infant's cries. Consequently, Macmurray maintains, 'The Other acquires the character of a community of which I am a member' (*PR*, p. 77). That is, discrimination of the collective other begins with the primary carer and expands in concentric circles to incorporate all the other people with whom the carer is in relation; from the immediate family, to the extended family, to the wider society and so on. While this point is perhaps beyond dispute, Macmurray emphasizes its practical aspect, insisting that the child discriminates between these various others prior to the acquisition of speech or motor skills (*PR*, p. 78). In other words, the child is able to distinguish between carers on the basis of their behaviour and, likewise, the child exhibits different types of behaviour in relating to them. Macmurray states that 'the child may be negatively motived towards one and positively to another' (*PR*, p. 78), depending largely on the quantity of care each one provides.

While the principal carer is the main focus of the infant's communicative behaviour, the interconnection of persons is such that the baby cannot separate the relationship with the

primary caregiver from the relations of the many other individuals who come into contact with them. Nevertheless, Macmurray suggests that the integration of these relations 'may be sought either positively or negatively' (*PR*, p. 79). In the former case the child manages to incorporate all the relevant others within the relationship with the carer, whereas in the latter case the child attempts to segregate the relationship with the carer from the carer's relation with others.

At a later stage of development the child learns to discriminate between persons and non-persons; however, the child's first apprehension is of a personal other. Consequently, Macmurray alleges that the young infant is an animist, endowing all objects with the same properties as the carer, until the ability to grasp abstract concepts is developed. Hence Macmurray contends, 'Our knowledge of the material presupposes, both logically and genetically, a knowledge of the personal' (*PR*, p. 79). It follows, therefore, that the non-personal is an abstraction from the personal; the personal is not an amplification of the non-personal. In essence, the non-personal is comprehended by eliminating the peculiarly personal aspects from the original apprehension of the other. Primarily Macmurray asserts that 'what is excluded in this abstraction is intention' (*PR*, p. 80) and therefore agency. That is, the other occupying the position of a you in the you and I relation has to be downgraded to the status of an it.[8] Further, since you and I are complementary concepts, abridging the former similarly abridges the latter; thus the comprehension of the material other corresponds to the understanding of the self as body.

Successful discrimination of the other, then, is twofold. In its positive aspect, it involves the division of the personal other into the many individuals who comprise it; in its negative aspect, it includes the separation of the personal and non-personal components of the other. According to

Macmurray, it can be difficult for adults who have been exercising abstract thought for some time to accept that the child's perception of the inanimate occurs via a process of 'depersonalization' (*PR*, p. 80). On the contrary, it is more usual to conclude that young children personify objects which they have already apprehended as inanimate. Moreover, misunderstanding the order of a child's development leads to an associated misconception of the establishment of the concept person. The misunderstanding assumes that the concept person is founded by upgrading from the concept material to reach the concept person; yet this would involve reapplying the elements that are excluded from the original experience of the personal other in order to reach the concept material. It is this type of error that Macmurray's detailed description of the system of depersonalization is seeking to avoid.

Initially, depersonalizing the other entails the perplexing and technical task of placing each object encountered in either the personal or the non-personal category. Moreover, the classification of objects requires an understanding of the types of activity that they exhibit. Primarily, the relation that a child has with a non-personal object lacks the reciprocity that is characteristic of the child's person-to-person relations. A material object cannot approach a person, nor can it set itself in motion; as Macmurray explains, 'It is that which in action is passive to action' (*PR*, p. 82). Hence non-personal items are comparable with the child's experience of being carried by the carer and the experience of falling over. Thus it is as a result of the experience of involuntary movement that intention is removed from the concept of the personal in order to comprehend that of the non-personal. Further, since material objects are unable to actively resist externally caused movement, they are recognizable as items

frequently employed as means for the realization of an agent's intention.

If ownership is involved, however, the procedure of depersonalization becomes more complicated. A child often becomes confused by an individual's material possessions, associating them with the person to whom they belong as if they are a part of that person. It follows, therefore, that it is easiest for the child to depersonalize items that are regularly employed by the carer(s) as instruments for action but do not belong exclusively to any one individual. Almost indefinitely, then, as Macmurray shows: '"My body" continues to occupy an ambiguous position in relation to me. From one point of view it *is* me or part of me; from another it is an object which I "have" or "own" or "possess", as I possess my clothes or my fountain-pen' (*PR*, p. 81). Nevertheless, the relationality that is the seat of the child's learning and experience makes it difficult for the child to comprehend the inanimate status of items that are not connected to anyone.[9]

Furthermore, beyond the preliminary differentiation of the other into persons and material objects, the child has to account for organic items. This stage of the process of discrimination is the most precarious, resulting, Macmurray alleges, in the temptation to settle for a dualist categorization of all items (*PR*, p. 83). The ambiguity involved in dividing the other into its material, organic and personal aspects issues from the nature of the person-organism relationship. On the one hand, plants and animals are cared for by humans, but on the other hand, they are used by humans to satisfy their needs. Yet even when there is a theoretical yielding to the dualist temptation, Macmurray contends that it collapses in action, since, despite the ability of some animals to communicate with humans, a child can only be taught how to be a member of the network of persons by another person. It is through the

child's engagement with the various types of other, then, that the child discerns the three categories. For Macmurray, therefore, 'the discrimination of the Other into persons, organisms and material objects is primarily practical' (*PR*, p. 84). Indeed, the child learns three types of action, and each one is appropriate only in relation to the particular category of the other to which it corresponds. Hence, in between the sort of behaviour that is germane for materials and that which is suitable for persons, the child discovers that which is applicable to organisms.[10] Nevertheless, Macmurray acknowledges that any attempt to draw specific boundaries around these three categories is bound to fail, if it ignores the fact that they comprise 'the unity of the Other as one world' (*PR*, p. 84). In other words, that which constitutes the other for the individual includes materials, organisms and persons; consequently, rational action towards an organic item, for example, must take the relevant physical objects and the intervening persons, as well as the nature of that organic item, into account.

Material, Organic, Personal

Whether the order of discrimination of the other which Macmurray depicts is actually necessary or whether it is merely contingent on the focus of humans' attention is not verifiable. Nonetheless, it seems to be equally plausible to suppose that a child, who was initially cared for by a robot and only later by a person, would develop a discriminatory capacity that began with the category of the non-personal rather than the personal. Even if this were the case, it would not alter Macmurray's claim that there are three levels of reality with corresponding fields of relationship. In conjunction with his understanding of rationality and successful action then, it is important to recognize whether the other is material, organic or personal. As we have

already seen, Macmurray insists that the organic form is insufficient as a description of the personal, but the reverse is not the case owing to the hierarchical relation of the three types of other. Macmurray states: 'The concept of "a person" is inclusive of the concept of "an organism", as the concept of "an organism" is inclusive of that of "a material body"' (*SA*, p. 117). Since the concept person incorporates the concepts organism and material, it is able to accommodate evolutionary theory concerning the first *Homo sapiens*. When Macmurray states that 'human development is *not* evolutionary' (*RAS*, p. 51), he is not opposing the scientific theories surrounding the origins of *Homo sapiens*; rather he is reiterating his claim that the organic form is an incomplete description of the personal.

We will discover in later chapters that the division of the other into materials, organisms and persons is not the only triad Macmurray employs; moreover, it shares with the others both the problem of evoking distinct boundaries and that of attempting to subsume two of the categories under the third. In particular, Macmurray's understanding of the organic category is contentious, since he employs rather traditional concepts which minimize animal capabilities. Primarily, Macmurray does not believe that animals yearn to share a common life in the way human beings do, and so they do not have the same impetus to communicate. In addition, as we have mentioned, he contrasts motive consciousness with cognitive consciousness, assuming that animals have only the former and are, therefore, confined to teleological activity. Consequently, he holds that:

> the term 'organic', when applied to personal behaviour, does not refer to that which we have in common with the animals, though it includes whatever of this there may be. It refers to the habitual aspect of personal activity in abstraction from the intentionality to which it is normally subordinate. (*PR*, p. 66)

Organisms, then, have actual, but not specifically intentional relations with the other. Further, by reacting to stimuli, animals have a vague awareness of the other, but not the knowledge on which intentions rely. Since it is knowledge of the other that enables actions to be rational, Macmurray insists that reason and action are peculiarly human capacities. Thus, as we noted, he states that to describe an animal is to 'exclude reference to any form of behaviour which is exclusively human; to exclude reference to rationality in any of its expressions, practical or theoretical, reference to action or to knowledge, to deliberate purpose or reflective thought' (*PR*, p. 50).

O'Connor tries to vindicate this area of Macmurray's theory by suggesting that 'this is only a description of our *modes of knowing*' (O'Connor, a1964, p. 483). However, this implies a distinction of the Kantian type, between the world as it appears to be and the world as it is in itself, a dualism to which, as we have seen, Macmurray is opposed. On the contrary, Macmurray is adamant that the cognitive awareness of these three concepts does correspond to reality. Hence, as Harrison points out, for Macmurray, 'No animal is a person; and persons cannot be coherently thought of as complex animals' (*SA*, p. xvi). Instead it is perhaps more advantageous to deal with Macmurray's restrictive comments concerning animal consciousness by recognizing their historical framework. It is only relatively recently that the domination of human beings over the animal kingdom has been reassessed (Clarke and Linzey, 1990). Furthermore, despite the attempts of some contemporary theologians to make animal welfare compatible with the Christian faith, in the past the Jewish and Christian traditions have been guilty of assuming a God-given sanction to use animals (Linzey, 1994). Given Macmurray's era and his Calvinistic background then, his conventional view of animals is not surprising.

However, in spite of the contentious nature of certain scientific studies, such as those carried out by Jane Goodall and Dian Fossey, their research makes it increasingly difficult to draw hard and fast distinctions between the characteristics of humans and those of other animals. In particular, the work of Goodall and Fossey provides the grounds for at least considering it possible that some animals can think, can learn language, are self-aware and are inherently social (Southwick, 1963). Whether trained animals have self-consciousness and cognition that is comparable with the human type is not certain, but it is clear that animals bridge the ability spectrum between plants and humans. Especially with regards to babies and the severely mentally disabled, therefore, it is not possible to separate the properties of human beings from those of the other animals without resorting to what Singer terms 'speciesism' (Singer, 1993, pp. 55–82).

Consequently, Macmurray's theory is rendered suspect by the fact that it pursues a strict division between human beings and other animals on the basis of their capabilities. Yet Macmurray is more concerned with asserting that there is a difference than with any attempt to present an accurate description of that difference. In the absence of any specific definition of such a difference then, Macmurray's insistence, that the category of the personal is not just more than but is other than the organic, is something of a tautology; that is, the personal refers to persons. In addition, however, the crux of Macmurray's differentiation of material, organic and personal rests on the fact that persons need other persons for their preservation, development and fulfilment. Even if the primary distinction between human beings and other animals is one of species then, the argument that non-humans do not require personal relations is beyond contention. Moreover, the level of communication on which

personal relations are founded is different in kind from communication found in non-human animal groups.

Withdrawal and Return

Further explanation is necessary concerning the manner in which the person-to-person relationship enables the growth of the self as an agent. As we have mentioned, it is during the process of discriminating the other that awareness of the self also grows, as that which is different from the other while also being an aspect of that other. That is, the separation of the other into material, organic and personal elements corresponds to those same elements in the self. Contrary to the tradition which maintains that the self is comprehended in isolation from and in opposition to the other, therefore, Macmurray holds that the self exists 'in active relation with the Other of which he forms part' (*PR*, p. 86).

  In addition, we have also noted that the physical closeness shared by child and carer is not undivided, rather it consists of a 'rhythm of withdrawal and return' (*PR*, p. 87). For infants, the negative motive of fear is heightened by awareness of the rhythm, since it reminds them that they lack the ability to satisfy their own needs. Consequently, the absence of the carer fills the child with trepidation, increasing the strength of the child's negative motive. If the child is to wait patiently for the comfort of the carer, therefore, this negative aspect must be subordinated to a positive one. Hence while infants are waiting for their carers, they remain calm by remembering past responses and imagining future ones. If, however, the expected response from the carer does not arrive, the child's trust in the carer is shattered. This can happen either when the carer fails to respond to the child's cry at all or when the carer's response falls short of fully satisfying the child's need. In both

instances the result, Macmurray explains, is that there is a 'reversal of the natural dominance' (*PR*, p. 88) whereby the once subordinate negative motive comes to the fore and dominates over the positive motive.

In the case of newborn babies, any failures in response from the primary carers are likely to be fortuitous; yet as we mentioned earlier, in order for children to develop the skills required to care for themselves, there comes a point when carers must refuse to respond. Although denial from a carer is one aspect of care, it appears to infants as if the care has been terminated. Since children cannot survive alone, they feel that their existence is in jeopardy; thus fear for themselves is greatly increased. Fear of isolation from the other, then, culminates in the fear of death. Moreover, as Macmurray shows, the dissolution of the carer-child relationship is actually 'by the act of the Other' (*PR*, p. 89); consequently, it is only through the action of the carer that the relationship can be restored. However, since the child's positive motive, although subordinate, is still operative, the child will attempt to revive the relationship. Yet while carers are withholding care, infants defend themselves by acquiring the skills necessary to provide for themselves. It is in this sense, then, that a child's negatively motived actions are, according to Macmurray, 'egocentric' (*PR*, p. 89).

In conjunction with Macmurray's form of the personal, which suggests that the negative refers to and is for the sake of the positive, withdrawal is for the purpose of return. Thus in the ideal situation, Macmurray holds, the rhythm proceeds 'from the positive through the negative back to the positive' (*PR*, p. 90). In addition, Macmurray's form of the personal presents contraries also as contingents. Hence without the negative, there could be no differentiation of differently motivated phases and consequently no development of the positive; that is, withdrawal is necessary in order to enhance return. The rhythmic pattern of the

carer-child relation, therefore, is intentional as opposed to being merely factual. Consequently, the withdrawal phase operates as a rejection of the relationship without actually cancelling it. As Macmurray asserts, withdrawal 'falls within the relation and presupposes it even while negating it' (*PR*, p. 92).

We have already discussed the sense in which rejection intends paradoxically to eliminate the relation that it presumes. Moreover, since the individual is constituted by relationships, eliminating the relation would be detrimental to both the self and the other; in addition, the intention and the action underlying the annulment of the relation would be annulled along with it. However, action cannot be annulled, Macmurray claims, since the past cannot be undone; at most the individual can 'make it *as if* it had never been' (*PR*, p. 92). Consequently, there can be only a symbolic as opposed to an actual nullifying of the relationship. For infants then, the egocentric action that is characteristic of the negative phase is grounded in the fallacious notion that they can exist independently of their carers. Consequently, children acquire certain skills as the negative aspect of development, but the successes or otherwise of their growth are measured by their attitude in later life towards other persons. Indeed, Macmurray holds that an individual's 'quality as a person is the quality of his personal relations' (*PR*, p. 95), and this depends on the underlying motive.

As carers continue to refuse to gratify infants' wishes, in order to encourage the development of their abilities, the infants' cries develop from quiescent requests into active commands. In effect, infants learn self-assertion, setting their 'will' against that of their carers. Moreover, according to Macmurray, this is when children begin to make the distinction between right and wrong, good and bad. That is, when the carer does what the child wishes, the child

considers the carer to be good, but when the opposite is the case, the child considers the carer to be bad. Hence Macmurray claims that 'From this conflict of agents are derived all the characteristic dichotomies in terms of which human life must be lived, and in it they are contained' (*PR*, p. 98). In early life, this friction confuses carer-infant relations; infants are torn within, fearing the people that they love. Nevertheless, since a child's survival depends on the continuation of the relationship even while it is being rejected, the child is forced to act in accordance with the carer's wishes. In spite of the fact that the carer persists in refusing to offer the expected response then, the child's agency brings about a settlement.

However, if the child's action is based solely on the necessity that the carer's refusal to respond has engendered, the negative motive remains dominant. For the child to complete the rhythm, therefore, the child has to re-evaluate the impression of the carer. That is, the child has to accept that, despite the carer's refusal to respond, the carer has not been bad and abandoned the child. It is this awareness that, according to Macmurray, 'provides the formal basis of intellectual experience' and 'the formal basis of moral experience' (*PR*, p. 100). Essentially then, the child must recognize the difference between appearance and reality, accepting the course of action that the carer adopts instead of willing the carer to respond differently. Consequently, the clash of wills is overcome and the previously mutual relationship is both regained and improved. That is, infants learn to have faith in their carers, even when care does not seem to be forthcoming, and they reciprocate their carers' affections by performing for the carer and for themselves the skills they have acquired. Hence the negative motive is subordinated again to the positive motive and the child cooperates with the carer instead of being entirely dependent on someone else's care.

Thus proof that the rhythm has been completed successfully is provided by the absence of any desire for the previous state of complete dependence.

Nonetheless, Macmurray alleges that 'such a success is beyond the bounds of all probability' (*PR*, p. 101). In other words, the rhythm is unlikely to be a consistent success, due to the frequency of the withdrawal phase and the inevitable failings of the caregiver. Moreover, when the care shown to the child is lacking, the child's fears are not entirely groundless; hence fears may be repressed rather than overcome. When the rhythm fails, the child's positive and negative motives are intermingled; hence cooperation with the carer is contrary to the child's will. The child does not find the relationship gratifying and, as a result, continues to fantasize about the preferred care, thereby failing to resolve the aforementioned conflict between appearance and reality.

For the infant who prefers fantasy to reality, Macmurray asserts, mutuality is impossible, leaving two options: 'He can either run away or fight' (*PR*, p. 103). A child who runs away will become an introvert, dwelling on the imaginary situation and seeking to appease the carer's rejection through obedience and submission. On the contrary, the child who fights becomes an extrovert, stocking up power and attempting to compel the carer to satisfy needs through aggression. Moreover, it is Macmurray's contention that either trait can persist into maturity; thus infecting future person-to-person relationships (*PR*, p. 104). Nevertheless, since both attitudes stem from the same negative motive of fear, they are interchangeable, while in addition, since they are the endmost limits of a failed rhythm, it is unlikely that any single individual will be thoroughly aggressive or totally submissive for the duration of life. Moreover, although it is possible to detect the characteristic disposition of an individual over time, as negatively motived attitudes

aggression and submission are ultimately self-frustrating. In essence, both attitudes intend to establish the mutuality that an individual needs in order to be fulfilled – one by duty, the other by duress – but at the same time they both lead to a defensive response, engaging in self-centred as opposed to other-centred action. Hence Macmurray states that the negative motive 'can produce, at most, a reciprocity of co-operation which simulates, even while it excludes, the personal unity which it seeks to achieve' (*PR*, p. 105). Nonetheless, the frequency of the rhythm of withdrawal and return is grounds for success as well as failure. Thus whatever the prevailing disposition learned from a previous rhythm, it can be unlearned and relearned. In the end, the persistence of the rhythm of withdrawal and return provides the individual with an indefinite number of opportunities for its successful completion.

Psychological Evidence

It might seem that Macmurray's portrayal of the carer-child relationship contains more psychoanalysis than philosophy. Aware that such an accusation could be levelled at his theory; he states that 'philosophy does not constitute itself, as a science does, by isolating a field of study, but by refusing all such exclusions and abstractions' (*PR*, p. 132). He maintains, then, that one aspect of his rejection of the *cogito* as the starting point of philosophical investigation is the expansion of its field. Moreover, despite the fact that it could be argued that Macmurray's 'armchair' psychology lacks the vigour that an expert in the area could provide, his convictions are corroborated by the data of respected psychologists and psychoanalysts. In addition to supporting and even borrowing from Macmurray's work though, the writings of the aforementioned specialists reveal omissions in his theory.

Macmurray's account of the structure of the carer-child relationship gives the impression that he is familiar with psychoanalysis, although he rarely refers to other scholars. He does mention Freud and it is possible that Macmurray's description of the aggressive and submissive dispositions has some connection with Freud's comprehension of the masochistic and sadistic characters (*PR*, pp. 151–2, 154).[11] However, although Freud attributes the coexistence of love and hate in children to their desires and fears concerning their relationships with their carers, his overall concern is with children's biological instincts (Freud, 1986, pp. 213–16). Consequently, and at odds with Macmurray, Freud holds that children are more concerned with gaining pleasure than with any special individual. Nevertheless, Klein suggests that a child's demonstrations of love or hate are conditioned by specific individuals and their behaviour towards that child (Klein and Riviere, 1937, p. 57). In this respect, Emmet's suggestion that Macmurray's ideas compare more substantially with the work of Klein than with the writings of Freud is plausible (Emmet, r1962, p. 233). Yet while Klein endows the carer-child relationship with greater mutuality than Freud allows, she still bases the dynamics of the relation on the child's wish-fulfilment, whereas Macmurray's claim is that human beings drive to communicate is bound up with a craving for relationships that goes beyond the satisfaction of their organic desires.

Subsequent to Macmurray's work, some psychological investigations have reported findings that support Macmurray's suggestion, while others use Macmurray to explain their results. For example, Jones alleges that 'Macmurray's metaphysic of the personal provides a philosophical justification for the relational psychoanalytic theories' (Jones, ch1996, p. 26). Relational psychoanalytic theories contradict Freud's emphasis on instinctual pursuit by instead alleging that human beings have an inherent

propensity towards object-relations. In particular, despite the human infant's need to be related to an adult for survival, Fairburn insists that the child's engagement in the relationship is due only secondarily to the biological pleasures it affords; primarily, he holds, the child pursues person-to-person connection for its own sake (ibid., citing Fairburn, pp. 28–9). Furthermore, Winnicott's testimony confirms Macmurray's assertion that the carer-child relationship is the source of self-identity, stating that the transition 'from a weak and fragmentary ego to self-awareness' (Davis and Wallbridge, 1981, p. 33) issues from effective maternal provision. Moreover, although he does not attribute all negativity to fear in the way that Macmurray does, he is convinced that mental health problems in adulthood stem from a lack of maternal care in early life. Furthermore, as Macmurray attests, Winnicott reports that the dependency that a human infant experiences does not end with maturity; rather it progresses to a higher level (Winnicott, 1964, p. 199). Essentially these theorists are in agreement with Macmurray that the enjoyment of person-to-person relationships is characteristic of human nature; it is not simply a by-product of biological drives. In this respect, Winnicott famously states that 'if you set out to describe a baby, you will find you are describing a *baby and someone*' (Winnicott, 1962, p. 137).

Similarly, Guntrip's examination of the carer-infant relationship leads him to authenticate Macmurray's notions, while, in addition, he uses Macmurray's terminology in order to clarify his own findings. For example, he adopts Macmurray's triadic categorization of the material, organic and personal, as a tool for explaining the sense in which the mutuality of a human being's object-relations occasion development and render the individual more than organic (Guntrip, ch1971, p. 139). Further, he suggests that psychotherapy will only be successful if it recognizes this

fact and its implications. One such implication, he contends, is that reciprocity is impaired by fear (ibid., p. 155). Fear destroys self-worth causing infants to respond to others with aggression or submission, thus preventing them from apprehending or substantiating their value.

It seems, then, that Macmurray deserves commendation for his recognition of the significance for understanding human nature of person-to-person relationships. Likewise, his perception of the role of the carer-child relation in the development of the person is admirable, since he pre-empts the results of the more recent academic research into this field and the complementary object-relations theories. In effect, therefore, these psychological studies add scientific credence to Macmurray's explanation of early epistemology. On the one hand, Klopper's contemporary work claims that Winnicott's analysis of the mother-child relationship has lost none of its credibility (Klopper, a2005); on the other hand, Summers's suggests that psychoanalytic theory of the self has yet to realize the full extent of the efficacy of Winnicott's work (Summers, a2005). Nevertheless, recent zoological studies confirm, as we have indicated, that it is possible to criticize Macmurray's overstated distinction between human beings and other animals. Although this problem has little bearing on Macmurray's incisive perception of human relationality, Hodgkin asserts that Macmurray is guilty also of failing to recognize the importance of authority and distance (Hodgkin, a1997, p. 394). In this context, Hodgkin is concerned that Macmurray has an insufficient grasp both of the method by which the child discovers that the respective adult has needs, and of the extent to which the adult must allow the child the liberty to make uninstructed discoveries. Hodgkin suggests that successful child growth depends on imposed discipline as much as exploratory space. Admittedly, Macmurray concentrates on the child's requirements more than the

carer's, emphasizing the importance of the relationship for the infant's acquirement of skills and future relational motivation. Consequently, he does not speak of privacy, but this is understandable since he is attempting to reform the western individualistic approach to solitude.[12] Furthermore, while his mention of the manner in which the child's activities are curtailed by the carer is brief, his insistence that the negative aspect is necessary to the positive, particularly with regards to the rhythm of withdrawal and return, is a fitting rejoinder to Hodgkin's criticism. Hence while Macmurray's theory might benefit from some development in the areas that Hodgkin exposes, his overriding aim is to reveal the importance of reciprocal relationships for the development of human beings as persons, and in this respect his thesis is upheld by the work of the aforementioned mental health specialists.

Conclusion

In Part II, we have discovered some of the most radical features of Macmurray's theory, together with his intriguing combination of analytic and Continental philosophical styles. Analytically, Macmurray asserts that the self as agent is also in relation with the other. Moreover, this leads him to establish a new definition of the person, which is capable of distinguishing the human being from the rest of the animal species. During our examination of the specific characteristics that Macmurray holds to be peculiarly human, we discussed the manner in which his traditional definition of other animals affects his theory. Overall, however, we have concluded that his emphasis on the need for and the persistence of interhuman relations does separate human beings from other animals. Thus Macmurray provides a description of the human being which, even with its psychological contents, is primarily a distinctively

philosophical conception of the self. As Conford states, 'Macmurray did not, in addressing human problems, reject philosophical form and method' (Conford, 1996, p. 20).

Nevertheless, despite Macmurray's effort to contain the negative within the positive, the need has arisen to add emphasis to his perception of the otherness of the other and to highlight the importance of conceptual space. Hence having argued initially for the coherence and validity of Macmurray's theory of agency, we have now cemented this through the assessment and confirmation of the majority of his interpretation of the carer-child relation, and its significance as the fundamental form of human life. Rationality, then, as a distinguishing characteristic of the human being, conditions lifelong interdependence; in effect, Macmurray's theory reinforces the practical acknowledgement that, as he insists, 'Persons … are constituted by their mutual relation to one another' (*PR*, p. 24.) We have still to examine, though, the implications of the distinction between persons and non-persons. It is only when we look at the wider society and the more directly related adults that the significance of the interrelation of love and fear for the full development of the person will become apparent. In essence, we have established the salient points of Macmurray's definition of the person, but we have not yet considered the possibility of applying this to the practicalities of sustaining personal growth. In particular, Part II has served to emphasize the dependence that the individual has on another person for satisfaction, which, we shall see, is the source of the ethical status of the other. In the process of asserting that the self has an inescapable dependence on the other, it has become clear that disruption is as likely as satisfaction. What it means, however, to treat the other as a person and not just as an object, as well as the consideration of the possibilities for heterocentricity in adulthood, have still to be drawn out.

During the course of so doing, we will assert the significance of further aspects of Macmurray's theory, but we will realize also the problems he creates from the triads he employs. Overall, however, the strengths of his work outweigh the weaknesses, and the polished description of communicative relations that Macmurray's later work contains becomes the mainstay of an appealing account of the good life, bolstering the themes of his early work. As Hulme acknowledges, Macmurray's work offers 'a fresh rational approach … for the dignity of man' (Hulme, r1962, p. 476).

In the end, any investigation into the field of the personal must begin by defining the person. Further, if it is possible for a human being to manifest varying degrees of personhood, it is probable that the most basic and underdeveloped form of the person is exhibited by the human baby. Consequently, it is through the inspection of the characteristics that separate the baby from the other animals, and the accompanying recognition of that which constitutes the dynamics of growth, that the interplay of mature persons is understood. Although the field of the personal is wider and more complicated for adults than it is for children, the potential for having a contented life as a fully developed person begins in infancy. Primarily, the potential for satisfactory adult relations is centred in the carer-child relation, since this is the ground of human existence and, therefore, confirmation of the adequacy of Macmurray's concept of the person. Moreover, it is through positive adult relations only that the complete expression of a person's agency is made possible. Further, as we have seen, agency is the essential form of the existence of the self and the source of the fundamental impulse to communicate with the other.

[1] Love and fear are the polar motives of the same motivation; hence Macmurray contends that there are two motives, but one motivation. This is not to say that fear is a derivative of love however.

[2] In his later work, Macmurray suggests that, in extreme cases, what appears to be action motivated by love and fear is actually pure organic activity in response to stimulus. He cites lust and panic as examples, but admits that pure organic activity is rare (*PR*, p. 69). In an earlier work, Macmurray refers to the 'pervasive and permanent' nature of personal motives, as opposed to the 'intermittent and successive' nature of organic motives where, for example, fear is present only as a reaction to a specific threat (*CF*, pp. 78–9).

[3] As we have seen, the self as agent and in relation with other selves is rendered a person by virtue of the need and desire to communicate; hence personal motives are motives of communication.

[4] Macmurray maintains that self-love is a contradiction in terms.

[5] Macmurray uses the terms 'motived' and 'motivated' interchangeably.

[6] Due to the corruption in usage of all three terms – hate, fear and love – Macmurray attempts to clarify his meaning with the terms 'resentment', 'anxiety' and 'caring'.

[7] Within the carer-child relation, the infant dies without the assistance of the carer. This might not be the case with adult relations, but the example of a spurned lover committing suicide is an indication, Macmurray maintains, of the same point. That is, the rejected parties are filled with fear for their persons because they depend on other persons for the fulfilment of their own person (*PR*, p. 73).

[8] Here again Macmurray's understanding of types of relations is reminiscent of Buber's.

[9] For example, space and the planets are non-personal items which are too vast and too far away to be used as tools in the everyday sense.

[10] As noted in Part I, matter is governed by laws, while living things are guided by *telos*. It is only rational, therefore, to treat them as such.

[11] Macmurray also mentions Ian Suttie (*PR*, p. 45).

[12] As Torrance points out Macmurray places privacy within the context of relationships, not as escape from them (Torrance, ch2002).

PART III
Persons and Politics

Chapter 5
Societies and Communities

Introduction

In order to continue with Macmurray's definition of the person, we must discover the implications for adulthood that follow from his description of agency and the development that occurs within the carer-infant relation. In particular then, this Part will begin to tease out the ethical ramifications of arguing for a holistic and relational account of the human being, by reference to the distinction between persons and non-persons, and the ensuing division of personal and impersonal relations. A key factor in this respect appears in early unpublished material where Macmurray states, 'I must distinguish radically between "Social Relations" and "Personal Relations"' (c1914–36, 18 October 1930). A germinal form of this hypothesis is present in the published work *The Philosophy of Communism* (1933); however, its most comprehensive version, which does not appear until *Persons in Relation* (1961), omits any such explicit connections with communism. With the aid of the BBC, Macmurray was able to broadcast his earnest but less developed views over the radio, prior to and during the Second World War, urging the West to reconsider its political institutions in order to advance democracy. The reaction was mixed, especially so concerning a series of talks entitled 'Persons and Functions' (a1941b, a1941c, a1941e, a1941h, u1941), in which Macmurray introduced the wider public to the idea that the working life is not the whole of life, rather it is the means to the personal life.

In essence, the personal life is a life of freedom and equality; still, without political recognition of the importance of these concepts, they cannot be maintained in the personal life. Primarily, the personal life is concerned with the direct relations of persons, but in this Part we will deal mostly with situations where the persons concerned are only indirectly related to one another, predominantly through the economic networks of society. While pondering on morality affects both Macmurray's early work and his later works, the majority of his writings on the most adequate forms of society appear during the 1930s and 1940s. In particular, this material is concerned with the effects of certain types of political institutions on the constitution of social relations, in response to the crises of international relations resulting from the two World Wars. To complete Macmurray's discussion of politics, we will need to contrast it with religion, in effect making a distinction between societies and communities, although we will have to postpone a full discussion of communities until Part IV.

Morality

In Part II, we discussed the carer-child relationship as the original form of all person-to-person relations, in empirical and psychological terms. Now by linking this to the philosophical form of the person that we set out in Part I, we will discover the manner in which this form provides a moral basis for the relations of persons in adulthood. As we have already shown, the development of an infant's discriminatory capacity complicates the infant's relation to the carer by providing an awareness of several carers, and their relations to one another. In short, the other becomes many others with whom the child has diverse relations. Moreover, the child learns to distinguish between persons and non-persons, and the criteria for this distinction persist

into adulthood. Thus as Macmurray states, 'The question to which we have sought an answer is this: "What makes any individual entity a person?" and such a question must have the same answer at any stage of his [or her] existence' (*PR*, p. 107). It is for this reason therefore that the form of the carer-infant relation is equally applicable to adults' relations with their fellows. Similarly, in consideration of the deliberation concerning whether adults can be said to be the same persons they were as children, Macmurray insists that adults are the same person in form, although the content may have changed dramatically. Likewise the development of the child's abilities is relevant to an understanding of adult relations, on the grounds that an individual's agency is progressively exhibited. Moreover, the growth of agency forces the individual to distinguish between reality and unreality in order that the individual might engage in appropriate action. As we have seen, for Macmurray, 'the implicit objective of all personal action [is] the achievement and maintenance of a fully positive relation to the Other' (*PR*, p. 108), through the continued domination of the positive motive over the negative motive.

If the adult has a differentiated perception of the other, even if that adult has been unable to subordinate the negative motive in the relationship with the primary carer, it is possible that the negative motive is subordinated in other relations. For example, an individual might be negatively motivated towards one member of the family while being positively motivated towards another. On a larger scale, Macmurray suggests that an entire family could be negatively motivated towards another, or even that an entire society could be negatively motivated towards other societies. In this sense he holds that 'The family … is the natural model for any more inclusive group of persons conceived as a personal whole' (*PR*, p. 109).

As we have seen in the case of the infant, the dominance of the positive or the negative motive results in one of three different kinds of behaviour, which according to Macmurray affect the morality of an act. He refers to these three dispositions as 'categories of apperception' (*PR*, p. 110). In Part I, we discussed the role of the attention and the intention for enabling action. Macmurray uses the term 'apperception' then in reference to the manner in which the attention is employed to select and interpret the relevant knowledge for the pursuit of an intention in the given circumstance. Thus the apperception of the other is regarded as negative or positive depending on whether the other is seen primarily as a support for, or a resistance to, the actions of the self. Furthermore, it is on the basis of this apperception that the self will decide whether to act negatively or positively towards the other. In addition, the three dispositions towards the other, as first exhibited in the carer-infant relation, are the comprehensive and unavoidable forms of action governing all personal relationships, and it is in this sense that Macmurray refers to them as 'categories' (*PR*, p. 112). According to Macmurray the three dispositions of childhood – loving, aggressive and submissive – are comparable in adulthood with communal, pragmatic and contemplative ways of life respectively.

When an agent engages in action, the agent has to choose which course of action to follow and, in so doing, the agent has to distinguish between right and wrong action. This distinction is based upon the agent's knowledge of the other and the agent's skills for using the other as a tool. Hence the attempt to realize an intention involves the shift from a factual to an intentional relation with the other. Thus Macmurray states that 'To act rightly, I must know, so far as is relevant to my intention, both what the properties or characters of the Other are, and also how to use the Other as a means to my end' (*PR*, p. 113). As we saw in Part I,

science is concerned with efficient means while art is concerned with a suitable end. An action, therefore, is judged on the grounds of its technological rightness/wrongness and its aesthetic rightness/wrongness; the former is essentially a pragmatic consideration while the latter is primarily contemplative (*PR*, p. 115). Since it is not possible to divide the means from the end of an action, in practice the judgements of right or wrong issue from the attitude of the judge. That is, the contemplative judge highlights the end of an act, whereas the pragmatic judge emphasizes the means of the act. While these two judgements are concerned with rightness/wrongness however, the judgement they make is not concerned with the morality of the act. As Macmurray asserts, 'The most obviously immoral action can be efficiently and skilfully performed' (*PR*, p. 116).

For the agent, the arena of action is that of relations with other agents, and therefore when the self acts the other is affected. Consequently, Macmurray contends that morality in acting depends on the reference of the underlying intention to the other, or rather: 'The moral rightness of an action … has its ground in the relation of persons' (*PR*, p. 116). It became clear in our discussion of the carer-infant relationship that action involves a battle of wills; thus actions are morally culpable in so far as they seek to perpetuate instead of mutually resolving that battle. The individual can act either with the intention of assisting the other in acting or with the intention of preventing the other from pursuing a particular course of action.

Hence if the intention of one individual is the opposite of another's intention, the individuals might adopt either the submissive or the aggressive attitude. If individuals submit, they relinquish their ability to express their agency in the way they had intended. Yet, if agents set themselves at loggerheads with one another, none of them will be

expressing their agency in the manner previously intended. Whether or not the agents concerned are related on a direct or an indirect level, the essential point is that individuals' freedom to act and thereby manifest their nature as agents is contingent on the intentions of other agents. It is in this sense therefore that the morality of an action is rooted in its reference to the other. Thus Macmurray claims that 'a morally right action is an action which intends community' (*PR*, p. 119).[1]

While an individual exercises freedom by acting, at the same time this determines the future and thereby limits the possibilities of action for other agents; consequently, the individual is responsible to other agents for those actions. In Macmurray's schema, 'Freedom and responsibility are … aspects of one fact' (*PR*, p. 119). Nonetheless, an agent cannot be held responsible for affecting the other in areas of which the agent had no knowledge of the other. That is, an agent's individual actions are to be regarded as morally right, in spite of their results, in so far as the agent has an overarching intention towards the sustenance rather than the dissolution of community. Thus Macmurray holds that 'the morality of an action is inherent in action itself, and does not supervene in cases where a particular action has consequences which impinge in a critical fashion on the lives of other people' (*PR*, p. 117).[2] In fact, agents are persons by being conscious of their membership of a community of persons and, therefore, also by being aware of the manner in which their actions render community relations intentional. Indeed, relationality is the unifying intention of all of an individual's acts, since it issues from the individual's nature as an agent. Morality then has an active not merely a passive reference to the maintenance of a community, regardless of the success or failure of a particular act in achieving this intention.[3]

In addition, an agent's moral culpability is limited by the agent's typical mode of apperception. That is, if agents act with the intention of maintaining community, at least in the way that they view their community, then their actions are morally right. Hence Macmurray argues that 'An agent's morality must be relative to his own conscience' (*PR*, p. 120). Similarly, the individual's moral culpability is limited by the typical apperception of the community as a whole. As a member of a group, the individual will be aware of that group's particular moral stance and that certain behaviour will be anticipated. Inasmuch as the individual's conscience does not conflict with the community's moral standards therefore, the morally right course of action is to conform. Even when the individual's conscience is at odds with the community's moral standards, due to the reciprocal nature of personal relations, the expectations of the other community members partially affects the morality of the individual's actions.[4] What is problematic, Macmurray holds, is separating the proposed standard of morality from the type that is practised. He explains that 'The morality traditionally professed may be ideal and theoretical; while the normal orthodox morality is practical and effective' (*PR*, p. 121).

Essentially then Macmurray is arguing that the three categories of apperception, discovered through the analysis of child development, form the basis of relations in adulthood, not merely on an individual level, but collectively. In fact, Macmurray is not alone in making this suggestion. There are numerous sociological studies that deal with the manner in which social norms and attitudes are transmitted from one generation to the next, perpetuating particular predilections throughout an entire nation.[5] However, Macmurray also argues that, while whole societies might be inclined to base their moral code on one of these types, this does not mean that only this category

can be detected. A society might make use of all three categories within the various relations of its smaller factions, but, as with the individual, since the three categories are incompatible, one category will normally subordinate the other two. As we mentioned earlier, Macmurray refers to these three types as pragmatic, contemplative and communal. In addition, he equates the two former modes with the negative motive and the latter with the positive. Consequently, the communal attitude is characteristically heterocentric. That is, he states, 'the centre of reference for the agent, when he seeks to act rightly, is always the personal Other' (*PR*, p. 122). It follows then that the communal society is concerned with the sustenance of positive personal relationships amongst all its members, actively putting the other before the self. Since Macmurray has equated this mode with the loving attitude of the child, he claims that this community endeavours to eradicate fear and animosity by extending love. Moreover, he suggests that this category of apperception is epitomized by the ancient Hebrews, and was introduced into Europe through the spread of Christianity (*PR*, p. 123).[6]

Alternatively the categories of apperception which stem from the negative motive are both dualist and egocentric, as we have seen in their childhood expressions. Since the person is constituted by relations, these two modes must continue their relationships, but they intend their destruction. As a result, there is an interplay between the actual world and the ideal world, but, Macmurray states, 'Whether this gives rise to a contemplative or to a pragmatic mode of morality depends upon which of the two worlds is thought as the *real* world, which, that is to say, is taken as being for the sake of the other' (*PR*, p. 123). For the contemplative then, the ideal world is taken as the real world; engagement with the real world is only as a means to enhancing the ideal world. That is, the contemplative

prefers to concentrate efforts on spiritual rather than material matters. This corresponds therefore to the submissive child who prefers imagination to reality. A whole society can operate in this way provided that it has an established and continuous form of existence; in this sense it is an organic society. Its members will relate to one another on a functional level, intuitively and automatically behaving in accordance with social habit. The moral standard of this society will be aesthetically grounded in a collective vision of good practice that produces the desired end. According to Macmurray, this attitude was introduced into Europe through the classical Greek moralists.[7]

Although the pragmatic mode stems from the same negative motive, it is the antithesis of the contemplative way of life. In reference to infancy, it is comparable with the aggressive child. A pragmatic society emphasizes the material issues over the spiritual, and it is concerned with resisting rather than placating the other. It concentrates its efforts on the amassing of power, assessing the technical merit of the means for action rather than their outcome. However, since it too must maintain a group bond of sorts, it retains peace through rules. Thus morality in this society is dependent on the individual's ability to restrict actions to the law; the individual is obliged to exercise self-control. According to Macmurray, Europe has been infiltrated with this mode of behaviour through the influence of Stoic philosophy and Roman society.[8]

Greeks and Romans

In his early work Macmurray offers a more detailed analysis of the ancient Greeks, the ancient Romans and the ancient Hebrews, providing a more substantial, although not indisputable, basis for his claim that these three cultures can be respectively labelled as contemplative, pragmatic

and communal (*CH*, pp. 121–45). Macmurray's assessment of the Hebrew culture is grounded in its religious aspect; hence we return to this in Part IV. The fundamental characteristics, as he sees them, of the Greeks and the Romans, and the historical transition from the one to the other, though, is relevant to the discussion of social relations under consideration here.

Essentially, Macmurray is arguing that there are 'three forms of consciousness' (*CH*, p. 20), which have distinct expressions. While the communal form is essentially religious, the contemplative form excels in the aesthetic, whereas the pragmatic form makes advances in science. When Macmurray calls the Romans pragmatic, then, he is referring to their technological discoveries and their success with organization, administration and engineering. In essence, he maintains that these achievements reflect their preoccupation with the practicalities of life; he states that 'The habit of the Roman mind makes it see life in terms of practical problems to be solved, and it sets itself to the invention of solutions' (*CH*, p. 21). Nevertheless, Macmurray is not arguing that Rome did not have art or religion, but merely that it failed to be outstanding in these fields. Their art, he holds, was imitative rather than ingenious. He acknowledges their accomplishments in satirical writing and in architecture, but he insists that these areas of art are practically grounded. In terms of religion, they also failed to be creative, preferring the practical emphasis of ethics and the deification of the Emperor. A pragmatic society, such as ancient Rome, employs art and religion merely as tools for the preservation of an efficient social unity.

On the contrary, Macmurray claims that the Greeks lack such practical efficacy, concentrating on ideal forms and the sustenance of tradition instead. Consequently, they retain a rudimentary and conventional form of society known as the city-state, making little attempt to improve it, even when its

stability is waning. In Macmurray's opinion, 'The Greek mind aims throughout at the perfect realization of the idea of social life which this small community enshrines, and equally it resists passionately the influences which would tend to destroy this form and substitute another' (*CH*, pp. 22–3). Unlike the Romans then, the Greeks do not create new types of architecture, although they do seek to perfect the traditional forms and produce the ideal types. Their aesthetic expression therefore demonstrates the spontaneity and advancement that Roman art lacks. Similarly, their religion is bound up in mythological and dramatic symbolism. Just as Macmurray does not deny the existence of art in Roman society, likewise he does not suggest that Greece had no science. However, the scientific knowledge that is characteristic of this period is, he argues, based on aesthetic intuition rather than empirical observation or practical application. In effect, the Greeks are visionaries rather than technicians, contemplating and reflecting on ideas which are pleasing to the mind rather than experimentally verifiable.

Primarily though, the contemplative way of life can be maintained only temporarily, since its emphasis on contemplation involves a division between the real world and the ideal world. In the absence of a resolution to this dualism though, its collapse, according to Macmurray, produces its counterpart, that is, the rise of pragmatism. He claims that 'Idealism and Materialism are fundamentally contradictory, yet they necessitate one another, and the one is the shadow of the other. For they express the two sides of a humanity that is in contradiction with itself' (*CH*, p. 134). Leisure is the goal of the contemplative; hence the contemplative must, Macmurray explains, 'escape from the necessities of the practical life or find some way of doing without work' (*CH*, p. 132). This then is the root of the dualism between the spiritual life and the material life.

Since it is the needs of the body that prevent leisure, the mind/spirit has to be viewed in otherworldly terms, where it is no longer shackled to a material body. However, it is only possible to be a spectator of the world, rather than a participant in the world, if an ideal world is set over and against the real world. In reality, contemplation cannot be the goal of the masses; only a select few can escape work by having others to do it for them. For this reason, the contemplative cannot pursue equality. Further, since action to satisfy bodily requirements cannot be ignored altogether, the contemplative is forced to act, but the contemplative treats action merely as a means to leisure. In this way, action in a contemplative society is based on an aesthetically grounded ideal conception of the good life, which is fundamentally at odds with the actual life and so cannot be fully realized. Consequently, ethics and cosmology are divided; the former provides knowledge of the ideal, whereas the latter provides a deterministic account of the actual. Even where action is necessary, inner qualities, such as pleasure or happiness, are considered to be more important than the practical efficacy of an act. Material change can only be addressed then, if the ethical ideal is abandoned and replaced with pragmatism.

According to Macmurray, the transition from the contemplative to the pragmatic way of life is bridged by Stoicism, which he insists 'represents the point at which the development of the inner contradiction of the contemplative ideal has produced its opposite' (*CH*, p. 138). That is, there comes a point when the traditions of the city-state are no longer sufficient to dictate automatic action and leave maximum time for reflection. With the beginnings of the Macedonian Empire, Macmurray asserts, the Greeks are forced into action. Stoicism then constructs a theoretical foundation for practical activity. (This persists in the Roman era due to the inability of the pragmatic consciousness to

develop its own reflective system.) As Stoicism takes hold, the contemplative dualism between the ideal and the real world is internalized, creating a dualism between mind and body, or rather between reason and passion. When the aristocracy cannot depend on social habit to determine the activity of its workers, it can maintain its superiority only by enforcing this order. As the contemplatives become pragmatists therefore, they begin to apply the knowledge they have accrued. Since they have traditionally regarded action negatively, the Stoic division of reason and the passions serves to explain the inconsistency between that which is desired and that which is necessary. When the contemplative is forced into practical activity then, action becomes that which accords with reason, while reflection is that which is desired. This metaphysical dualism allows individuals to fight for their own desires by adopting an attitude of subservience to reason. In this sense, the contemplative exhibits a negative will to power, but as action takes over, this becomes a positive will to power; submission is turned into aggression. Hence Macmurray argues that 'Stoicism is a product of the Greek mind; but it functions as the reflective expression of the Roman mind' (*CH*, p. 144), alternatively providing the impetus for the moralist who seeks individual perfection and the drive of the soldier who endeavours to advance the nation.

Whether a specifically Roman and a specifically Greek consciousness can be identified in this way is doubtful. In the Hellenistic world, as Walbank shows, science progressed in both the physical and biological fields, even though it is remembered for its art (Walbank, 1981, p. 176). Similarly, Cameron attests to the advances in art made during the time of the supposedly scientific Roman Empire (Cameron, 1993, p. 76). In addition, historical influences which have made an impact on the West not only include more societies and eras than Macmurray mentions, they are also less

distinct than he suggests, at times existing simultaneously and partially. This somewhat sweeping and linear analysis of history through the ages is characteristic, Ferré holds, of Macmurray's tendency to fail 'to show, rather than merely to assume, the comprehensiveness of his discussion' (Ferré, r1962, p. 288). However, since the importance of the relation of Roman, Greek and Hebrew cultures for Macmurray will become clearer in Part IV, we will set this problem aside while we assess Macmurray's interpretation of the manner in which the Greek and Roman forms have infected philosophy.

Hobbes and Rousseau

During the discussion of morality, we discovered that ethical problems arise when the individual comes into contact with other individuals. It is then from the perspective of agents in relation that moral questions are answered, and then are applied to all members of the social group concerned. According to Macmurray, the social unity of human beings is intentionally maintained, through action, as opposed to having a merely organic basis and progression (*PR*, p. 127).[9] Morality therefore is an issue for the human group in so far as action sustains the relations of persons, since these relations are necessary in order for human beings to be persons. For Macmurray, human sociality goes beyond that of the other animals, in form as well as complexity.[10] Consequently, as we have already seen in Part II, he is opposed to any leap from biological analyses to conclusions regarding human behaviour, on the grounds that such theories view the social unity of human beings in a factual rather than an intentional way. Thus their interpretation of human sociality is from the standpoint of the spectator, without the recognition that all individuals are also participants in human relations. It is only possible to

theorize about human nature in this way, without changing the subsequent behaviour, Macmurray contends, if a dualism of mind and matter and/or reason and emotion is retained. However, he claims that these fallacies can be detected in philosophical as well as scientific theories of human relationality.

While many philosophical theories concerning human groups equate society with the state, Macmurray suggests that this is a misrepresentation, since the state is merely one component of political societies, and further several societies do not even have this political aspect (*PR*, p. 133).[11] The state, he explains, usually refers to a group's armed forces or at the least to its ability to enforce a legal system. Hence groups of human beings who do not have a discernible system of law and order are considered to be underdeveloped or in need of organizational instruction. Yet Macmurray holds that the inclination to tie the term 'society' to a group's political administration and therefore to its legal and military powers, is indicative of the persistence of the Roman, pragmatic attitude towards social unity.[12]

In his later work, Macmurray states that 'Thomas Hobbes … provides an almost perfect example of an analysis of society in the pragmatic mode of apperception' (*PR*, p. 134). While Hobbes' theory is a logical rather than an actual historical description of human interaction, its premise is that human beings are essentially solitary entities. When two individuals do relate, they are fearful of one another and so their actions are defensive. According to Macmurray then, in the Hobbesian portrayal 'the motivation of each in relation to the others is wholly negative. Further, the mode of their negative relation is the aggressive mode' (*PR*, p. 134). In effect, Hobbes maintains that the natural impulse of the individual is to exert power in the protection of individual life, resulting 'in that condition which is called

Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man' (Hobbes, 1991, p. 88).

In addition, Hobbes claims that since these individuals are rational beings, they are aware that the full expression of this rationality requires the coexistence of humans in a society, whereby fear can be overcome. For Macmurray though, this view of rationality is also pragmatic: 'It is a technological reason, a capacity to adapt means to ends' (*PR*, p. 134). Similarly, the laws of nature that Hobbes relays are synonymous with the pragmatic mode of morality, since they are held to stem from the human capacity for reason, and are applicable to all people on this basis (Hobbes, 1991, p. 91). In this sense, Hobbes is able to refer to the impetus to preserve the self as a 'right of nature' (Hobbes, 1991, p. 91). Moreover such laws are intended to promote long-term rather than short-term goals; thus Macmurray holds that the individual's exertion of power, in the Hobbesian schema, is restricted by a technological principle. For Hobbes, he argues, 'To act rationally is to use the right means to secure his ends, and the right means are those which will in fact secure them, and secure them with the least expenditure of energy' (*PR*, p. 135). In order for this generalized statement of rational and moral action to be effective then, all individuals must recognize the need for society and agree to cooperate with the other members of their society, by limiting the extent to which they use force against them in the effort to secure self-preservation. It follows therefore that any one individual can form and maintain this agreement only for as long as all the other relevant individuals do likewise.[13] Hobbes' resolution of this problem is to ensure that the members of a society have a greater fear of breaking the law than they have of the potential threat to their life from their fellows; hence he introduces the 'soveraigne' (Hobbes, 1991, p. 121).

Thus the rational society, which is universally recognized as a necessity for a decent social existence, is made possible by an external force. In this sense, reason enables individuals to view social cooperation as being in their own interests and also as being morally obligatory. Inasmuch as it is obedience to the law that provides the security required to overcome fear of others, and the ensuing need to act aggressively towards them for the purpose of self-preservation, Macmurray claims that the role of the Hobbesian sovereign, in the formation of society, is as a 'pragmatic device' (*PR*, p. 136). Moreover, he suggests that 'Though Hobbesism has been violently and triumphantly exposed and disproved by most modern social theorists, it seems to possess a vitality which refuses to succumb' (*PR*, p. 136). That is, while Hobbes has been accused of being a 'theorist of absolute state power' (Tuck, 1989, p. 69), Macmurray contends that the practical aims of modern society have more in common with Hobbes' analysis of society than is commonly acknowledged. In other words, it offers an explanation, based on rationality, for the competitiveness found within western society, but this egocentrism is not often admitted openly. Thus in Macmurray's opinion, western society is operating dualistically; its theory and practice are not at one.

It is usual for Hobbes' theory to be criticized partly on the grounds of its ambiguity concerning the plausibility of limiting the sovereign (Tuck, 1989, p. 68). However, Macmurray does not attempt to attack the Hobbesian schema on this basis; instead he seeks to draw out the weaknesses of the Hobbesian account of society by comparing it with his version of personal relations (*PR*, pp. 136–40). Primarily then, he is critical of the Hobbesian portrayal of human beings for its pragmatic standpoint, since this leads to the assumption that social unity is made possible only through law enforcement, due to the

predominantly negative motivation of one individual towards another.[14] Furthermore, as we have mentioned, Macmurray is opposed to the equation of social unity with the state. In Hobbes' case, he claims that this equation stems from a mechanical perception of society, which contains an atomized view of human beings (*PR*, p. 137). Even though the sovereign is meant to be a representative of the people (Hobbes, 1991, p. 231) and therefore acting in their best interests, Macmurray argues that, with its supposedly rational basis, this is a technical resolution of the issue of interrelation. He states that for Hobbes, 'the State is the highest achievement … of our human capacity to devise efficient means to achieve our natural ends' (*PR*, p. 137).

Most of all though, Macmurray agrees with those who are critical of Hobbes' fundamental premise on the grounds of its opposition to the view that human beings do not naturally seek interrelation. In part Macmurray explains this misrepresentation of human nature by reference to dualism; that is, Hobbes presents human nature as that which prevents cooperation and human reason as that which enables it. However, Macmurray suspects that, if nature caused humans to repel one another, reason would not be capable of engendering their unity. In his opinion, the possibility of people in the state of nature reasonably deciding to transfer their rights to that of the sovereign, so that membership to the commonwealth could commence, relies on a seriously reductionist portrayal of nature, supposedly overcome by an over-inflated view of rationality. Moreover, Macmurray is certain that there is abundant evidence to suggest that human beings have a natural tendency to unite, and that they engage in acts which are not controlled by an overriding impulse towards self-preservation, but might even extend to self-sacrifice. He argues that:

> People enjoy being together and working together, quite apart from any calculation of self-interest, and even at times against their private interests. The war of all against all is at best an abnormal state of affairs, and a man with no interests whatever in the fortunes of his fellows is a freak of nature, and hardly human. (*PR*, p. 139)

Nevertheless, he recognizes that even if this statement is taken to be factually accurate, the variety of ways in which human cooperation could be interpreted cannot be dismissed. For example, such facts do not prove that charitable acts would persist if accompanied by the constant negation of self-interest.

Still, according to Macmurray, even the pessimistic view of human nature that Hobbes asserts contains the assumption that human interests are imbedded in social unity, occasioning the individual to endure all manner of suffering so long as the state of nature is evaded. In addition, Macmurray holds that Hobbes' emphasis on retaining the established form of government in order to avoid returning to the state of nature is unwarranted. Macmurray claims that the habit of living as a society would be sufficient to maintain cooperation through the temporary collapse of one governmental form and the construction of another. In spite of these criticisms though, Macmurray favours Hobbes' theory over its rivals on the grounds that it is more like the Jewish and Christian traditions.[15] He suggests that it could be summarized with the biblical quote 'The heart *is* deceitful above all *things*, and desperately wicked' (*PR*, p. 140; Jeremiah 17:9).[16]

As an example of a philosophical theory which can be viewed as the antithesis to Hobbes, Macmurray refers to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (*PR*, p. 140–46). Primarily he holds that Rousseau's theory, like Hobbes', is based on a dualism of human nature and human reason, except that their relation has been reversed. He states that 'Rousseauism finds the bond of society in man's "animal" nature and the source of hostility and conflict in reason' (*PR*, p. 140). That

is, in its unadulterated state, human nature desires what is good for itself, and so it seeks perfectibility. Consequently, this human capacity for self-improvement leads to the creation of artificial social constructions. However, it is within the confines of these structures that both virtue and vice become apparent. Hence Rousseau's famous statement: 'Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains' (Rousseau, 1973, p. 165). That is, social unity is fundamental to the good life, for Rousseau, and so distortion is inevitable. His solution for allowing the progress of social systems while ensuring minimum corruption is the construction of a social contract.

According to Macmurray though, this involves a paradoxical relation between the way society *is* and the way society *ought* to be (*PR*, p. 140). Fundamentally, he claims that Rousseau has an organic conception of society, maintaining that if society is not actually like this, then it ought to be so. As an organism, the growth of society is held to be by dialectical progression towards a final goal. Conflict then is indicative of the temporary tension between thesis and antithesis until the synthesis emerges. However, the end towards which society is heading is not yet; that is, it is known in idea but not in actuality. On this basis, Macmurray views Rousseau's theory as an idealist portrayal of society, where individuals are meant to 'live in one generation and enjoy in the next' (*PR*, p. 141).[17] Human beings are able to understand that the current state is only a temporary stage, necessary as a part of the transition towards the ideal, by virtue of their rational capacity. It is reason then that assists the individual in accepting progress, preventing the individual from mistaking the current stage for the end stage. Satisfaction with the present therefore is to be found by accepting this as an essential stage in the inevitable progression towards the ideal state. In this sense, individuals identify with the end and acknowledge that it is

the end rather than the present that they really desire. Their role in the short term is to be carried out dutifully in order to assist in the progression towards the long-term goal. Moreover, as social rather than solitary individuals, individuals serve social progress and express their nature by acting with others. Hence for Rousseau, social improvement is aided by the amalgamation of individual wills into one 'General Will' (Rousseau, 1973, p. 160).

In Macmurray's opinion though, Rousseau's version of the social contract is comparable with the circumstances of the submissive child. He states that 'it is transparently clear that this conception of society is based on a contemplative apperception, just as the Hobbesian is based on a pragmatic apperception' (*PR*, p. 141). Whereas the child who submits to the carer's will exerts the will in the imagination, Rousseau's perception of the ideal state is not mere fantasy. Macmurray argues that Rousseau's perception of the ideal is rational, since it retains a reference to the real. However, in so far as this institutes a dualism between the real world and the ideal world, it demonstrates a negative category of apperception. That is, the real world is viewed only as a means to a higher end; in addition, the inevitability of this end makes resistance pointless and unpleasant. It is in this sense then that acceptance of the expected end is regarded as a submission to the other. Furthermore, Macmurray holds that the dualism between the actual world and the anticipated world involves an internal dualism for the individual; the individual is a spectator waiting for the ideal world, but the individual also has to engage with the real world as a participant. Consequently, despite Rousseau's assertion of the social nature of human beings, it is in individuals' private lives that they can dwell on the ideal, rather than in their public life. An individual cannot seek satisfaction in the actual life, or intend the ideal life, because to do so would dissolve the cooperation; instead

each individual must be content with the imagination of the ideal as comfort for any present distress. In a less obvious manner than with the pragmatic mode then, Macmurray holds that Rousseau's description of society is still treating individuals as isolated entities.

For Rousseau, while society is needed it must not override the individual's identity; hence the association must be such that no individual is under the rule of any other, and every member is safeguarded by the association. In Macmurray's opinion, Rousseau's solution to this problem is 'a mystical self-identification with the whole of which I form part' (*PR*, p. 143).[18] Furthermore, the larger the group the more difficult the identification of the self with the whole becomes. In addition, unlike the pragmatic mode of apperception, the contemplative mode connects society with voluntary acquiescence instead of being enforced by the state. According to Macmurray, this type of idealism and submission is similar to the Greek form of society, although Rousseau also accepts progress as natural. Consequently, disagreements are expected, but when they occur Rousseau maintains that these are merely the dialectical discovery of the General Will as opposed to being power struggles. Once a decision is made, then self-government will be sustained by the unanimous sanctioning of that decision. It is in this sense that Rousseau allows for the institution of a 'legislator'(Rousseau, 1973, p. 183), accepting that government is a necessary function of society, but rejecting any equation of social unity with the state.

Nevertheless, if individuals become antagonistic and refuse to accept the General Will as their will, the sovereign and the appropriate legal bodies must enforce it. Hence Rousseau claims that the individual is 'forced to be free' (Rousseau, 1973, p. 175), confirming Macmurray's suspicion that this is a paradoxical model. That is, the individual relinquishes private desires for the sake of the fundamental

desire for peaceful cooperation, which it is not therefore a real inhibition of freedom.[19] Moreover, since happiness is constituted by individual freedom, not only must the individual's submission to the General Will be voluntary, the means employed in the maintenance of the General Will must be legitimate (Rousseau, 1973, p. 182). That is, the sustenance of the General Will must serve to enhance individual freedom rather than being an engagement in the wielding of power. In this way Hall states, Rousseau:

> contrives both to retain … his own view that it is only by voluntarily doing what is in the interests of each one that men can remain free while associating together, and also …. Hobbes's apparently quite contrary view that it is only by contracting with each other to submit to a ruler or ruling body with supreme coercive power that men can associate freely. (Hall, 1973, p. 90)

It is on this basis that Macmurray views Rousseau's theory as the antithesis to Hobbes' version.

However, a self-sanctioning contract such as this lays more importance on the constitution of the original body-politic than Hobbes' type of social contract. Once in place, the original constitution of the contract is not especially relevant to Hobbes provided that the participants have given the sovereign power. For Rousseau however, those who originally instigate the contract not only endow the sovereign with power, but also are the sovereign, and as such must exercise the sovereign power. Hobbesian citizens only agree to obey the sovereign, whereas Rousseau's constituents are also required to accept their fellow humans as equal members of the sovereign and be accepted in like manner; in this way they are bound in a 'double relation' (Rousseau, 1973, p. 175). When the body politic is active it operates as decreeing sovereign, and when it is passive it operates as obedient subjects. The individuals therein are simultaneously passive and active, conforming and

legislating, adding further fuel to Macmurray's claim that Rousseau's theory employs dualisms.

As Hall explains, this is a less plausible contract than the Hobbesian version, inasmuch as it is held that individuals are more likely to agree to obey a particular authority on the condition that others will do likewise, rather than having to accept that the laws obeyed do express the General Will (Hall, 1973, p. 103). In addition, it seems inconsistent to suggest both that the General Will differs from the private wills of individuals' and yet that it is also to be discerned from the sum of individual wills. It can then be difficult at times to hold the individualistic threads and the theory of social contract together. Consequently, Macmurray's primary concern with this problem is that it reduces the status of the practical life, elevating the life of reflection. Action in the real world is not intended to bring the ideal world into existence, it is merely necessary during the interim while the ideal world is awaited. Since Macmurray's theory views action as primary, he insists that Rousseau's account is essentially illusory. In particular, he suggests that 'the theory is really a compensation for the unsatisfactory situation which exists in practice' (*PR*, p. 145). That is, he asserts that the submissive attitude associated with the contemplative mode of apperception provides the appearance of social unity without creating real unity. In effect, Rousseau is convinced that individual liberty and development requires society, but at the same time society is then only a means to this end.

While this point may be valid, Macmurray is perhaps overstating the issue by equating Rousseau with idealism and contemplation. Overall, his assessment and dismissal of Rousseau's theory is less rigorous and therefore less convincing than his analysis of Hobbes' portrayal. Perhaps this is due to his assertion that the two theories are ambivalent forms of the same motivation. He maintains that

if the divergence between real and ideal worlds becomes untenable, the real world comes into the foreground and social unity will have to be maintained by force. In this way, the negative motive remains, but the contemplative society evolves into a pragmatic society. Thus Macmurray holds that both theories are as inaccurate as each other; Hobbes' for its emphasis on hostility and Rousseau's for its emphasis on goodness. In Macmurray's opinion, both of these misconceptions of human nature display the individualism that is characteristic of the negative motive and its contrary apperceptions of society. Although it is possible that Macmurray's unhappiness with Rousseau is based on the refutation of the concept of original sin, since he comments that Hobbes more closely represents the wicked human of the Jewish and Christian traditions, Macmurray seems to be certain that the above reasons for dismissing Hobbes' and Rousseau's hypotheses as inadequate descriptions of human society will be generally accepted.

For the most part, Macmurray's interpretation of Hobbes is not unusual; thus his connection of Hobbes' theory with an aggressive attitude is not beyond plausibility. Similarly, the equation of the ancient Romans with a pragmatic attitude is understandable. However, there does seem to be a leap between Macmurray's description of the aggressive attitude in childhood and his use of the term 'pragmatic' for the appearance of this attitude in society. Furthermore, this leap seems even greater with Macmurray's attempt to relate Rousseau's theory to the submissive attitude of the child, especially since he refers to this as the contemplative category of apperception. His analysis of the ancient Greeks is not quite as far-fetched, but there is little reason to presume that a Hobbesian society would develop most in the field of science or that Rousseau's society would have its greatest achievements in the field of art. Nevertheless, these problems have more to do with Macmurray's

terminology than with his recognition of the different attitudes that individuals or whole societies might have towards one another.

Indeed, suspiciously neat trios (triads) of categorization are a commonplace in Macmurray's writings, developing from the early to the later works, suggesting that he is perhaps overly concerned with presenting a tidy thesis. The most basic triple which we discussed through Macmurray's criticism of Cartesian dualism is grounded in the differentiation of materials, organisms and persons. In turn, this led to the triad of physical, biological and psychological sciences; physics being connected with intellectual pursuit of the laws of nature and the means to life, while biology is connected with *telos* and is viewed as the emotional and aesthetic basis of the ends to which the means might be applied and, finally, psychology deals with people. Then through the assessment of the carer-infant relationship, we introduced Macmurray's description of the aggressive, submissive and loving dispositions, which we have now discovered to be linked to the pragmatic, the contemplative and the communal modes of life. In connection with the earlier triad from which the others are inferred therefore, the pragmatists value science and rules, the contemplatives value art and ideal goals, while loving individuals value other persons. As specific examples of these types, we have discussed Macmurray's citation of Hobbes' theory and the life of the ancient Romans as the first category, Rousseau's theory and the life of the ancient Greeks as the second category, and in Part IV, we will analyse the ancient Hebrews as a practical example of the third type. When we discuss Macmurray's interpretation of the ancient Hebrews in more detail, we will be completing his triadic (tripartite) formulation by relating the communal attitude to his definition of religion.

Indirect and Direct Relations

We have already encountered the problems that this systematized approach has given rise to; however in so far as the problems mentioned are accounted for by Macmurray's methodology and do not constitute substantive flaws in his definition of the person and personal relations, we can disentangle the merits of his thesis from his attempt to surround it with an excessively orderly format. It is possible to conclude therefore that his propositions concerning the nature of the person remain plausible, in spite of his enigmatic tripartism and, inasmuch as it informs his perception of social relations, we can continue to give serious consideration to his understanding of the attitudes therein.

In particular, as we have seen, the relation of persons, for Macmurray, is a moral issue. Moreover, since he insists that persons are agents, we might expect morality to depend on action. However, Macmurray seems to be more concerned with an agent's intention rather than with the particular effect of an action. In so far as the consequences of any specific action for all other persons cannot be discerned in advance this makes sense. Still, on the grounds that an intention is such only if it actually results in an effort to actively achieve it, Macmurray would be opposed to any suggestion that action itself is irrelevant or unnecessary. Furthermore, while his assessment of an agent's intention allows the individual's responsibility to be diminished, if the individual has an inadequate or a false knowledge of the other and so unwittingly curtails another's freedom, he would essentially be opposed to claims of ignorance where knowledge was available.

In addition, while it has been assumed that modes of apperception produce types of societies, Macmurray realizes that it might seem that a particular apperception will only

cause a corresponding impression of social bonds, rather than an alteration of the form of society (*PR*, pp. 147–8). Yet if this were the case, social bonds would be merely factual, whereas Macmurray argues that they are intentional. In other words, any active practical relation will be affected by the agent's conception of that relation. Whether the individual's perception of social bonds is true will be discovered in action; hence if the individual's representation of society is false, action will correspond to their apperception rather than to the actual situation. Furthermore, if the misapprehension is concerned with human nature, the individual's actions will be self-frustrating and will fail to achieve that which is intended. When the category of apperception perceives of social bonds negatively then, in so far as the self acts defensively, it appears to the individual as if actions are conditioned by the threat from the other. On the contrary though, the individual's actions are really being determined by fear of the other. Moreover, defensive action gives the appearance of isolation; however, this is not because humans are inherently solitary beings, rather it is that the fear which the defensive individual experiences causes the individual to withdraw from fully personal relations with the other. Where this is the case, the grounds for assessing the adequacy of the social unity depends on its efficiency for preserving the private lives of essentially isolated individuals. Both a social unity maintained by force, such as the Hobbesian society, or a social unity maintained by consent, as Rousseau describes, are examples of this.

According to Macmurray, 'I need you in order to be myself' (*PR*, p. 150); that is, individuals require fully positive and personal relations in order to fulfil their nature. When the category of apperception is negative, then Macmurray maintains that the individuals concerned are united on an impersonal level. To reinforce the distinction between

positive and negative apperceptions, or personal and impersonal social bonds, Macmurray refers to groups of the latter type as 'societies' and groups of the former type as 'communities' (*PR*, p. 145). Yet he contends that prevailing negative apperceptions in the West, in either the contemplative mode, the pragmatic mode or a combination of both modes, has led to the interchangeable use of the term 'society' with the term 'community'.

Although the differentiation of societies and communities is less pronounced in his earlier work, the impression that there are different types of societies distinguishable by the attitude that the individuals within them have towards one another is present (*CC*, pp. 21–4; a1930–31, pp. 127–42). He explains that the term 'society', in its most basic form, can be applied to any group of intentionally related people. However, there is a definite distinction, he argues, between 'groups which consist of people co-operating for certain specific purposes' and 'groups which are bound together by something deeper than any purpose' (*CC*, p. 22). He suggests that a group such as a trade union or sports club would fit into the former category, whereas the family, who partake of a common life regardless of any wider purpose which this may serve, comes under the latter category. In this sense then, it is the kind of unity that holds a group together that makes the difference, and so it is the intention to create or sustain a community (rather than a society) that renders an action moral.

Furthermore, society and community are not mutually exclusive terms. Since Macmurray's logical form of the personal is a positive which is constituted by its own negative, and a community is the fullest expression of positive, personal relationships, every community accommodates a society as the negative but necessary component of it. Within the family setting, cooperation to achieve a goal is inevitable. While this does not mean that

every society is also a community, it is unlikely that the members of a trade union for example, would not have any concern for their fellow associates beyond the group's smooth functioning. There is therefore a sliding scale from society to community along which the various social groups travel, their position depending, Macmurray asserts, on the 'intensity of the feeling of comradeship' running through them (*CC*, p. 23).[20]

In his later work, he states that the term 'community' is applicable only when the people involved 'are in communion with one another, and their association is a fellowship' (*PR*, p. 146). He clarifies this distinction by reference to the manner in which the groups are created and sustained. When an individual comes into relation with other human beings due to an 'external and compulsive' force, this is a society, at least initially; if the relation occurs due to a 'spontaneous and intrinsic' force (*CC*, p. 23), this is a community. A society then comes into existence to fulfil a need that is not necessarily applicable to all, whereas a community fulfils the basic human need for mutuality and companionship. In a community, the relation is regarded as an end in itself, whereas a society is a means to an end.

On a broader scale, Macmurray suggests that the distinction between societies and communities correlates with the difference between directly and indirectly related groups of people (*PR*, p. 186). Indirect relations then are the negative aspect of the direct relations that constitute the personal. Nevertheless, indirect relations are still intentional rather than merely factual. Primarily, these relationships are grounded in the cooperation of people at work for economic reasons; hence their common basis is the treatment of the world-as-means. That is, indirect relations revolve around the use of persons as labour, and the production and distribution of its products. Within the indirect relations of workers therefore, the individual may be positively or

negatively motived towards some, while having no motive at all towards others. Essentially, it involves the connection of people who might have no physical contact with one another, but who cooperate for a material purpose. Consequently, the people concerned are not related to one another *as persons*, but on the grounds of their functions.

It is Macmurray's contention that indirect relations are a means to an end; they are necessary for direct relations, and direct relations are the goal. Hence he insists that the economic component of life is for the sake of, and justified by reference to, the personal life. In an early work he states that 'The functional life is *for* the personal life; the personal life is *through* the functional life'(a1941h).[21] It follows therefore that the fundamental concern in the smooth running of indirect relations is the pragmatic issue of efficiency, making the most of the available resources, in terms of persons, materials and technology, to maximize the output. Indeed, the more efficient the working life, the greater its benefits to the personal life. For Macmurray, the constraints of the working life must not override the freedom of the personal life. Moreover, he argues that 'maintaining, improving and adjusting the indirect or economic relations of persons is the sphere of politics' (*PR*, p. 188). Through the organization of the economy Macmurray asserts that the chief purpose of the state is to uphold justice, enabling the subordination of the working life to the personal life. It is through his examination of the arena of politics therefore that Macmurray seeks to outline the possibility of moral action, when actions are indirect, and thereby of maintaining social unity and personal freedom, without resorting to either the method described by Hobbes or the system Rousseau portrays. In sum, as Kirkpatrick notes: 'Throughout his [Macmurray's] work he was trying, in effect, to provide the "something else" or

"something more" beyond political principles that is needed to sustain human unity' (Kirkpatrick, 2005, p. 3).

[1] We will discuss the use of the term 'community' more fully at a later stage. For our present purpose, it will be sufficient to be aware that Macmurray defines community as 'the harmonious interrelation of agents' (*PR*, p. 119). He states that this is consistent with the Kantian suggestion that the individual ought to be more concerned with ends than with means (*PR*, p. 119; Kant, 1976).

[2] There is some tension here between Macmurray's emphasis on practice and his insistence that it is the intention rather than the act that might be morally reprehensible.

[3] In this respect, Macmurray maintains that an individual who attempts murder is morally culpable of murder, although not legally so (*PR*, p. 120).

[4] However, Macmurray does not give any detail on the source of such a conscience. There is a link here with virtue theory and narrative ethics; we will explore this in a later chapter.

[5] Bem cites the manner in which the Deep South of the United States for example, persists with racism in this way (Bem, 1970, p. 70).

[6] The form of this group will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 8. Nevertheless, Macmurray suggests that the biblical phrases 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself' and 'Love your enemies' are the maxims of the communal attitude (James 2:8 and Matthew 5:44). Biblical references throughout this book are taken from the *King James Authorized Version*, since it is likely that this is the version used by Macmurray.

[7] In particular, he cites Plato's work as the epitome of this form (*PR*, p. 125; Plato, 1994).

[8] In particular, he cites Kant's work as a prime example of this form (*PR*, p. 126; Kant, 1930).

[9] He argues that an evolutionary group proceeds from homogeneity to heterogeneity, whereas a human group begins as a heterogeneity and becomes a homogeneity.

[10] On these grounds, he is critical of Aristotle's political view of the human being, since this suggests a herding instinct, rather than a personal drive (Aristotle, 1981).

[11] He cites literary societies (such as reading groups) as an example here. He also claims that the city-states of ancient Greece would not qualify as states in the way that this term is usually applied in the modern world.

[12] Consequently, Macmurray is critical of Bosanquet's attempt to argue for the spiritual as opposed to the enforced bond of social unity, since he still uses the term 'state' in his title (Bosanquet, 1951).

[13] This is not dissimilar to the Kantian acknowledgement that ought implies can (Kant, 1976).

[14] He states that 'Actual societies will approximate to this type in proportion as the motivation of their members is negative in relation to one another, and their intentional activity is practical rather than reflective' (*PR*, p. 137).

[15] That is, in terms of the motifs of selfishness and sin, not in terms of love and forgiveness.

[16] This may be overstating Hobbes' view of humanity, since, as Tuck asserts, the state of nature describes people who are 'stand-offish towards one another rather than inherently belligerent' (Tuck, 1989, p. 55). Also, there is a tension in Macmurray's argument between the occasions of altruism and those that he would refer to as wickedness.

[17] Macmurray citing Rousseau. Both Macmurray's published and unpublished interpretations of Rousseau stem from his reading of *The Social Contract* (*PR*, p. 143 n. 1; RP).

[18] His use of the term 'mystical' implies that the identification is reflective rather than practical. Macmurray suggests that this is like actors' identification with the characters they are playing, from which their 'real' self is distinct. In this sense, the identification is somewhat illusory.

[19] On this basis, Cobban suggests that Rousseau is the 'true prophet, if not the very source and fountain-head of the modern democratic state' (Cobban, 1934, p. 24).

[20] Macmurray seems to be employing two different models here. On the one hand, societies and communities exist within each other, while on the other hand, they represent opposite ends of the spectrum.

[21] We will return to this concept later, but it is worth noting here that while the economic sphere is, potentially, contained within the personal sphere, it is also the foundation of it. In other words, the personal life is regarded as being more important than the economic life, and when this is recognized the two become coextensive.

Chapter 6
Justice and the State

Justice and Law

Although acknowledging that justice is essentially a moral concept, Macmurray also points out that its status as such is somewhat dubious. In one sense, he holds, justice appears to be the 'lower limit of moral behaviour' (*PR*, p. 188),[1] since it is assumed to be the least that individuals can reasonably expect from their fellows. In addition, he also explains that it seems to be the '*sine qua non* of all morality' (*PR*, p. 188), since the virtuous qualities which go beyond basic justice, such as compassion and charity, are rendered immoral if they are exercised unjustly, that is, if they favour one individual to the detriment of another. In order to hold these two factors together, Macmurray refers back to his logical form of the personal, stating: 'Justice is that negative aspect of morality which is necessary to the constitution of the positive, though subordinate within it' (*PR*, p. 188).[2] It is then through the maintenance of justice that morality is sustained, ensuring that the whole other, not just its smaller elements, is treated morally.

Earlier we connected the moral treatment of persons with the sustenance of community; however, a community requires that the individuals therein are directly related to one another. In order for a society to have the potential to become a community therefore, it must be constructed so that if the indirectly related individuals were to come into direct contact with one another their actions would be positively motivated. In the sense in which justice is the

minimum prerequisite of morality then, it is the mainstay of any society. Consequently, even when the relations are indirect, the individuals concerned are morally obliged to exercise justice in their cooperative activities. However, individuals are likely to consider the effect that their actions might have on people whom they do not know only if they are assured that others are doing likewise. In the case of functionally related human beings, just cooperation could be maintained by common consent to a contract. Yet in addition Macmurray alleges that 'if we do not trust one another' (*PR*, p. 191), it is necessary to institute an authoritative body that has the power to impose penalties if that contract is broken.

Initially Macmurray's reference to a general agreement in this way seems to be similar to Rousseau's theory of society, while his reference to an authority figure sounds like Hobbes' analysis of social bonds. Consequently, Macmurray marks the distinction between his theory and those with which he is dissatisfied by the addition of certain qualifications to the pragmatic devices required for securing justice. In particular, he is opposed to an extreme authority, and emphasizes his suggestion that such authority is required only where trust is lacking. According to Macmurray, a certain degree of cooperation among people in a society occurs without enforcement, since most people do trust most other people in most cases. Hence the power of the state is actually dependent on the pre-existent level of trust among its citizens and thus on their intention to maintain social cooperation.[3] That is, the authority of the state to exercise sanctions is expected to operate only when trust is lacking. On the grounds that a habit has to be taught and learned, Macmurray states that 'It was in the family that society originated; and it is in the family that the habit of social co-operation is learned afresh by every new generation' (*PR*, p. 192). Moreover, since the healthy family

unit is characterized by relations of love, it is a community as well as a society. Thus Macmurray holds that while the state requires society, society issues from community.

However, Macmurray acknowledges that it is within relatively small societies only that the prevailing customs and the regard for public opinion are likely to be sufficient tools for maintaining social cooperation. When there is no longer an adequate custom for the purpose – for example, if a society is large or if several customarily divergent societies are materially connected – then the state is needed to ensure that individuals cooperate with those they do not know, and from whom the consequences of action are mostly invisible. Thus in a rather sweeping and controversial commentary on the process of history, Macmurray claims that 'Politics, in fact and in conception, emerged with the breakdown of the self-sufficiency of the city-state (as we misleadingly call it) through the introduction of coined money, a market economy and overseas trade' (*PR*, p. 192). That is, these three elements expanded the network of economic cooperation, replacing the self-sufficiency of small societies with their interdependence on one another. In spite of the advantages of economic interdependence, this linking of heterogeneous customs also entails competition for greater control of production and distribution, both across the boundaries and within the previously self-sufficient factions. Due to the tension between an individual's interests and those of the group as a whole therefore, a system of law must now be established to deal with the differing interests of the individuals within that group and with the interconnection of several groups. However, Macmurray argues that the form of the state that began in ancient Greece was unable to maintain the Greek city-state, since 'The nexus of indirect relationship was not coincident with the limits of political control' (*PR*, p. 193). He claims that it was concerned only with the interests of one of the

groups that constituted the wider society and not with the maintenance of justice across borders. As a result of this, the Greek way of life gave way to the Roman Empire, subsequently maintaining peace through the use of extensive force.

Despite the contentious nature of this analysis of history, Macmurray's concern is with the manner in which justice might be sustained across a plurality of divergent but interrelated societies, so that the activities of one individual do not purposely or unwittingly harm another individual. Macmurray argues that this is to be achieved through the employment of the law, but without going to Roman extremes. Essentially, he claims that law is a means and not an end and therefore its value lies in its efficiency. In this respect he asserts that its dilemma is to sustain 'the minimum of interference with the practical freedom of the individual which is necessary to keep the peace' (*PR*, p. 194). If the level of interference is under-active or over-zealous, it will not be operating efficiently and some of the people, reacting against unjust treatment, would have grounds for revolt. Hence the law cannot exist effectively as a static collection of rules, rather it must adjust in accordance with the fluid circumstances of the people to whom it is applicable. It is the role of the state then, to construct, amend and apply the necessary guidelines to ensure that all the individuals and groups concerned are treated justly. Thus Macmurray alleges that the law is 'the means to justice in the indirect relations of the members of an association of persons co-operating for the production and distribution of the means of personal life' (*PR*, p. 194).[4]

Nevertheless, in terms of the individual, Macmurray does not suggest that the individual has an unconditional obligation to conform to the law. According to Macmurray, the individual need conform to the law only when a legal complaint is brought by someone else. In addition, so long

as no one else has grounds for complaint, the individual is free to act outside the law. Moreover, it is Macmurray's opinion that if an individual's knowledge leads the individual to suspect that the current law requires the individual to engage in immoral action, then the individual is actually under a stronger moral obligation to act in contradiction to the law than to conform to it. While political and moral obligations cannot be practically divided, since political accountability issues from the moral obligation to act justly towards others, when politics and morality conflict, the latter takes precedence over the former. For Macmurray, 'political obligation is a derivative and indirect moral obligation' (*PR*, p. 196). Furthermore, since it is not possible in the case of indirect relations to know, let alone consult, all the people who will be affected by an individual's actions, that individual, in order to intend justice, must also intend the means to achieving justice. Consequently, although the individual is not bound by an unqualified obligation to conform to the law, the moral obligation to act justly requires that the individual maintain the law.

Since this obligation consists of an attempt to increase the efficiency of the law and not simply of the failure to contravene it, the obligation to dissent that an immoral law entails requires qualification. That is, the dissenter must act in such a way as to improve the current system, rather than causing its collapse, and therefore the dissenter must accept both the state's role as the arbiter of the law and any punishment that the state places on the individual.[5] While the individual can expect the same treatment under the law as anyone else, the individual is not in a position to judge the effects of actions where the relations are indirect, and so the individual must not prevent the law from sustaining the necessary cooperation of persons and their functions, which it does through general as opposed to particular rules. On this basis it is possible that individuals might argue that

their interests are not being served by the law, but perhaps this is because they have no knowledge of the interests of others.

Essentially Macmurray seeks to stress the utility rather than intrinsic value that the law holds. When the state is personified, Macmurray maintains that this is a serious error, which 'consists in assigning religious functions to the state; in looking to political organization to create community' (*PR*, p. 198).[6] While the law is a pragmatic device for sustaining social collaboration, community cannot be organized into existence in this way. When this mistake is made the state and the accumulation of power become ends in themselves. Macmurray argues that this is illogical, since power is the means to action and the state is the means to justice in action. Although temporarily stocking up a means, such as money or knowledge, until the use to which it shall be put is decided is inevitable, to view a means as an end is irrational. In fact, he asserts that such a pragmatic perception of society 'necessarily results in the apotheosis of the State: for it makes the State the author of society and society the creature of the State' (*PR*, p. 200). Where this is the case, the law becomes the standard of justice rather than a means to it, then moral action is governed by its capacity for strengthening the state in ways the state decrees. Moreover, this state values the individual only in so far as it can use the individual to gain more power, instead of serving the individual in the interests of justice.

Since it is clearly possible for the state to misuse power and to instigate injustices, the law itself cannot provide the standard by which to measure justice. For Macmurray therefore, it is the intention to create and maintain justice that is of primary importance, not simply the distinction between justice and injustice. In effect he states that 'Justice is an aspect of morality; it is a restriction which I impose on my own power for the sake of others' (*PR*, p. 201).

For the individual, this means refraining from exploiting any other individual or seeking privileges for oneself. The same criteria also apply to the indirect relations of societies; if the society as a whole intends justice in its interaction with other societies, it will refrain from deliberately exercising its power to limit the actions of another society.

As an instrument for ensuring justice then, the existence of the law presupposes both the intention towards justice and the conception of injustice. In so far as the group of people concerned continue to cooperate with one another, the state assumes that justice exists. However, a system of law and its enforcement would be necessary only if the pre-existent system of cooperation were under attack on the grounds of injustice or incoherence. Thus Macmurray states that law is 'an instrument for the modification of custom in the interest of justice' (*PR*, p. 203). Nevertheless, he acknowledges that there is a discrepancy involved in referring to the law both as a portrayal of, and a mechanism for, altering what is customary. In explanation he argues that as the circumstances of economic relations change it becomes necessary to adapt custom and previously effective law, in order that justice can continue: this and also the sustenance of cooperation through the change is the function of the law. Thereafter, a new law is judged to be an effective means of furthering justice if its amendments subsequently become customary. That is, the law serves to modify the social behaviour without dissolving social cohesion. Consequently, rather than operating from a concept of absolute justice, the law is validated by the absence of complaint from the people. It is possible that the people could have a misguided sense of fairness, but so long as they continue to cooperate there are no grounds for suspecting that they are experiencing injustice.[7] It seems therefore that such a subjective sense of justice can be

assessed only at the practical rather than the theoretical level.

Evidently Macmurray expects a great deal from the individual, in thought and action, since he equates consent with justice. He does not account for the fact that the majority of people (or at least those whom the government regards as most significant), rather than one individual, would need to revolt before the state would change the law. Furthermore, as Macmurray acknowledges, when people are related for utilitarian purposes work can become an end in itself. What Macmurray does not emphasize sufficiently is the fact that when this occurs, the working classes, despite suffering injustice, could be either too tired or too fearful of job loss to revolt; they might not even believe that revolution would improve rather than worsen their situation anyway (Horkheimer, ch1978, pp. 95–117; Marcuse, ch1978, pp. 138–62).

In addition to misuse of power, Macmurray suggests that the law might simply be insufficient to sustain justice across indirect relations by failing to be applicable to all the individuals or groups that are related in this way. For example, as greater numbers of societies become economically interdependent, if they do not also develop a single system of law to which they are all accountable, it might not be possible to maintain justice within even one of the societies involved. In this situation as with Macmurray's description of the collapse of ancient Greece, each society, for the benefit of its own citizens, is competing to exercise its power to secure the control of an economic field of which it comprises only one component. Consequently, even if the law in one of these societies previously sustained justice, it becomes a tool for exacting privilege and exploitation. Thus Macmurray asserts that 'Unless the independent States can unite, by common consent, under one system of effective law, they must destroy one another in a struggle for power'

(*PR*, p. 204); this, he argues, is the contemporary situation facing the entire world. His damning conclusion is that without a unifying system of law neither justice nor cooperation can prevail. If cooperation has to be enforced, the result will be the same as it is in the carer-infant relation: mutuality and personal development will be prevented. The intention to maintain justice in the political sphere then is of paramount importance, because this is merely the negative aspect of moral action where the relations of persons are direct.

Any system of law that is effective at achieving justice, therefore, needs to apply to all indirectly related members of an economic nexus whose actions might affect one another. Hence a worldwide network of trade requires a common law for procuring justice. In the absence of a worldwide system of justice, Macmurray is anxious that individual states will be perpetually at war with one another (*PR*, pp. 204–5). Within the modern era, resources have been amassed in capitalist countries, yet the reality of an international economy suggests that the West needs to share these resources. Interdependent wealth adds an extra dimension to the balance of means and ends, so that the intentions of separate nations 'must not merely be possible. They must be compossible with those of all the others' (*CF*, p. 50), if justice is to prevail. When intentions are incompatible then, it is the law which prevents special privilege, protecting all concerned; in this way, an effective law produces the compossibility necessary for justice.

Beyond the assertion that worldwide trade requires a worldwide system of law and justice, Macmurray offers little elaboration concerning how it might function, either while it is being developed or when it has been established. However in the midst of the Second World War, he does make it clear that international unity is incompatible with nationalism. While acknowledging that nationality can be a

matter of pride within cross-national friendships, he claims that nationalism negates unity.[8] Moreover, he points out that widespread travel and migration has meant that nationalism is no longer a matter of genetics or geography; where nationalism is promoted, its basis is primarily psychological. Consequently, if a government wishes to instil nationalism, it must convince a particular group of people that they have something in common, or it must take over the whole world. An attempt such as this involves exploitative acts towards certain factions within one nation and/or towards other nations. Hence in Macmurray's opinion, nationalism is 'a menace to the peace of the world' (*CF*, p. 58). In an economically and culturally interdependent world, according to Macmurray, a world-state is required which is capable of maintaining political unity and cultural diversity.[9] (He does not consider the possibility that the cooperation of nation-states might render a world government unnecessary.)

Since British political union is comprised of different cultures, Macmurray suggests that Great Britain has successfully transcended nationalism and thus contains the germinal form of a European commonwealth and perhaps even worldwide unity (*CD*, pp. 10–12). However, it can also be argued that Britain only united through war and empirical necessity and that this unity is in fact disintegrating. As well as the political parties that support the independence of Scotland and Wales from England, it is clearly possible to cite cases which show that, in practice, many people in Britain are still discriminated against because of their nationality.[10] Moreover, Britain has proved to be one of the most reluctant nations in the pursuit of European unity, either because the politicians hold that such an association will diminish British culture and identity, or because they claim that Britain's wealth will be decreased if its economic decisions become more controlled

by the rest of Europe than they are at present.[11] While the European Parliament is now operative, it has shown that it is difficult for the whole of Europe to reach agreement on, for example, policies concerning the environment, let alone the whole world.[12]

In Macmurray's opinion, a worldwide system of government has not been established because of fear regarding the ultimate responsibility that would accompany it. While this might be true, it seems equally likely that fear of political unification stems from a fear of a loss of individual and/or national freedom, in cultural as well as competitive terms. The different emphases of different countries and the ensuing problems encountered in the construction of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* following the Second World War is testament to this problem. Further, although an agreement was reached and marks a great achievement, its legal status is rather vague and minimal.

Conversely, this reticence to share resources is balanced by the outreach, in terms of aid, that the wealthier nations offer to poorer nations, especially following natural disasters. In particular, the South East Asian 2004 tsunami revealed that the Paris Club (of rich creditor nations) was willing to freeze the international debt which was hampering the rebuilding of devastated countries. Similarly, the work of the United Nations does represent a form of international justice. Yet at the same time, the ongoing antagonistic situation in Iraq is an example of hostility, as opposed to mere apathy, facing the issue of global union.[13] In addition, it shows that all nations are not given equal status in the sense that Macmurray hopes they might be. Overall, it seems that the possibility of politically uniting the entire world under one law and one government, while maintaining cultural diversity, is unrealizable.[14] Nevertheless, in order for the British form of unity to have a

realistic chance at extension towards global unity, Macmurray does argue that it would need to alter its economic organization.

Negative and Positive Government

In the midst of the Second World War, Macmurray produced his most extensive work on the British government and its economy. In his opinion, Britain's involvement in the war stemmed from a deep-rooted belief in democracy. However, at the time he stressed the point that a democratic solution to the war would require new forms of government. In general he states, 'Democratic institutions are the instruments of democracy, not democracy itself' (*CC*, p. 8). Hence any political organization that successfully realizes democratic principles today might be ineffective tomorrow, if the conditions of its society change while it remains the same. For Macmurray then, the occasion of war is an indication of the need for political institutions to evolve, disentangling themselves from tradition in the pursuit of democracy.

He maintains that 'Freedom and equality are the keynotes of democracy' (*CC*, p. 9), since a true democratic order is characterized by the social equivalence and tolerance of all. In order for privilege and distinction to be eradicated and for democracy to be realized, he claims, it must also be held that '*All political authority is limited*' (*CC*, p. 9). In essence, he argues that the fundamental difference between democracy and totalitarianism is the notion that there are particular areas of human life which exist outside the political arena. Moreover, since it would be ludicrous to expect a political organization to define its own limits, it is up to the citizens both to decide which aspects of life are excluded from the political sphere and also to devise the means for preventing the state from stepping over these

boundaries. As we have already seen Macmurray is firmly convinced that the politicians exist to serve their citizens and not vice versa, on the grounds that the human being is more than just a citizen.[15]

In the post-war situation, Macmurray assumes that retaining and extending democracy will involve 'passing from an era of *negative* government to an era of *positive* government' (*CD*, p. 7). He suggests that the liberal tradition of Britain consists of a negative democracy. It has been founded on two different yet connected factors, namely cultural freedom and economic freedom. According to Macmurray, it is only the former that is essential to democracy itself, since it is in the interests of all the people. Cultural freedom, which includes freedom of conscience, thought, speech and so on, marks those areas of a human being's life over which the government does not have control. Economic freedom, in terms of free trade in a free market, however, is only in the interests of those with capital. Consequently, it is this aspect of the British liberal tradition that renders it a negative democracy; that is, its government is unable to utilize the economic resources of the society to benefit all its citizens. Yet Macmurray contends that 'whereas cultural freedom grows as democracy advances, economic freedom decreases' (*CD*, p. 15), since as industry flourishes, the tension between those with capital and those with labour forces the government to intervene. While the principle of a free economy prevents the government from having a direct command over the country's wealth, it forces the government into indirect efforts to protect the economic freedom of all its citizens. In an attempt to prevent the exploitation of those with labour, the government has to subsidize failing businesses, but its function in the economy of the country is restricted to this limited and negative role. In the end, the majority of the capital is owned by a few wealthy individuals or

corporations, and so this negative democracy is actually an oligarchy.

If the government were to be allowed to control the country's material resources, it could have a positive role in the economy of the country and could therefore result in a positive democracy. In essence, he asserts that 'we can remove the ban on government control of the economic field and still remain a democracy, provided always that the cultural field remains outside the competence of political authority and we devise the machinery to enforce this limitation upon the government' (*CD*, p. 17). Moreover, he argues that the equalization of wealth is a necessity for extending democracy. Further, he suggests that those who claim that democracy is inefficient and ineffective are mistakenly identifying democracy with a system of negative government. While Macmurray is aware that the positive governments that existed in Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany in the 1940s did not result in advanced democracy then, he still insists that 'The negation of the autonomy of the economic life does not imply the negation of the autonomy of the cultural life' (*CD*, p. 20). On the basis that socialism provides an example of a positive government, Macmurray considers the 1940s rise of the socialist movement to be a possible tool, but not necessarily the only means, for Britain to utilize in the transition from negative to positive government. In fact, he argues that the socialist movement is primarily the 'demand for the subordination of the economic life to the cultural life of the community' (*CD*, p. 21).

While it is possible to have cultural freedom in the absence of economic freedom, he claims, the problem is maintaining the former without control of the latter. Indeed, the tension between capital and labour grows with the increase in industrialization due to the inherent and inescapable connection between economic and cultural

freedom. In fact, the development of the latter depends on the adequacy of the former, since, as Macmurray shows, 'The means of life are also the means of a good life' (*CD*, p. 21). Consequently, while there is a free economy those without capital lack the funds with which to develop their cultural life, in addition to the government lacking the economic power to protect the cultural freedom of those people. On the grounds that the competition that is characteristic of a free market creates wealth and therefore the means for cultural growth for a mere few citizens then, it is Macmurray's contention that a free economy is contrary to rather than being harmonious with cultural freedom for all citizens. It is primarily for this reason, he holds, that democracy appears to be inefficient and is eventually prevented.

Confident first that the British people have a deep-seated propensity to seek democracy, and secondly that the industrialization of Britain is frustrating democracy, Macmurray assumes that Britain will be compelled to make the transition from a negative to a positive government. He states that the need for a positive government is 'the natural climax of the development of negative democracy' (*CD*, p. 34). On this basis, he claims that he is not engaging in a debate concerning the relative merits and defects of either negative or positive governments, but merely wishes to set out some guidelines to ensure that when the transition from one to the other takes place cultural freedom need not be lost (*CD*, p. 18; p. 30). Still, considering Macmurray's assessment of the impossibility of a free economy sustaining democracy over a period of time, it seems that in his opinion a positive government has a greater potential for creating democracy for all its citizens than a negative one.

Fundamentally, he states that a positive democracy 'would mean the *practical* ownership of the means of

production and distribution by the State' (*CD*, p. 30). However, in the British liberal tradition, the government is prevented from suppressing cultural freedom by its subordination to Parliament. In order for the government to alter public policy, it must be sanctioned by the House of Commons – the elected representatives of the people – and the effectiveness of this system relies on the fact that the government does not have economic control. If Britain were to make the transition from a negative to a positive government then, the people would need a different method for limiting political power.[16] Moreover, history reveals that a government with material control is liable to seek cultural control also. In order to counteract the fear that this would always be the case, Macmurray points out that a negative democracy, as well as a positive democracy, contains the potential for resulting in totalitarianism. That is, the few members who control the country's wealth could abuse the disproportionate consideration from the government that they enjoy in order to become the government. Thus he claims that 'it becomes a question of whether an economic dictatorship in the hands of government is not a lesser evil than an economic dictatorship in the hands of an association of private citizens' (*CD*, p. 28).

This seems to be an overstatement of the case, but Macmurray explains that while the growth of monopolies undermines the free economic enterprise for all citizens which the British liberal tradition sought to achieve, the government intervention into economic affairs that this occasions can prevent industrialization from reaching its ultimate goal. Consequently, even as economic freedom collapses, the transition to a positive government could be evaded. However, this does not weaken Macmurray's central claim that, while democracy requires a government that is under the control of the citizens, true democracy appears to be thwarted by capitalism. In addition, the situation of

persisting with a negative government is complicated further by the international network of economic relations. It is Macmurray's contention that the countries with positive governments will be more efficient in the international field than those with negative governments (*CD*, p. 36).

Since the West has amassed the technological means for controlling nature, Macmurray is certain that further advances in human progress depend on the application of these means. Nevertheless, he states that 'they can be used for the welfare of humanity only through planned, co-ordinated and persistent communal effort' (*CD*, p. 36). That is, if a society's resources are going to benefit the society as a whole, they must be controlled by a governing body concerned with the interests of the citizens. Essentially therefore, the possibility of a positive government being limited by its citizens rests on psychological sentiment. According to Macmurray, a government with economic control could be prevented from misusing this power and from dictating the cultural life of its citizens through its reverence for democracy and for its people. In addition to this optimistic conception, he argues for 'a very considerable extension of local self-government' (*CD*, p. 40).[17] He is aware of the need for centralization in terms of economic planning, but maintains that there is an equally significant need for decentralization in terms of its application, which, he holds, will allow all the citizens to be in control of their economic lives to a greater extent than they are with a negative government.

Communism and Socialism

In part, Macmurray's analysis of the British liberal tradition, and his emphasis on the need for a positive government, stems from his high regard for the principles of communist theory. He claims that Marxist philosophy represents a

significant advance in the understanding of society (PC; ch1935a–e). Clearly he seeks to avoid the misinterpretation that could arise from equating communism with Marxism, or with the dictatorships that call themselves communist. In addition, he attempts to separate the movement towards a communist society from communist theory itself (*PC*, pp. 10–13). Essentially though, he respects Marx's attempt to examine social relations from an economic standpoint. In particular, he highlights the fact that when Marx speaks of the interrelation of capital and labour, this implies the interrelation of *people* who own capital and *people* who offer labour (*PC*, pp. 46–8; Marx and Engels, 1967; Marx, 1990). Furthermore, since Marx interprets the changing status of these relations on dialectical grounds, Macmurray claims that he provides a scientific basis from which to act intelligently. That is, Macmurray accepts that the struggle for the control of the means of production affects the interplay of those with resources and those with labour, thus dividing them into different classes.

However, this does not mean that Macmurray agrees entirely with the principles of Marxist and/or communist theory. He states that his position is 'within the tradition of thought which derives from Marx' (*PC*, p. 62), and is appropriating the Marxist principle that all theories are to be modified in conjunction with the results of the experimental action that ensues from them. Hence he points out that, while it is a fact that society is comprised of people in relation, this does not mean that all relationships conform to the one type; rather there are three ways in which persons relate to one another – mechanical, organic and personal (*PC*, p. 65). In Macmurray's opinion, the mechanical relation of people as instruments and the organic relation of people for the achievement of a common purpose are substantially distinct from the relation of people as persons. According to Macmurray, mechanical and organic relations are more

likely to change with the dialectical alteration in economic circumstances than are companionships. It is the universality of this third type of relationship therefore that leads Macmurray to argue that all forms of relationship are not accounted for by reference to the material conditions of a society (*PC*, p. 66). Thus he maintains that the Marxist analysis of dialectical growth is a useful tool for understanding human relations in so far as they are organically determined, but it is not satisfactory as a complete account of personal relationships.

Moreover, since human beings are 'superorganic' (*PC*, p. 67), they seek to control the environment as much as having to adapt to it, but Marx does not account for this. In addition, Macmurray alleges that Marx's failure in this respect explains a further weakness in his theory. By postulating an entirely organic conception of human relationality, Marx assumes that progressive adaptation to the environment is indefinite; this is the basis for the communist assumption that communism is an inevitable stage in the solution to the tension between capital and labour. On the contrary, Macmurray argues that human beings could decide to give up the struggle and resign themselves to the current situation before the advent of communism occurred.

Nevertheless, Macmurray's aim is merely to point out the limitations of the economic interpretation of human history. In addition to accepting that economic differences do affect the relations of persons, Macmurray maintains that in the absence of deliberate planning the development of human society does have an organic impetus. As we have mentioned, he holds that, since society has amassed the technique for greater production of means, human progress depends on the cooperative application of these means, rather than the struggle for control of them. Further, he also asserts that western capitalism allows only a few to control

the economic lives of many, infecting national and international relations with competition for profit, where some gain and some lose. So there is a class division that prevents the relation of persons as persons, and therefore Macmurray states that 'a communist society is the only form of society in which the planning of social development is possible' (*PC*, p. 77). In essence though, Macmurray is emphasizing dialectic as opposed to dogmatic communist theory, and so he is not, for example, committed to violent revolution. In addition, he stresses the impossibility of imposing economic equality by force, since equating politics with economics leads to an over-emphasis on efficiency at the expense of justice, producing a dictatorship rather than a classless society.

Fundamentally then, the creation of a classless society requires the recognition that the state is merely an instrument of the people. Hence the state can regulate a society's economic situation for increased personal development, if it recognizes that justice means the destruction of economic privilege. The beginning of a planned economy, without resulting in the end of democracy therefore, must include the acknowledgement that human relations are not simply based on economics. In particular, Macmurray argues that western individualism needs to be overcome, if democracy is to be maintained through an advance into communism (*PC*, p. 94). As we have mentioned in Part II, rather than threatening individuality Macmurray contends that individuality can be sustained only within personal relations. It is a sense of community then, he argues, that could sustain economic equality and evade fascism. In this respect he states that 'Individualism and communism are opposites and irreconcilable. Individuality and community are correlatives' (*PC*, p. 96). At its most basic level as we have seen, Macmurray claims that the communal bond is found within

the family setting. However, the growth of individualism has led to female emancipation which, while progressive in itself, requires that a new form of this bond be established. In its absence, he suggests the state might deem it necessary to enforce social cooperation, thus creating a dictatorship rather than a classless society.

In spite of Macmurray's hopeful anticipation of communism in the 1930s, his references to it become less pronounced in later works. The reasons for this seem to be twofold. First, the failure of countries such as Soviet Russia to get beyond dictatorship and issue in a classless society must have been disheartening to those who assumed communism was the way forward. Secondly, the growth of negative sentiment towards communism in the West might have caused Macmurray to refrain from making public statements praising it. During the 1940s, he makes little reference to communism, but he still asserts that democracy has outgrown capitalism, thus necessitating the socialization of industry and finance (*CC*, p. 53). Hindsight reveals that he was mistaken in this respect; nevertheless, although socialism did not arrive within the anticipated timescale, this does not mean that his expectation was entirely false. However, the dictatorships of the East, and their subsequent collapse, forces the West to consider whether socialism is a real possibility and moreover, whether it is even desirable.

Mixed-economy status, because a historical reality, often seems to be unavoidable. Nevertheless, Wilde's view is not that socialism is redundant or impossible, but rather that it requires a different form (Wilde, 1994, p. 155). It is claimed by Wilde that the eastern dictatorships occurred because the political conditions and the sense of community necessary for material equality were only partially developed when the communists gained power (ibid., p. 140). The impatient political elite, who took over material

wealth, forced a fully controlled economy on people not yet convinced of its benefit, and so, in the end, they failed to produce social equality. Consequently, this is not grounds for concluding that socialism and democracy are incompatible. On the contrary, in recent years, according to Gamble, democrats have been acknowledging that real democracy requires socialism, and socialists have realized that the prevention of totalitarianism requires democracy (Gamble, ch1991).

In Britain, the Labour Party has traditionally stood for social equality. With the advent of New Labour however, the traditional socialist policy of public ownership of industry has been replaced with the somewhat evasive notion of partnership, in between private and public enterprise (Blair, 1996, p. 19). Although the former Prime Minister, Mr Tony Blair, claims to have been influenced by Macmurray's work, Britain's New Labour has not ushered in the socialism that Macmurray hoped for (*Sunday Telegraph*, a1996).[18] While both Blair and Macmurray claim to be convinced that the maximization of individual freedom depends on the values of the whole community, their divergence regarding the importance of economic equality is conspicuous. As I argue elsewhere, their divergence can be largely explained by the fact that Blair's use of the term 'community' is seriously at odds with Macmurray's definition of the term, or rather Blair fudges the term 'community' by using it to refer both to societies and to communities (McIntosh, ch2007).

We should note, as Kirkpatrick reveals, that Macmurray's emphasis on community does not mean that he is a communitarian (Kirkpatrick, ch2002; 2005, pp. 121–2). In short, communitarianism emphasizes the responsibilities of the individual to the community, thereby valorizing community over individuality.[19] The rhetoric of New Labour politics could be characterized as communitarian in this way, given its insistence that the fulfilment of rights is tied

to and comes after discharging certain obligations (see McIntosh, a2007c). While Macmurray does stress community over individualism, responsibility to the community is not a duty that must be performed before benefits are granted. Rather, a Macmurrian community is one in which relationships of unconditional care balance individual freedom and responsibility; that is, responsible action is voluntarily engaged in, as a result of understanding the impact that irresponsible action may have on others (*PR*, pp. 190–91). Nevertheless, Macmurray recognizes the need for contractual obligations where community does not exist, but, as we have discussed, he refers to such relations as societies, not communities.

In addition, it is possible to argue that the differences between Macmurray's theory and Marxist principles prevent his concepts from being properly regarded as falling within the Marxist tradition. It is Lam's opinion that, since Macmurray fails to address the issue of what would be forfeited in the achievement of a classless society, his analysis loses the realism that is inherent in the Marxian system (Lam, a1940, p. 61). By concentrating on international issues, rather than the internal class struggle, Macmurray implies that it is the entire nation, and not primarily the working classes, that will bring about change in social relations. Consequently, there is a divergence between Marx's and Macmurray's assessments of the possibility of realizing classless society. While Macmurray and Marx both argue that capitalism and classless society are not compatible; whereas Marx concludes that revolution is therefore necessary, Macmurray seems to suggest that the eradication of class division can be a gradual process.

Primarily, Lam claims that Macmurray has misunderstood Marx, by reducing Marx's perception of the antagonism between the rich and the poor to his view of the biological necessity to satisfy hunger (ibid., p. 62). As a result,

Macmurray fails to see that, even when hunger has been appeased, economic inequality is still a cause of friction. Accordingly, Macmurray's perception of the rise of class consciousness and the significance of developing the means of production is inadequate, with the effect that he does not consider whether class division is engendered by nature or technology, nor whether social change is affected by individual or class opinion.

Fundamentally then, while Lam acknowledges that Macmurray's analysis beneficially allows the individual to be fulfilled through personal relationships, without having to wait for a classless society to exist, she contends that even this suggestion of inherent social cooperation is in opposition to Marx's portrayal of social conflict (ibid., p. 64). Similarly, Macmurray's depiction of the state as an instrument of justice, and therefore a tool for social reform, contradicts Marx's certainty concerning the need to demolish pre-existent institutions. At the heart of Marx's theory is the conviction that a communist society can only be brought about in an abrupt manner, whereas Macmurray seems to be arguing for the progressive increase in social freedom and equality. In essence, Lam holds that Marx 'is a revolutionist in theory and practice', whereas 'Macmurray is a reformer in theory and practice' (ibid., p. 65).

However, even if we accept Lam's criticisms, we cannot ignore the fact that Macmurray clearly assumes that he is in support of certain Marxist principles. In this sense it is primarily the increase in freedom and equality that he upholds as the goals of a socialist democracy and the means for increasing personal relationships. Due to the fact that the Communist dictatorships in the East have collapsed, Macmurray's claim that personal development requires cultural freedom is strengthened, but this does not prove that economic freedom either is or is not required to support it. Furthermore, the prospect of suffering a decrease in the

amount of freedom currently enjoyed means that Britain is still wary, both of instituting a positive government and of reinforcing international ties. If it is possible then to separate Macmurray's definitions of freedom and equality from his early emphasis on communism and socialism, it might be possible to argue for increased freedom and equality by alternative methods. In this way, taking account of Lam's criticisms and recognizing that Macmurray's reverence for communism is connected to a particular era, it will be possible to continue to advocate Macmurray's perception of enhanced personal development without necessarily having to accept his tenuous but earnest preference for communism and/or socialism.

Freedom and Equality

For Macmurray, freedom and equality are mutually inclusive categories; real freedom requires real equality. Equality between persons refers to equality of value and equality of consideration, in a legal and a general sense; his political stance though makes it clear that he also insists on the equality of opportunity that is determined by wealth. However, since inter-class loving relationships are possible and can be successful, economically diverse individuals do manage to relate on an equal basis. Moreover, there are many differences of background, other than financial, that can make equal relations difficult. For these reasons, it seems that Macmurray's emphasis on economic equality, while it might serve to make equal relations easier, is by no means a requirement and is not even necessarily more significant than, for example, similarities of cultural tradition.

Macmurray's concern with freedom is present from his earliest works. Initially, he argues that only real people can be free (*FMW*, pp. 163–70). An unreal person is someone

who assents to a statement intellectually, but not emotionally. A real person then has thoughts and feelings that correspond, and so is free to act in accordance with human nature; that is, to act in terms of the nature of the other, provided that the other is not being restrictive. In particular, Macmurray's early work introduces the notion that there are three kinds of freedom (*FMW*, pp. 171–80), laying the foundation for his later discussion of the three types of relationships. He explains that while free movement for inanimate objects is mechanical and predictable in conformity with the laws of nature, organic items are free if they are able to grow and develop in accordance with their teleological life cycle. Human beings though, as we have mentioned, are not simply confined to the obedience of laws or to adaptation to the environment; instead their freedom is grounded in the ability to act, which, in turn, is bound up with their relations as persons. As we have seen, mechanical and organic relations of persons are impersonal; that is, they deny the individuals concerned the equality and freedom that allow them to be persons in the fullest expression of their human nature. There is a sense therefore in which these modes of relation have an ethical hierarchy, since Macmurray equates morality with a communal intention.

After each of the world wars, Macmurray is certain that a time of great change is imminent, and each time he maintains that the struggle for freedom is of crucial importance during such reorganization. Consequently, he asserts that 'Dignity, freedom and responsibility are inseparably bound together' (*CF*, p. 9). This implies that the amount of freedom experienced can be diminished either by a lack of dignity or by dismissing responsibility. Yet, inasmuch as the freedom to act in the pursuit of an intention, in contrast with mere reaction, is a fundamental tenet of Macmurray's definition of the human being, freedom would appear to be absolute. However, Macmurray

is keen to address the manner in which freedom is both relative and paradoxical (*CF*, pp. 17–21). Although Macmurray disagrees with much of Rousseau's theory, as we have seen, he does not dispute Rousseau's claim that human beings, while born free, have some difficulty in exercising this freedom. It seems then that freedom 'is at once the Alpha and the Omega' (*CF*, p. 18) of human existence for Macmurray.

Moreover, instead of suggesting that human beings would exercise greater freedom if only they were not constrained by economic and environmental factors, Macmurray maintains that human beings are actually afraid of freedom; more precisely he argues that human beings are afraid of the responsibility that accompanies it.[20] Although he argues that 'Fear is an essential element in our make-up, without which we should not be human' (*CF*, p. 28), he also claims that too much fear cripples action. Entirely free persons, Macmurray holds, accept total responsibility for the consequences of their actions. Throughout the lifespan of human beings, they must constantly choose whether to strive towards security or freedom. According to Macmurray, this is an inescapable, but also an illusory, choice. It might appear to be reasonable to assume that security would give greater freedom, but on the contrary each additional defence reveals another area of vulnerability, increasing insecurity and fear, which in turn decreases freedom. Fear therefore is only overcome in the perpetual pursuit of greater freedom.

We have already discussed the interrelation of means and ends in the pursuit of an action. In effect, an agent needs to have knowledge both of the efficient means for carrying out an action and also of a desired end to be achieved. Freedom to act can be increased therefore either by an extension of the means at the individual's disposal or by decreasing desires. Hence Macmurray states that 'The

free man [or woman] is the man [or woman] whose means are adequate to his [or her] ends' (*CF*, p. 21). Since the discrimination between the means of action centres around technique, whereas the selection of an end for Macmurray is an ethical issue, he refers to these two aspects of action as the technological and the moral relativities of freedom (*CF*, p. 21). While technological power has expanded vastly in the West, Macmurray suggests that desires have been subject to an even more rapid growth, and so freedom has not actually been increased. There is a sense then in which the extension of freedom is aided by the exercise of self-restraint and the recognition of human limitations. Thus Macmurray states that 'Humility is the handmaid of freedom' (*CF*, p. 24).

Most significantly though and in conjunction with Macmurray's description of the status of the carer-infant relation, he claims that 'Human freedom can be realized only as the freedom of individuals in relation; and the freedom of each of us is relative to that of the others' (*CF*, p. 24). Since humans are interdependent rather than independent beings, this implies that any attempt to obtain freedom for the individual is futile. Even if the individual has balanced means and ends, the possibility remains that another person might prevent the individual from realizing the intention. At most, an individual can endeavour to act so as not to curtail the freedom of others in the hope that this will encourage them to act likewise, but without being assured that they will. Thus Macmurray claims that the amount of freedom experienced by an individual depends on 'the extent and the quality of social co-operation' (*CF*, p. 26). In addition, he suggests that the fear which occasions the pursuit of security is a fear of being constrained by the other. Instead of giving freedom to the other, the fearful individual seeks security by withdrawing from the other and the field of action, or by forcing the other to acquiesce to

demands, as we discovered in the analysis of the carer-infant relation. In either case, both the individual and the other lose freedom, since cooperation is denied.[21]

In order to overcome the fear that is a stumbling block to human freedom therefore, the individuals who are related to one another need to cooperate with one another from a positive motive, rather than from compulsion. It is in this sense that, for Macmurray, 'The primary condition of freedom, to which all other conditions are related, lies in the character and the quality of human relations' (*CF*, p. 31). However, as we have seen, when relations are indirect it is difficult either for the individual to be positively motived towards all the others whom the individual's actions affect, or to be aware of the ways in which the consequences of actions might be curtailing the freedom of someone else. In this situation, the state becomes a tool for sharing out the technological power to act, engaging in, what Macmurray terms, the 'socialization of means' (*CF*, p. 31). Nevertheless, while the political organization can serve to monitor the equal distribution of technical means, history has shown that political institutions can also be used to secure special privilege and exert dominance. Moreover, since action combines means and ends, increased freedom also requires the 'socialization of ends' (*CF*, p. 31). Consequently, Macmurray's effort to establish the means for creating and maintaining equality and freedom emphasizes the fact that political organization is insufficient in itself. It is in this respect that his distinction between societies and communities becomes most significant, since, he argues, it is communal spirit that secures cooperation without the use of force and ensures the compatibility of ends.

In so far as the original form of human existence is the carer-infant relation, 'Human life is *inherently* a common life' and, therefore, Macmurray holds that 'Community is prior to society' (*CF*, p. 56). In fact, he asserts that the direct relation

of heterocentrically motivated persons is the essence of human nature. Functional relations, such as those exhibited by the wider society of indirectly related people, are an aspect of communal relations, but their basis is the common humanity of its members rather than their functional utility. Freedom within a society then, according to Macmurray, is negative freedom (*PR*, p. 150), since, as Kirkpatrick explains, it is 'atomistic/contractarian' (Kirkpatrick, a1985, p. 568). Similarly, equality of value cannot occur where worth is measured by utility. For individuals to be valued equally, their natural differences must be recognized and accepted, regardless of synthetic differences. Moreover, since the associations within a society are restrained by legal bonds, fear of the other is suppressed rather than overcome, giving the appearance of security without real freedom. Hence individuals appear to be free by restricting themselves to actions that are within the law; that is, by acting from obligation rather than propensity. At most then, a political organization can induce loyalty in its subjects; it cannot create communal bonds (a crucial point that Tony Blair seems to have missed; see McIntosh, ch2007). In fact, in spite of Macmurray's high regard for the Marxist interpretation of economic relations, he claims that the communist system curtailed personal freedom by emphasizing efficiency at the expense of equality (*CF*, p. 68; a1933c; ch1938). Such inner bonds of unity are engendered, Macmurray maintains, by religion; thus it is religious freedom in particular that serves to prevent the abuse of political institutions and the subsequent limitation of freedom and equality.

State and Church

Fundamentally therefore, Macmurray contends that the relations of humans have two sources: the religious

community and the political powers. In the former case, the bond arises simply out of the desire for fellowship, whereas in the latter case, the bond is imposed for the purpose of controlling competition. If necessary social unity does not grow out of voluntarily shared values, then it is exacted by law. In short, relationality can be maintained 'either by affection or by force' (*CC*, p. 26). Hence as with the carer-infant relation, Macmurray holds that the motivations of individuals in society are governed either by fear or by love. While the government relies on fear in order to compel its citizens to behave as the state dictates then, a religious community is sustained by love.

Inasmuch as Macmurray notes the benefits of fear for considered action, and for preventing love from becoming tyrannical or sentimental, he is not implying that the distinction between religious communities and political organizations is one of virtue and vice. However, he is suggesting that, since love needs to dominate over fear in order for action to be carried out, 'in a sane world, religion will control politics' (*CC*, p. 28).[22] If the situation is reversed so that religion becomes subordinate to politics, totalitarianism is the eventual result. Moreover, this outcome is more likely if religion proves to be inadequate at sustaining the inner bond between fellows, since it is then left to politics to enforce an external bond of unity. In this respect, in reference to the political powers of the 1940s, Macmurray claims that Hitler is the effect of a long process rather than being the cause of it. He states that 'As the power of religion declines, so the power of the State must increase; until at last, where religion is rejected by society, the power and authority of the State must become unlimited' (*CC*, p. 30).

As the circumstances of society alter then, it becomes of crucial importance that there is a sufficient communal bond within society to prevent the changing political institutions

from eradicating democracy; it is this communal bond that provides the means for limiting political control and increasing freedom and equality. Hence Macmurray is presuming that the church and the state have distinct but interrelated roles in the appropriation of the good life. In his published monographs, he offers little explanation of this assumption, but in a series of papers which he wrote for BBC radio broadcasts, he does offer some elaboration on this issue.

As a result of individualism and the breakdown of communal bonds within modern society, he contends, humans are led to believe that their value depends solely on their contribution to society; thus a hierarchical cooperation of workers is created (a1941e). However, in accordance with Macmurray's allegation that the person is more than just a citizen, he holds that while all aspects of life have functional purposes many elements are also more than functional (a1941c). For example, he claims that while *Homo sapiens* and other animals eat for nourishment, human beings also eat and drink for fellowship.[23] In this way, the personal life transforms necessary biological functions into communal activities, potentially relating individuals to each other on an equal basis, despite differences of utility value in the workplace.

Nevertheless a human being engages in the personal and functional aspects of life simultaneously; an individual cannot separate practically these two diverse aspects. As a result, Macmurray explains that it is inevitable that a struggle between the two forms ensues, since one form will always, however temporarily, override the other. We have already discovered that Macmurray maintains that 'The functional life is *for* the personal life; the personal life is *through* the functional life' (a1941h). Since the functional life is concerned with the necessity of work, and the relations therein are monitored by the external guidelines of

the government, while conversely the personal life is concerned merely with the enjoyment of shared experience, and so the relations therein are regulated by an internal bond, it is the former that is for the latter and the latter that is through the former. Hence Macmurray holds that 'the State is *for* the community; the community is *through* the State' (a1941b). In essence then, he is implying that the two spheres are concerned with the two different but connected aspects of human experience, referred to elsewhere as the means and the ends of life, or the economic and the personal life. In short, the church exists for the personal life, whereas the state exists for the functional life; so it is in this sense that Macmurray seeks the subordination of politics to religion (CAS).

Nonetheless, since the church cannot exist without material means, the church cannot exist independently of the state for long. Similarly, while the state can seek to enforce cooperation, inner bonds of unity cannot be compelled, and so the state can do relatively little to occasion inner unity without the church. In addition, the church's community bonds are merely imaginary if they are not expressed through a common purpose, but likewise the state's sense of common purpose is minimal if life is not communal. Hence without a political system of justice, the means for connecting indirectly related people does not exist even if the church is present, and so the potential for increasing community is absent. Similarly, where such a system does exist, the society might evolve into a community, but only if the church is active also. While Macmurray would seem to be arguing for the separation of church and state – in so far as the former is required to remain dominant over the latter – since it is the latter rather than the former that controls the economy, their integration is also implied. It is this tension that leads Macmurray to state that 'The proper relation of religion and politics is the

unsolved problem of our civilization' (u1941). Indeed the recent and ongoing debate concerning the role of religious reasons in public debate, involving Nicholas Wolterstorff, Robert Audi and Jürgen Habermas in particular, but also found in the contrasting political and media responses to George W. Bush's religious rhetoric and Blair's desire to refer to religion, confirms that we have yet to resolve this issue (McIntosh, a2007c).

Although Macmurray's tentative effort to address this issue might seem to be opaque in detail, the attempt to simultaneously relate and separate religion and politics is not especially unusual. In this respect, it is possible to draw some comparisons between his theory of the roles of the church and the state and those of the Protestant Reformers. For example, Calvin argues that the bishop and the magistrate have different functions, but that the citizens must obey both (Calvin and Luther, 1991, pp. 3–43). Similarly, Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms, one spiritual and the other temporal, insists that the two not be fused, but that they must also support each other (ibid., pp. 47–86). Nevertheless, in spite of the similarities between such hypotheses and Macmurray's tenets, they offer little support to his enterprise, since in practice these Reformation theories led to a confusion of secular and religious authority. Consequently, as George shows, political obedience became a matter of conscience and labour became increasingly an end in itself, at the expense of the personal life (George, 1988, pp. 98–102, 244–6). It is clear that Macmurray is seeking to avoid this outcome, since as we have seen he only advocates conformity to law where the political system concerned is a just one, and while he stresses the need for work, he is opposed to any theory which regards work as more significant than leisure (LMA; a1957).

Hence it is perhaps the differences between his perception and those of the aforementioned reformed theologians that are more significant than the areas of agreement. In particular, Calvin's description of the exclusivity of the church's authority and his claim that the state is a tool for enforcing Christianity on its citizens are not elements of Macmurray's thought. Likewise Luther's assertion that the church concern itself with peace while the state wields the sword is at odds with Macmurray's claim that the state is an instrument of peace. Furthermore, whereas Luther insists on the redundancy of politics in the eventuality of worldwide Christianity, Macmurray affirms the necessity of political institutions for governing indirect relations even where community spirit is widespread, since conflicts of intention still arise and the consequences of action are still hidden. Though whether these qualifications would prove to be sufficient for protecting the personal life, if the church and the state were given the roles Macmurray assigns to them, could only be discovered in the event of endeavouring to put his theory into practice.

Since Macmurray's primary concern with the roles of church and state issues from his attempt to stress the importance of community for advancing the freedom and equality espoused by democracy, he provides the reasons for taking his suggestions seriously. In fact, he argues that real freedom and equality are the trademarks of communities rather than societies. Nonetheless, while insisting that the creation and maintenance of community is a religious rather than a political task, he is aware that his particular emphasis on religion is at odds with the prevailing view in the European society he is addressing (*CC*, pp. 14–15). In particular, he admits that many people in the West view religion as something essentially private rather than public and therefore unable to be sustained if the

government sought to eradicate it.[24] Even so, he remains adamant that:

> So long as religion is excluded from the competence of political authority, everything is excluded which democracy requires. And religion could of itself enforce the limitation of political authority which democracy demands. Indeed, in the long run, only religion is capable of doing this. (*CC*, p. 15)

Yet he also asserts that the religion practised in Europe would not be able to do this, and further that its freedom from the clutches of governmental direction is of little consequence.

On this basis, Macmurray is arguing for a dramatic alteration in the established forms of religion. (Moreover, at the time when he is convinced that economic freedom is coming to an end, he insists that the transformation of religion is urgent.) In essence, he asserts that if religion is to have the ability to sustain democracy, it must lose the individualism that has become characteristic of western society. Indeed, he states that 'individualism is incompatible with religion because it is incompatible with social unity' (*CC*, p. 16). That is, while human nature is inescapably social, he holds that it is religion that is the primary expression of this sociality, contrary to the view that religion is something which an individual engages in privately. Moreover, it is on the strength of this perception of religion that he argues that it is religion that can provide the inner bond necessary to maintain democracy in the event of industry and finance being controlled by the government. In addition, even without socialism, since the entire world is united economically, the possibility of increasing freedom and equality depends, he claims, on the creation and sustenance of a common culture. In particular, he suggests that Christianity has a greater potential than any other religion for rising to this task. Furthermore, he asserts that it has, in the past, proved itself to be capable of reformation

and so, at least in principle, it could be the tool of future international democracy. Yet we will have to postpone our discussion of the contentious nature of this argument until Part IV.

Even setting aside this issue though, many other questions still remain concerning Macmurray's assessment of the roles of church and state and their proper relation to one another. For example, we have not discovered why he stresses religion in particular as the most adequate form of cultural freedom for limiting the government, or rather why he asserts that it is religion that maintains community and not culture in general (a1943a). In addition, it seems possible that if the economy were to remain outside governmental control, then community bonds would not be necessary for limiting governmental power. Nevertheless, since it is not simply on the basis of his unrealized claim that 'Socialism, of one kind or another, is now inevitable' (*CC*, p. 32) that Macmurray argues for the importance of communal bonds, this aspect is of little consequence. Essentially his point is that, despite economic freedom, communities are more capable of creating and sustaining cooperation and therefore of increasing the freedom and equality that are fundamental to democracy and to personal development than an externally imposed unity. In order to fully understand his definitions of freedom and equality, his understanding of what constitutes the personal life and the grounds for his insistence that religion is public rather than private however, it will be necessary to examine his description of religion in detail. By making this the basis of Part IV, we will also explicate Macmurray's description of community and in addition consider the possibilities of rendering the term 'global community' meaningful.

Conclusion

Throughout Part III we have been connecting Macmurray's theoretical definition of the person with its practical counterparts. In particular, we have discussed the different attitudes that an individual or even a whole society might have towards the other in relation and, according to Macmurray, the manner in which this affects the morality of an individual's or even a nation's actions. While Macmurray argues that the freedom to act carries with it the responsibility that the individual or the society must not infringe on the freedom of another individual or society to act, a tension remains between the status of the intention directing the action and the outcome of the action itself. Macmurray seeks always to emphasize the practical over the theoretical, but due to the unforeseen consequences of action, he does suggest that a morally right action is one which intends to assist rather than hinder the other, in spite of its result.

Similarly, we have discovered that Macmurray's concepts are fraught with methodological problems, ranging from an overly simplistic analysis of history to an overly tidy thesis. Nonetheless, despite these issues, he remains faithful to his attempt to present the person as a holistic entity, only fully developed through positively motived relations. With insight he describes the different types of societies and the manner in which, where the prevailing motive is negative, interpersonal relations are hindered. In this context, we have seen that extensive emphasis on technology or self-interest creates as false a representation of the good life as does too highly a reflective and aesthetic attitude. Furthermore, Macmurray offers us the incisive distinction between societies and communities, clarifying the difference between forced or voluntary cooperation issuing from a specific agenda and voluntary association merely for the sake of the relationship.

From the standpoint of the person in relation then, it is not surprising that Macmurray views the purpose of justice and law to be the eradication of special privilege and the protection from harm. However, as a part of this notion, Macmurray does rest the weight of moral treatment of one's fellows on the individual. While he allows for the fact that indirect relations require a legislative body to safeguard the individual, he again leaves it up to the individual to complain in the face of unjust treatment. In this respect, in the same way that Macmurray's uniting of reason and emotion and theory and action creates the demand for emotional and intellectual sincerity, likewise the ethical implications of personal relations are challenging. Indeed, as we have seen, Macmurray argues that global identity is required, if exploitation is to be avoided. Even if this seems unrealistic though, it serves to highlight the seriousness with which Macmurray regards international relations, and it reveals the fact that he clearly reveres the tenets of democracy as valid principles for the whole of humanity. In essence, it is this underlying notion that will be developed in Part IV.

As the central aspect of his interpretation of democracy, we have discovered that the freedom and equality which democracy is meant to secure are, for Macmurray, more connected with culture than economics. While for a time Macmurray's writings do concentrate on economic equality, underlying this is his overall emphasis on the equal value of all human beings. Moreover, he assists in the struggle to overcome individualism and to recognize the significance of relationships for personal development through his attempt to redress the balance between the working life and the personal life. In the contemporary situation where computers are portable and the home becomes an extension of the office, it is refreshing to come across a theory which portrays the working life as a means to the home life, rather

than an end in itself. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to expect personal rather than economic relations to encourage equality and freedom.

However, the distinction between the functional life and the personal life becomes opaque when it is associated with his distinction between culture and economics. Since Macmurray fails to discuss the full extent of the political arena, the cultural life is left to encompass almost all that is not financial. In this sense, it then seems that the state has a relatively small function in relation to all that the church must encompass. Yet when the terms 'work' and 'love' are employed as the distinguishing characteristics of politics and religion, this situation would seem to be reversed. Even though the family is somehow supposed to bridge the gap between a political society and a religious community, we are left confused concerning which aspects of life are meant to be covered by each institution. Education, for example, is held to be an aspect of cultural freedom and is regarded therefore as being outside the boundaries of political competence, but as a means to the working life, it would seem to belong to governmental direction. In addition though, at least some moral instruction is concerned with relationality on a personal (spiritual) level, and so teaching this presumably belongs within the jurisdiction of the religiously proficient (although not necessarily associated with a traditional religion).

Admittedly, Macmurray's insistence on the practical interrelation of politics and religion and economy and culture perhaps explains the complication over an issue such as that of education; it may even render it unimportant, but at the same time, if Macmurray's theory is to be put into practice, a decision would have to be made concerning who would have the authority over education. In this sense, it seems to be an oversimplification to divide the whole of life into the two categories of work and love

without elaborating further on the role of politics beyond the economy. While Macmurray does equate the state with justice and law, he is not explicit about the issues involved. Part of the problem is that we are tying concepts from different eras of Macmurray's writings together. Still at the heart of the confusion is the role of religion, which is meant to be an aspect of cultural freedom and yet also the fountainhead of all cultural freedoms. Since we have yet to discuss religion in detail, we cannot unpack this issue here, nor then can we properly assess the freedom and equality of persons at this stage. However, we can point out that Macmurray's insistence on the interrelation of politics and religion allows each to have an important function. Not only does the suggestion that politics alone cannot create community guard against the tendency to expect politicians to create the good life in all its facets, the importance of a just political organization for providing the potential for a society to become a community also gives the state a crucial role to play in advancing personal development.

Nonetheless, the attempt to bring ethics into the political sphere contains inherent problems. For example, Macmurray's emphasis on international justice is intended to protect the smaller nations from the self-interest of the larger and more powerful nations. Yet he does not discuss the manner in which his western view of human dignity would be in conflict with that of other cultures, nor does he state whether interference in their culture, based on his standards of freedom, would be acceptable. Similarly, even when he is debating socialism, he does not explain whether it would be acceptable, even on a national level, to take wealth from the rich and give it to the poor in order to increase equality of opportunity. In general, Macmurray is opposed to theories which force the individual to be free, and he would therefore be expected to conform to a type of liberalism which views cultural interference as contentious.

As a possible solution to this problem Almond states that 'it is important to recognize the difference between practical toleration of a practice and moral endorsement' of it (Almond, ch2002, p. 167). How far this distinction can be maintained in practice though is unclear; moreover, since Macmurray's whole work is concerned with the unity rather than the division of theory and practice, it seems unlikely that he would be satisfied with Almond's approach.[25] In the end, whether such a distinction can be sustained seems to depend on a certain separation of the public life and the private life, perhaps in terms of politics and religion. However, as we have mentioned, while Macmurray allows for these two aspects to have different roles, he insists on their interdependence.

[1] This bears some similarity to Rawls' concept of fairness (Rawls, 1971).

[2] This combination of a narrow and a general sense of justice is not unlike Aristotle's account of justice (Aristotle, 1981).

[3] While intention plays a part in the theories of Rousseau and Hobbes, their perception of how this leads to social cooperation is somewhat different from Macmurray's. In addition, while Macmurray assumes that the state only has as much power as its citizens allow it, he also admits that if a government has become a habit of its society, it would have to exercise extreme and extensive injustice before its people would revolt (*PR*, p. 192).

[4] On this issue, Flew accuses Macmurray of confusing 'ought' with 'are', so that he states that laws *are* for justice, rather than stating that the law *ought* to be an instrument of justice (Flew, r1951, pp. 272–3). This is a valid criticism to an extent; however, it is also true that countries/groups introduce law in order to obtain justice, whatever that particular conception of justice might be.

[5] Hence Macmurray is not advocating anarchy (EB, 'Socialism for the Individual'). This is not dissimilar to Singer's account of civil disobedience (Singer, 1973).

[6] He equates the Romantic movement, Rousseau's emphasis on human goodness and the democratic revolutions with this mistake; for example, the phrase 'liberty, equality, fraternity' describes community instead of society. We will return to the possibilities of religion creating community in the next chapter.

[7] For Macmurray then, it would seem that happy slaves simply continue to be slaves until such time as they become dissatisfied with the situation. Macmurray is criticized by Flew in this respect; Flew suggests that Soviets living under Stalin are suffering real limitations even if they have no desire for an alternative existence. However, Flew is in danger of defining freedom on his western terms and concluding that certain people, regardless of their wishes, should be forced to have this freedom (Flew, r1951, pp. 272–3).

[8] Macmurray is making the distinction between nationality as a fact and nationalism as a policy (a1933d, p. 70). It is also evident that he believes that national character is influenced by cultural factors and is therefore essentially a matter of choice rather than being determined prior to birth (r1927a, p. 53). Nevertheless, Macmurray is clearly proud that he is a Scot, and claims that Scottishness can be categorized (u1922b; mUndated).

[9] He does believe that worldwide unity is a possibility, not an unobtainable aim. In addition, he assumes that the creation of the League of Nations, despite its practical failure, was an indication that many people understood the need for community spirit in an economically united world (*CF*, pp. 40–43). Further, he made it his aim to use philosophy to contribute to worldwide and perpetual peace by overcoming nationalism and realizing the humanity of all (ch1960).

[10] Solomos, for example, documents the anti-Irish, anti-Jewish and anti-black sentiments that still exist in Britain (Solomos, 1989). Even more damaging to Macmurray's argument is the anti-English sentiment that exists in Scotland, since it is the 'successful' union of Scotland and England that he praises most (Glen, 1971).

[11] Ross describes in detail Britain's reluctance to join the rest of Europe (Ross, 1989).

[12] Wallace and Wallace detail the problems the European Parliament has faced (Wallace and Wallace, 1996).

[13] Stagner writes in more general terms of the problems of national loyalties and hostilities preventing international peace (Stagner, 1967).

[14] The problems facing global union are numerous. For example, Kochen maintains that it might be possible for an economically united world to learn to control conflict, but not much more than this, while Puchala points out that the breakdown in national integration is a more pressing issue than international integration, and Domínquez reveals that the less developed nations express little interest in international affairs (Kochen, ch1981; Puchala, ch1981, pp. 145–64; Domínquez, ch1981, pp. 184–205).

[15] Macmurray's contrast between a citizen and a person is primarily a distinction between economics and culture. He does not give as much consideration to the other ways in which an individual is a citizen.

[16] Woolf fails to understand why a government with economic control could not continue to be limited by the House of Commons. However, Woolf does not state what reason the government would have for paying attention to the opinion of the House of Commons if it did not rely on it for financial support (Woolf, r1944).

[17] It would seem therefore that Macmurray would be pleased with Scottish (and Welsh) devolution but opposed to independence (a1927c).

[18] An interview with Tony Blair also printed in *New Britain* (Blair, 1996, pp. 59–60). Blair comments that knowledge of his ideas can be gained by reading Macmurray's work (*Scotland on Sunday*, a1994) and he endorses Macmurray's thought with a favourable foreword for a Macmurray anthology (Conford, 1996, pp. 9–10).

[19] Communitarians are critical of liberalism's focus on individual rights without a shared conception of the good; for more detail on the debate between communitarianism and liberalism, see Mulhall and Swift, 1992.

[20] We have already noted the connection of freedom and responsibility. Similar to Macmurray, Fromm also speaks of the fear of freedom and the yearning for security (Fromm, 1992, pp. 110–11).

[21] In an early work, Macmurray refers to aggression as a positive and to submission as a negative defence of the self, although both are referred to as negative motives in the account of the carer-child relationship, given in the Gifford lectures, to avoid confusion with the positive motive of heterocentricity (*CF*, pp. 28–9; *PR*).

[22] The term 'control' is used here in a qualified sense. Macmurray is not advocating a theocratic state, although he has leanings in this direction. In essence, he is implying that religion is concerned with the other, whereas politics is more concerned with the self, but both are needed.

[23] While this might not always be the case (with convenience foods, microwave ovens and work, the family mealtime is something of a memory), it is true that celebrations often involve feasting where hunger is not an issue, just as going to the pub with friends is rarely a matter of thirst. Perhaps a

comparison can be made here with the German language and its usage of *essen* for humans, but *fressen* for animals.

[24] It is clear that in certain areas of the East religion controls public life, but Macmurray does not wish to see the amalgamation of church and state in this way. It could also be argued that power exercised by religion in the West is public, but that this is more concealed than in the East.

[25] Almond also adopts this line in reference to the times when the media relays controversial aspects of politicians' private lives to the public (Almond, ch2002), whereas Macmurray would seem to be opposed to the argument that these matters do not affect a person's ability to do a job. Yet, inasmuch as politics and religion are regarded as separable, the strength of the effect of personal misdemeanours on a person's working life is ambiguous.

PART IV
Persons and Religion

Chapter 7
Against Idealism in Religion

Introduction

For Macmurray, an account of the person is incomplete without reference to religion. In fact from his first to his last published monograph, he is seeking both to define and to assert the importance of religion. Consequently, his perception of religion informs the whole of his philosophy, including science and politics, and gives special meaning to his emphasis on agency and relation, as defining characteristics of the person, in an ethical sense. In particular, he attempts to reconstruct organized Christianity. Primarily, this enterprise stems from the disillusionment that accompanied his experiences of the First World War, both in active service and as a civilian (*SRR*, pp. 16–21). Subsequent to the fighting, he is certain that the nation as a whole shares his loss of confidence. Its root, he contends, is an intellectual assent to earlier, outmoded assurances that have no emotional sway in the post-war society (*FMW*, pp. 15–25).

Religion, even before the war, is, he claims, a defensive element in society that fails to be a vital source of faith, existing under the threat that science will make it redundant; yet the promise of science – that it has all the answers – is expressed with disbelief by a post-Enlightenment generation. Neither science nor religion seem to be capable of capturing the enthusiasm of the British people to the extent previously attained, but no other system has as yet replaced these. Consequently in the

aftermath of war, the dilemma of the 1930s, as well as being an issue of industry and economy, is, more importantly for Macmurray, the lack of a 'common working faith' (*FMW*, p. 50). Part of the blame for this situation he assigns to the recent concentration of education on the development of the intellect and science more than emotions and art. The effect of this, he claims, is that the individual and the wider society is equipped with the knowledge required to achieve something, but with little understanding as to what that person or the wider society desires to achieve. In other words, Macmurray equates science with the intellect and the provision of means, and art with emotion and the provision of ends. If religion is going to have a necessary role in human activity, therefore, it must encompass both of these areas.

The dilemma sensed by Macmurray is still attested to in more recent works; for example, Bosch refers to the time of phasing out old ideas and issuing in new ones as a 'paradigm shift' (Bosch, 1991, p. 4).[1] For Bosch, the paradigm shift of the early 1990s involved movement from an era of individualistic and instrumental reason towards a more communicative and interdependent concept (ibid., p. 362).[2] Now in the aftermath of the destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001, the subsequent 7 July 2005 bombings in London and the so-called war on terrorism, the paradigm shift of the new millennium appears to be the resurgence of religion as much as secularization. It is in a forward-thinking attempt to address the recourse to religion anticipated years earlier that Macmurray spends several decades describing his form of a progressive religion. Moreover, he seeks to redefine religion in a way that will render it necessary to the understanding and the progress of humanity. Hence he states that 'The philosophy of religion is not itself necessarily religious. It arises because the philosopher,

whatever his personal belief, is faced with a claim which religion makes and cannot avoid making. It is the claim that reality is personal' (*RE*, p. 129).

Furthermore, it is on the validity of this claim that the rationality of religion rests. If this claim is found to be true, therefore, any philosophy which fails to include religion will be an incomplete account of the nature of reality. However, in order to assess whether reality is indeed personal, as Macmurray acknowledges, both the terms 'real' and 'personal' need to be elucidated. In so doing, Macmurray uses his arguments concerning the falseness of the dualism of mind and matter, and the similarly fallacious postulation of the isolated self, to refute the claim that reality is impersonal.

We have already discussed the manner in which Macmurray perceives there to be three rather than two levels of existence and, correspondingly, three methods of relating. At the heart of his description of reality, then, is the assertion that the human being has knowledge of that which is not the self and of dependence on it. Furthermore, it is through the encounter with that which is more than material and more than organic that the personal is known and thus the division of all things into the categories of mind and matter is disputed. Likewise, the assertion that the self is a solitary being is disputed by insisting that the person is such by virtue of reciprocal person-to-person relations. Hence he states, 'To be a person is … to live as a member of a personal reality, in dependence upon it' (*RE*, p. 134). Whereas science informs the relation of the person to matter and art informs the relation of the person to organisms, it is the relation of persons as persons that religion addresses. While a person can behave towards other persons as if they are merely material or organic, doing so is irrational and prevents the full expression of personality. Since the material and the organic are included within the

personal, relations of persons as instruments or on functional grounds will be included within fully personal relations, but it is only through the meeting of equals that the nature of the person is fully realized. In the absence of this, the relation is limited and, according to Macmurray, irreligious.

Through an analysis of Macmurray's understanding of religion, therefore, the distinction between societies and communities, which we set out in Chapter 5, is clarified. However, this does not mean that Macmurray's description of religion is clear-cut. In fact, his version of the religious community, in terms of its worship and mission for example, remains vague; similarly, Macmurray does not offer any comprehensive account of the divine attributes or the possibilities for divine-human fellowship. There are two main reasons for this elusiveness: first, Macmurray is seeking to portray religion in a manner which renders it accessible to all people, regardless of specific experiences; secondly, he is attempting to present an undogmatic narrative which remains open to criticism, development and the acceptance of diverse beliefs.

In this sense, Duncan refers to Macmurray's work as a religious philosophy, as opposed to a philosophy of religion (Duncan, 1990, pp. 117–22). Religion, for Macmurray, is an integral aspect of human life; consequently, Macmurray does not believe that religion can ever be eradicated from society. As it has existed in the past, however, institutionalized religion has been subject to a great deal of condemnation, from both internal and external sources. Hence Macmurray engages in an analysis of some of the political criticisms levelled against religion; he also addresses the many schisms that have divided religious practice into a multitude of forms. Essentially, this involves an exposition of, what he claims is, unreal religion. In addition, Macmurray is concerned with the inconsistencies

in religious teaching that science has revealed. As a result, he attempts to bring both science and art under the scope of religious activity, connecting these activities with specific attitudes and social structures. Since his concern with the effect that scientific discoveries have on religious confidence is reflective of his era, it is perhaps an unnecessary pursuit today; however, it still serves to demarcate the characteristics of the different fields of inquiry.

Despite the variety of religions that exist, Macmurray chooses to affirm the tenets of Christianity as the basis for what he perceives as a real religion, yet he does so in such a way that he questions traditional meanings of the term. In reference to his theory of agency and relationality, this reformed religious activity, if supported by democratic politics, is, he contends, the essential means for creating and maintaining widespread free action and relationships of equality. While secularization brought with it a decline in religious adherence, which for some indicated the gradual end of religion, Macmurray is convinced that religion has, and always will have, a role in society. In particular, as we have seen, he claims that even the most complex political institutions do not encompass every aspect of human life, thus allowing both church and state to have separate and yet interdependent functions. As with any individual, Macmurray's thought must be examined in relation to its social and historical context. His most detailed work concerning the decline of religion appeared in the 1930s and 1940s and, therefore, just as the socialism in his political theory reveals the influence of Marxism and reflects upon the growth of communism, his discussion of religion does likewise. Primarily, his concern in this respect is with Marx's critique of idealism, in general and especially in relation to the social efficacy of Christianity.

Against Idealism

We have already discussed the manner in which Macmurray respects the Marxist interpretation of economics. In particular, he applauds the logical theory of development that underlies Marx's social and economic theory. However, in his opinion, '[Marx's] greatness consisted in his capacity to use theories, which he himself did not create, in a new way' (*PC*, p. 12). Thus when Macmurray seeks to explicate the theoretical aspects of Marxian theory with which he is in agreement, he examines the relationship between Hegelian philosophy and Marxist analysis, giving special attention to Marx's rejection of Hegelian idealism (*PC*, p. 15).

Within Hegelianism, Macmurray argues, the factual distinction between ideas and things becomes confused. As a result of a certain absorption in ideas, the idea is held to be primary; thus the thing which the idea represents becomes of secondary importance. Similarly, practical activity is regarded as subordinate to mental activity, and so ideas are confirmed only theoretically. In the end, therefore, the ideas rather than the 'things' that they symbolize are viewed as reality; that is, knowledge of the world issues from individuals' ideas concerning it as opposed to their practical interaction with it. Nevertheless, in Macmurray's opinion, this idealist perception is radically false (*PC*, p. 21). On the contrary, he prefers the realist position, maintaining that it is things themselves that are the reality, since the ideas of them are mere appearances of reality. Hence it is things that have primary significance and provide the standard by which to ascertain the validity of an idea.

Likewise, Marx, he explains, is struck by the lack of continuity between Hegel's idea of the state and the actual situation of inequality experienced by citizens in Prussia at that time (ch1935b). By firmly rejecting the concept that reality is idea, Marx is favouring the primacy of action over

thought; whereas idealism, by valuing thought more than action, retreats from the responsibility of changing the actual situation and finds pleasure in the life of the imagination. For Marx however, life is practical and the significance of thought, therefore, lies in its effect on action. It is this view that leads him to state 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world … the point, however, is to change it' (Marx, 1968, p. 30). According to Macmurray, the importance of this statement is its implication: 'Thought verifies itself in action, and only in action' (*PC*, p. 26).

Furthermore, Macmurray emphasizes the role played by Marx's engagement with Stirner's work in his rejection of Hegelian idealism (*PC*, pp. 27–30). That is, while Stirner acknowledges the tyranny of ideas in the pursuit of individual freedom, Marx realizes that an individual does not become free merely by eradicating oppressive ideas from the mind. Rather, even if people can abandon tyrannical ideas, they are still powerless to change their behaviour accordingly if the remainder of the relevant society continues to uphold those ideas. In addition, as Macmurray reveals, Marx insists that such ideas are the effects of the socio-economic relations that are already restricting freedom in a practical way (*PC*, pp. 30–31).

It is in the event of practical rather than theoretical activity in particular, then, that the distinction between ideas and things cannot be ignored. On this basis, Macmurray claims that at the core of Marx's rejection of idealism is the assumption that 'theory and practice are one' and further that 'practice determines theory' (*PC*, pp. 36 and 38). It is, therefore, actions as opposed to thoughts that indicate the ideas held, or rather belief is ascertained by examining behaviour as opposed to mere verbal assertions. In order for theoretical activity to have significance, therefore, it must inform practical activity; in this respect, the two ought to be in agreement. It is as a result of this

perception of the interrelation of theory and practice, then, that Marx is opposed to utopianism; and the avoidance of utopianism, Macmurray points out, requires that theories be tested in practice (*PC*, p. 43).

Essentially, the significance of Macmurray's interpretation of Marxist philosophy, especially its rejection of Hegelian idealism, is most interesting for our purposes in terms of its connection with Marx's rejection of religion and Macmurray's attempt to respond to that rejection.[3] In particular, Macmurray seeks to overturn the Marxist critique of religion as idealist. Marx claims that religion originates from the experience of suffering, but as an expression of a consolatory and, therefore, paralysing ideal rather than as an active objection to that suffering. It is on this basis that Marx views religion as an inversion of reality, comprised by an illusion, leading to his famous statement that 'Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people' (Marx, 1975, p. 244).

However, Macmurray is unable to accept that a classless society must be an irreligious one, maintaining on the contrary that religion is the foundation for social justice. In fact, he attempts to account for Marx's indictment of religion in a way that allows him to maintain his faith in religion as well as his faith in Marx's socio-economic analysis. He insists that the traditional form of religion with which Marx is familiar is indeed infected with idealism, but that this is not the case for all religion (p1944a, p. 6).[4]

Religion in General

In Macmurray's later work, his defence of religion against the Marxist critique is accompanied by a similar defence against the comparative criticisms that Freud levels at religion. According to Freud, 'Spirits and demons … are only

projections of man's own emotional impulses' (Freud, 1985, p. 150). Religion then, for Freud, represents the illusory projection of a child's view of the parent figure onto the world; in short, he argues that the source of religion is 'a longing for the father' (Freud, 1985, p. 210). While Macmurray acknowledges that a discussion of religion will employ terminology that is reminiscent of the language used in his investigation into the carer-infant relationship, he is adamantly opposed to the suggestion that this verifies the conclusions of Freud and/or Marx. That is, he does not hold either that religion issues from the desire to sustain the dependence that the individual experienced during childhood, or that its existence reflects the immaturity of an entire social group. Freud and Marx use these arguments to suggest that religion is illusory, but in so doing, Macmurray claims, they are relying 'upon the *a priori* analogical interpretation of personal experience through biological analogy' (*PR*, p. 152). As we have already seen, Macmurray is opposed to any theory that implies either that the human being develops rationality over time or that social groups are organically composed. On the contrary, he maintains that humans are inherently rational and utilize this capacity to sustain societies through the establishment of institutions (*PR*, p. 153).

Moreover, with particular reference to the Marxist criticism of religion, Macmurray asserts that there is insufficient empirical evidence to support wholly this accusation. While much religion might be opium for its adherents in the way Marx suggests, Macmurray insists that Judaism, for example, is a materialist as opposed to an idealist religion. With reference to the Freudian criticism of religion, Macmurray agrees that this is a valid claim, but only partially so. A child's development, for Macmurray, issues from interaction with another person; thus he states that 'It is this form which finds expression in religion … but

there is nothing illusory about this' (*PR*, p. 154). Hence it is in this way that the form of religion has similarities with the child's familial relations, but this does not necessarily imply that its content is mere fantasy. On the contrary, according to Macmurray, it is only through the achievement of positive relations with others, as an adult, that persons are able to express their nature fully. For Macmurray, it is when an adult fails to overcome the negative motive – rooted in the withdrawal phase of the carer-infant relation – that childish fantasy is exhibited, since the adult then seeks the termination of the mutual relations that persons require.[5] Indeed, in Macmurray's opinion, if Freud's theory concerning religion is regarded as true, it must also be applied to other forms of reflective activity, such as science and art, due to the fact that all reflection begins its development in the child's imagination. Moreover, inasmuch as the healthy family represents a community and not simply a society, it is, in fact, an appropriate model for religion to adopt.

Consequently, Macmurray sets out to demarcate some fundamental features of religion in general, which will serve to dispute the conclusions of Marx and Freud concerning the essential nature of religion (*PR*, pp. 156–7). First, he insists that the existence of religion is universal. Every society has a religion, at least of sorts, so religion must be rooted in an experience that is common to all humans.[6] Secondly, he shows that, despite the aspects of human conduct that are comparable with the behaviour of other animals, religion is an exclusively human phenomenon. He then uses this recognition to argue that religion is a peculiarly personal as opposed to an organic activity (a1961). While it might seem that all this argument amounts to is the tautology that personal experience is the experience of persons, Macmurray's point is that religion issues from the aspect of persons that distinguishes them from the other animals. In essence therefore, religion is a rational as opposed to an

irrational pursuit. Thirdly, and somewhat controversially, Macmurray claims that religion is the historical matrix of all other forms of cultural activity. On the grounds that the religion of a primitive society pervades all other aspects of their culture – from the arts to politics – Macmurray suggests that science and art, for example, become autonomous activities of reflection only if the development of society involves their separation from religion. This occurs when the religion has become ineffective, with the result that it too becomes one aspect of life instead of operating as its unifying element. Fourthly, he asserts that the intention of a religion is to include all people, regardless of ability; consequently, its continued existence requires the active participation of all the members of the society with which it is concerned. For example, he points out, just as a national religion intends the inclusion of all people who comprise the relevant nation, similarly a tribal religion depends upon the cooperation of the entire tribe (cf. Bergounioux and Goetz, 1965; Quilici, 1970). While such examples do not reveal much, since the extent of necessary inclusion is contained in the terms 'national' and 'tribal', Macmurray employs these examples to argue that religion is inherently inclusive, whereas the reflective activities of science and art are exclusive, in so far as involvement in them requires expertise. Overall, he categorically states that 'These four characteristics of religion are *prima facie* distinguishing characteristics of its form. Any theory of religion which neglects them or fails to account for them is *ipso facto* either inadequate or erroneous' (*PR*, p. 157).

Religion and its Field

Before the strength of his refutation of the Freudian and Marxist analyses of religion can be discerned then, we need to tease out Macmurray's definition of religion. His earliest

conviction concerning religion is that it is a social as opposed to a solitary activity (*CC*, pp. 17–22; ch1939e). It is this notion that underlies the four characteristics of religion listed above and supports the argument that they imply; that is, the claim that religion is a universal phenomenon. In particular therefore, Macmurray argues that it is western individualism that has led to the view that religion is a solitary or private pursuit. On the contrary, he states that 'Religion is the primary manifestation of the social character of human nature, and it is concerned with society [community], not with the individual' (*CC*, p. 17).[7] While this assumption is evident for Macmurray, he also offers some confirmation of it by reference to the historical role of religion rather than its modern expression. The specific illustration of the Jewish Diaspora and the continued persecution of the Jews is corroboration, for Macmurray, that religion is capable of maintaining the unity of a group that has, for example, no common place of residence. He declares that this 'is proof positive that religion is concerned with society and is capable by itself of maintaining social unity under the least favourable conditions' (*CC*, p. 19).

Even in Britain where religion, Christianity especially, appears to be a private issue, Macmurray asserts that it is still fundamentally social. Individualism has meant that the relation of the self to one's fellows occupies a different status from the relation of the self to God, but in both cases it is the nature of the relation that is regarded as significant. Moreover, across the divisions of Christianity into its various denominations, the ritual of communion retains a pivotal location. This act, the preoccupation with concepts such as reconciliation and atonement, and the postulation of God as the father of all humanity, suggests that Christianity, despite appearances to the contrary, is essentially concerned with social unity.

Nevertheless, even if religion is fundamentally social, this does not necessarily imply that religion is a universal phenomenon. While Macmurray continues to insist that this is the case throughout his writings, the most thorough justification for this claim appears in an early work, where Macmurray sets out to discover the source of religious experience (*SRE*, pp. 15–44). If religion were illusory, this would not mean, he argues, that it lacked an empirical foundation; rather it would mean that the information from which it stemmed had been misrepresented. Thus Macmurray maintains that religion is indeed rooted in fact, stating that 'In all cases the field is a field of normal, universal, and uninterpreted human experience' (*SRE*, p. 19). Hence if religion is concerned with fear, this is due to the experience of fear in everyday life; similarly, if religion mirrors the carer-infant relation, this is due to the common experience of that relationship.

It would be unfair therefore to engage in an analysis of religion that referred only to religious practices and not to their source. However what renders those facts relevant material for religious consideration is a certain attitude of mind rather than the nature of the facts themselves. He argues that 'The religious man comes to worship, the artist to admire, the scientist to observe' (*SRE*, p. 21). Thus if it is a religious attitude that imbues particular facts with religious significance, the field of religious data would seem to be as endless as it is for science or art. Nevertheless, while individuals can adopt any one of these attitudes – religious, scientific, artistic, or even all three of them – it will become apparent that different aspects of the field of information lend themselves more readily to each of these attitudes. Consequently, although the scientific, artistic and religious attitudes all address the same facts, their centres of interest vary.

In order to focus on the most relevant information, then, each attitude selects the data to which it will attend and, in so doing, evaluative judgements are made. We encountered this necessity in Part I, where we discovered that successful practical activity involves both means and ends. When considering the world-as-means, individuals are concerned with a predominantly intellectual assessment of utility value, whereas their consideration of the world-as-end involves a primarily emotional recognition of intrinsic value. Further, as reflective activities, these two types of valuation are equated with the knowledge that science and art provide and, according to Macmurray's definitions, science employs generalizations whereas art emphasizes the particular.

Furthermore, Macmurray portrays the distinction between utility and intrinsic value in action, and the corresponding distinction between the general and the particular in reflection, as antithetical types of knowledge, although they refer to the same objects. However, in order to act a person must be capable of simultaneously viewing the world-as-means and the same world-as-end. In this respect, Macmurray argues that the religious attitude is the synthesis of science and art (*SRE*, p. 34). Moreover, as a third form of valuation it deals with an aspect of experience that science and art omit. For the scientist and/or the artist, the field of data is the world; yet they are also a part of the world. As a third form of valuation then, religion is concerned with the self and with other persons. It recognizes that the entire field of experience includes human beings, both as observers on the world and also as dependents in the world. Thus according to Macmurray: 'It is characteristic of the religious valuation that it assigns a very high value to the human judgement that sets a very low value on its own activities, including its judgements' (*SRE*, p. 38). Self-judgement then is a reflective activity stemming

from the practical experience that human beings have of the reciprocity of the relation between judge and judged. Hence it is the paradoxical nature of the common human experience of being able both to be judge and judged that leads to the contradictory notions of transcendence and immanence. In other words, when religion attempts to combine the concepts of transcendence and immanence by applying them to an infinite being, this is because the person, as finite being, experiences her or his own capacity to transcend the self and to be immanent in the world (cf. a1939a).

Furthermore, by recognizing that the self is in a position of judging others, it must also be recognized that the self exists as an other to be judged. As Macmurray states, 'The primary fact is that part of the world of common experience for each of us is the rest of us' (*SRE*, p. 39). This, Macmurray holds, is 'the central problem of human life, and it is a religious problem' (*SRE*, p. 40). It is a problem because individual selves find that, in action, they are forced to pass judgement on their fellows and vice versa. Hence it is not possible for individuals to assess other persons on the grounds of utility and/or intrinsic value in the same way in which they judge objects, since those other persons are engaged in making similar judgements about the aforementioned individuals. That is, if all people regard all other people as means, each will try to be the master, whereas if all people regard all other people as ends, they will all try to be servants. In this way, Macmurray claims, a solely scientific or a solely artistic attitude towards other persons fails to produce cooperation. What is needed, he asserts, is 'an attitude which somehow contains both of the other two attitudes while transcending them both' (*SRE*, p. 42). For cooperative action to occur, individuals must view others as means and ends, while also recognizing their own possession of both utility (means) and intrinsic (ends) value.

Moreover, when persons recognize others as ends, they unite in what Macmurray refers to as fellowship or community (*SRE*, p. 43). In addition, he argues that such relations are characterized by heterocentricity; that is, the individuals involved in such a relation engage in that relation for the purpose of caring for each other.

Religion as Reflection

For Macmurray therefore, religion deals primarily with what he views to be the most rudimentary problem for humanity: person-to-person relations. In fact, Macmurray argues that such relations fulfil human nature in a manner in which organized relations cannot. It is in this sense, then, that religion rather than politics is necessary for personal growth (cf. a1956b). In his later work Macmurray contends that 'The self-realization of any individual person is only fully achieved if he is positively motived towards every other person with whom he is in relation' (*PR*, p. 159). Thus for all agents to realize their nature, the existence of a universal community would be required.

It is, then, on the grounds that human existence is one of interdependence, Macmurray maintains, that the experience to which religion refers is a universal experience. For this reason he also claims that religion is an indivisible factor of human life, rather than an immature expression that the adult is expected to set aside. Moreover, since 'The religious activity of the self is its effort to enter into communion with the Other' (*SRE*, p. 47), it remains an essentially practical as opposed to a reflective activity. That is, it is not possible for one person to have communion with another by proxy. Hence, although religion has its reflective aspect, the conclusions therein can be effected only in action and for this reason significant religious reflection is concerned primarily with actual rather than ideal communities (*PR*, pp.

157–9). Nonetheless, while religion can be evaluated only from the perspective of agents in relation, a proper consideration of religion in general, Macmurray argues, begins with 'religion as a form of reflective activity, and with its origin in the structure of universal human experience' (*PR*, p. 151), as opposed to beginning with any one particular type of religious expression.

Religion as a reflective activity arises in a similar way to the other reflective activities; primarily due to a problem in action. As we have seen, the reflective activity of the scientific attitude comes to the fore when the means of action are inefficient, whereas the reflective activity of the aesthetic attitude is engaged in due to unsatisfactory ends. Further, as Macmurray points out, 'The analysis of action into means and ends seems to exhaust the possibilities' (*RAS*, p. 52); yet as we have previously mentioned, action can be thwarted by other persons (ch1970b). It is this issue that religion as a reflective activity addresses; that is, religious reflection universalizes the common experience of human interrelation.

At the heart of all religious reflection is, Macmurray states, 'a common activity set apart from all the other common activities and so invested with special significance' (*SRE*, p. 65).[8] Thus a religious activity might appear to mirror an everyday activity, but engagement in the former signifies that the participants are conscious of their common life; for example, the necessity to eat, under certain circumstances, is transformed into a sacred meal. In his later work, he develops this concept, claiming that 'Religion … is the reflective activity which expresses the consciousness of community; or more tersely, religion is the celebration of communion' (*PR*, p. 162). By using the term 'celebration', Macmurray is implying that both the knowledge of community and the enjoyment of it can be represented symbolically (cf. CTR). For this to be the case, symbolic

reflective activity must be communal; moreover, engagement in it must be due primarily to that to which it refers, rather than being solely for the pleasure brought about by the activity itself.

By virtue of this reference, then, the factual relations of persons are made intentional, and for Macmurray it is this intention that divides *Homo sapiens* from the other animals and renders religious activity rational. Furthermore, by raising factual relations to an intentional level, the awareness of failings in relation and also the possibilities for realizing positive relations are increased. In this way, reflection combines the past and the present to inform the future. Yet the future possibilities for relations among persons have more than one direction. Consequently, in his early work, Macmurray contends that 'the task of religion is the maintenance and extension of human community' (*SRE*, p. 63). The effort to sustain existing community, therefore, is the negative aspect of the religious enterprise, whereas the effort to extend community is the positive aspect of the religious enterprise. Furthermore, this latter aspect, Macmurray reveals, can be divided further into positive and negative components, since the extent of community experienced can be increased either by enlarging the number of members or by improving the constitution of the pre-existent relations therein. As Macmurray claims, community has 'both a quantitative and qualitative side' (*SRE*, p. 74). However, these two elements are not divisible: a sudden influx in numbers diminishes community until the quality is increased and, similarly, the quality of community within an established number of members requires an increase in quantity for the community to avoid stagnation.

Hence as tribes expand, the function of religion becomes more complex. In addition to being accepted by the existing group, new members must both acknowledge their membership and understand the symbolism of the religious

rituals in which they participate. The primary problem here is that the symbols employed can represent the community only if they have the same meaning for each of the community's members. In essence, what the symbols seek to signify is the free and equal relation of one person to another and to another and so on. It is this problem, Macmurray explains, that can be solved only through the image of a universal personal other. In an early work, he states that 'The idea of God as the universal Other is, therefore, inherent in the act of religious reflection' (*SRE*, p. 80; cf. *RAS*, p. 56).[9] Further, in his later work he argues that since the common life of persons is grounded in action, the successful representation of a community of persons is through a universal agent (*PR*, p. 164). It is in the sustenance of unity then that groups of all sizes require leaders. However, Macmurray qualifies this acknowledgement by stating:

> The necessity is not primarily for a ruler, but for a ritual head, a representative of the unity of the community as a personal reality, so that each member can think his [or her] membership of the community through his [or her] relation to this person, who represents and embodies the intention which constitutes the general fellowship. (*PR*, p. 164)[10]

Thus if this account of the idea of a universal other is accepted, the origin and function of the idea of God has an explanation. In order for the symbolical universal other to encompass all persons related to one another communally over time, therefore, this figure must be both the founder of the group and its everlasting leader. According to Macmurray, this explains the existence of ancestor worship in religion (*PR*, p. 164). That is, even while individual members of the group die, the group as a whole is seen to continue. It is this sense of belonging, with its combination of the temporal and the ephemeral, which for Macmurray constitutes religious experience.[11] Consequently, he states

that God is apprehended as 'that infinite person in which our finite human relationships have their ground and their being' (*SRE*, p. 81).

In addition, he develops this argument to serve as explanation of the existence of nature worship in religion, on the grounds that persons are not capable of action without utilizing non-personal means (*PR*, p. 165). That is, a community of persons is rooted in the non-personal world: persons are a part of nature. Successful communal action, therefore, involves the cooperation of nature as well as the cooperation of persons. While the conflict of intentions among persons is one source of division, similarly nature (via natural disasters, disease, drought, famine and so on) can destroy community. Hence in order to symbolize the unity of persons with nature, the universal other must be the creator of the world.[12] Religion then, while dealing primarily with person-to-person relationships, encompasses the entire field of experience; its idea of a personal other is inclusive of the idea of the non-personal.

At a time when community is only partial, then, the role of religion continues to be the creation of community and the maintenance of the intention to extend that community. In Macmurray's opinion:

> The function of religion is then to mobilize and strengthen the positive elements in the motivation of its members, to overcome the negative motives where they exist, to prevent the outbreak of enmity and strife, to dominate the fear of the Other and subordinate the centrifugal to the centripetal tendencies in the community. (*PR*, p. 163)

It is in this sense that the ultimate goal of any particular community is a universal community of persons. Hence religion makes significant progression when the kinship group or tribal religion is developed into the concept of the universal religion; following this, its growth must be from the idea to the realization of universal community. While

this seems to be an insurmountable task, Macmurray claims that individuals will be drawn towards it, simply because persons need such relations for their fulfilment (a1956e).[13] Further, in the event of universal community, religion would not cease to exist Macmurray holds; it would continue to be practised as the celebration and stabilization of the community achieved.

Religion in Relation to Science and Art

We have noted briefly that the consideration of religion as a reflective activity engenders the connected issues of rationality within religion and its relation to science and art. Religion, science and art are the three general expressions of rationality that ensue from personal experience; however, from his early work Macmurray contends that religion is more extensively rational than science and art (cf. *RE*, p. 117). As we discussed in Part I, the capacity to act in terms of the nature of the other, which characterizes the rationality of the person, varies in relation to the type of other concerned. That is, science arises as the effort to act rationally in relation to matter, art arises in relation to organisms and religion arises in relation to persons.[14] He argues that the fullest expression of rationality requires the relation of like beings; hence it is only when persons relate to one another as persons that the human capacity to be rational achieves its fullest expression (*RE*, p. 119). In fact, Macmurray insists that religion is the primary mode of reflection both 'in the historical and the genetic sense' (*PR*, p. 167).

Since for Macmurray the human infant possesses rationality, the growth of the infant is pervaded by the urge to overcome irrationality. Further, since irrationality is characterized by self-interest, rationality in the field of personal relationships is demarcated by mutuality and

equality, in contrast with the instrumental and functional relations that science and art inform. When persons are related to one another on an unequal basis, therefore, Macmurray would maintain that such a relationship, while having its place, is fundamentally irrational and irreligious. Hence he states that 'The primary religious assertion is that all men [and women] are equal, and that fellowship is the only relation between persons which is fully rational, or fully appropriate to their nature as persons. In this assertion the whole nature of religion is bound up' (*RE*, p. 124). Furthermore, Macmurray claims that exclusive fellowship is irrational, since its exclusivity denotes a defensive attitude towards the other person in relation that cannot permit of additional members (*RAS*, p. 60).[15] That is, when two persons relate to one another as persons, the equality that they enjoy is based on their common humanity; this implies that when any persons are associated with others, as persons, they are equal. Consequently, a society which professes to be religious, but which encourages individualism, Macmurray maintains, is irreligious and irrational (*RE*, p. 127). However, he explains that, just as religious persons may find themselves attacking the established forms of religion in order to advance rational relations, irreligious persons may find themselves strenuously defending an established religion in order to sustain an unequal social structure, since 'the orthodox religious ritual of any society is always the *symbol* of its structure of personal relationships' (*RE*, pp. 127–8).

Religion, then, is as objective as either science or art, except the self-transcending interest is in another person instead of in an object.[16] Moreover, since Macmurray regards positive person-to-person relationships as the essence of the problematic of the personal, religious reflection is regarded as the primary form of reflection; that is, it is on the grounds that the person is partially comprised of matter and organic

life that religion is held to include science and art within it. Thus in his later work, he states that 'this form of reflection will be the matrix of all forms of reflection, and will contain them, as it were, in solution. It will also be universal in its occurrence, and inclusive in its scope' (*PR*, p. 162).

Science, art and religion refer respectively to the means, the end and the morality of an action. As a whole, therefore, the satisfactoriness of an end and the efficiency of the means are secondary to the morality of the act; and a moral act, as we have seen, is one that intends community. While science and art are unified in religion then, for Macmurray, it is when their unity in action fails that means and ends develop as independent forms of reflection (*PR*, p. 175). Nonetheless, the autonomous forms of science and art are the necessary negative elements in the constitution of the positive form of real religion, just as withdrawal into reflection is a necessary aspect of action. Within religion, science and art refer to and qualify each other. If, however, reflection is not for the sake of returning to action, then art or science will act as antithetical substitutes for religion, with the result that relations between persons will be operating on a societal rather than a community basis.

Traditional dualism, though, often confuses this reflective division between intellect and emotion with the difference between science and religion. When religion is confused with art in this way, its field is thought to be the spiritual, while that of science is the material; thus religion is confused with science as an incompatible belief system. Neither mysticism nor theology are synonymous with religion, Macmurray maintains, so the incompatibility is a myth (*RE*, p. 107).[17] Indeed, he states that 'Mysticism is, in itself, an expression of contemplative reflection. It is an aesthetic rather than a religious experience' (*RAS*, p. 44). Although the antagonism between science and religion is a more pressing issue for Macmurray than it is for the late

twentieth century, the twenty-first century has seen renewed interest in this area given the contention of evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins that religion subverts reason (Dawkins, 2006). It is of contemporary significance then that Macmurray investigates the possibility of being both scientific and religious (cf. CRS).

Furthermore, even if science and religion were contradictory, Macmurray fails to see why this would mean the eradication of religion rather than science (*RAS*, p. 9). On the contrary, he maintains that it is religion that is essential and concrete, although it may be necessary to break radically with traditional forms of religion for this to be the case. Hence he suggests that 'If religion could abandon its traditional dogmatism and become itself empirically minded, it could lead the progressive movement with science as its technical adviser' (*SRE*, pp. 10–11). That is, Macmurray is demanding 'a religion that modern science need not be ashamed to serve' (*RE*, p. 116).

While the historical claim that science has expressed greater rationality than religion is valid, Macmurray supports the ultimate rationality of religion by insisting that, logically as opposed to temporally, religion develops after art and art after science. Hence while science and art are developing, religion exists in an incompletely developed form also. At the same time, however, Macmurray maintains that, since science and art are limited and specialized activities, they are derivatives of religion in its fullest form.

In essence he argues that 'It is only through the confusion with science or art that the validity of religion can be doubted' (*RAS*, p. 59). While science can provide knowledge of persons in general and art can provide knowledge of an individual person in particular, Macmurray's contention is that both of these types of knowledge lack the personal aspect that is to be found in religious reflection. Essentially, he is making a distinction

between having knowledge of a person and actually knowing that person. He states that 'Religious knowledge … universalizes the problem of personal relationship, and seeks an understanding of personal relationship as such' (*PR*, p. 168). This seems to be a tautology, in so far as religion offers a personal knowledge that is simply knowledge of persons. Yet underlying this claim is the implication that it is only through communication that persons can know one another. Since persons can choose not to reveal themselves or can disguise their nature, the conclusions of an observation of a person do not necessarily correspond to that person's real nature. Knowledge of persons requires that they reveal themselves, and in so doing they discover their own nature; thus knowledge of persons depends on mutual self-revelation. Moreover, such revelation requires that the individuals concerned are positively motivated towards one another. In the absence of a dominant positive motive, revelation is hindered and the other person cannot be known. In a situation such as this, the relationship is based on appearance – the way the other person appears to be – rather than on actual knowledge of the other person's nature.

Furthermore, the communication through which persons, as agents, relate to one another is usually language, and this, Macmurray suggests, mirrors the analysis of science, art and religion detailed above. The structure of the personal and, therefore, of language incorporates first, second and third persons. That is, I speak to you about him, her or it. While the first and second persons are interchangeable in a conversation, the third person remains constant. Religion represents the first and second persons not only in relation with each other but also in relation with a third other: God. However science and art, in different ways, restrict this formula by a limitation of the attention. An artist engages with an object in order to produce a work

of art, but the person(s) who will view the work of art following its completion is (are) not of primary significance. In this sense, art suppresses the second person while the first and third persons relate. Science on the other hand suppresses both the first and second persons as far as possible, so that the conclusions drawn from the observation of an object are reliable. That is, provided the object remains constant, neither the scientist carrying out the experiment nor any other person to whom the scientist communicates the results of that experiment are intended to alter the results. Scientific knowledge therefore is the same for all persons, whereas the aesthetic appreciation of an object can be different for each person. Hence while science and art both utilize the same resources for their deliberations, the types of knowledge they produce are different; the former providing facts, the latter dealing with value.

In effect then, the fullest form of the personal is experienced when two friends engage in conversation, since they not only share information but also enjoy fellowship. In this case the conversation is continued due to the interest that the persons involved have in each other, and it is from this that their interest in the object under discussion stems. If two people converse out of mutual interest in a particular topic without any concern for the other person or that person's views on the subject, the mutuality that characterizes a fully personal relationship is lacking. It is in this sense that science and art lack reciprocity, being concerned with the other as means and/or end, rather than seeking active cooperation.

As autonomous reflective activities, the scientific and the artistic attitudes towards the other, Macmurray claims, are antithetical. He states that 'Religion … intends the synthesis of art and science; art and science each intend themselves and exclude one another' (*PR*, p. 176). Science and art are personal activities inasmuch as it is persons who engage in

them, but as activities of observation and contemplation respectively, rather than personal relations, the intention towards the other in either case is impersonal. Hence as autonomous activities, Macmurray asserts, the intellectual emphasis of science and the emotional emphasis of art contain a limited view of the world; they abstract specific elements of the encounter with the other. Moreover, even with adequate knowledge of efficient means and satisfactory ends, their integration in the achievement of successful action is possible only if agents act together. It is in this sense that the creation and sustenance of community is, for Macmurray, 'the ground of all really efficient and really satisfactory action whatever' (*PR*, p. 185).

Reality in Religious Reflection

By combining the claim that religious reflection issues from the common experience of humanity with the claim that religious reflection goes beyond the capacities of scientific and artistic reflection, Macmurray's schema, rather than distinguishing between religious and irreligious societies, sets out the guidelines for distinguishing between societies that practise real religion and those that practise unreal religion. Religion as a reflective activity, Macmurray holds, is unreal if its motive is negative. In conjunction with the interplay of motives in the carer-infant relationship as we have described it, Macmurray implies that while real religion is heterocentric, unreal religion is egocentric (cf. *PR*, p. 170). If the negative mode is predominantly pragmatic, the unreal religion in question will be mainly technical and concerned with recruiting material power. If the negative mode is primarily contemplative, its unreal religion will be chiefly concerned with spirituality and immortality. Thus unreal religion, in either of the negative modes, accepts and employs a dualism of material and spiritual elements,

whereas, according to Macmurray, 'the primary demand of religion is for a personal integrity' (*PR*, p. 172).

With reference to the symbolism employed in religious reflection then, Macmurray argues that 'the question to be asked about its representation is not simply whether it is true, nor merely whether it is satisfying, but whether it is *real*' (*PR*, p. 173). Nevertheless, the latter criterion includes the two former categories; thus a real representation will be both true and satisfying, whereas an unreal representation might be either untrue or dissatisfying. Further, as we noted in Part I, the qualities of truth and satisfaction are rooted in the intellect and the emotion respectively; the former involving facts and the latter being concerned with value. We also discovered that the accuracy of either judgement is discovered in action, since they respectively inform the means and the end of an action. It follows, therefore, that the reality of the symbolism employed in religious reflection is also to be discovered in action.

Nevertheless, while truth and satisfaction are integrated in action, their separation for the purposes of reflection is resonated in religion. Macmurray states that 'Religion … has two aspects, ritual and doctrine' (*PR*, p. 174). For Macmurray, ritual is primary and doctrine is secondary. In conjunction with Macmurray's triadic formulae, then, he connects ritual with the aesthetic attitude and therefore with values, while he relates doctrine to the scientific attitude and therefore to facts. Hence as symbols in reflection, these elements represent absolute truth and absolute goodness; moreover, as aspects of the problem of positive personal relationships, their unity in action would be the achievement of a universal community.

For the purpose of assessing whether a religious form is valid or not then, the important issue for Macmurray is the accuracy with which its subjective ideas refer to the objective experience of reality (*SRE*, pp. 91–2). The relation

between withdrawal into reflection and return to practice in religion, he holds, is the reverse of the corresponding relation in science, since 'Scientific understanding is concerned with the tactics of life, religious understanding with its essence' (*SRE*, pp. 90–91). Consequently, religious reflection is subsequent to religious activity and seeks to improve it, whereas scientific reflection precedes scientific activity in order to introduce it. On this basis, if scientific reflection is false the practice will fail, but if religious reflection is false the practice is not prevented and complicates the attempt to ascertain the validity of religious reflection. For example, if religious ideas refer to the ideas of others, rather than to reality, they are true in a qualified sense. Likewise, the symbols used in reflection may have originally referred accurately to reality, but as social conditions changed they may have become meaningless. In Macmurray's opinion, religious ideas would not exist at all if they were not intended to be true; the problem is that potential truth is not always realized (*SRE*, pp. 97–103).

There are therefore four different types of reference of religious ideas. First, a religious idea might refer to another world as a substitute for a reference to reality; secondly, it might refer to reality inaccurately and therefore have significance without whole truth. Thirdly, it might refer to reality accurately having significance and truth, and fourthly, religious ideas might be a mixture of accurate and inaccurate references to reality. With all these possibilities, it seems that unreality is nearly impossible to avoid; nonetheless, since religion expresses human nature, to eliminate religion, Macmurray contends, would be to deny personal existence (*SRE*, p. 108).

Idealism in Religion

Even if we accept Macmurray's definition of religion as an expression of community, his description of the possibility of religious ideas losing their empirical reference lends credence to the Marxist criticism of religion. In fact, Macmurray is in agreement with Marx over the need to reject religion that provides the consolation of an afterlife in the place of action towards a free and equal society (*CS*, p. 31). However, whereas Marx maintains that the issuing in of a classless society will coincide with the elimination of all religion, Macmurray argues that there are both 'good' (real/positive) and 'bad' (unreal/negative) religions and that only the latter will be eradicated in the event of universal freedom and equality (*RAS*, p. 60). Moreover, Macmurray points out that, while Marx's opposition to religion stems from his antagonism towards ideology, in so far as communism is itself an ideology Marx could not sanction the uncritical rejection of all ideologies. Rather, in conjunction with his integration of theory and practice, Marx opposes the pursuit of a theory for itself rather than for its significance in action. If therefore, Macmurray can show that a particular religious ideology promotes the active attempt to increase freedom and equality, then, he is convinced, the Marxist rejection of all religion can be opposed without also abandoning its socio-economic theory.

An ideology related to a new form of society can, Macmurray explains, be the source of progress (ch1935c). However, once that form of society has been brought into existence, the ideology behind it operates as a conservative force against further change, since it serves to sustain the form of society it envisaged. For additional progress to occur, a growing number of people within that society need to be sufficiently dissatisfied to dispute the prevailing ideology. In this way the dialectic of ideologies is set in motion: the new ideology emerges as the antithesis of the old thesis until it develops into a synthesis which, in turn,

becomes the new thesis of the society. An idealist is someone who clings to the old thesis or ideology with reactionary force, in spite of the growth of their society. Over time therefore, the idealist's conception of society loses its reference to the actual conditions of the society concerned and the ideology becomes idealism; hence the idea becomes the focus with the idealist concentrating on thought more than on physical action (p1944a, p. 9).

When Marx accuses religion in general of being incompatible with the creation of a classless society then, it is on the grounds that it is idealist. Nevertheless, the nature of religion, according to Macmurray, 'is ideal only after it has become universal' (*CS*, p. 35). However, as we have noted, a sense of community is accompanied by the human knowledge of death and isolation; thus even in the case of a tribal religion, the fear that death occasions can be curbed with fallacy.

Historically therefore, religion has sought to maintain community through a variety of reassurances surrounding death. Either, Macmurray alleges, religion states: 'Fear not; trust in God and He will see that none of the things you fear will happen to you', or it can proffer the alternative statement: 'Fear not; the things that you are afraid of are quite likely to happen to you, but they are nothing to be afraid of' (*PR*, p. 171). If religion denies death, it is, Macmurray states, pseudo-religion (*CS*, p. 48). As we have seen, the freedom to act requires that the fear of the other be overcome; in the absence of this, freedom and community are merely illusory. Since death is an inescapable aspect of reality, a religion that offers immortality can do so only by constructing an alternative reality; in effect the reality of this world is denied through the imagination of another ideal world. Consequently, religious idealism specifically shares with any other type of idealism the corruption of the natural unity of idea and

object, and its consequent dualism. While dualism in general gives primacy to thought rather than action, the effect of religious idealism is the use of the ideal world as a standard by which to judge the real world. When other humans act in accordance with the facts of the real world and not how the idealist would have them behave, the idealist claims to be acting in a manner that will bring about the ideal. However the ideal cannot be realized, since it takes no account of the material factors affecting action in the real world; in other words 'it is a blind and vain hope' (p1944a, p. 16). Thus idealists can maintain the illusion that the imaginary world is the real world only through self-deception; idealists must feign that their actions are pursuing the ideal whereas they are in fact in accordance with reality. It follows therefore that for the idealist, necessary action in the material world is as automatic and as stable as possible, in order for the efforts to be concentrated on matters of the soul instead of practical concerns. Hence the religion of the idealist, Macmurray explains, maintains the primacy of the spiritual over the material; its adherents claim that miracles do happen, but they do not expect them in daily life (p1944a, pp. 10–11).

Clearly, the idealists' perception of the ideal world stands in sharp contrast to reality, since they are faced in the real world with the commonplace facts of dissatisfaction and death. To retain the pretence that the spiritual world is more real than the material world therefore, idealists must think and feel their illusion, but not act upon it; action involves encounter with the actual world and would therefore result in disillusionment. Hence Macmurray states that 'The only way to preserve illusions is to achieve the isolation of a world of ideas from the reality to which they refer, and to attach the emotions to these ideas' (*CS*, p. 54). That is, Macmurray argues, if a person truly believed that this world was only for the sake of the next, and that the next world

was going to be vastly more satisfying than this one, the logical course of action would be to commit suicide (p1944a, p. 14; *CS*, p. 51). Although many examples of religious suicide pacts could be cited, these are still relatively unusual. When they do occur, they might prove that the adherents do believe that the next world offers a better life than this one; however, it does not prove that they have achieved immortality rather than death. It is Macmurray's contention that the majority of adherents of idealist religion(s) merely succeed in repressing rather than dissolving their knowledge of death. (While this may be true, Macmurray does not address the fact that many religions hold a prohibition against suicide.)

Where suicide is not permissible, action in this world is designed to protect the idealist against potential sources of death, but this is ultimately a futile exercise. As humanity progresses and increases its knowledge, this increases the knowledge and fear of death also. In order to maintain the illusion of freedom and of community then, a pseudo-religion is necessarily reactionary; that is, it hankers after the past and diminished knowledge rather than development, fighting for tradition as opposed to progress (since progress might reveal the true knowledge that the illusion has masked). To maintain an idealist religion, Macmurray asserts, its adherents either have no desire for immediate change, or they do not think that human effort can secure change (p1944a, p. 18; *CS*, p. 51). For those people who have a sense of urgency and a belief in the possibility of making a difference, an idealist religion is meaningless. Macmurray implies therefore that if religious expression referred to the issues of the material world and acted accordingly it would not be idealist. Moreover, he suggests that Marx's rejection of religion stems from the equation of all religion with pseudo-religion; whereby religion appears to be riddled with fear and egocentricity,

preventing action in reality and offering freedom and heterocentricity as illusory ideals only. Thus in order to combat the communist assertion that social progress requires the elimination of religion, Macmurray states that religion must show itself to be 'a creative force in material human life' (*CS*, p. 57).

Although Macmurray agrees with Marx's criticisms concerning religion in so far as they apply to pseudo-religion, since he holds that religion is not by nature idealist, his argument is theistic, in contrast with the atheism of Marxists. While Macmurray relates the Marxist critique of religion to a particular type of religion, he seeks to combat atheism in a similar manner. That is, he suggests that the assertions of the atheist are valid only inasmuch as they are directed towards a false conception of God. Hence in Macmurray's opinion, it is possible to make a distinction between believing in God and believing in the idea of God (*CS*, pp. 16–29). Clearly the term 'god' means something different to each religion that employs it, to the extent that some religious definitions are incompatible with others. It could be argued that the truth or falsity of each definition is not important if persons who hold it find it beneficial; however, the propagation of a false idea necessarily involves illusion and would therefore, according to Macmurray, be offensive (*CS*, p. 17). While the existence, or otherwise, of God does not depend on whether anyone believes as much, the truth or falsity of any particular conception of God depends on whether there is a reality to which it corresponds. Consequently, according to Macmurray, 'Belief in God is properly an attitude to life which expresses itself in our ways of behaving' (*CS*, p. 19). That is, it is only by an examination of the actions of those who profess to have such a belief that their notion of God can be assessed.

In Macmurray's description, belief in God, whatever the exact definition, causes the believer to trust that the world is following a structured course, as opposed to believing that events in the world are merely accidental (*CS*, p. 21). Those who believe in God in the Macmurrian sense have minimal concern for their own security, thus allowing them to be heterocentrically motived. On the basis of the Marxist account of the process of history then, Macmurray suggests that communists, despite their profession of atheism, have a theistic attitude. Thus he makes the seemingly contradictory statement that 'Communism, whatever its exponents may say, has recovered that essential core of a real belief in God, which organized Christianity has in our day largely lost' (*CS*, p. 24).

As a scientific theory, communism judges the effect of a specific belief in God by examining the actions of its adherents (*CS*, p. 19). Since the practical significance of an idealist religion is merely as the mainstay of the status quo, rather than the increase of freedom and equality for all, the communist concludes that religion is in opposition to socialist principles. Likewise, if idealist religion professes a belief in God, the communist is forced to profess atheism. However, Macmurray suggests that the people whom the communist has observed do not actually believe in God; since an atavistic attitude is not directly linked with belief in God (*CS*, p. 27).[18] Thus Macmurray implies that at times those who claim to be theists do not believe in God, while those who claim to be atheists do belief in God. Indeed, he states that 'There would be nothing paradoxical in the discovery that a religion which had lost its faith in God must be overwhelmed by a faith which had rejected religion' (*CS*, p. 28).

It seems that almost nobody knows what they believe except for Macmurray, unless when he claims to be a theist he is also mistaken; either way, it appears to be a rather

patronizing and confusing argument. Yet the purpose of Macmurray's contention is to make possible the claim that a belief in God is compatible with the socio-economic theory of communism (Marx, 1968, p. 72 onwards). In essence, if the communist indictment of theism is based on a misconception of religion, it is the rejection of certain religious forms and not the rejection of religion itself that is a necessary part of the production of a classless society. Furthermore, since the nature of religion, for Macmurray, is concerned with the interdependence of human beings, in Macmurray's opinion communism restricts its potential by rejecting religion. On the contrary, he suggests that the Christian perception of God and of personal relations is an appropriate tool for advancing freedom and equality.

Newbigin's Assessment

So far Macmurray's descriptions, both of religion and of belief in God, appear to be rather minimalist. Nevertheless, they serve to highlight the error of critics who reject all religion on the grounds of idealism. While Macmurray seeks to bolster his calculation of the importance of religion by presenting religion as an all-encompassing mode of expression, this is not essential to his premise. That is, if religion issues from the common experience of human interrelation, this does not necessarily mean that it includes science and art as derivative components; yet by arguing that it does include them, Macmurray is able to draw out a distinction between the religious attitude and the aesthetic attitude and further to establish a mutually beneficial relation between science and religion.

In spite of the scope of his reductionist account of religion though, its opacity is bound to lead to misinterpretation or general incoherence. Newbigin, for example, finds that his sympathy for Macmurray's attack on

pseudo-religion is undermined by, what he asserts to be, Macmurray's partially unintelligible naturalistic explanation of religion (Newbigin, 1937). As we have seen, Macmurray argues that real religion is the expression of community. In the case of a universal religion then, some idealism is unavoidable, since its reference to an actual community includes the anticipation of a wider community that does not currently exist. Admittedly therefore, a universal religion is at risk of becoming a pseudo-religion. While Macmurray maintains that this need not be the case, provided that the religion remains practical and avoids the recourse to inactive otherworldliness, Newbigin claims that this is an unsatisfactory explanation of the paradox of the universal religion (ibid., p. 56). For Newbigin, while humanity remains divided, it is only possible to make sense of the hope of universal community, if it is claimed that human beings ought to be one community (ibid., p. 58). In fact, Newbigin asserts that the possibility of community is rooted in this common obligation (ibid., p. 75).

Since Newbigin views this 'ought' as having its roots in a divine obligation to which humanity is subject, it is partly Macmurray's perception of God that he is attacking. As we have seen, Macmurray presents God as an infinite agent, capable of representing the unity of all finite persons, leading Newbigin to claim that Macmurray's God is a formal category rather than a fully personal being (ibid., p. 68); consequently, for example, rendering the phenomenon of prayer (communication with God) lacking in coherence. Nevertheless, while Macmurray's indefinite description of God is a source of frustration for Newbigin, this does not equate to a serious weakness in one of the fundamental aspects of Macmurrian theory (since Macmurray's theory of religion does not require a more definite description of God and Macmurray is not concerned with the efficacy of prayer).

However Newbigin's claim that moral obligation issues from the experience of God requires a response.

During our discussion of morality in Chapter 5, we discovered that Macmurray is opposed to the construction of absolute (divine or otherwise) moral laws, on the grounds that they institute a division of reason and emotion and thereby restrict freedom. Moral action, according to Macmurray, avoids disrupting community and/or curtailing another person's freedom to act. It is, then, as a result of an adequate apprehension of the nature of the other that the individual is able to act morally; although it is possible for the individual to ignore the facts and to treat the other immorally. Nevertheless, while agreeing that moral laws are restrictive, Newbigin holds that without both asserting that the facts ought to be acted upon and that this 'ought' has a divine source, Macmurray's theory provides inadequate grounds for moral action (ibid., p. 73). Similarly, while Macmurray argues that an individual's beliefs are discerned in his or her action, Newbigin maintains that this gives rise to a lack of choice rendering it impossible to act in contradiction with belief; for example, when the divine obligation is recognized and opposed (ibid., p. 74).[19] Yet Newbigin confuses his argument from duty, in an attempt to protect freedom of choice, by suggesting that God's forgiveness of human beings who neglect their duty causes them to fulfil that duty out of gratitude rather than imposition (ibid., p. 82).

It seems that the force of Newbigin's criticism is negligible here. First, rational arguments (such as virtue theory and consequentialist ethics) and practical examples (of humanitarian agencies such as Médecins Sans Frontières and Amnesty International) in support of concepts of humanity and/or social motivation for acting morally without theism have been well rehearsed and, in any case, Macmurray's theory contains a concept of god, even if it is

not the one that Newbigin desires. Secondly, Newbigin has taken the Macmurrian account of the relationship between belief and action to an absurd extreme; while Macmurray argues that genuine beliefs are borne out in practice, he does not suggest that individuals lack the freedom to act contrary to their beliefs or that every action taken at face value reveals a belief. For example, it would be unreasonable to conclude that X does not believe in healthy eating because she or he was seen eating a bag of doughnuts, when X generally eats healthily and only occasionally gives in to the temptation of fatty, sugary foods. Moreover, it hardly seems plausible to argue that humans will be more likely to be swayed by gratitude for divine forgiveness than by fear of divine punishment, and Newbigin gives no supporting evidence for this view.

Consequently, Newbigin's account of divine obligation does not render the notion of universal community any more plausible or less paradoxical than it is in Macmurray's account of universal religion. On the contrary, since Macmurray's basis for communal relations and a religious enterprise stem from his description of human nature, instead of from his perception of God or of God's demand on humanity, Macmurray is able to argue that religion is inherent in human society and, further, that community is the source of freedom rather than an obligation imposed by a divine being. While this does limit the significance of his concept of God, it does not justify the reintroduction of duty in the confused manner that Newbigin implies, nor does its avoidance of duty render it incomprehensible or invalid. In fact, despite his theistic convictions, Macmurray offers an account of religion that is available to all people; it does not require 'special experiences and strange visions' (p1944a, p. 18). Furthermore, real religion, Macmurray asserts, will not speak endlessly of God and be drawn into supernatural

idealism; rather, it will discuss human fellowship, recognizing this as religious experience (ch1970a).[20]

Finally, it is of the utmost importance to remember that Macmurray's insistence on the verification of belief in action denotes a refusal to validate any specific set of religious doctrines (cf. *PR*, p. 223). On the one hand, Macmurray is opposed to the division of community, superiority and exclusivity to which doctrinal statements give rise. On the other hand, Macmurray is keenly aware of developments in our knowledge of reality and stresses the need for comparable revision of religious beliefs and appropriate action. In this way, the significance of actions and the intentions underlying action retain a practical basis; they are assessed in terms of correspondence with the nature of reality and not on the grounds of absolute moral ideals.

[1] He borrows this terminology from Kuhn.

[2] He borrows this idea from Habermas.

[3] In Chapter 6, we discussed the manner in which Lam asserts that Macmurray has failed to grasp the importance of the intricacies of Marx's social theory; in addition, she suggests that Macmurray has misconstrued Marx's reliance on Hegelianism. In particular, she criticizes Macmurray for failing to emphasize the distinction between Hegel's view of the state and the actual situation from which Marx's work ensues, concluding that the two theories cannot be synthesized in the manner Macmurray suggests. However, since Macmurray's central concern is with Marx's rejection of idealism, whether or not this is the antithesis to Hegel or a divergence from Hegel is not of primary importance (Lam, a1940, pp. 49–51; cf. Hook, 1958, pp. 17–21 and pp. 41–3; cf. HM).

[4] He explains that he is using 'idealism' both in the philosophical and the popular sense, the one being an extension of the other. How the infection with idealism occurred will be dealt with shortly.

[5] On this basis, Macmurray implies that it is atheism rather than religion that is the product of childish fantasy (cf. *PR*, p. 155).

[6] According to Macmurray's theory of religion then, every society contains a religious aspect in so far as it acknowledges and demonstrates its communal life. Hence he claims that active atheism is an indication of the attempt to quell a society's religious aspect, while passive atheism is indicative of an oversight in the identification of that religious aspect.

[7] It should be noted that, in this early work, Macmurray uses 'society' to refer to what he names 'community' in later works.

[8] Any rituals or activities, however ordinary, therefore, which are given special significance, could be regarded as religious (cf. a1956a). Ritual occupies a central place in Macmurray's definition of religion (*RAS*, p. 56).

[9] Macmurray avoids the traditional proofs for the existence of God, on the grounds that they stem from the standpoint of the 'I think'. From the standpoint of action, however, the existence of the other is a given. His perception amounts to an undogmatic or natural theology, but it is not, Macmurray insists, pantheism, since pantheism employs an organic as opposed to a personal conception of the universe (cf. *PR*, pp. 206–24).

[10] While this clearly is the case with most groups, and especially with larger groups, such as nations, it is possible to argue that in smaller groups, such as families or friendship groups, the unity of intention and action could be achieved democratically.

[11] Macmurray equates his perception with Tillich's claim that knowledge of God is through knowledge of depth (ch1970a; cf. Tillich, 1951, pp. 238–41).

[12] Macmurray speaks more frequently of fellowship *in* God rather than *with* God (cf. *PR*, p. 165). However, Cizewski argues that this distinction is trivial (Cizewski, a1992).

[13] He argues that it is in this sense that the task of religion can be regarded as the salvation of the world. Sin then is the breakdown in relationships (cf. *RE*, p. 132).

[14] Thus Macmurray suggests that 'it is the significance of the term to the persons who use it that matters, not the fact that it is used or refused' (*RE*, pp. 124–5). Hence he argues paradoxically that 'the professed atheist may be more truly religious than the theist' (*RE*, p. 125). As a result, his notion of God is rather vague; he states that 'God is known as that which is partially, but never completely, realized' (*RE*, p. 126) in any fully personal relationship (but this kind of description is not uncommon in theistic religions).

[15] Macmurray does not mention the role of fidelity, as an exclusive attitude within marital relations, in serving to strengthen rather than limit the relationship. Then again it is possible for 'swingers' to argue that sexual openness strengthens a committed relationship. (According to Costello, Macmurray struggled to accept the 'open' relationship to which his theory pointed; Costello, 2002, pp. 213–18.)

[16] Hence, the religious person is more concerned with person-to-person relations than with defining God (*RAS*, p. 48). In this respect, Macmurray is at odds with Barth, due to Barth's conception of God as wholly other; however, in common with Macmurray, Barth also argued against individualism and used Jesus as the mediator of love between the human and the divine (cf. Barth, 1960, p. 208 onwards).

[17] Still, in so far as the rhythm of withdrawal and return is essential to Macmurray's perception, there is room for mysticism within his concept of religion provided it leads to social action rather than solitude (cf. Limpitlaw, ch2002).

[18] Macmurray seems to be more concerned with the reasonableness of his hypothesis of God than with its actuality (cf. ch1927b).

[19] He cites the biblical example of Jonah's attempt to avoid God's call to Nineveh as an example here.

[20] Macmurray does claim that human friendships are only a partial experience of God, but he also insists that all language of God is mythological (cf. *RE*, p. 126).

Chapter 8
Religion and Morality

The Ancient Hebrews

Despite Macmurray's generalized definition of religion, he emphasizes Christianity especially, partly due to the fact that it is the official religion of his country and also on the grounds that it contains an important feature which other religions lack. Nevertheless, his faith in Christianity is accompanied by the acknowledgement that it is, in essence, almost impossible to define (*CS*, pp. 7–15; *CH*, pp. 1–15; a1937a). In western Europe, phrases such as 'a Christian morality' and/or 'a Christian attitude' are utilized as if they are generally understood; however, there is widespread disagreement both within and outside the various denominations of the Christian religion concerning what it means to be a Christian. It is of primary importance for Macmurray that Christianity be defined in such a way as to render it a practically effective strategy for human progress; otherwise he must conclude that it is mere idealism and abandon his belief in it. In order to assess its meaning then, he begins with an examination of its roots rather than its modern expressions.

Even with this proviso though, the task remains a complicated one. It does not seem to be debatable that the term 'Christian' must have some connection with Jesus Christ as its founder. However, as Macmurray points out, a distinction could still be made between historical continuity and continuity of ideas (*CH*, p. 2). In the former case, any and every act that the Christian churches engage in would

have to be regarded as Christian, whereas in the latter case it would only be the acts that were in direct accordance with the teachings of Jesus that would be classified as Christian. Although the history of the Christian church is riddled with the schisms that have been caused by disputes over the authenticity of beliefs and customs in terms of their authorship, Macmurray argues for the dominance of historical succession. Thus he states that 'Christianity is primarily the movement which Jesus founded rather than the doctrines that he taught' (*CH*, p. 4). However, as we have shown, Macmurray seeks to define religion in relation to practical experience as opposed to ideals, and so his preference is for continuity of action, not mere lineage. Furthermore, the interlacing of theory and practice, which Macmurray insists upon, implies that constancy of practice includes a certain consistency of opinions, especially in terms of intention. According to Macmurray therefore, 'The only relevant claim is the claim to share continuity of purpose and intention. And this is a claim to be acting deliberately, consciously and effectually for the realization, in human life, of certain ends' (*CH*, p. 6). By refusing to separate theory and practice then, Macmurray avoids labelling someone a Christian who has no knowledge of Jesus but shares his beliefs, and he allows for criticism of the Christian churches on the grounds that they do not share Jesus' intention despite their historical connection with him.

A further complication arises, however, when we consider the nature of intentional activity. In Chapter 1, we discovered that a long-term intention is achieved by degrees; that is, by the limitation of the attention to any number of short-term intentions. Similarly, if a particular course of action fails to achieve the intention, it has to be altered, just as such failures increase the knowledge which informs them and alter the accompanying theory. For these reasons, Macmurray explains that continuity of action can

exist 'through quite radical changes both of theory and of practice' (*CH*, p. 12). In fact, for intentional activity to remain continuous through variations in social conditions, alteration of the underlying theory and/or practice might even be necessary. Moreover, it is possible, Macmurray holds, for different agents who appear to be following incompatible intentions actually to be working towards different aspects of the same overarching intention (*CH*, p. 15). Hence the continuity of action cannot be assessed on the basis of a theory, a practice or an intermediate intention alone. Thus the evaluation of the action of an individual or group, for consistency of purpose, is a complex process; nevertheless, Macmurray still attempts to define Jesus' intention.

He asserts that 'Christianity is essentially Jewish' (*CH*, p. 16); hence he seeks Jesus' intention via an examination of the Hebrew Bible's portrayal of the ancient Hebrews. European religion contains, Macmurray explains, a mixture of antagonistic cultures from ancient Rome, ancient Greece and the ancient Hebrews (*FMW*, pp. 71–80; TFRWC). As we have noted, he argues that these three cultures demonstrate a pragmatic, a contemplative and a religious consciousness respectively, corresponding to scientific, artistic and religious expression (*CH*, pp. 20–21; GCRP). When evaluating the form of western society, the influence of Greek and Roman cultures is, Macmurray claims, more readily acknowledged than the Hebrew influence, even though the permeation of Jewish culture spreads throughout Christianity. His explanation for this deficiency is that 'the Jews were and are religious, while we [Europeans] are not' (*CH*, p. 19). Likewise, he criticizes communist theory for borrowing from Christianity without engaging with the ancient Hebrews, and thereby concluding that religion is idealist and otherworldly from an incomplete analysis of its sources. In fact, Macmurray maintains that 'the ancient

Hebrews present us with the only example in history of a specifically religious civilization', and he continues, 'there is no unambiguous trace in the whole of their classical literature of a belief in another world or in a life after death' (*CH*, p. 20).

Since we have already discovered that, in his later work, Macmurray defines religion as the expression of community, it seems peculiar that his early work asserts that the ancient Hebrews are the sole example of a religious group. However, when Macmurray speaks of the ancient Hebrews in this way, he is concerned with their overriding apperception, in contrast with the pragmatic and contemplative apperceptions that he assigns respectively to the ancient Romans and the ancient Greeks; thus completing his triadic formulation.

A society that does not have a religious consciousness is identified, he alleges, by the fragmentation of its culture; that is, by the autonomy of science, art and religion (*CH*, p. 27). While he argues that all primitive societies contain science and art within their religious expression, during the process of growth, he suggests, science and art often develop more fully than religion. Hebrew society is significant therefore due to its ability to retain a religious consciousness as it advances. That is, he states, 'Religion … never becomes a particular sphere of human activity, but remains the synthesis of all' (*CH*, p. 28). It is this integration that separates a thoroughly religious consciousness from the dualist apperceptions of the ancient Greeks and the ancient Romans. In effect therefore, the Hebrew culture contains no contrast between the temporal and the spiritual, action and reflection, or non-religious and religious experiences. Nevertheless, the unavoidably totalitarian character of such a religious apperception leads Macmurray to state that 'If a society (or an individual) has a religion it is not religious. If it is religious it cannot have a religion' (*CH*, p. 29). Despite the

paradoxical nature of this statement, it serves to emphasize the point that the wholly religious attitude is one that does not distinguish between secular and religious aspects of life; it is an entire way of living, rather than a specific collection of doctrines or procedures.

According to Macmurray, the need to postulate another world and to conceive of God as wholly other frequently stems from the inability to conceive of this world religiously; hence the separation of the temporal and the spiritual occurs in order to comprehend of religious significance. It is as a result of their ability to perceive of this world religiously, then, that the Hebrew people seek the realization of the kingdom of God in this world, and not in a future world.[1] Nonetheless, the Hebrew Bible portrays the Hebrews' attempt to sustain integrity as a constant struggle against a variety of dualisms. In addition to confronting the tendency to divide spiritual affairs from material concerns, Macmurray alleges that the ancient Hebrews successfully evade class division (*CH*, p. 32). He claims that while the priests might appear to have higher social standing than the laity, it is the unprivileged prophets who actually relay religious wisdom to both the priests and the people. This is a significant issue for Macmurray, on the grounds that dualist patterns of thought are connected with the endorsement and not simply the presence of class distinction. Hence he states: 'it is, therefore, possible to escape from the dualism in consciousness and to recover the religious form of consciousness even in a dualist social order, by rejecting the social dualism and working for its abolition' (*CH*, p. 32).

Clearly the avoidance of the dualism of temporal and spiritual for the Hebrew people is centred in their theocracy. As we have seen, Macmurray does not claim that the religious person must believe in God, yet he does suggest that the unity of persons is most adequately understood from the postulation of a universal person. Moreover, we

have also noticed that it is what is meant by a particular conception of God, for those who believe in it, that is relevant. It is important for the ancient Hebrews, Macmurray asserts, that God is perceived to be a worker rather than an aristocrat; furthermore, the Hebrew people work with God. Moreover, it is as a result of this perception of the relationship between God and humans, Macmurray holds, that the Hebrews seek to sustain positive familial relations amongst themselves (cf. *CH*, pp. 33–4).[2]

Nonetheless the Hebrew people are only able to evade a dualism between actual and ideal relations by instituting the associated concepts of estrangement and reconciliation, which allows them to conceive of a continuing cooperation between themselves and God. In this way, the entire social history of the Hebrews is viewed from the perspective of divine agency. Reflection on the past then becomes an exercise in comprehending the nature of God and the divine intention for relations of harmony. Consequently, for the Hebrew people social interaction and religious experience are one and the same. It is characteristic of the religious consciousness then that it does not suggest either that religious reflection reveals nothing about social history, or that a historical account of social development fails to interest religion. Consequently, an account of the growth of Hebrew culture must deal with its social fabrication rather than with an isolated set of tenets or activities. Hence Macmurray states that 'it is not the ideas of reflection (as in the case of the Greeks) nor the practical institutions of social organization (as in the case of the Romans) that are universalized and scattered abroad throughout the world, but the Jewish people themselves' (*CH*, p. 41).

In spite of the accuracy of Macmurray's description of the ancient Hebrews in reference to the Hebrew Bible's depiction of them, his failure to mention the related historical criticism decreases the force of his argument. For

example, textual criticism and archaeological evidence have revealed that the Bible gives a theological rather than a historical account of the ancient Hebrews. Hence Ramsey asserts that the biblical material should be read as a narrative that might affirm a contemporary understanding of God, without being a factual representation of the beginnings of Judaism (Ramsey, 1981, pp. 99–103). Moreover, it is unlikely that the Hebrew consciousness can be as clearly identified as Macmurray suggests, and his portrayal of the Hebrew way of life as the sole example of a specifically religious consciousness is contentious. Furthermore, Macmurray's high regard for the ancient Hebrews seems to imply a preference for a belief in divine causation, but he does not mention the fact that much of the primitive belief in divine causation can now be explained by laws of nature. In fact, there is an inherent tension between the Hebrew theocratic society and Macmurray's demarcation of the roles of church and state, as discussed in Chapter 6. In essence, he chooses the Hebrews over other primitive societies on the grounds that they avoid certain dualisms and emphasize integration; however, we will discover that he is critical of modern Judaism for losing that emphasis.

Jesus, the Hebrew Prophet

Whether it is possible for anyone to suppress their twentieth-century influences for the purpose of grasping the comprehension and intention of an individual who lived nearly two thousand years ago is debatable, but Macmurray is not deterred by such difficulties. In essence, he seeks to discover Jesus' original intention by examining the material of the Gospels in relative isolation from the knowledge he has of the Pauline material that succeeds it and the centuries of scholarly theological interpretations. He uses

the New Testament as his source on the grounds that the Jesus of the Gospels is the only Jesus available for scrutiny (p1973, p. 3). Hence he does not engage with any arguments concerning the authenticity of the material therein, or its relation to the historical Jesus of Nazareth. He claims that those who relayed the information would have endeavoured to present as accurate a portrayal as possible, even though their individual aims and fallibility have led to certain discrepancies. Nevertheless, by retaining the tenets of the religious consciousness of the ancient Hebrews, he suggests, it is possible to portray Jesus' intention with a fair amount of accuracy.

For Macmurray, Jesus is 'the culmination of Jewish prophecy and the source of Christianity' (*CH*, p. 42; cf. ch1939d). He is arguing, therefore, that Jesus is profoundly Jewish; that is, he exhibits the religious consciousness characteristic of the Hebrew people. Like any other Hebrew prophet, then, Jesus' interpretation of Jewish society is profoundly religious. Hence he views Roman rule as an indication that the people have strayed from the divine purpose and so, as the Messiah prophesies in the Hebrew Bible, his task is to summons the Jews to return. Nevertheless, Jesus alters the mission of the Jews, since he extends the boundaries of Judaism to include the whole of humanity, through the Jews. Prior to his engagement with this mission, the Gospels report that Jesus is subject to a period of temptation, during which time he reflects on the method he will employ in the realization of the task (Matthew 4:1–11; Luke 4:1–13). According to Macmurray, by refusing to use miracles, Jesus is rejecting the separation of the material and the spiritual, while, by refusing to use force, Jesus is also rejecting the division of means and ends (*CH*, pp. 46–8; *CS*, p. 64).

Nonetheless, Jesus' integrated method is often misunderstood, Macmurray explains, due to a dualistic

interpretation of its ethical and apocalyptic elements, whereby the former is regarded as idealistic and the latter as symbolic (*CH*, pp. 49–54).[3] However, as integral aspects of one system, that which is normally held to be the apocalyptic element is simply the claim that the divine purpose cannot be thwarted, while the ethical element indicates the conditions required for its fulfilment; namely, the cooperation of human beings. When these two elements are considered in isolation, they appear to contradict one another, since the ethical aspects are concerned with positive relationships, whereas the apocalyptic aspects speak of destruction and violence. For the religious consciousness, though, Macmurray claims: 'The one is the basis of the other, and the truth of the ethic is manifested, and can only be manifested, in the realization of the prediction which makes it possible, which, in fact, is its *meaning*. Thus, if the "apocalyptic" is false, the "ethic" is untrue' (*CH*, p. 87). In other words, the ethical aspect is an elaboration of the means that will achieve the divine intention, while the apocalyptic element highlights the certainty of that intention being realized. Hence, Jesus' combination of discernment and anticipation depict life as it *is* and could be, rather than what *ought* to be the case. As Macmurray points out, Jesus' sayings use the indicative more than the imperative form; in addition to which, his disciples refer to his teaching as good news in contrast with the law of the Pharisees (a1956c). In order to fully comprehend the teaching of Jesus, therefore, it is necessary, Macmurray claims, to abandon the dualism of ethical and apocalyptic elements in favour of an integrated interpretation, which views Jesus' statements as offering both insight and foresight into the significance of human life and the practical principles necessary for its fulfilment (*CH*, p. 92).

For Jesus, Macmurray argues, the religious perception of reality, which engenders the Jewish history of cooperation with God, is applied to the whole of humanity (*CH*, pp. 93–6). Consequently, he views the whole of history as God's continued action; he does not view God as a first cause or prime mover. In this way, despite the multiplicity of human intentions, the history of mankind is the fulfilment of God's intention. Moreover, according to Macmurray, the divine intention for humanity is the fulfilment of human nature, which is through positive personal relationships (*CH*, p. 101). However, such relationships are only possible if the human beings concerned share God's intention, but it is not possible for agents to seek to achieve an intention of which they are unaware. Thus, Macmurray claims, Jesus makes it possible for the non-Jew to engage in a conscious cooperation with God towards the achievement of the divine purpose (*CH*, pp. 54–5).[4] In Macmurray's opinion, then, Jesus reveals the meaning of the 'Kingdom of Heaven' and the inner conditions required for its realization on earth (*CS*, p. 62; u1968c).[5]

Furthermore, for the religious consciousness, the perception of the divine purpose for humanity is equally an understanding of human nature. Hence, Macmurray claims, 'The discovery that Jesus made was the discovery that human life is personal' (*CH*, p. 55; cf. u1970b). As we have seen, by this he means that human beings are self-transcending and, therefore, inherently relational. Moreover, according to Macmurray, the descriptor 'personal' is more than organic; thus, Jesus contrasts the functional association of persons with the relation of persons as persons (*CH*, pp. 62–9. For example, the parable of the Good Samaritan supplements the notion of the factual, race-based relationship with the intentional relationship of biologically distinct individuals (Luke 10:30–37; cf. *CS*, p. 65). If, then, the divine intention for humanity is coincident with the

essential intention of human nature, it would seem that the individual already has an adequate motive for cooperating with God. Yet, it is still possible for individuals to refuse to accept the divine intention as their own, and to continue to act in contradiction with it. In so doing, they are frustrating the religious impulse of their human nature and, thus, they can do so only temporarily.[6]

According to Macmurray, Jesus views the cause of the attempt to negate human nature in this way as fear, repeatedly asking 'why are ye fearful' (*CH*, p. 83; Matthew 8:26). Moreover, it is significant, Macmurray asserts, that Jesus adds 'O ye of little faith' (p1973, p. 8; Matthew 8:26). On this basis, Macmurray suggests that faith and fear refer to optimism and pessimism respectively, since a fearful person acts towards others in an aggressive or submissive manner, whereas faith prompts the actions of confidence and trust that encourage reciprocal relations (p1964, pp. 6–8).[7] Fear, as the preventative of mutuality, is overcome, Macmurray holds, by love (*CH*, pp. 65–8). Consequently, Jesus upholds the commands of the Hebrew Bible to 'love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might' (Deuteronomy 6:5) and to 'love thy neighbour as thyself' (Leviticus 19:18). Further, Jesus adds the command to 'Love your enemies' (Matthew 5:44; Luke 6:27). In this way, he both advocates love as the basis of human unity and supports the intention to create community where there is enmity.

Thus, in Macmurray's opinion, Jesus is describing a type of behaviour rather than an ideal temperament. A command to love would be nonsensical if it meant that individuals should act towards other persons as if they loved them, since that would not be love, just as an inactive sentimentality towards other persons is not love. Thus Jesus renders the command to love intelligible by practical example, stating, 'As the Father hath loved me, so have I

loved you: continue ye in my love' and 'This is my commandment, That ye love one another, as I have loved you' (John 15:9 and 15:12). In essence, therefore, since love both overcomes the fear that paralyses action and also motivates positive relationships, these commands to love are, according to Macmurray, concerned with living life to the full and, thereby, fulfilling human nature (p1973, p. 11).

Inasmuch as Jesus' mission is connected with salvation, then, it is, for Macmurray, fear and egocentricity that humanity needs saving from (p1964, p. 7). 'Sin', as we have noted, exists where reciprocal relations are hindered, and so repentance is from actions that prevent community (*CH*, p. 67–9).[8] When Jesus addresses the problem of sin, he speaks of redemption via forgiveness, in contrast with the condemnation tradition expects; for example, he suggests that his followers forgive one another 'seventy times seven' (Matthew 18:22). Mutual forgiveness, Macmurray explains, removes guilt and shame and so assists in the restoration of positive relationships (*CS*, pp. 110–13; *SRE*, pp. 72–3). Furthermore, since thought and action are interdependent, when Jesus extends the Hebrew Bible's censure of murder to include inappropriate anger for example, he is opposing the negation of relationship in intention as well as in fact (Matthew 5:22; *CH*, pp. 67–8).

Community, as we have discussed, is characterized by freedom and equality and, for Macmurray, free persons are those who are able to realize their intentions in action. Since Jesus reveals that the intention of human nature is to engage in loving relationships, he provides the knowledge that is required for successful action, claiming 'ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free' (John 8:32). Equality, as we have defined it, refers to the elimination of superiority on a personal level, despite functional inequalities. Hence Jesus is not just concerned with actual equality; where inequality does exist he asserts

the intention to create equality, stating 'whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant' (Matthew 20:27). While equality does not necessarily include material equality, a situation of economic dependence renders freedom in the personal life problematic. According to Macmurray, it is this insight that leads Jesus to select his followers from the common people, rather than from the ruling classes (*CS*, p. 70).[9] In addition to which Jesus further redresses class distinction through the act of washing the disciples' feet (*CH*, p. 74; John 13:5–17). Consequently, he does not refer to the relationship between himself and his followers as one of master and servant; instead he calls his disciples 'friends' (John 15:15).

Despite the traditional interpretations, he cannot, Macmurray maintains, be advocating servanthood as an end in itself (*CH*, pp. 81–3). Servants fulfil their masters' orders out of obligation and often without any knowledge as to the masters' ends, whereas friends share information and act together freely. That is, community implies communal action, which, in turn, requires a common intention. Hence he alleges that Jesus considers self-sacrifice to be occasionally required, but that he does not promote it as the basis of community, since it contradicts the principles of freedom and equality (p1943, p. 4; a1930d). Within a friendship it is possible that the respective parties could appear to be making sacrifices to an onlooker, when, in fact, they are acting to satisfy the human need for free and equal relations by sharing the means to life. On this basis, when he declares, 'Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends' (John 15:13), Jesus is commenting on the value of life; he is not supporting the martyr. Similarly, Macmurray suggests, when Jesus states, 'He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life … shall find it' (p1943, p. 5; Matthew 10:39), he is defending the self-revelation and heterocentric action that

friendship requires, by contrasting it with the defensive behaviour occasioned by egocentricity.

This area of Macmurray's thought lends itself especially well to the concerns of more recent feminist theology. Feminist theology is highly critical of the manner in which institutionalized Christianity has legitimized the subordination of women on the basis of a motif of self-sacrifice. On the contrary, as Farley states, 'When it [feminist theology] criticizes notions of Christian love as self-sacrifice, it just gets clear on what has been taught all along' (Farley, ch1994, p. 197). Hence as I argue elsewhere, we need to look again at the concept of sacrifice and to find a way forward that takes both the motif and the feminist critique of it seriously (McIntosh, a2007a). In particular, given the high incidence of domestic violence, we need to maintain an appropriate account of self-love that allows for some sacrifice but rules out self-abasement. It is in this respect that Macmurray's emphasis on friendship as mutuality in relationships is at one with feminist theology.

While it may not be particularly unusual for religion to emphasize friendship, in Macmurray's opinion it is Jesus alone who makes friendship the empirical essence of life, rather than an ideal. In effect, Jesus teaches his disciples to have a religious attitude of mind. Primarily this involves the extension of the notion of community to include all of humanity, which in turn involves the integration of practice and theory. It is this, Macmurray argues, that 'makes the life of Jesus the religious life *par excellence*' (*CS*, p. 88). Then, after Jesus is put to death, the disciples are left as the germinal form of the kingdom of heaven on earth, with the task of extending that community indefinitely.[10]

In spite of the disparity that might exist between this interpretation of Jesus' life and the predominant perception of the institutionalized Christian churches, Macmurray's rendition is supported by the analysis Harvey submits. He

too is opposed to the tradition that portrays Jesus as a moralist and, like Macmurray, endeavours to re-evaluate some of the sayings of Jesus, replacing idealization with an emphasis on living life to the full (Harvey, 1991, pp. 6 and 11). For example, he holds that the saying 'He that shall lose his life shall find it' is an invitation to dismiss the subjection and fear that accompanies the life of the victim, for the purpose of choosing to live life freely (ibid., pp. 80–87). It seems that for both Macmurray and Harvey, Jesus' life is an example of someone taking control of his identity and confidently realizing his potential as a person, despite the hardships that he incurs in the process.

Immaturity in Religion

Furthermore, for Macmurray, while the Hebrew consciousness allows a distinction to be made between real and unreal religion, Jesus' life represents the basis for a distinction between mature and immature religion (*RE*, pp. 140–48). Prior to the development of the mature form, religion must progress towards maturity, during which time real religion develops dialectically with unreal religion. Immaturity, according to Macmurray, is denoted by a lack of consciousness concerning the task and method required for the fulfilment of the religious impulse. Consequently, an immature religion is likely to concentrate on divine favour rather than human community. Jesus, as we have seen, is the 'religious genius' (*RE*, p. 146) who understands the need for and the composition of fully positive personal relationships. However, Macmurray argues that, while Jesus' religious experience is mature, the failure of humanity to share his comprehension has prevented religion from achieving maturity (*RE*, p. 148).

According to Macmurray, Judaism has failed to realize the implications of the religious consciousness on which it is

based, by retaining a biologically exclusive stance (*CC*, p. 40). That is, it focuses on the maintenance of the existing community more than the extension of that community; in effect it functions as a conservative rather than a creative religion (*CC*, pp. 35–7). Conservation and creation are, Macmurray states, the inseparable negative and positive aspects of a vital religion, balancing increase in quantity with increase in quality (*SRE*, p. 74). However, Macmurray claims that 'there is religious irrationality in the limitation of community to a particular group. There is nothing in the relations of persons that demands, or even permits, of such limitations' (*RAS*, p. 60). While, therefore, Judaism was the instrument by which religion could have progressed from a conservative to a creative form, it rejected this transformation. Christianity does not have a biological basis for membership. In so far as it has remained continuous with Jesus' intention, therefore, it functions as an instrument of democratic and universal community. Nevertheless, throughout the majority of European history, as Macmurray readily acknowledges, Christianity has also appeared to be a conservative rather than a creative religion, sustaining the status quo as opposed to supporting the poor and fighting for equality (*CH*, p. 121).

Yet, Macmurray's thesis is weakened by its failure to give a sufficient account of the times when Christianity has fought for the oppressed. He would claim that such instances are representative of the true Christian intention, while the instances of the Christian churches acting as the oppressor are indicative of the loss of that intention. In this way, whether Christianity proves to be conservative or creative, Macmurray's interpretation of history accounts for this in such a way as to support his tenets. He justifies this interpretation by pointing out that critics of the Christian church highlight the inconsistencies between its theory and its practice (*CC*, p. 47).

Immediately after his death, the missionary activity of Jesus' followers, especially Paul, indicates the seriousness with which they undertook the task of extending community. Early Christianity stood for social equality and blossomed amongst the common people, with the effect that their activity was seen to jeopardize the superiority of the Roman government. After failing to eradicate Christianity through persecution, then, in the interests of perpetuating the dualist form of society upon which they depended, the rulers allied themselves with the Christian church. However, by becoming the official religion of the Roman Empire, Macmurray holds, Christianity lost its integrity (*CH*, p. 126). He states that 'On the practical side Christianity became dualist by accepting the Roman structure of law, organization and administration as the guarantee of the unity of the church. On the theoretical side it fell into dualism by the acceptance of the thought-forms of Greek philosophy' (*CH*, p. 131). In the former case, the representatives of the Christian church accepted the power of the Roman government, thus instituting dualism between the leaders and the people, while also dividing secular and spiritual authority. In the latter case, religious experience was interpreted with the assistance of Stoic philosophy, thereby creating a theology which is employed subsequently as the standard of acceptable belief, hence instituting a dualism between reflection and action.

European Christendom, then, had an ambiguous form of Christianity. In essence, the Hebrew consciousness had been fused with the Graeco-Roman consciousness; consequently, it struggled to hold the communal, the pragmatic and the contemplative attitudes together (TFRWC). As a result, the history of Christianity is punctuated by a series of schisms, resulting in division between the global East and West. For Macmurray, the Greek Orthodox Church of the East exemplifies the contemplative consciousness through the

establishment an aesthetic and apocalyptic religion, while the Roman Church employs a pragmatic religion composed of duty ethics (*CH*, pp. 153–4).[11] Similarly, the competition between temporal and spiritual leaders, for authority over the people, weakens both, but in the end the church relinquishes power to the state. Hence the church retains power as an instrument of the secular power, aligned with the rulers rather than the people. When, therefore, the Christian intention is brought to the fore, primarily with the cultural Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation, the protagonists of these movements discover that their criticisms are levelled against the official churches, despite their individual religious convictions.[12]

Thus Macmurray contends: 'The Christianity which comes to consciousness in the modern world is not recognized as Christian, and tends more and more to be considered anti-Christian and anti-religious' (*CH*, p. 169). Nevertheless, the success of the Christian intention, as opposed to official Christianity, is severely limited by its failure to overcome dualism. In particular, it retains the individualistic perception with which it became infused during the Middle Ages; consequently, freedom remains an ideal, achieved in appearance as freedom of the mind. Moreover, Macmurray argues that the continued division of spiritual and material elements is responsible for the decline in Christianity's credibility. In fact, he views the contradiction between the teachings of Jesus and the social practice of the professedly Christian churches to be 'pious fraud' (*CC*, p. 50). For as long as official Christianity continues to support the status quo and to be a symbol of medieval society, maintaining standards of belief that have been refuted by science, it is to be expected that those who seek freedom and equality will look to secular authority for its creation.

In spite of Macmurray's criticism of organized Christianity, he asserts that dualism, as the negation of

human nature, is self-frustrating; hence the outcome will eventually be the freedom and equality that are the trademarks of the Christian intention. In order for official Christianity to be a part of this process, it must abandon dogma and conservatism in favour of a more creative and experimental approach (a1926a). Likewise it must oppose hierarchy and privilege by fighting for the oppressed rather than supporting those in power. As we have already seen, Macmurray argues that freedom is only achieved through communal action, which includes the integration of theory and practice and, therefore, implies material equality. Macmurray states that 'Until in this way religion becomes a force for the creation of community, of the conscious community of men and women who know and appreciate and love one another, not merely religion, but the life of mankind is immature and sub-rational' (*RE*, p. 155). A mature religion, he claims, will be extending the family bond of mutual affection to include greater numbers of individuals on the basis of their common humanity rather than their specific beliefs.[13]

Hence as Duncan explains, Macmurray is making a distinction between religious belief and religious faith; the former involves assenting to particular creeds or dogmas, while the latter involves a positive attitude of mind (Duncan, 1990, pp. 123–7 and Duncan, a1993). Individuals could, therefore, have religious faith in the absence of professing religious belief and, in so far as persons' dispositions fail to be contingent upon their doctrinal affirmation, vice versa. Doctrines are, Macmurray maintains, essentially vague and unhelpful, stemming from the dualism of reason and passion in the West that emphasizes the intellect at the expense of emotion (*RAS*, pp. 71–2). Consequently, doctrinal allegiance becomes the foundation of membership to a Christian church, instituting an exclusive and static method of establishing unity, whereas a

universal religion is inclusive by definition. As we have seen, Macmurray concentrates on ritual as an appropriate means of maintaining the unity of a group, provided the rituals employed hold meaning for the members and are not archaic traditions. Christianity, he argues, can only achieve its original intention if it is grounded in the principle that 'Life is a going out *to the other*' (p1973, p. 11, emphasis added); it must avoid the Graeco-Roman temptation to construct an absolute Christian ethic from Jesus' life, which has caused the church alternately to be afraid and to be feared (p1973, pp. 12–14; a1956c).[14]

Nevertheless, an interpretation of history that relates all of the social successes and failures of Christianity to dualism seems to be somewhat contrived. In addition, it is highly dubitable to suppose that if orthodox Judaism had accepted Christianity two thousand years ago society would be classless now, since there is no evidence to verify the claim that Jews have been any more or any less socialist than other societies. According to Orwell, Macmurray's great reverence for Judaism is simply 'racial mysticism', while Middleton Murry finds Macmurray's historical analysis of Christianity to be schematic and 'superficially simple' (Adelphi, r1939, p. 226 and p. 233). However, Macmurray's interpretation of the failings of organized Christianity, in terms of its transition away from its founder's intention, allows him both to argue that the Christian consciousness is essentially socialist and, paradoxically, to explain why the socialist movements in history have tended to be opposed to religion, especially Christianity.

Synthesizing Communism and Christianity

Macmurray argues that the proximity of Jesus' life and teaching, as he outlines it, to the main principles of communist theory is due to the fact that the latter is derived

from the former (*CS*, pp. 90–91).[15] That is, stress on the unity of theory and practice and the importance of class conflict and economic status in shaping social development, while recognizably Marxist, are rooted in the concepts Jesus' expounds. Clearly, the most fundamental and therefore irrevocable difference between Marx and Jesus is their attitude towards religion. It is of primary importance to Macmurray, though, that the communist rejection of religion constitutes a serious restriction to its understanding of social progress. Alongside the argument of the communist – that the elevation of the spiritual life above the material life constitutes idealism – Macmurray additionally contends that the reverse position – the elevation of the material life above the spiritual life – is equally flawed. According to Macmurray, the temporal aspect of life is grounded in an eternal aspect; similarly the eternal aspect is to be found within the temporal aspect, as opposed to being assigned to another world. He states, 'Without that eternal reality the temporal process would itself be unreal and without significance' (*CS*, p. 93): this interrelation of eternal and temporal requires some explanation however.

As Macmurray points out, the term 'humanity' refers to an idea, which in reality is comprised of individual human beings and their individual lives. It follows then that the developmental processes of humanity are dependent on the experiences of individuals, at particular times and in particular places. To speak of the development of humanity as a unit, therefore, requires the relation of specific human beings to each other and to the rest of the world through time. Hence Macmurray holds that 'The temporal significance of human history can only exist as part of the eternal significance of individual men and women themselves' (*CS*, p. 94). Furthermore, as we have seen, Macmurray maintains that it is necessary to postulate a universal other, namely God, in order to comprehend the

integration of humans with each other and with nature over a large timescale. Thus he argues that 'Only real religion can achieve the synthesis of the eternal aspect of personal life with the temporal' (*CS*, p. 95).

While the eternal aspect of human experience refers to the cycle of birth and death, the time in between is sustained by the motives of hunger and love. We have already discussed Macmurray's understanding of the cooperative unity inherent in the physical sustenance of a society; likewise we have noted that love is reduced to sentimentality if it does not have material expression. It is in this sense, therefore, that the love motive, as an essential characteristic of human nature, is the eternal aspect that includes the hunger motive as its temporal aspect. For Jesus, Macmurray asserts, hunger is subordinate to love, or, rather, communal relations are of greater importance than work relations; thus his concern with friendship remains dominant over his concern with the material life (*CS*, pp. 102–6). Communism, however, concentrates on the temporal aspect of human life, viewing human relations as constituted almost entirely by their economic and material situation.

Since pseudo-religion separates love from hunger, Marx seems to have intelligible grounds for stating that 'religion is a purely private matter' (Marx, 1968, p. 257). Yet Macmurray contends that, although the temporal aspect is necessary to and included within the eternal aspect, it cannot override it. In fact, the cooperation that is necessary for the working life is, as we have seen, made possible by virtue of the love motive. Human progress then requires both the realization that equality rests on common humanity and the introduction of the forms of social organization necessary for that equality to be experienced on a practical level. Communism, Macmurray reveals, concentrates on the development of the new institutions necessary for advancing equality without recognizing, as

Jesus does, that social forms can only improve life if they account for the relational character of human nature (*CS*, pp. 127–8).[16]

Macmurray states that 'Communism presupposes Christianity, and its denial merely isolates it from its own conditions. Christianity implies Communism, and the denial of this merely isolates Christianity from its own reality' (*CS*, p. 144). Consequently, Macmurray contends that equality requires a synthesis of Christianity and communism, so that, at least in principle, any individual could be 'at once a convinced Communist and a sincere Christian' (ch1935a, p. 506). However, inasmuch as communist theory rejects the benefits of religion itself and not merely the effects of pseudo-religion, this would not be possible in practice. In order for a synthesis to take place, both Christianity and communism would need to undergo radical revision. As we have seen, Macmurray is in favour of the eradication of idealism from organized Christianity on the grounds that this is not real Christianity. Since the Communist societies which did come into existence failed to create classless societies, Macmurray extends the same courtesy to communism. Consequently, he examines the freedom and equality that each system has the potential to produce, in principle rather than in experience (ch1934a).

It might seem strange that, in this respect, Macmurray stresses that principles are to be examined despite practices, especially since the rest of his thesis centres around the insistence that it is action that is primary and thought that is secondary. Nevertheless, if the intention to produce freedom and equality is present in both communism and Christianity, as he has defined it, in the absence of practical examples of real Christianity or of true communist societies, Macmurray can only present a theoretical analysis. In so doing, he remains faithful to his

convictions, provided that his analysis is undertaken from the standpoint of action.

With reference to those elements of communist theory which might appear to be in conflict with Christian principles then, Macmurray seeks to show that each inconsistency is such only from the perspective of unreality and inactivity (*CS*, pp. 155–65). Christian critics, he points out, maintain that the introduction of communism would result in the loss of democracy and of freedom, the degeneration of the value of the individual and of the family, and also the veneration of violence. However such critics, Macmurray argues, fail to realize that real democracy and real freedom require economic equality. Further, while the real significance of individuals is bound up with their personal lives, we have discovered that this is supported by a well-organized functional life; similarly the real value of the family lies in its shared affection and not in its legal or social construction. Hence Macmurray states that:

> A Christian Communism would be concerned not merely to affirm and supply the individual hunger-needs of all its members but in addition to, and as the full purpose of this, to provide the conditions for free mutual relationship and the creative personal expressions of human life which have their roots in this self-transcendence of individual personality. (*CS*, pp. 161–2)

We have also seen that, while Jesus rejects the use of force as a legitimate means for creating community, since it occasions fear rather than love, it is also possible to cite instances where Jesus employed force; although Macmurray insists that the use of force must remain subordinate to the communal intention (Matthew 21:12–13; *CS*, p. 166).

While unreal Christianity can rediscover its socio-economic effect by learning from communist theory, it also contains a perception of human relationality which communism lacks. In short, while the communist perception of the goal of human history is worked out purely in terms of

economic circumstances, Christianity interprets human history in terms of the will of God, which includes the outworking of the material conditions necessary for the realization of universal community. Overall, Macmurray claims that the Christian emphasis on friendship renders it capable of recapturing an economic practicability, whereas the communist exclusion of the religious impulse of human nature will result in its failure (*CS*, pp. 187–9). That is, communism can create the conditions necessary for equality, but it lacks the ability to overcome fear with love and, thereby, sustain and extend that equality. It is then up to real Christianity rather than politics to effect the synthesis.

Whether Christianity and communism can be synthesized in this way remains a controversial issue. We have already noted Lam's criticism of Macmurray's reduction of class antagonism to the hunger motive; in addition, she asserts that Macmurray fails to address the real challenge to organized religion posed by Marxism (Lam, a1940, pp. 57–63). She claims that 'He [Macmurray] has lifted out of Marx's total system only his social objectives and his opposition to theism and has treated these as if they constituted the entire problem of the relation of Christianity to Marxism' (ibid., p. 63). Similarly, Graubard suggests that Macmurray is taking communism out of context and using it as a set of principles applicable to any situation, instead of to the specific issues of capitalism (Graubard, r1933, p. 192).[17] Obviously it is against the dialectical concept in Marxism to reduce communism to a set of principles, yet this is a necessity in order for there to be philosophical discussion of it. Furthermore, Macmurray's concern is to save religion and to convince Christians, who would reject Marx's entire theory because of its profession to be atheist, that they need not be so dismissive. Consequently, he approaches the synthesis of Christianity and communism

from the standpoint of a religious socialist rather than a Marxist scholar. He insists that a political system alone cannot replace egocentricism with real community; rather, this is achieved by religion (*PC*, p. 95). Moreover, the persistence of religion in the attempts to create communist societies lends support to Macmurray's claim that the religious impulse is innate and that its denial would lead to the failure of communism.

Despite the collapse of Communist societies, and the persistence of both religious and capitalist institutions, much of today's politics is still affected by Marxism, even though it is now clear that communism is not a blueprint for a trouble-free society. With the benefit of the hindsight afforded by history, Stokes, in his study of communist collapse, declares that the only sensible political theory for the future is a pluralist one (Stokes, 1993, pp. 6–8). Furthermore, MacIntyre argues that it is plausible to maintain that, while Marxism is not wholly true, it does present some truths which cannot be divorced from Marx's theoretical formulation of them, and which can be brought into dialogue with Christianity (MacIntyre, 1968, p. 89). Likewise, as McLellan reveals, the future effort to promote freedom and equality, whether from the Marxist or the Christian standpoint, requires a critically incisive attitude towards the ideas therein and an openness regarding their alteration (McLellan, 1995, pp. 80–85). In his attempt at a synthesis, the most important feature for Macmurray would seem to be the elimination of idealism and the reinstatement of the reference of ideas to reality.

Whether it is possible in practice to have a religion that has borrowed social relevance from Marxism, and displays an accompanying self-critical ideology, is the question by which Macmurray's interpretation is substantiated or refuted. Beyond his membership of the Christian Left before the Second World War began, Macmurray was not a part of

any self-critical, Marxist religious movement, but such movements do exist. One example is to be found in Latin America, and for the purposes of discussion it is termed 'liberation theology'; although, as with Marxism, it is essentially a practice and not a static list of principles.[18] As a tool, the dialectic of history and the social structure of Marxism offers an explanation, which liberation theology adopts, of the phenomenon of economic oppression (cf. Gutiérrez, 1988, p. 49). In addition, liberation theologians view Jesus Christ as a liberator of whole persons, addressing all forms of oppression of which economic exploitation is but one (ibid., pp. 83–97). Liberation theology seeks to unite the spiritual and the temporal aspects of life, as Macmurray advocates, while avoiding the idealism that Marx repudiates.

Some critics, as McGovern points out, accuse this pluralist movement of reducing faith to politics and, therefore, the spiritual to the temporal (McGovern, 1989, pp. 47–9). This is an accusation which could equally be levelled at Macmurray's theory, yet both he and liberation theologians would argue that this criticism stems from distorted, otherworldly religion. Alternatively, Kee claims that liberation theology is not Marxist enough (Kee, 1990, pp. 257–60). In his opinion, liberation theology fails to address the Marxist claim that religion involves the projection of human desires onto another world. It is true that liberation theology's vision of a new and better society is of one that is promised by God; the same is true of Macmurray's and of any Christian theory. Nonetheless, both liberation theologians and Macmurray make a concerted effort to begin the creation of an improved society in this world. Since the Marxist, as atheist, claims that images of God are projections of human needs and wants, the theist has to disagree and, in this sense, the two systems remain incompatible. While a convinced theist might find

Macmurray's theism somewhat opaque then, in terms of his attempt to synthesize Christianity and communism this opacity might be an advantage.

Criticisms and Clarifications

At the core of Macmurray's analysis of Christianity is its communal intention. Before assessing the merits and limitations of his interpretation then, we need to examine the notion of community more closely. In Chapter 5, we discovered that Macmurray distinguishes between a society and a community primarily on the grounds of the nature of the bonds therein. Furthermore, he equates the former with politics and the latter with religion, although the two types are interdependent. While a society consists of organized cooperation for the fulfilment of a specific function, the members of a community relate for the sake of fellowship. Consequently, a community is a fully 'personal unity' (*CF*, p. 70); it is constituted by the relation of free and equal persons who love and care for one another. We have also noted that this type of relation is commonly referred to as friendship; moreover, while Macmurray contentiously regards any effort to achieve friendship as religious, he similarly regards the continued existence of religions to be evidence that human nature craves increased friendship (cf. *RE*, pp. 35–6; p. 124). Hence Macmurray portrays the relationship between Jesus and his disciples as one of friendship.

In certain respects Macmurray's description of friendship reflects the Aristotelian conception of it. For example, Aristotle argues that friendship is a part of human nature and, therefore, necessary for happiness (Aristotle, 1934, 8.1.1; 9.9.5–7). In addition he portrays the friendship relation as one of love and active goodwill (ibid., 8.3.4 and 9.5; cf. Aristotle, 1952, 7.1.1–3). Furthermore, Aristotle

allows for degrees of friendship, in terms of what it is about the person that is found loveable, whether that is what is 'good, or pleasant, or useful' (Aristotle, 1934, 8.2.1). Thus if an individual's love for others has its foundation in the pleasure or the utility that they provide, these are lower forms of friendship. When friendship is based upon the goodness of others – that is, in the persons themselves rather than in their properties – this is, for Aristotle, 'perfect' or 'primary' friendship.[19]

For Macmurray, it would only be this latter type of relation that would constitute friendship, although this would include the two other types as subordinate elements. In Chapter 3, we criticized Macmurray's analysis of the relationship between the self and the other for failing to give sufficient significance to particular others. It seems that his account of friendship would similarly be more complete if it allowed for different levels of friendship and the relevance of a particular other. Aristotle is able to account for the fact that not all people can be perfect friends, whereas Macmurray implies that one or other of the individuals concerned is at fault if the relationship is not a loving one. Nevertheless, Aristotle's pluralistic model leads to an indistinctness which Macmurray's singular definition of the term evades. As Price notes, the qualifications of the goodwill exercised in the lower forms of friendship either leaves them with too little in common with the primary type for the respective parties to be classified as friends, or they create a 'homonym' (Price, 1989, p. 135) of the term.

More importantly, both Aristotle and Macmurray are faced with the problem of depicting what it means to love others for themselves. Self-interest and veneration for station are clearly excluded; yet any attempt to state why one person loves another reveals that there is a sense in which any love of another is concerned with attributes as much as with the person. It is probably the effort to avoid

this misinterpretation that prevents Macmurray from describing degrees of friendship. However, the alternative pitfall is a vague description of a general love of humanity, which fails to divulge the tremendous devotion between two especially close friends. It is in order to avoid this misunderstanding that Macmurray emphasizes the importance of direct acquaintance, practical activity and reciprocity.

Nevertheless, in order for Macmurray to argue that friendship is the ground of universal community, he does claim that the essential basis of friendship is common humanity (*CF*, p. 84). In principle, therefore, the relation is an inclusive as opposed to an exclusive one; yet the larger the group the less likely it is that all its members will enjoy friendship with one another. Hence it is in this sense that the intention to extend community is crucial, so that when indirectly related members of the group do come into contact with one another their relation will be one of friendship. Macmurray states:

> This does not mean that in the larger communities fellowship is less real, or that it differs in its essential character. In the larger fellowship the full intention remains latent and potential, as it were, and is fully expressed only in the direct relations of its members, each to each. (*CF*, p. 71)

Moreover, this potential community avoids idealism by advancing the conditions necessary for people to meet as friends. In effect, this means continuing to strive for greater freedom and equality. As we have seen, freedom and equality are mutually inclusive categories; the freedom to be oneself requires that the other enter into a relationship with the self without either party becoming a source of fear, a superior or a dependent. As we have seen, the form of community is based on the family; although it must constantly change as the society changes.[20] Hence in conjunction with Macmurray's emphasis on the unity of

theory and practice, he insists that the actual form of a universal community could only be discovered in its realization; nevertheless, he maintains that the Christian intention is committed to its realization. While the realization of universal community entails the promotion of diversity rather than conformity, Macmurray confusingly argues that the kingdom of heaven on earth must have a single tradition, on the grounds that incompatibility between the different value systems of the various cultural and religious traditions of the world threatens the possibility of worldwide freedom and equality (*CF*, pp. 98–103). Thus he lists the characteristics of this 'universal tradition' as follows: 'Common humanity would be its basis of judgement, respect for personality its first law, and friendship, which is the fullest realization of the personal life, its supreme good, to which all other goods are subordinate' (*CF*, p. 99).

Despite his disillusionment with the denominational form Christian churches have taken in the past, Macmurray remains convinced that, through its acknowledgement of previous failures, it is possible for Christianity to become the democratic and revolutionary religion that he believes it originally intended to be (*CC*, pp. 42–7). In this respect, Macmurray's theory could be legitimately used as a tool for revising Christian theology.[21] In fact, a Macmurrian theology would complement the traditional anthropological approach with its interrelation of the material, the organic and the personal, while also highlighting the significance of the embodied self and the importance of practical efficacy. Indeed, the emphasis on interpreting the world from a Trinitarian perspective, as found in late twentieth-century theology, is not dissimilar to Macmurray's stress on the relational nature of the personal (cf. Moltmann, 1981).

Nevertheless, a revised theology that failed to take the severity of Macmurray's attack on organized Christianity

into account would not meet his challenge. That is, traditional perceptions of eschatology, mission, prayer and doctrine for example, are not supported by Macmurray's thesis. Beyond the rather general assertion concerning the inevitability of the divine intention, Macmurray's theory lacks an eschatology. Similarly, while Macmurray does describe the disciples as a missionary movement and Jesus as having a mission, it is a mission of care, advancing freedom and equality rather than eliciting conversion, that is implied. Private religion, therefore, does have a role in a Macmurrian account, as a temporary withdrawal that aims to improve the activity of corporate religion; if private religion becomes an end in itself, though, celebration of communion is merely fantastical (*RAS*, p. 69). Likewise doctrine need not be discarded altogether; however it must be kept to a minimum, if it is to remain comprehensible and subordinate to social action (*RAS*, pp. 74–7). Above all, doctrine must retain a hypothetical stance in order to be inclusive and able to adapt to changing circumstances.[22] In effect, Macmurray is advocating the compatibility of a multitude of theologies; thus the ecumenical movement is, he suggests, a solid foundation for a freely united Christian church (p1964).[23]

Furthermore, in the absence of any assertion concerning the divinity of Jesus Christ, a Macmurrian theology views Jesus basically as an exceptional figure. In spite of his desire to maintain the uniqueness of Jesus, then, Macmurray merely asserts that Jesus is a Hebrew prophet. It seems, therefore, that Jesus' insights might be beneficially combined with those of other great social activists, such as Buddha, Muhammad, Gandhi or Mandela, in the creation of wider positive relationships. Perhaps political revolutionaries can be left aside on the grounds that their goal was not a universal community, but other universal religions cannot. Of the three competing universal religions – Buddhism,

Islam and Christianity – Macmurray insists that 'Buddhism achieves a merely ideal spirituality; Mahommedanism merely an idealized materialism' (*CS*, p. 63), leaving Christianity alone with the capacity to produce the community he envisages. Buddhism and Islam operate, he alleges, on the negative motive of fear, exhibiting submission and aggression respectively (*CF*, p. 91; *SRR*, p. 39). When Christianity has been drawn to adopt either of these dualist methods it has, according to him, realized that this is contrary to its original intention. Whether or not other religions have the same potential for community that Macmurray sees in Christianity, he has done little to argue this point convincingly. Moreover, he is not granting Buddhism and Islam the same historical consideration he affords Christianity, since he makes no attempt to disentangle their original intentions from the forms that have become associated with them.

Islam is a theocracy with its roots in the Jewish tradition, like Christianity. For Muslims, Jesus is not divine; he is a prophet alongside other prophets, which is unacceptable in traditional Christianity, but not necessarily so for Macmurray (*The Qur'an*, 2:250). Moreover, as Rippin elaborates, there is no single definition of Muslim; rather there are many different groups with different theologies and different ways of life, including the contemplative branch of Sufis (Rippin, 1990, p. 61). Hence, while this diversity and the uncertainty over early writings cause any attempt to identify the original intention to be fraught with difficulties, Macmurray's sweeping generalization about aggression cannot be deemed irreproachable (ibid., p. 59). Contemporary Muslim movements have, Rippin explains, been undergoing the same processes of emancipation as Christianity and, likewise, some have claimed that the resulting changes in form are bringing Islam closer to its original intention (Rippin, 1993, p. 27).

An ancient religion such as Buddhism has even less opportunity to conscientiously clarify its original intention. Buddha, as he appears in the Buddhist Scriptures, seeks the path to salvation through a life of self-restraint (*Buddhist Scriptures*, part 1, chapter 2). As Buddhism grew, Conze reveals, many different branches developed with varying amounts of missionary endeavour; thus rendering generalizations such as Macmurray's increasingly difficult to sustain (Conze, 1959, p. 200). Moreover Buddhism's concept of the 'not-self' (*Buddhist Scriptures*, part 2, chapter 3), its abstract notion of the divine, and its ability to have meaning for anyone disillusioned by the impermanence of life, without requiring specific religious allegiance, is consistent with Macmurray's imprecise understanding of religion.

Despite the contemplative and forceful forms that have become associated with Buddhism and Islam then, in some respects they appear to be consistent with the religious consciousness and the inclusiveness Macmurray ascribes to real Christianity. In fact, his insistence on Christianity is at odds with his emphasis on inclusivity. Perhaps during his era he could still envisage Britain and even Europe as predominantly Christian; today, however, religious plurality is a reality on a local almost as much as on a global level. While Hick, for example, attempts to hold all religions together in dialogical relation, maintaining the equal validity of each, the practicability of this approach is limited (Hick, 1995, p. 120). In particular, despite the seriousness of Hick's effort to prevent religious superiority, as Newbigin indicates, adhering to any particular religion involves claims as to its accuracy and uniqueness, at least on an implicit level (Newbigin, 1997, p. 171). With this proviso, and on the grounds that contemporary Britain is, as Bruce states, both a multicultural and a largely secularized society, Macmurray's understanding of the need for human unity

would be more widely comprehensible if it could be separated from its Christian emphasis (Bruce, 1995, pp. 73 and 127).

Conclusion

By engaging in a discussion of Macmurray's perception of religion, we have discovered the full impact of his emphasis on agency and relation. As we have seen, Macmurray's interplay of positive and negative elements represents withdrawal as well as the return to action as an essential aspect of personal development. Similarly, in spite of the limitations he assigns to the political sphere, the political life is held to be a necessary component of the religious life. Furthermore, while fundamentally opposed to western individualism, Macmurray's criticisms of communism are levelled against the tendency towards collectivism, since economic relations are then given precedence over personal relations. Consequently, while Macmurray is not a liberal individualist, as we noted in Chapter 6 he is not a communitarian either.[24] With reference to debates concerning the proper relation of the public life to the private life – in cases such as the death of the Princess of Wales, the Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky scandal, or the current controversy over Wikileaks for example – Macmurray's theory offers a solution. In short, as Torrance points out, he implies that privacy has an important role in the development of the individual in opposition to community; yet at the same time the private life cannot be separated from its effect upon the life of the community (Torrance, ch2002).

In this respect, Macmurray's community is both the essence of the good life and a grave responsibility.[25] Since Macmurray is opposed to the strict formulation of moral codes, there is a sense in which his description of the

religious attitude appears to be a form of virtue theory. Macmurray shares MacIntyre's view of the moral fragmentation of society and the corresponding need to discover the nature of the good life in relation to human ontology and sociality, instead of being bound by outmoded codes of practice (cf. u1944b; u1924–27; MacIntyre, 1994). In addition, Macmurray's emphasis on action, as an inherent aspect of personal development, is consistent with MacIntyre's emphasis on narrative. That is, the concept of a universal ethic is abandoned on the grounds that morality is rooted in the particular community to which an individual belongs. While narrative ethics run the risks of vagueness and sectarianism, they benefit from an adaptability to changed and changing conditions of existence. Consequently, while MacIntyre's ideas have been used by Hauerwas for example, to construct a theory which is only applicable to a specific group of people, Macmurray's local reference has global significance (cf. Hauerwas, 1985). For Macmurray, as we have seen, morality depends upon our actions in relation to the other, where the intention to act in a certain way towards any individual is also open to moral scrutiny.

Nevertheless, the extent to which a human being can expect to live the self-transcendent life Macmurray describes is debatable. In particular, Downie and Emmet maintain that a fully positive personal relationship is not possible (Downie, ch2002; Emmet, 1966, pp. 170–71). They both criticize Macmurray for paying insufficient attention to the perception of roles within relations. That is, the manner in which other people perceive of individuals and the sense in which individuals cannot relate to others outside of any role whatsoever prevents them from expressing their person unhindered by assumed duties and responsibilities. For instance, the historical role of wife and mother reduced a woman's identity to that of attachment to her husband.

Socially constructed roles are difficult for both women and men to avoid and to change. While Macmurray attempts to account for this factor by insisting that the impersonal is contained within the personal, this may not be adequate.

Nevertheless, Macmurray's stress on loving relationships is at least an alternative to egocentricism and social disruption.[26] Nonetheless, the possibility of extending the love relationship without diminishing its significance remains dubious. In fact, Langford criticizes Macmurray for reducing *agape* to *philia* (Langford, a1966). Clearly Macmurray connects the personal relationship with the family bond; yet he also insists that the relationship is unconditionally focused on the other. Further, love is portrayed as an overarching affection, which encompasses and subordinates all others.[27] It seems, then, that *philia* would be an inadequate description of Macmurray's perception of love, although it would make the possibility of extending the bond more realizable.[28]

If the reality of a universal family is not a realistic expectation in the near future, then, as Kirkpatrick states, friendship groups can still exist to sustain the conditions necessary for a universal community (Kirkpatrick, 1986, p. 222). For Macmurray, it seems that friendship is both a description and a prescription; thus he avoids turning friendship into the ought of moral objective, while also attempting to hold together what naturally is the case with what could be intended to be the case. While seeking to avoid utopianism, by comparing the contemplative and pragmatic approaches to social unity with his understanding of community, Macmurray summarizes his theory with the statement: 'All meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action for the sake of friendship' (*SA*, p. 15). This appears to be an overstatement of the case and, as we have seen, Macmurray's thesis is restricted by its conception of friendship; however, it does highlight the

importance of agency and relation in the fulfilment of the personal life.

In addition, it could be claimed that Macmurray's optimistic view of his own era, as a crucial step forward in human history, is rather arrogant. Furthermore, by eliciting the original intention of religious expression as the potential for future human development, he creates perhaps the greatest tension of his proposal, appearing to associate holistic advance with the return to a primitive form of society. For any developed society to have a religious consciousness, without having a religion, it would need to remove the consciousness of religious practices that social awareness has caused; yet this is not possible, since progression is made through new forms, not by recapturing the past. Admittedly, Macmurray stresses the need to avoid atavism and to concentrate on future practice, but this is hampered somewhat by his tendency to interpret history in a schematic manner. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that he has 'carried much from the old order that should have been left behind' (*SA*, p. 14); it is perhaps with reference to his Calvinist upbringing that this is most clearly the case.

Macmurray insists on the relevance of religion, yet 'religion' is a decidedly dubious term in his employment of it. Primarily the role God occupies in Macmurrian religion is opaque, especially since Macmurray's concern with the Marxist condemnation of otherworldly religion causes Macmurray to evade supernaturalism. For Macmurray, the concept 'God' is understood empirically, yet he offers no explanation as to why many people do not recognize it. In addition, it seems that Macmurray is engaged in a serious attempt to defend religion against its critics, even though he explicitly states that religion, as an aspect of human activity and reflection, requires no such apology (*RAS*, p.10). While he expects a great deal from religious persons, his account of religion could be adapted with ease into a non-

religious social ethic. In fact, it seems that it would be plausible to borrow the intention and the method for creating community from Christianity, without insisting on the label 'Christian', just as Macmurray borrows his socioeconomic theory from Marx without becoming a Marxist.

On the one hand, it could be argued that Macmurray's description of religion would be weakened by detaching specific elements, and this might be the case. However, rather than dividing his work into categories of acceptability, the removal of exclusive labels serves to render his theory more comprehensible. On the other hand, in so far as Macmurray gives credibility to religion by relating it to science, retaining his employment of the term 'religion' provides the theist with a useful tool for reasserting the modern relevance of theism (see Higgs, a1982). Similarly, the theologian can utilize the scope and unity of Macmurray's practical reference to God to assert the relevance of theology in understanding the human race and, therefore, its comparable status and interconnection with other academic disciplines (see White, a1973). In this respect, Macmurray's theory could be improved by reference to his influences and also by engagement with post-Enlightenment criticisms of religion.

Since Macmurray asserts a natural theology of sorts, he limits the role of theistic specialists, in order to portray God as a unifying principle, open to all. In this sense religion seems to retain significance as a cohesive force, but if religion is failing in this task an alternative term for social cohesion could be employed. Essentially, cohesion seems to be connected with the responsibility of the individual for the group; in fact, in situations of ethnic conflict it seems that Macmurray's emphasis on reconciliation would be more beneficial than the assertion of a Christian intention.[29] In short, Macmurray offers a model for counteracting the will to

power by revealing that freedom is curtailed by other persons (ch1940). It is for this reason that the person requires what he refers to as friendship and/or religion.

Inasmuch as Macmurray's aim, through his description of religion, is to assert the significance of religion for understanding that positive person-to-person relationships are sustained by love and forgiveness then, he succeeds. Moreover, his opacity concerning specific religious beliefs and activities is inherent in that aim. Even though he reaches his conclusions from a particular view of communism, he complements the Marxist interpretation of work and economic relations with his perception of the significance of love and leisure (see Kirkpatrick, a1985). He gives an account of human nature and the possibilities for freedom and equality that is ethically qualified and extremely demanding without being absolutist; furthermore, it has a scope which a more clearly defined programme would lack. Consequently, we can conclude that, provided idealism and dogmatism are avoided, Macmurray's work portrays the fulfilment of the person as the active participation in the creation and sustenance of egalitarian society and, thus, he gives a role to mutuality and other-centredness which is refreshing in an age of individualized competition.

[1] While a belief in immortality could be compatible with the religious consciousness then, it is not inherent in it (cf. *CH*, p. 30). Macmurray suggests that personality is somehow 'super-temporal' and could therefore continue beyond the death of the organism; however, he is opposed to body-soul dualism (cf. *RE*, pp. 158–70).

[2] For Macmurray, Judaism insists that it is impossible to love God without loving one's neighbour, and he cites the command to love one's neighbour as a direct corollary of the command to love God (cf. Leviticus 19:18; Deuteronomy 6:5). Consequently, Trethowan states that Macmurray makes the notion of loving God redundant, but Macmurray's intention is to emphasize the irrelevance of a 'love' that has no bearing on everyday life (Trethowan, r1967).

[3] For example, Macmurray argues that the statement 'Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth' (Matthew 5:5) implies that humility assists material success; it does not imply that humility is virtuous in an ideal sense.

[4] Macmurray holds that the Incarnation is merely the human way of acknowledging that the infinite is experienced through the finite, as opposed to suggesting that Jesus is somehow human and divine.

[5] However, over time, dualism changed this into a concentration on the kingdom of heaven in heaven (cf. a1935c).

[6] Macmurray suggests that Jesus' statement 'every city or house divided against itself shall not stand' (Matthew 12:25) as well as the metaphor of the foolish man who built his house on sand (Matthew 7:26) are examples of this. In other words, to cooperate with God is to create community, while those who reject cooperation with God cannot thwart the eventual creation of community; Jesus' death is an example of this (cf. *CH*, pp. 118–19).

[7] He cites the parable of the talents as an example of Jesus' understanding of fear (cf. Matthew 25:14–26).

[8] For Macmurray, this is more significant than the breaking of moral codes (cf. a1938a).

[9] In fact, Jesus preaches to the poor and frequently speaks unfavourably of the wealthy, the account of the rich man and Lazarus being one example (cf. Luke 16:19–31), although Macmurray maintains that Christianity is more concerned with reconciliation than condemnation or retaliation (cf. NCCSO).

[10] Macmurray views the resurrection in a mythological way, understanding the post-crucifixion experiences of Jesus' presence as visions enabling the disciples to overcome their fear (cf. *SRR*, p. 53).

[11] Similarly, Macmurray claims (over-simplistically) that Protestantism exhibits dualism by tending towards otherworldliness, whereas Catholicism exhibits dualism by tending towards the use of force (cf. *CS*, p. 132).

[12] In this sense, the Christian intention wins through the corruption of its form (cf. ch1950).

[13] It is a weakness in Macmurray's theory that he does not consider the problems counter-societies have experienced. In addition, Cooper examines the manner in which the family unit suppresses spontaneity in favour of conformism, instilling taboos and restricting individual identity, and like

Macmurray he calls for a more communal form of rearing that is less insistent on biological relation (cf. Cooper, 1971, pp. 24–30).

[14] As a result of this view, Macmurray praises Lindsay's attack on dogma and Singer's forceful denunciation of the history of the Christian churches (r1936 and r1944).

[15] He is referring here to Feuerbach's humanist interpretation of Christianity and Marx's subsequent debt to Feuerbach.

[16] It is in this sense that communism claims that classless society will be accompanied by the disappearance of religion, whereas Macmurray argues that the realization of a classless society would mean merely the disappearance of pseudo-religion (*CS*, p. 138).

[17] Macmurray's response to Graubard's criticism is 'I am afraid that I cannot reply to it. It leaves me speechless ' (Graubard, r1933, p. 194).

[18] Lind suggests that liberation theology and Macmurray's theory are complementary; while both use Marxist analysis and emphasize orthopraxis rather than orthodoxy, the former would benefit from a philosophical reading of dualism and the latter would benefit from a more explicit awareness of his context (Lind, a1992).

[19] The term 'perfect' is used in *The Nicomachean Ethics*, whereas the term 'primary' is used in *The Eudemian Ethics* (cf. Aristotle,1934, 8.3.6 and Aristotle, 1952, 7.2.38).

[20] The family is not to be insisted on for the purpose of social cohesion, but as an inherent aspect of the personal life, where 'family' is to be interpreted in a variety ways. Macmurray favours a kibbutz type of communal living (cf. p1929a).

[21] Fergusson uses Macmurray in this way (Fergusson, ch1997).

[22] In this respect, Macmurray's attitude is similar to the approach taken by nonfoundationalism (cf. Thiel, 1994).

[23] Although the World Council of Churches and the British Council of Churches are moves in the right direction, for Macmurray they are overly constrained by doctrinal formula (cf. *SRR*, pp. 64–9). For this reason Macmurray joined the Society of Friends (*SRR*, pp. 63–75; u1963/4).

[24] For a detailed examination of the debate between liberals and communitarians, see Mulhall and Swift, 1992.

[25] It seems that Macmurray's combination of social responsibility with self-fulfilment has gained favour in political circles where the term 'community' is used (cf. Etzioni, 1995). However, this is not compatible with government cuts to welfare funding and the emphasis on individual responsibility in David Cameron's 'big society'.

[26] Fromm, for example, is convinced that the future of social integration depends upon the promotion of shared experience of persons, in place of an attitude of material ownership and aggression (Fromm, 1992).

[27] Aquinas gives a similar account of love (cf. Aquinas, 1993, pp. 156–68).

[28] *Agape* would not constitute an accurate description of Macmurray's view of love either, since it is associated with the notion of self-sacrifice that he condemns.

[29] In this respect, Macmurray's correlation of the individual with the group is not dissimilar to Sacks' portrayal of the way forward (Sacks, 1995).

Conclusion

At the start of our inquiry into the nature of the person, we examined Macmurray's dissatisfaction with traditional explanations that are, he claims, 'both theoretical and egocentric' (*SA*, p. 11). Thus we set out Macmurray's alternative, portraying it as a more adequate conception of the person than the dualist explanation offered by Descartes, on the grounds of its holistic approach. In particular, we used Macmurray's theory to present an integrated account of mind and body, theory and practice, thought and action, reason and emotion, the self and the other.

In Chapter 1 we analysed Macmurray's theory of agency, suggesting that, for the person, action rather than thought is primary. An essential component of this contention surrounded the role of intention, since Macmurray holds that 'the motive of an action need not be conscious, while the intention must be' (*SA*, p. 195). Hence it is the realization of the intention that determines the success or failure of an action, and is, therefore, in a qualified sense, more significant than the efficacy of practical activity.[1] Moreover, we were able to rescue Macmurray's theory from the accusation of reverse dualism by emphasizing his contention that the 'positive' aspect contains the 'negative' aspect as an essential part of it, and so reflection is necessarily included within action. That is, he holds, 'The negative … has meaning only by reference to the positive' and, further, 'Without the negative there could be no development of the positive' (*PR*, pp. 90–91). Consequently, we discovered that, despite certain ambiguities in detail, the

pliability of Macmurray's agency-centred hypothesis in accounting for, and marrying, the diverse activities of the person lends it credence.

In addition to promoting an indiscriminate acceptance of people of all ranges of cognitive ability, Macmurray's perception leads to the claim that 'the capacity for reason belongs to our emotional nature, just as much as to the intellect' (*RE*, p.16).[2] As we have seen, Macmurray's use of the terms 'reason' and 'rationality' refer to the ability to act objectively; that is, in terms of the nature of the other. While we have been critical of the traditional distinction between humans and other animals that Macmurray uses this argument to imply, in Chapter 2 we have supported his striking insistence that the emotions admit of and require education (*RE*, p. 24). Indeed, by referring to some experiments into emotional education, we confirmed the accuracy of Macmurray's perception concerning the development and fulfilment of the human person (cf. Goleman, 1995).

Then we discovered that while Macmurray's assessment of the function of reason and emotion in action is associated with a restrained account of scientific and artistic activity, we also found that Macmurray's attempt to unite fact and value anticipates a modern view of their interdependence. Moreover, the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic worth, which this entails, is significant in connection with the nature of personal relationships.

In Chapter 3 we showed that the concept of the other is included within the definition of the self as an agent; since, Macmurray holds, 'When I act I modify the world' (*SA*, p. 91). Hence we asserted that agency is a necessary but not a sufficient category to encompass all that is essentially human; rather the self as agent must be considered in relation. Moreover, from the example of a newborn baby, we employed Macmurray's argument to indicate that the

human infant is dependent upon a relation with another person. Children have survived 'in the wild' where there have been other animals to feed and care for them, but their inability to relate to human beings when they encounter them tends towards the conclusion that, despite still being human, these people are somehow less than fully persons. For example, when Eccles writes about the case of Genie who was deprived of the usual human contact until the age of 13, he states that 'she was of course a human being, but not a human person' (Eccles, 1989, p. 232). However, it could be argued that, since domesticated animals would have difficulty surviving in the wild, they are less than fully 'animal' and that, in this sense, all species require integration with their 'community'.

According to Macmurray:

> [The baby] cannot live at all by any initiative, whether personal or organic, of his own. He can live only through other people and in dynamic relation with them. In virtue of this fact he is a person, for the personal is constituted by the relation of persons. His rationality is already present, though only germinally, in the fact that he lives and can only live by communication. (*PR*, p. 51)[3]

In fact, in Chapter 4 we attested to the fact that communication is a key factor throughout human life, from basic survival, through the processes of attaining developmental skills, into the realm of adult relations.

While this is not a denial of children's ability to grow up to be independent of their parents and peers in terms of staying alive, we have alleged that all persons have an inherent need to engage in a common life with their fellow human beings. That is, the factual and dependent relations of children to their carers are transformed into the intentional relations of consenting adults. His emphasis on the importance of community for personal growth is a significant corrective to contemporary examples of social exclusion, analysis of which reveals that human dignity is

bound up with access to and integration in community (Graham, a2000).

As Macmurray states: 'human experience is, in principle, shared experience; human life, even in its most individual elements, is a common life; and human behaviour carries always, in its inherent structure, a reference to the personal Other … The unit of the personal is not the "I", but the "You and I"' (*PR*, p. 61). Consequently, the only image I can have of myself is that which is reflected through my relations with other persons and objects.[4] Since it is not uncommon for other people to suggest images of particular individuals which those individuals adamantly reject, on the grounds that the images are different from the way the individuals genuinely are, it could be argued that individuals do have pictures of themselves beyond those that are reflected by others. However, we have employed Macmurray's theory to make the point that without interaction with others, it would not be possible to conceive of the self in contrast with the other, nor therefore to have a perception of the self that either agreed or disagreed with that presented by others. This argument is verified by the practice of psychotherapy, which relies on the notion that an individual's character has been shaped by prior relationships. In this respect, perhaps Macmurray fails to emphasize the importance of individual distance sufficiently, or the need for an authority figure in the process of growth; however, he does make the noteworthy suggestion that the other is apprehended primarily as personal. That is, the non-personal other is known 'by a *reduction of the concept of the Other which excludes part of its definition*; only … by a partial negation: only by down-grading the "You" in the "You and I" to the status of "It"' (*PR*, p. 80). We showed that Macmurray views the non-personal world of animals and plants in overly instrumental terms, yet his anthropocentrism serves to highlight the recognition of the intrinsic worth of other

humans. To this end, we maintained that Macmurray's recognition of the manner in which the dominant motives learned in the home are exhibited by societies as a whole is revealing.

In Chapter 5, therefore, we examined Macmurray's distinction between pragmatic and contemplative societies. While we asserted that his attempt to illustrate the sense in which these types of society operate from a negative premise is a little strained, we found that his account of the defects of dualism in social organization was warranted. By distinguishing between the mode of consciousness that 'tends to despise reflection' and that which 'tends to despise practice' (*CH*, p.111), we agreed with Macmurray that to concentrate solely on either of these aspects of an individual's life is inadequate. In addition to integrating these areas of an individual's life, we have argued for the integration of individuals with their fellows; as Macmurray insists, 'our freedom, as individuals, depends upon the co-operation of others' (*CF*, p. 25). It is in this sense then that we have employed Macmurray's perception to refute the western notion of independence, in favour of a definition of the person that views adults as interdependent beings. Furthermore, it is in this respect that Macmurray's theory both describes the relational impetus of human nature and contains a moral dimension. He states that 'Self-realization is the true moral ideal' (*FMW*, p. 215). Accordingly, Macmurray's agenda contains his specific perception of the good life.

Thus through the promotion of the interrelated concepts of freedom and equality, we have affirmed the suggestion that personal fulfilment requires that neither the individual nor society is to be subordinated to the other.[5] To this end, in Chapter 6 we have examined Macmurray's promotion of a type of democracy that borrows more heavily from socialist and communist principles than from the so-called

democracy of western liberal capitalism. In particular, he asserts, 'The negation of the autonomy of the economic life does not imply the negation of the autonomy of the cultural life' (*CD*, p. 19). However, Macmurray's treatment of the state control of finances is rather vague and his preference for cultural freedom is clearly at odds with the Marxist interpretation of religion. Nevertheless, we were not able to ignore the fact that the amount of freedom enjoyed by each individual is bound up with their economic situation and with the extent that such freedom is available to the society as a whole. Hence he states, 'We have to establish freedom for all … [people] in a single world order, or lose our own' (*CF*, p. 100). For this to be possible, Macmurray argues for a united system of justice and law, but does not explain its possibility beyond asserting that '*religion could … enforce the limitation of political authority which democracy demands. Indeed … only religion is capable of doing this*' (*CC*, p. 15).

Moreover, in Chapter 7 we discovered that Macmurray's portrayal of the diverse, but interrelated functions of church and state is supplemented by his particular account of religion. Since Macmurray states that the government 'is a system of devices … a means, not an end' (*PR*, p. 167), we found that his theory offers an advantageous antidote to the dissolution of the personal life, elevating its status while integrating it with the working life. In short, we argued that there is an aspect of the personal life that exists beyond the field of politics. Similarly, Macmurray offers an intelligible account of the interplay of positive and negative motives in human relations, giving a role to both love and fear. In particular, he insists that 'Love is fulfilled only when it is reciprocated' (*PR*, p. 73); it entreats a positive response. Religion then is the expression of the human need to exist in community, where 'community' implies a loving as opposed to a selfish motive, thereby transforming the indirect

relations of political societies into direct and intentional relationships. Rather than being equated with specific religious allegiance, Macmurrian religion is characterized by care for the other; thus preserving the independence of other persons and encouraging those persons to express their nature. In this sense therefore, in Chapter 8 we revealed that Macmurray's definition of 'religion' relies on the notion of friendship. By discussing the nature of friendship we attested to Macmurray's claim that 'human nature expresses itself most concretely and completely in friendship' (*FMW*, p. 179), and consequently we highlighted the importance of communal activity for sustaining friendship relations.

Significantly, we attested to the fact that Macmurray's account of religion is radically different from the institutionalized forms that exist in the western tradition. In essence, Macmurray maintains that 'real religion' is actively engaged in the increase of freedom and equality, whereas unreal religion is otherworldly. On the basis of the post-apocalyptic accent of much of western Christianity, Macmurray alleges that it 'is very sick, and cannot recover until it is cured of idealism' (p1944a, p. 6). Nevertheless, it is through his assessment of the ancient Hebrews and the life and teaching of the New Testament Gospels' portrayal of Jesus that Macmurray clarifies his perception of real religion. We discovered, then, that he asserts that the original intention of Christianity is communal, but that this intention was corrupted by the acceptance of Greek and Roman concepts and methods. As we noted earlier, in support of his view Farley contends that work which 'criticizes notions of Christian love as self-sacrifice … just gets clear on what has been taught all along' (Farley, ch1994, p. 197). Nevertheless, we have argued that Macmurray's use of the terms 'religion' and 'Christianity' contradicts his argument for an all-inclusive community.[6] Likewise, while Macmurray's

emphasis on practice, rather than belief, is advantageous in a religiously pluralist society, it still only allows for universal community in terms of the lowest common denominator. Yet we have realized that Macmurray's stress on intention implies that individuals need, at the least, to refrain from deliberately curtailing the freedom of those with whom they come into contact, in order to be achieving a community, of sorts.[7] Beyond this, we have found his portrayal of community, based on the common humanity and intrinsic worth of every individual, to be an appropriate model for engaging in the active extension of freedom and equality.

There are two main areas of distinctiveness in this monograph: the first issues from the breadth of the study of Macmurray's work which it contains, while the second concerns the nature of the arguments within it. As we mentioned in the Introduction, there is little secondary material on Macmurray's ideas; where such information is available, it tends to address just one aspect of his philosophy and/or to make reference to a limited selection of his published writings, thus lacking the comprehensiveness of a full-length investigation. In addition, this monograph will contribute to making familiarity with Macmurray's unpublished work less scarce. At times, therefore, it has been necessary to engage in lengthy exposition of Macmurray's ideas, before entering into critical analysis of them, in order to set out his particular position and to assess the developments that occur between his early and his later writings.

Furthermore this text begins with a brief exploration of Macmurray's life, in order to assist in the understanding of the manner in which certain key events had an effect on his perception. Similarly, the body of the text compares and contrasts Macmurray's work with that of other relevant scholars, in an attempt both to contextualize and to assess the significance of his proposals. In this respect, Macmurray

rarely offers any account of his influences, giving the impression that a greater extent of his work is independent of scholarly influences than is likely to be the case.

Nevertheless, the central contention of this monograph is that much of Macmurray's writing contains fresh material for his time, which is still relevant to ours; the issues therein are gaining credence in current understanding, albeit primarily but not exclusively from non-philosophical sources such as psychotherapy (see Clarke, ch2005 and Miller, ch2004), education (see Fielding, a2007 and Stern, 2006) and political studies (see Hale, a2002 and Prideaux, a2005). One of the purposes of this text, then, is to increase the awareness of Macmurray's tenets. In fact, since this study is interdisciplinary in its method, it reveals both the large scope of Macmurray's work and its usefulness to a wide variety of fields. Other investigations into his perception have tended to isolate specific aspects of his writings, in order to apply them to one field (cf. Kirkpatrick, 2005); both the likelihood and the benefits of so doing are apparent, yet Macmurray refused to be constrained in this way. He acknowledged that his expertise was in the field of philosophy and approached other subject areas from a philosophical standpoint. In particular, his religious convictions pervade his philosophy to an extent that prevents them from being ignored, and his work has found both critics and sympathizers in the field of theology. On the one hand, Robinson finds Macmurray's concept of God 'wrong in what … [it] denies but right in what … [it] asserts' (Robinson, 1963, p. 52), preferring to claim both that transcendence is a uniquely divine attribute and that we encounter transcendence every day, whereas Macmurray only holds to the latter. On the other hand, Macmurray's account of relationality and his heterocentric ethic has found favour in moral theology (see Slocum, a2000 and Kirkpatrick, 2003).[8] Accordingly, this text is broadly based in

the fields of philosophy and theology, while encountering other subjects as the range of Macmurray's investigation demands.

With reference to the nature of the arguments contained within this study, the text remains supportive of Macmurray's view of the person in its essential aspects; yet, in addition, it has its own elements of criticism. For the most part, the areas of criticism revolve around points of detail, which do not affect the validity of Macmurray's central tenets in any irremediable way. That is, by engaging with the ambiguities and problems found in Macmurray's account, this text has attempted to refine rather than dismiss his perception.

Initially then, we have claimed that Macmurray's theory of agency is a more adequate account of the person than the traditional concentration on reflection. This has been argued for on the grounds that practical activity is primary, and, further, that Macmurray's account is able not necessarily to demonstrate but to include reflective activity, which is a significant advance on dualist theories that are unable to explain mind and body interaction. In part, this stance is justified by the empirical experience of the embodied self, which confirms the intelligibility of the core of Macmurray's theory. In addition, we have sought to defend Macmurray's interpretation of agency from the criticisms levelled at other similar theories, contending that the comments therein stem from the dualistic perspective Macmurray is seeking to eradicate.

Since other agency theories exist, our defence of Macmurray's position is, perhaps, not entirely unexpected. However, the correlative suggestion that the integration of the self requires the education of the emotions and a reinterpretation of the concept of reason, as the capacity for self-transcendence, both intellectually and emotionally, is more unusual; although it is gaining credence in philosophy

(cf. Goldie, 2000; Nussbaum, 2001). Moreover this aspect – the reinterpretation of emotion and reason – is especially attuned to feminist epistemology (cf. Jaggar, a1989). In spite of Macmurray's practical activities in support of these issues, his writings on them are a little vague, and largely unmentioned by the secondary material on his ideas. As an essential component of our effort to highlight the importance of this area of Macmurray's perception for realizing a holistic account of the person, we have therefore supplemented his theory with practical examples from pedagogical approaches; thus revealing the additional freedom for the individual, but also the heightened responsibility that emotional sincerity entails. In conjunction with enhancing the ability to act, through emotional as well as intellectual development, we asserted that his description of the interplay of the means and the ends of an action is a beneficial clarification, even though it rests on an account of science and art that would be considered inadequate by specialists in those fields.

Moreover, in addition to the merits of Macmurray's postulation of agency, we discovered that agency is an incomplete definition of the person without including his treatment of relationality; indeed, this is where the essence of self-transcendence lies. Hence by delving into child-development studies, we have been able to consolidate Macmurray's theoretical account of the self as a being in communication with other persons. Similarly, by referring to other philosophical scholars, we have confirmed the growing acknowledgement that the self and the other are indissolubly linked, in terms of the recognition and the fulfilment of the self. This is another aspect of his philosophy that concurs with feminist theory, as Farley states: 'When it [feminist theology] raises up the importance of mutuality, it follows the theorists of sociality ... Martin Buber, John MacMurray' (Farley, ch1994, p. 197). While we have

employed Macmurray's rhythm of withdrawal and return to emphasize the process by which the self requires the other, as a source of support and opposition in development, we have also drawn out the importance both of specific relationships and of distance in this context, since it seems that Macmurray fails to stress these issues sufficiently.

While we could simply assess the groundwork of Macmurray's definition of the person, his theory goes beyond the mere assertion of agency and relation, seeking to reveal the most significant of the implications that follow from it. In particular, this involves an examination of types of relations and conflicts in action. Although we have still found much of Macmurray's work to be of relevance in this respect, we have also had reasonable grounds for supposing that certain areas of Macmurray's contentions have arisen as a result of his individual convictions, instead of issuing from the tenets of his philosophical propositions. Consequently, we have argued that the inescapability of interaction with one's fellow humans gives rise to morality, especially where the actions of the individual affect the freedom of another human being; however, there cannot be any absolute moral laws governing behaviour, since the nature of the other is diverse. Moreover, by exploring Macmurray's distinction between positive and negative motives, we have shown that arbitration between competing individuals and/or nations is required. Nonetheless, while Macmurray suggests that the freedom and equality of all humans necessitates a communist or at least a socialist society, we have been critical of this assumption. In particular, we have recognized the relevance of the war-torn era in which Macmurray makes this proposition, and the damage done to his argument by the more recent collapse of the societies that referred to themselves as communist. We also contended that his interpretation of communist principles is not definitively communist and that, owing to

the opacity with which he addresses the issue of private property for example, he fails to prove that socialism is necessary for, or would guarantee, a freer and more equal society.

Even so, we have found his distinction between functionally related individuals and groups of people pursuing relationships for their own sake to be illuminating. In conjunction with Macmurray's argument, everyday experience is testament to the ease with which individuals can express themselves among friends, but are frequently hindered from doing so among strangers or in situations where the relations are hierarchical. Hence we have supported Macmurray's claim that the working life is a means to the personal life and is not the whole of life. In this respect, we showed that Macmurray's account of fully positive personal relationships is closely connected with his view of the religious enterprise. In particular, we agreed with Macmurray that a religion which emphasized love for the other, and sought to increase freedom and equality in practical ways, would have the potential to represent a more inclusive community than one which was founded upon a specific doctrinal position. Nevertheless, despite the benefit that Macmurray's description of religion could have if it were adopted by an ineffective and/or outmoded form, we contended that his definition of religion can only be referred to as such in a minimalist sense, since it removes what are usually considered to be the essential threads of religious debate. We have acknowledged that Macmurray's description of religion could function as a useful corrective for a religion that has become sidetracked; however, the employment of recognized terminology is misleading if it is not also implying the most commonly held aspects of that term. Consequently, we asserted that his emphasis on Christianity, while approaching Christianity from a critical and instructional angle, is not a direct correlate of his theory

and is, in fact, a hindrance to extending community in view of the reality of religious pluralism and Macmurray's otherwise inclusive emphasis.

Overall therefore, this text has argued that Macmurray's account of the human being, as an agent and in relation with other human beings, is a helpful definition of the person. Similarly, we have confirmed his recognition of the implications of his account of personhood, especially in terms of the importance of the necessity of greater freedom and equality for all related persons, if individuals are to express their nature. Furthermore, we have supported his insistence on the integration of all aspects of life and verified the significance of communal activity for sustaining positive personal relationships, thereby encouraging the development of the individual and of the group as a whole. While we have been critical of Macmurray's political and religious descriptions, we have recognized the relevance of the attitude of the individual and the wider society towards others for securing the personal fulfilment of all human beings. This aspect of his theory is both in harmony with and a useful resource for feminist theology. In a passage that sounds Macmurrian, Harrison states:

> For better or worse, women have had to face the reality that we have the power not only to create personal bonds between people but, more basically, to build up and deepen *personhood itself*. And to build up 'the person' is also to deepen relationship, that is to bring forth community. (Harrison, ch1990, p. 203)

Yet she continues, 'We do not yet have a moral theology that teaches us the awe-ful, awe-some truth that we have the power through acts of love or lovelessness literally to create one another' (Harrison, ch1990, p. 203). As we have seen though, Macmurray presented such a theory decades earlier, indicating both that he was forward thinking and that the time and the need for a theory such as his has come.

We suggested in the Introduction that the eclecticism and, at times, the public popularity of Macmurray's writings was perhaps part of the explanation for his work being neglected by a number of professional philosophers, both during his lifetime and thereafter. In addition, the sometimes contrived nature of Macmurray's theory detracts from the overall plausibility of his ideas.[9] Likewise the lack of thorough logical support for his particular political and religious leanings disguises the intuitive aspects of his essential tenets concerning the nature of the person. Furthermore, the problems of deducing Macmurray's sources and placing his emphases in context could lead to scepticism concerning his competence, while the practicability of his perception is hidden by the impossibility of constructing an entire system on the basis of his contentions.[10] Negatively then, it could be maintained that Macmurray is not an astounding philosopher.

However, in its most fundamental aspects, the areas of Macmurray's work which occasion the above criticisms are the same areas that demonstrate his incisiveness. His is clearly an anthropocentric theory, which highlights the inherent worth of all human beings, even though it fails to offer a satisfactory account of the intrinsic, rather than the merely instrumental, worth that other animals and nature might possess.[11] In fact, Macmurray's perception of the centrality of the other has been used by psychologists and psychotherapists to explain and defend the importance of the mother-child relationship in shaping an individual's mental health; thus lending credence to assertions which he acknowledges to be beyond his area of proficiency.

Positively then, especially as theories of relationality and personalism, as found in the work of Emmanuel Mounier and Max Scheler for example, become more widespread, Macmurray's thought is gaining recognition. Contemporary scholars may express some of his propositions in a more

comprehensive manner, but Macmurray laid the groundwork for these ideas. At the time when he presented his analysis, therefore, it was creative and it remains so. In particular, the breadth of his investigation allows his concepts to be adapted and understood by a wide variety of fields. Even if Macmurray's theory is not accepted as a whole, the central aspects of it represent an intelligible and coherent model for understanding the person, and one that corresponds with our experience of the world. Indeed, for those who agree that the notions of agency and relation represent a more adequate view of the characteristics of the human being than they had previously encountered, Macmurray's work could be the inspiration for developing personal relationships, producing more holistically gratified persons and, on a wider scale, perhaps improving international and interreligious relations.

Macmurray states that 'The philosopher should reveal himself not as a specialist in a particular field but rather as one who has grasped the significance of human life and achieved the ability, if not to live well, at least to understand how it should be lived' (*IU*, p. 8). This statement gives us the appropriate criteria for assessing whether he has achieved his aim. It is the contention of this text that studying Macmurray's writings does result in a different perception of the world, which clarifies the nature of the person. His theory of agency offers a more satisfactorily integrated account of the person than Cartesian dualism, in accordance with the human experience of embodiment. In addition, Macmurray's interpretation of the desire and the need that human beings have for relationships accords with the realities both of loneliness and of intimacy prevalent throughout society. Finally, it is apparent that he has achieved a clear recognition of the dehumanizing effects of inequality and repressed freedom, even if we have yet to find the most appropriate answers to these problems. Thus

with reference to the above quotation, we can conclude that Macmurray has 'grasped the significance of human life' and understood how it might be lived more completely.

In addition, as Blair states, 'he [Macmurray] confronted what will be the critical political question of the twenty-first century: the relationship between individual and society' (Blair, 'Foreword', in Conford, 1996, p. 9). Despite the decline in Blair's popularity following his decision to go to war with Iraq, he may have been correct on this point. The extreme and painful examples of the destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001, and the fear and chaos in London caused by suicide bombers on 7 July 2005, do indeed underline the extent to which the relationship between individuals and society is a pressing political concern. Moreover, the anti-Muslim sentiment that has resulted from these attacks needs to be redressed with an acceptance of religious pluralism that focuses on shared personhood rather than oppositional beliefs; in this respect, if Macmurray were alive today it is likely that he would be a supporter of the 'HOPE not hate' campaign.[12] Likewise the current economic predicament, along with recent floods, earthquakes and tsunamis, as well as the ongoing HIV/AIDS crisis, highlight the need for a Macmurrian global community; for the intention to build relationships of economic assistance based on care, with opportunities for the flourishing and well-being of all persons. While an ethic of care and matters of distributive justice have been championed by feminism, Macmurray's combination of caring relations with a holistic conception of the person additionally offers a basis from which to debate issues in contemporary bioethics and socio-political justice, such as abortion and euthanasia, capital punishment and privacy (see Jeffko, 1999). Moreover, Macmurray's understanding of care for persons and communities may even provide much needed guidance for

the use of technological developments beyond his imagination, such as new reproductive technologies and stem cell research. Nevertheless, in order that an ethic of care avoid being either over-burdensome for the carer or smothering of the cared for, we cannot ignore difference altogether; hence the Golden Rule 'do to others as you would be done by' is limited in so far as it risks assuming we are all alike. Alternatively, we would do well, therefore, to do to others as they would be done by.

In short, Macmurray's understanding of community can best be summed up in the African notion of '*ubuntu*', which is defined as 'I am because we are' (Chivers, a2007, p. 45). *Ubuntu* reminds us that our freedoms and privileges are bound up in our relations with others and theirs are bound up in us; if we remember this in our activities we will exhibit greater levels of respect and care towards others. Justice, peace and personal fulfilment are dependent on the extent to which we recognize and appreciate *ubuntu*. For these reasons, Macmurray's work merits serious consideration today and, therefore, deserves to be given a greater level of academic attention than it has previously received; thereby providing the opportunity for its weaknesses to be resolved and its strengths to be amplified.

[1] We noted that there is some confusion surrounding the distinction between long-term and short-term intentions, further complicated by the equation of motive with habit, but these problems do not diminish the significance of Macmurray's theory of agency, and his account of the selectivity of the attention serves to relieve some of the confusion.

[2] There is some ambiguity in Macmurray's use of the term 'reason', since it is used both in reference to the intellect itself and also as a characteristic which the intellect and the emotions possess. In the former case Macmurray uses the term in the traditional manner, whereas in the latter case he is using his own definition of the term.

[3] Macmurray's employs the use of 'he' here in keeping with his era, but 'she' would apply equally. In addition, although Macmurray emphasizes the family here, we rescued his theory from atavism by explaining that he does not imply a traditional type of family.

[4] As we have seen, personality, for Macmurray, is that which all persons share, not that which distinguishes one person from another. The aspect of a person that makes him/her different from another person is 'personal individuality', and this is recognized in the moment of opposition to the other (*PR*, p. 91).

[5] As we have seen, this centres on an equality which removes notions of inferiority and superiority, thereby creating the freedom to act.

[6] As we have seen, he does not address the issues usually associated with western religion, such as worship, human salvation, the attributes of the divine and so on.

[7] As we have noted, however, the problem created by those who refuse to be befriended remains.

[8] Slocum employs Macmurray's theory of relationality and his perception of religion as this-worldly to support a Christian theology of hope. Kirkpatrick relies heavily on Macmurray's communal ethic, although he argues for a stronger theism than Macmurray, on the grounds that relationality in itself provides only a 'thin' notion of the good if it lacks an ontological basis. For Kirkpatrick, theism provides the ontological basis for community and therefore a 'thick' perception of the good (Kirkpatrick, 2003, pp. 118–23).

[9] For example, we have seen that the use of triads and of the terms 'positive' and 'negative' gives the initial impression of systematically ordered hypotheses, but closer investigation reveals that the categories therein are, at times, strained or oversimplified.

[10] As we have mentioned, Macmurray cannot be strictly labelled a liberal or a communitarian; further, his emphasis on the attempt to create universal community appears to render his propositions ultimately unrealizable, unless the intention to create community is primary.

[11] Recent DNA testing, which attests to the close links between human beings and certain other animals, could be used either to support or to criticize Macmurray's account, depending upon whether the results are taken to imply that the differences are very slight or that they are highly significant.

[12] A campaign in Britain organized to combat racism, see <http://www.hopenothate.org.uk>.

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